REJECTION ON TUESDAY -- AND I HAVE USED THIS WORD BEFORE AND I
           USE IT ADVISEDLY, BUT I THINK IT IS ACCURATE -- I THINK
           REJECTING THE TREATY WOULD BE CATASTROPHIC. WE ARE IN A
           SITUATION WHERE OUR DISTINGUISHED MAJORITY LEADER, SENATOR
           LOTT, IS UNWILLING TO DEFER THE VOTE. IF HE IS GOING TO HAVE TO
           FACE A CRESCENDO OF DEMANDS DURING NEXT YEAR. SENATOR LOTT DID
           NOT WANT TO SCHEDULE THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY VOTE AT

           THIS TIME. I KNOW BECAUSE I HAD ASKED HIM TO DO SO. I HAD ASKED
           HIM TO DO SO IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, AND WHEN HE HAD GIVEN ME
           HIS REASONS, I AWAITED HIS JUDGMENT JUDGMENT. THERE WAS
           SUBSTANTIAL URGING -- MAYBE EVEN AGITATION, MAYBE EVEN GOADING
           ON THE SENATE FLOOR BY SOME -- THAT SENATOR LOTT SHOULD
           SCHEDULE THIS VOTE. HE FINALLY RESPONDED TO IT. AND HE
           RESPONDED TO IT IN THE CONTEXT WHERE THE FRET IS SURE TO BE
           DEFEATED -- WHERE THE TREATY IS SURE TO BE DEFEATED. PRESIDENT

           CLINTON HELD A DINNER LAST TUESDAY EVENING, ATTENDED BY A
           NUMBER OF PEOPLE HORX SENATOR WARNER, SENATOR BIDEN, SENATOR
           HAGEL, MYSELF AND OTHERS -- AND THE PRESIDENT DECLINED, I THINK
           IT IS FAIR TO COMMENT -- I THINK IT'S BEEN IN THE PUBLIC MEDIA
           -- THE PRESIDENT DECLINED TO ASK THAT THE VOTE BE DEFERRED ON
           THE CONDITION THAT THE PRESIDENT NOT ASK THAT IT BE TAKEN UP
           ALL DURING THE YEAR 2000. BECAUSE THE PRESIDENT FELT THAT THAT
           WOULD SIGNIFY BACKING OFF, THOUGHT THAT SOME EVENTS MIGHT
           DEVELOP WHERE HE HAD TO CALL OFF THE TREATY AND HE SAID

           CANDIDLY HE'D HAVE A HARD TIME EXPLAINING IT TO OUR ALLIES.
           WELL, I CAN UNDERSTAND SENATOR LOTT'S NOT WANTING TO SEE THIS
           MATTER BECOME A POLITICAL FOOTBALL IN THE YEAR 2000, AND IT HAS
           THAT POTENTIAL WHETHER THE PARTIES INTEND IT OR NOT. IF THERE
           IS A CRESCENDO OF DEMAND FOR THE TREATY TO BE TAKEN UP IN
           SPRING, SUMMER, FALL NEXT YEAR COULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE
           ELECTION IN THE YEAR 2000. SO I THINK THAT IT IS REALISTIC TO
           TAKE IT OUT OF THE ELECTION. SENATOR LEVIN, THE DISTINGUISHED

           RANKING MEMBER OF THE ARMED SERVICES, MADE THE PUBLIC COMMENT
           IN THE HEARINGS THAT HE THOUGHT THE TREATY SHOULD NOT COME UP
           FOR RATIFICATION BEFORE THE ELECTION. I THINK THAT IS A SOUND
           JUDGMENT. THERE MAY BE A WAY OUT OF THAT DILEMMA BY SCHEDULING
           THE TREATY DEBATE AND VOTE ON NOVEMBER 15 OF THE YEAR 2000.
           THAT WILL TAKE IT OUT OF THE ELECTION CYCLE AND THAT WOULD
           ALLOW PRESIDENT CLINTON, WHO HAS ADVOCATED THE TREATY, TO BE A
           SPOKESMAN AND HAVE IT DECIDED ON HIS WATCH. OR THERE'S ANOTHER

           ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE, NOT AS GOOD IN MY OPINION AS DOING IT
           IN NOVEMBER OF THE YEAR 2000, BUT THAT WOULD BE TO SCHEDULE THE
           DEBATE AND VOTE ON JANUARY 3, BETWEEN JANUARY 3 AND JANUARY 20
           OF 2001. WOULDN'T HAVE A LAME DUCK SENATE. THEN AGAIN IT WOULD
           BE ON PRESIDENT CLINTON'S WATCH. IT WOULD BE OUT OF THE
           ELECTION. BUT I THINK A -- BUT I THINK IT VERY IMPORTANT TO
           TAKE THIS TREATY OUT OF PARTISANSHIP AND POLITICS. AND THERE IS
           AN OVERHANG AND WE SHOULDN'T I.G. NOR IT. A PARTISAN OVERTHOONG

           THIS DEBATE. ALL 45 DEMOCRATS SAID TO BE IN FAVOR OF THE
           TREATY. THE NUMBER OF REPUBLICANS UNKNOWN PRECISELY, VERY, VERY
           LIMITED. AND THAT'S BAD FOR AMERICA AND THAT'S BAD FOR THE
           WORLD. WHEN WE HAD THE VOTE ON THE USE OF FORCE, THE GULF IN
           JANUARY OF 1991, IT WAS LARGELY PARTISAN. 42 REPUBLICANS AND
           ONLY 10 DEMOCRATS BACKED THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENT. WHEN WE HAD
           A VOTE ON THE USE OF AIRSTRIKES IN YUGOSLAVIA ORALIER THIS

           YEAR, IT WAS 58-41. ONLY 17 OF 55 REPUBLICANS JOINED THE
           DOCRATS. AND THAT PARTISANSHIP IS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE. I THINK,
           MR. PRESIDENT, IT IS INEVITABLE --
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: THE TIME YIELDED TO THE SENATOR FROM
           PENNSYLVANIA --
           

           MR. SPECTER: ONE ADDITIONAL MINUTE, MR. PRESIDENT?
           
           

           MR. BIDEN: MR. PRESIDENT, I WILL DO THAT. WE ONLY HAVE SEVEN
           HOURS OF DEBATE IN THIS AND WE GOT 31 PEOPLE WANTING TO SPEAK.
           THIS IS THE LAST MINUTE. IF HE GOES ONE SECOND OVER -- I LOVE
           HIM -- BUT I WILL OBJECT.
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: THE SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA HAS ONE
           ADDITIONAL MINUTE.
           

           MR. SPECTER: WELL, IT DOESN'T LAST VERY LONG IF  IS ONLY UP TO
           A MINUTE. I THINK THERE OUGHT TOBACCO A RECOGNITION OF ANOTHER
           PROBLEM TO BE STATED IN 20 SECONDS. AND THAT IS THAT THERE IS A
           CERTAIN LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN CAPITOL HILL AND THE WHITE HOUSE,
           AND THAT'S FACTOR WE HAVE TO TEA TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR
           CALCULATIONS. WITHIN 20 SECOND I CAN'T RECOUNT WHY. IN
           CONCLUSION, MR. PRESIDENT, THE TO TWO MOST POPULAR WORDS IN ANY

           SPEECH, I THINK THAT WE OUGHT TO AVOID PLAYING NUCLEAR ROULETTE
           WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. RUSSIAN ROULETTE IS A
           GREAT SPORT, PLAYED WITH A REVOLVER, WHICH CHAMBER HAS THE
           BULLET. BUT I THINK IN THIS CHAMBER WE'RE PLAYING WITH NUCLEAR
           ROULETTE IF WE GO TO A VOTE NEXT TUESDAY AND REJECT THIS
           TREATY. SO I URGE MY COLLEAGUES TO WORK HARD TO FIND A WAY TO
           DEBATE AND VOTE THIS ISSUE AT A LATER TIME.
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: WHO YIELDS TIME?
           
           

           MR. MOYNIHAN: MR. PRESIDENT, I YIELD TIME --
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: THE SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA.
           

           MR. WARNER: I WANT TO ASK MY GOOD FRIEND A QUESTION. FIRST, MR.
           PRESIDENT, WE JOINED THIS INSTITUTION AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, A
           NUMBER OF YEARS AGO, AND I VERY MUCH RESPECT REALLY SO MUCH OF
           YOUR CAREER HAS BEEN DEVOTED TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. AND HE
           RUEFLECTED VERY WARMLY ON ONE OF THE GREAT -- AND YOU REFLECTED
           VERY WARMLY ON ONE OF THE GREAT BOTH OF US HAD, AND THAT WAS
           SENATOR TOWER, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.

           BUT I WANT TO GO BACK TO A PARTICULAR REFERENCE THAT YOU MADE
           IN YOUR OPENING REMARKS TO THE SUPPORT BY THE UNIFORMED
           OFFICERS, NOTABLY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS AND OTHERS
           FOR THIS TREATY. NOW, IT IS TRUE THAT THERE IS A DIVISION OF
           OPINION BETWEEN THE JOINT CHIEFS, AND I DON'T SPEAK IN TERMS OF
           THOSE IN OFFICE TODAY. I MEAN THOSE WHO PRECEDED THEM THEM. WE

           HAVE LETTERS ON BOTH SIDES POINTING OUT, MR. PRESIDENT, HOW MEN
           AND WOMEN OF GOOD CONSCIENCE, MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAVE HAD
           EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN THESE FIELDS, ARE DIFFERING ON THIS
           TREATY. BUT THE QUESTION I PUT TO MY GOOD FRIEND -- AND IT
           RELATES TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL OF THIS TREATY
           IN 1997, SEPTEMBER 22, 1997, AND I AM READING FROM THAT

           DOCUMENT, WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE TREATY TO THE SENATE, AND THERE
           IS THE PROVISION IN THERE CALLED "THE SAFEGUARDS." I RECITE A
           SENTENCE OUT OF THAT. "THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT
           OF THE UNITED STATES IS INFORMED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
           AND THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY, ADVISED BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
           COUNCIL, THE DIRECTOR OF D.O.E.'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES
           AND THE COMMANDER OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, THAT A HIGH
           LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE SAFETY OR RELIABILITY OF A NUCLEAR
           WEAPON TYPE, THAT THE TWO SECRETARIES CONSIDER TO BE CRITICAL

           TO OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT, COULD NO LONGER BE CERTIFIED, THE
           PRESIDENT IN CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS WOULD BE PREPARED
           TO WITHDRAW FROM THE CTBT UNDER THE STANDARD SUPREME NATIONAL
           INTEREST CLAUSE IN ORDER TO CONDUCT WHATEVER TESTING MIGHT BE
           REQUIRED." NOW, MR. PRESIDENT, SPEAKING FOR MYSELF -- AND I
           HAVE IN THE COURSE OF THE LAST SEVERAL DAYS AS CHAIRMAN OF THE
           ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE DEALT EXTENSIVELY WITH THIS ENTIRE

           ISSUE BEFORE THE SENATE TODAY -- I HAVE TIME AND TIME AGAIN
           REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT IT IS MY CONCLUSION, DRAWN FROM
           TALKING WITH A NUMBER OF THESE SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, WHO
           TODAY HAVE GIVEN THEIR SUPPORT SUPPORT, WHO IN YEARS PAST HAVE
           GIVEN THEIR SUPPORT, THAT IT IS THIS CLAUSE THAT IS THE
           FOUNDATION FOR THEIR OPINION OF SUPPORT. BUT I SAY TO MY GOOD
           FRIEND, WERE WE TO RATIFY THIS TREATY AND IT TO GO INTO FORCE,

           THEN MANY NATIONS COULD RELY ON THE ACT OF THE UNITED STATES --
           AS A MATTER OF FACT, ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THIS
           TREATY IS TO INDUCE OTHER NATIONS TO FOLLOW, AND THEN EIGHT,
           10, 12 YEARS DOWN THE ROAD, WE EXERCISE THE RIGHT UNDER THIS.
           WHAT HAPPENS TO THOSE NATIONS?
           THEY'RE LEFT OUT THERE STRIPPED OF PROTECTION, THAT THEY COULD
           WITH THEIR TO EN ENSYSTEMS HAVE DEVELOPED, AND WE'RE -- IF WE

           WERE EVER COMPELLED TO ANNOUNCE TO THE WORLD THAT WE HAVE
           CONCERN ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY, THE SAFETY OF OUR NUCLEAR
           ARSENAL, THAT WOULD SEND A FRIGHTENING MESSAGE ACROSS THE LAND
           THAT WHAT WE HAVE HAD IN PLACE THESE 50 YEARS, REFERRED TO AS
           THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA, WHICH UMBRELLA PRESERVED THE PEACE FROM
           MAJOR CONFLICT IN EUROPE FOR 50 YEARS, THAT THAT IS NOW IN
           DOUBT -- NOW, MR. PRESIDENT, AS YOU TALK ABOUT WHO'S SUPPORTING

           THE TREATY, LET'S GO BACK AND EXAMINE THE REASONS. AND I SAY
           THAT THE MILITARY RELIED VERY HEAVILY ON THAT CLAUSE. IN MY
           JUDGMENT, IF THAT CLAUSE WERE EVER UTILIZED, THIS COUNTRY WOULD
           BE IN A FAR WORSE POSITION THAN IF THE SENATE WERE TO EXERCISE
           ITS RIGHT AND WITHHOLD THE ADVISE AND CONSENT ON RATIFICATION.
           I ASK MY GOOD FRIEND, IF THAT CLAUSE WERE INVOKED, WHAT WOULD
           BE THE REALITY AMONG THE WORLD'S COMMUNITY OF NATIONS?

           WHAT WOULD BE THE REALITY OF THE SIGNAL GOING OUT THAT OUR
           CREDIBLE DETERRENT IS IN QUESTION?
           
           

           MR. SPECTER: MR. PRESIDENT, I AM DELIGHTED TO RESPOND TO THAT
           QUESTION FROM THE DISTINGUISHED CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED SERVICES
           COMMITTEE ON A NUMBER OF LEVELS. FIRST OF ALL, THE CLAUSE IS
           THERE, SO THAT WHEN THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
           AND OTHERS SUPPORT THE TREATY BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THAT
           CLAUSE, THAT'S A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR AND THAT CLAUSE IS WORTH
           RELYING UPON. AND THAT IS THE REASON THAT IF THERE SHOULD BE A
           PROBLEM, EITHER WITH THE STABILITY OF OUR STOCKPILE OR WITH THE

           VERIFICATION AND THAT WE FELT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR NATIONAL
           SECURITY TO INVOKE THAT CLAUSE AND WITHDRAW, THAT WWOULD DO SO.
           WITH RESPECT TO OTHER NATIONS WHICH MIGHT RATIFY THE TREATY
           BASED UPON OUR LEADERSHIP, THEY DO SO WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT
           THAT CLAUSE IS PRESENT AND THAT WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW
           IN OUR SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST. SO THAT IF WE SHOULD EXERCISE
           THAT RIGHT, IT IS ENTIRELY FAIR IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THOSE

           NATIONS BECAUSE THEY HAVE KNOWN FROM THE VERY OUTSET THAT THAT
           IS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. NOTHING SUBVERTED OR HID BEEN THAT.
           AND WHEN YOU ASK THE POINTED QUESTION AT THE END ON A SERIES OF
           IMPLICIT QUESTIONS, WHEN YOU ASKED THE QUESTION, HOW WOULD IT
           LOOK FOR OUR NATIONAL SECURITY IF WE MADE A CONCESSION THAT WE
           HAD A TEST AND WITHDREW FROM THE TREATY, I WOULD SAY TO MY
           DISTINGUISHED COLLEAGUE FROM VIRGINIA THAT NO WORSE THAN IF WE
           DID NOT HAVE THE TREATY AND WE STARTED TO TEST. THE ONLY REASON
           WE WOULD EXERCISE THAT CLAUSE WAND DRAW FROM THE TREATY WOULD

           BE SO THAT WE COULD START TO TEST. WELL, ASSUME THAT WE DON'T
           HAVE THE TREATY AND ASSUME DOWN THE ROAD WE START TO TEST TEST.
           THAT'S GOING TO BE A LOUD SIGNAL, AN EXPLOSIVE SIGNAL, TO THE
           WORLD THAT WE'RE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE STATUS QUO AND THAT WE
           HAVE TO TEST. SO I THINK THAT EXERCISING THAT CLAUSE WOULD BE
           NO MORE PHATIC OR NO MORE OF A PROBLEM FOR THE UNITED STATES
           THAN NOT DOING SO. BUT I THINK THAT WHEN YOU TAKE A LOOK BEHIND

           GENERAL SHELTON, OTHER CHAIRMEN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
           GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI, DAVID JONES, BILL CROWE, GENERAL VICI --
           OR CHAIRMAN VICI WAS ON THE OTHER SIDE AND I THINK THAT'S A
           VERY, VERY WEIGHTY CONSIDERATION.
           

           MR. WARNER: WELL, MR. PRESIDENT, I SIMPLY FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION
           ON ONE OR MORE NATIONS SHOULD THIS TREATY BE RATIFIED, SAYING
           THEN THERE'S NO NECESSITY FOR US TO LAUNCH OUR OWN PROGRAM
           BECAUSE THERE STANDS THE UNITED STATES, THE LEADER, AND WHEN IN
           THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE WE EVER EXERCISED SUCH A
           CLAUSE AS THIS, I SAY TO MY GOOD FRIEND, I DON'T THINK THERE'S
           A PRECEDENT IN OUR 200-YEAR HISTORY OF EVER PULLING OUT. BUT,

           NEVERTHELESS, WE COULD BE FACED WITH THOSE FACTS. OTHERWISE
           THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO REASON TO HAVE PUT THAT CLAUSE IN
           THERE. IT WAS A REALIZATION OF THE PRESIDENT AT THAT TIME IN
           TRANSMITTING THE TREATY TO THE SENATE THAT THESE CONDITIONS
           COULD ARISE, AND HE PUT THAT CLAUSE IN AND I DARE SAY IT WAS
           PUT IN THERE SUCH THAT THE MILITARY UNIFORMED COMMUNITY COULD
           LEND ITS SUPPORT. BUT WHAT HAPPENS TO THAT NATION THAT IS --
           THAT DID NOT START THEIR PROGRAM AND TEN OR 12 YEARS HENCE IS
           LEFT OUT THERE?

           TAKE, FOR EXAMPLE, JAPAN. IT HAS THE CAPACITY TO GENERATE A
           PROGRAM IN A MATTER OF A FEW YEARS, BUT THEY HAVE RELIED, IN
           MANY RESPECTS, ON OUR NUCLEAR DETERRENT. BUT IF THAT'S EVER PUT
           IN DOUBT DOUBT, THAT NATION AND OTHERS WOULD WANT TO START
           THEIR PROGRAMS. BUT IT WOULD TAKE A DECADE FOR THEM, PERHAPS
           NOT JAPAN BUT MOST NATIONS -- A DECADE FOR THEM TO PUT IN PLACE
           ANY CREDIBLE NUCLEAR DETERRENT FOR THEMSELVES. SO I SAY TO MY
           GOOD FRIEND -- AND I KNOW OTHER SENATORS WANT
{END: 1999/10/08 TIME: 11-00 , Fri.  106TH SENATE, FIRST SESSION}