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THE OPPORTUNITY,

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V I / THE OPPORTUNITY; REASONS IMMEDIATE ALLIANCE WITH ST DOMINGO. ¦ w <-/A. AUTHOR OF " THE CRISIS OF THE SUGAR COLONIES." Tame.* $i:«f4e^\ LONDON: MINTED 1ÎT C. WHITTWGBAM, OttmStrm, Fitter tone; - FOR J.'HATCHARD, PICCADILLY. 1804. ''

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To the Right Hon. William Pitt, Chancellor of the Exchequer, &amp;c&amp;c. 7 v

g~ï z-^ u TO THE HÏGHT HON. T/ILLIAM PITT, tHAWJEIX-OR OF tilt kkdHEaUER, fee. fcc. V*H..Éiu.it, ,1 mu t imi.. SIR> IUSE a Freedom which may appear a little extraordinary in prefixing your name to a letter originally addressed to Mr. Addington. To conceal this seeming impropriety, by expunging his name from the fallowing sheets, would not be difccuït; for ï wrote not to Mr. Addington, but to the Prime Minister of this country : but to make such an alteration in a work already print- ed, would be to incur two inconveniences loss of time, wliich in this case, perhaps, may l>e important to the public, and lose of money, which you know "is "rareïy un- important to an author. This

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vi This work was commenced soon after the evacuation of St. Domingo by the French was first announced in Europe. The Author, to his surprise, then found reason to suspect, that his Majesty's mi- nisters were irresolute as to the line of policy which it might be expedient to adopt towards the people of that island ; and conceiving that by such indecision an opportunity of obtaining much good, and averting great evils, might be irre- coverably lost, he resolved to offer his ad- vice' on that interesting subject, both to the Minister and to the Public. The execution of this purpose, however, was repeatedly interrupted by unavoida- ble private impediments, and the work has loitered long in the Press, as well as in the closet. One half of the following sheets were printed, and nearly the whole re- mainder composed, before the late change of administration took place or was ex- pected \ and yet it has been impossible to publish them sooner. Delay, Sir, in these eventful times, i<T peculiarly inconvenient to statesmen and political writers. The

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vii 3 The titles and situations of all my prin- cipal parties are already become obso- lete. Mr. Addington is no longer Chan- cellor of the Exchequer; Buonaparte is become Emperor of the French ; and Dessalines sole Governor, instead of Tri- umvir, not of St. Domingo, but Hayti. But what is more important, the eyents which it was my aim to avert are already beginning to outwing the tardy progress of my pen and of the press. Dessalines, if late rumour may be trusted, is not only acting upon maxims very opposite to those by which he lately attempted to conciliate his European neighbours, and perpetrat- ing crimes which a better policy on our part might have prevented, but is already waging that maritime war which was pre- dicted in the following sheets, and de- nouncing, with a voice far more impres- sive than mine, the necessity of our restor- ing peace to the Gulph of Mexico, if we would avert from it new revolutions. I must publish without further delay, lest we should hear next of his having quar- relled with Jamaica, and conquered Cuba, or of a reconciliation on the basis of in-

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viu } independency between St., Pomingo and France. AUow me, therefore, Sir» to transfer to you, in its original shape, as an official heir-loom, the advice which was meant for your predecessor. I have the honour to be, SIR, Your most obedient humble Servant, THE AUTHOR. May 31,160*.

The Opportunity. pp. 1-20. 11 0001

THE OPPORTUNITY. TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HENRY ADDINGTON, CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER, 8e. »c. SIR, Near two years ago, I publicly ad- dressed to you some reflections on West Indian affairs, in a pamphlet entitled, The Crisis of the Sugar Colonies. Had the opinions maintained in that publica- tion been refuted by intermediate events, i$ would have been unreasonable to expect from you at this period, a favourable or a patient attention ; but if, on the contrary, those opinions have been since strikingly verified by experience, I may, without presumption, claim a second audience on the same interesting subject. Nor will it weaken this pretension, if you should" be able to recollect, that the author's views were thought on their first promulgation, to be singu- lar, and his practical conclusions rash: for the tes* B timony

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t 2 timony of experience in their favour is not the lesjs decisive ; and when political suggestions are demonstrated to have been just, their singularity and apparent boldness become arguments of their necessity and importance. Unless vanity deceive me, that publication, however diffidently received by yourself or your colleagues, was not wholly fruitless of some im- portant public effects. Though personally a stranger to you, I know that you honoured the work with a perusal ; and would hope that it contributed in some degree to fix you in a line of conduct in what relates to St. Domingo, from which you have had much ex- citement to swerve, but of which the wisdom as well as the rectitude,- is now universally acknow- ledged. If so, my claim to your patient attention rests upon a still stronger title than that which has been already advanced. To my former advice, much popular preposses- sion certainly stood opposed ; and as I have now to offer further counsel, suggested by the 6ame views, to which, perhaps, in some points, the current of public opinion may still be adverse, a brief re- trospect of some of the leading opinions maintain- ed in " The Crisis," and of the experimental con- firmation which they have received, /may be no improper or unnecessary prelude. . After

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£ s After offering many reasons for believing that the ostensible purpose held out by the French government was not its real object in the great expedition then proceeding againt St. Domingo, but that the restitution of private slavery was the Consul's true purpose, I endeavoured in that pam- phlet to point out the peculiar obstacles, both phy- sical and moral, by which the accomplishment of that purpose would be opposed *. In delineating these, it was found necessary to adduce facts relative to colonial slavery, of which the true nature was generally misconceived in Europe f; and here, to some minds celebrated for political knowledge in general, as well as to many ordinary readers, the author's premises, as he has reason to believe, appeared not less ques- tionable than his conclusions : yet, reasoning from these premises, he inferred with much con- fidence the high probability of events which have since actually occurred in St. Domingo, extraordinary and wonderful though those events have appeared to the European public J. The harsh and unparalleled nature of West India bondage in general, and those distinguishing features of that state which were delineated in the Crisis, were the very corner stones, and * Crisis, Letter 2d. f lb. p. 7 to 15. X lb. p. 56 to 76. foundation

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C * foundation walls, upon the solidity of which the whole structure of the argument depended. From the terrible peculiarities of that state, and from these alone, it was inferred, that the negroes of St. Domingo would never submit to it again *; for it was admitted, that to any yoke known else- where by the name of slavery, the gigantic power, the relentless vengeance, the craft, and violence of the French government, might probably be able to enforce submission. Political, and even personal freedom had been completely overthrown in many parts of Europe; and there was nothing in the air of the Antilles to make the spirit of li- berty there more vigorous, or less tameable by the terror of the sword ; but it was predicted that negro freedom would be found invincible in St. Domingo, because the horrors of the state opposed 1.0 it were experimentally known to its defenders : and because they were of that intolerable kind which the author endeavoured to describe f. He foresaw the true though strange issue of the unequal contest between the colossal republic of France, and the negroes of a West India island, only because he clearly understood the nature of the practical question in dispute. The great local and personal advantages, * Crisis, p. 55-6. + lb. p. 46 to 56, 75-6, &c which

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* which favoured the cause of freedom in that cli- mate, were not overlooked or concealed on the contrary, they were fully explained and relied upon* as necessary means; but the vital and in- domitable principle, which could alone give life and efficacy to those means of resistance, was an, aversion to the former yoke not to be overcome ; an antipathy more powerful, than all the terrors that despotism could oppose to it, more stimu- lating than any passion or appetite tljat could plead for submission, and more obstinate than the love of life itself. Upon these premises and these calculations, it was foretold early in March, 1802, that the issue of the French expedition would be such as, to the astonishment of Europe, it has ultimately proved disappointment to the views of the consul, and a triumph to his sable opponents. In the progress and incidents, as well as the final event of that extraordinary contest, the *« Crisis of the Sugar Colonies" has proved for the most part a history by anticipation of the war of St. Domingo. J That the arms of France would probably have a short-lived apparent success was foreseen f ; nor * Crisis, p. 58 to 69. t lb. p. 44-5. were

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I 6 were the artifices and frauds, which concurred with force in the attainment of that ephemeral tri- umph, unexpected*; but it was also foreseen that the discovery of the true object of the war would produce a new and decisive resistance f. The facility, so clearly manifested, of obtaining a loyal submission to the republic without the restitution of the former slavery J; the speedy re- sort to a compromise on that basis, such as was actually, though perfidiously, made by Leclerc, after force had been tried in vain § ; the division of the negro chiefs and troops, by a crafty con- cealment of the design against freedom in the outset, and the consequent defection of many of them from Toussaint || ; their faithful adherence, nevertheless, to the cause of general freedom, when the mask was dropped by the invaders 4ft ; these, and other leading incidents of the contest, were all foretold in the Crisis, with more or less confidence and clearness, in proportion as they were more or less necessary results of the general premises from which they were all inferred. To point out at large the agreement of these * Crisis, p. 45. t lb. p. 45-6. % lb. p. 45. § lb. p. 85; || lb. p. 45. «fib. p. 45-6. 56-7,8. conjectural

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{ 'h conjectura) conclusions with subsequent events^ would be to exceed those limits, which regard, to your time, Sir, and my own must prescribe to this addrçss. The task will be more easy when, a tolerably fair and. intelligent account of the late* war in St, Pomingo shall meet the public eye^ but in spite of the unprecedented^ falshoodj of the consular press, no Englishman is so ill informed of the events of tha£ horrible war, as not to perceive, should he now turn pver the pages of the Crisis, that the opinions there disclosed have beerç |ully verified, and the author's; expectation» very strik- ingly confirmed, To the purpose for which this brief review is offered, the confirmation of the premises of fact contained in that pamphlet, some events unfore- seen by the author, are no less important than those which his conjectures embraced. That a compromise would be the result of the obstinate resistance which the French ge- nerals would encounter, and of their despair of final success, he foresaw to be probable*; but that perfidy so unexampled in the history of this bad world, as was practised by the French com- manders, would be employeôTto frustrate the com- pact, was as much beyond his foresight as that of the illustrious victim of the crime, the generous and immortal Toussaint. Ignorant of the yet * Crisis, p. 85. unfathomed

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C s unfathomed depth of French depravity, and sup- posing that the consul had more political wis- dom than he has lately exhibited, the author did not foresee the probability of a measure, at once fhe basest and the weakest that ever dishonoured à nation. The second jeopardy, therefore, to the cause of African freedom, which resulted from this perfidy, put the strength of the defensive principle and means, upon which the author relied, to a proof unexpectedly severe : yet such were the truth and the force of those premises upon which his reason- ing was built, so invincible were the feelings which withstood the restitution of slavery, and such the natural means of resistance, that the betrayed and disheartened colonists, though perfidiously de- prived of their leaders, of their military cham- pions, and of their arms, again made head against the armies of the republic, and again triumphed over their powerful and ferocious oppressors. The desperate perseverance with which the war was afterwards prosecuted by the consul, the terri- ble means which he employed, and the remorseless devotion of the monsters Leclerc and Rochambeau, and their troops, to their master's horrible behests, were also far beyond the author's calculations; but the principles upon which he relied have passed unhurt through all these extreme ordeals, and their justice has by every trial been more clearly established. The

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t 0 ï The last and strongest confirmation has been given by the consul himself. He, who acted» upon notions diametrically opposite to the opi- nions maintained in the Crisis, and who ex-> pected so little difficulty in the execution of his projects, that he sent not only his brother, and brother-in-law, but his sister, with her infant child, to grace and enjoy his expected easy tri- umph over African freedom, saw at length his error so clearly, that in despair of re-esta-f Wishing slavery, he resolved on extermination; and instead of still aiming to reclaim a flourish- ing colony, fought, massacred, and murdered for a desert. Without detaining you longer with a review, to the seeming egotism of which I could be reconciled only by its undeniable public importance, I demand in general new credence to the facts, and some in- creased regard to the conclusions contained in my former address ; to some of which I shall have oc- casion to revert in the course of the ensuing discus- sions. In particular, I hope that one great truth, Which was matter of argumentative induction in the Crisis, the invincibility of freedom in St. Do- mingo, may now be fairly assumed, as a proved and incontestible truth. The new and interesting question which I pro- pose now to discuss, is " what line of conduct a " British minister ought, al the present juncture, " lo adopt towards the people of St. Domingo?" C Upon

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10 } Upon this important question, but one practi- cal notion, and that of a very indefinite kind, seems as yet to have entered into the conception of the public. That every degree of amity towards this new society, consistent with a due regard to ©urç own colonial interests, ought to be observed, seems to be a unanimous sentiment. It seems also to be in general thought, that some commerH dal intercourse ought to be formed with them, so as to secure to ourselves whatever trade their in- dustry may immediately furnish. But these opi- nions, as far as they have met the public pye, are qualified by so many cautious and ambiguous terms, that their authors may be affirmed to have yet formed no decisive practical judgment. For my part, having a distinct and firm opinion on this interesting subject, an opinion, which, however erroneous it may be, is simple, practical, and, in my own poor judgment, highly important to my country, I feel myself bound to declare it ; and shall do so without management or reserve. you ought, sir, i conceive to acknowledge without delay, the liberty of the negroes o? St. Domingo; and to enter into f deral en- gagements WITH THEM AS A SOVEREIGN AND IN- dependent people; and you ought further, not only» to grant, but, if necessary, to volunteer, a guarantee of their independency against the Republic of France. Should this proposition startle at first by its ap- parent

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t « parent boldness, it is no more than I expect. So let me againiiint, did the opinion maintained in the Crisis, that the colossal Republic of France, the terror of continental Europe, could not with all its force, txush this same petty community trf negroes. So it might be added, did at its first promulgation, almost every opinion or measure of national policy, which in this age of wonders has ultimately proved to have been wise. These are times in which hesitating choice and tardy decision will generally be found at a fault, and in which a British statesman should remember -Cato's maxim, that f-i *h-*Feat' admitted into public councils " Betrays like treason»"- r-* But should you favpur me with a patient atten- tion, you will perhaps find that the course here proposed, though a decided, is not a rash one : that the measures I recommend are bold in appear- ance only, not in reality ; and, that they are in truth essential to any plan of colonial policy, from which future security can be expected or hoped. Let not my advice be prejudged at the outset by that dislike of innovation in the abstract, which the experience of the age has inspired. A new order of things has arisen in the West Indies, to which former precedents are quite inapplicable. The British statesman has there no beaten path to pursue ; he has a new country before him, and a new

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12 1 a new road to explore. An unprecedented re- volution has rent asunder the basis of our old Colonial policy, and further perseverance in it, out of mere respect to its antiquity, would savour more of pedantry than prudence ; its former wis- dom, had it indeed been wise, would perhaps be the clearest evidence of its future folly. It was, I grant, a fundamental maxim of all the powers of Europe who possessed colonies in the Antilles, that the supremacy of the European race, and the depression of the African, must be at all times, and at the expence of every other public principle, maintained. It was a rule para- mount in importance to all national rivalships, and to all national quarrels, There was an in- tercommunity of feelings and privileges among the white skinned colonists, which, when the sub-» ordination of negroes was in question, ' made English and French, Dutch and Spanish, Euro- pean friend and European enemy, very unim- portant distinctions. But this strong chain of sympathy, forged by mutuality of despotic abuse, and rivetted by a sense of common danger, has been broken by the same shock that overthrew the social edifices of Europe; and effects have followed, of which the stability can now no more be doubted, than the novelty or the importance. An African people, insubordinated to any . European

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ï 13 î European inhabitants of the same territory, and independent of all exterior government, is planted in the centre of the Antilles ; and possesses an entire island, the most important pf the group*; An island of far greater extent than any other {Cuba alone excepted) in the whole Western Archipelago, and which, in population and pro- duce, was lately equal to all the rest united. This new society has already proved itself, in its Very infancy, unconquerable by the greatest pow- ers in the civilized world, having successively de- fended its freedom and its territory against the long continued hostility of Great Britain at one period ; and against the vast, impetuous, persever- ing, and merciless, efforts of France at another. By power and victory, therefore, as well as by freedom and independency, is the African race raised from its late prostrate and despised state in this very considerable part of the West Indies. Instead of that abject and brutal condition which was before their universal lot, the black islanders may now reasonably elevate their heads above their palefaced neighbours; for whether their Country shall remain permanently severed from * The language of an old historian of this island is re- markable : ** La situation de cette isle par rapport aux autres *' Antilles, nepouvoit être plus avantageuse. Elle en est presque *' environée, 4" l'on diroit qu' élit à été placée au centre de ce *' grand Archipel pour lui donner la loi." Hist, de L'isle Es- pagnole par Charlevoix. Tom. I. Ljv. i. France

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t w J the dominion of France or not ; it possesses a po- tential independency, of which none of its neigh- bours can boast : while they continue to lean for support and protection upon distant states, St, Domingo is found to be able not only to sustain itself without the aid of those states, but to set the greatest of them at defiance. To persist after so extreme a revolution, in our anterior policy, would be more irrational, than even to retain the prejudices by which that policy Was introduced and upheld. If we can be so far the dupes of prepossession as still to hold these saBle heroes and patriots personally cheap, let us at least respect their power ; and advert to the danger of still acting towards them upon princi- ples of Creolian antipathy and contempt. National prejudice may indeed, in this case, as in others, survive the causes from which it was derived ; but a wise statesman will, in such cases, rather veer round with the refluent tide of events, than vainly attempt to stem it, by still courting the lingering breeze of opinion. Rome had not ceased, perhaps, in the days of Honorius to de- spise the northern barbarians T but Stilicho was not absurd enough to disdain to treat with those hardy warriors,upon Roman ground; or to apply to them in other respects the old imperial maxims. At this day we regard, with just derision, the ar- rogant and contemptuous style of the impotent successors

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C 15 I successors of Othman ; but though they call us, " Christian dogs," they are, too prudent to ad- here in their public councils, to a correspondent practice. They thankfully accept us as allies, and are happy to secure the patrimony of the pro- phet by our unhallowed aid. Though revolution in this case touches only the skirts of the empire, the principle of policy is the same ; and let not the British cabinet dis- play more bigotry, and less wisdom, in the western Archipelago, than the Turkish Divan, or Grand Vizier, in the eastern. An entire and absolute adherence to our ancient policy in the Antilles, will scarcely however now be thought advisable, even by the most prejudiced mind. The necessity of a material departure from it has indeed, been practically admitted, in many measures of the last and present war; especially in our convention with Toussaint, and in the assistance lately given to his successors against their European enemies : for such measures, wise and necessary though they must be allowed to have been, were directly at variance with the policy adhered to at all former periods. But prejudice, though obliged to abandon its former lines, may be disposed in this case to make only a partial and lingering retreat. Though it is demonstrably unwise still to treat the new peo- ple as natural inferiors and enemies, it may to* many,

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r iff many, seem a boldness of innovation to treat them- as independent equals and friends. Of this hesi- tating sentiment, I am sorry to perceive strong symptoms in our late conduct on the coast of St. Domingo. My advice, therefore, may possibly still be opposed by some adverse prepossession on the! score of novelty. If obliged to innovate, let us, it may be said, be slow and cautious in the process. But let it well be considered, that the circum- stances out of which our colonial policy arose, are not merely altered; they are completely reversed. From universal bondage in the" Antilles, the African race, I repeat, has started into liberty, sovereignty, and power. Instead of subjection to the lowest of foreign states, they have triumphed over the. most powerful. A correspondent re- verse has also, in a more important point, been adopted in the conduct of this and other nations. To that close confederacy of the European race in the Antilles, by which the chains of the negroe* seemed to be for ever rivetted, have succeeded wars between European powers, in which these once despised objects of the common hostility and oppression have been received as auxiliaries and co-belligerents at least, if not also as allies. The change, so far as regards the queen of the West Indian islands, the sole subject of these re- marks, is, in all points, perfect and extreme. Now if different situations, require different mea- sures,

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t 17 sures ; opposite situations, seem to demand oppc~» site measures. But at least, it can furnish no sound presumption against the wisdom of a new system of conduct, that it is diametrically opposite to former principles, when the case itself has been totally reversed ; and this is all for which I wish at present to contend. Let us proceed then to consider, without any prepossession or bias, the arguments by which the advice I have offered may be fairly recom- mended or opposed. The first step towards a right choice, is to sur- vey attentively the different objects among which we have to chuse ; and as it seems to me, that in this case there are, in a general view, but four different paths of conduct, in one of which you must of necessity tread, it may be proper to say something of each. They are, 1st. To interdict all commercial intercourse whatever, between his Majesty's subjects and the people of St. Domingo. 2d. To permit such intercourse, but without any conventional basis. 3d. To enter into some commercial treaty or convention with the negro chiefs, not involving any relations closer than those of general amity and trade. 4th. To adopt the decisive measures which I have ventured to recommend. D Of

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E 18 1 Of the first of these plans little perhaps need bfe «aid, for it will probably find few, if any, supporters'. Such a measure would in the first place be- fbund to be .attended with great practical dif- ficulties. The advantages of the prohibited trade, and the facility of a clandestine intercourse be- tween St. Domingo and Jamaica, would probably give rise to an extensive contraband commerce. Every view of political caution upon which the prohibition could be founded, would in that case be defeated ; for if a trade with this new people, though lawfully and openly conducted, would be dangerous to our colonies, a secret, illicit, and consequently unregulated intercourse, could not be less so. But the prohibition, whether abortive ox effec- tual, would be very likely to produce a conse- quence which every reflecting mind must' strongly deprecate. A total interdiction of trade between British subjects and the inhabitants ofSt. Domingo, could not well consist, in the notions of the latter, with the belief of a pacific disposition on our part, arid would naturally incline them to regard us as secret foes to their freedom as well as their independence. Besides, the strong means by which alone such a prohibition could be enforced, would look too much like war, not to be easily mistaken for it, by a people inexpert in political distinctions, and justly

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justly jealous of the disposition of all their more civilized neighbours. But supposing this line of policy to be open to no such practical objections, it involves a sacrifice of advantages, which this commercial and mari- time country ought not, without very important reasons, to make. The ports of St. Domingo, notwithstanding all the desolations of the late dreadful war, and the wasteful effects of foreign and intestine calami- ties during nine or ten preceding years, will still have some valuable exports to furnish. The cap- tures made of cargoes shipped from that island since the commencement of the present hostilities, sufficiently prove that agriculture, however dimi- nished, had not been wholly abandoned ; much less wilj the hoe be idle when the musket may be safely laid aside ; for that freedom and a negro government are not incompatible with a large and increasing growth of exportable produce, was, under the beneficent administration ofToussaint*, very clearly proved. The * The exports from St. Domingo, throughout the last war, however small when compared to their former amount, wereby no means contemptible. But under the governraentof Tous- saint, especially after his treaty with General Maitland had re- lieved him from the severe pressure of a maritime war, the tillage of the island was rapidly improving. The French commanders on the arrival of their ill fated expedi- tion,

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t *o The barbarous and impolitic measures of the consul, have unquestionably occasioned a vast deterioration in the state of the colony since that fortunate period, in respect not only of immediate produce, but of the works and buildings necessary in the manufacturing of sugar ; but of so great and fertile a field even the gleanings must be important ; and there is no good reason for doubt- ing that its prosperity will speedily revive. tion, were surprised to find agriculture in so high a degree restored. " The cultivation of the colony," said Leclerc, in his first official dispatches, " is in a muck higher state of pros- " perity than could have been imagined." Official dispatches of February 9th, 1802, in London newspapers of March 26th. Upon this head, the word of the French government or ite commanders may safely be taken ; because the exaggeratioa of existing prosperity, would have magnified the merit of the man, whom they had recently proscribed as a traitor ; and tended strongly to recommend an order of things, which they were labouring by the most dreadful means to abolish. An equally unexceptionable testimony of the same ten- dency, lately met the author's eye, in a letter found on board Le Bon Accord, Pierre Pâtissier, master, a prize taken at the commencement of the present war. The writer, who appears to be a very intelligent Frenchman, and to have been com- manding engineer at Port au Prince, and who addresses him- self confidentially to a superior officer of his own corps in France, in speaking of the recent battles and conflagrations in the south of the island, says : " La partie du sud, qui il y a " deux mois et demi etoit encore intacte et valait mieux, Que "LA MARTINIÛUE, TANT PAR SON ETENDUE, QUE PARSES RAPPORTS, " est maintenant le theatre de la guerre la plus horrible, &c." The original letter is in the Registry of the High Court of Admiralty: it is dated at the Cape, 18 Floreal, An. 11. (May 7, 1803 .J ' That

The Opportunity. pp. 21-40. 31 0021

21 That the produce of the island will soon be as great as it was before the revolution, is, I admit, more than can be reasonably expected. The num- ber of adults fit for labour is unquestionably reduced in a very great proportion ; nor will free men and women ever be brought to work so intensely as slaves are compelled to do by the coercion of the whip. They will not labour more severely than con- sists with the preservation of health, with the or- dinary duration of life, and the maintenance and in- crease of native population; which is only saying in other words what is expressed in the preceding sentence. But unless new demons should arise to re-act the madness of Buonaparte, the effects of the new system will, in a few years, amply make up for this double drawback on the immediate efforts of the planter. The superfecundity of unoppressed human nature, will not only give back what the sword and the drownings have destroyed, but will produce rapidly an overflowing population ; and husbandry will regain in the number of la- bourers, what it loses by mitigation pf toil *. Whatever * M. Malouet's information on these subjects must have been more copious and authoritative than that of almost any other man in Europe; for in addition to his long experience in colonial affairs, and extensive private acquaintance in the West Indian circles, he, as the public apologist of the Consul, had access, no doubt, to the official correspondence and other papers in thebu-

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E î* ) Whatever the amount of the exportable produce of this great island may be, its import of foreign commodities will be as great at least as the barter of that produce may suffice to purchase ; and its export, as well as import trade, will long be entirely carried on in foreign ship- ping, and on account of foreign merchants : for it would be extravagant to suppose, that this new community of husbandmen and soldiers, will soon acquire a.trading capital of its own, or a commer- cial marine. No branch cf commerce which we possess, can in its kind be more desirable than this to a manu- facturing and maritime country, Its value in a na- tional view will, in proportion to its actual extent, very far exceed that of our present West Indian trade : for the ships which bring over the produce pf our islands, do not, upon an average, obtain oner- third of an entire freight on their outward voyages ; and for this obvious reason, that a small proportion only of the proceeds of the imported colonial reausof the colonial department.The following testimony of M. Malouet is therefore of great importance. " Tous les rapports annoncent un beaucoup plus grand nombre d'en/ans, et moins de mortalitéparmis les négrillons, qu'il n'y en avoit avant la revolution s ce qui est imputé au repos absolu dont jouissent les femmes grosses, et a un moi ndre travail de la part des nègres." (Collection de Memoirs sur les Colonies, &c. parV. P- Malouet, ancien Admi- nistrateur des Colonies et de la Marine, Tome IV. Intro- duction, p. 52.) M. Malouet, let it be observed, is no ami des noirs, but a West IndiÉJ, ànd a defender of the Slave Trade. produce

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produce is sent back in European goods, perhaps not a twentieth part*; whereas these new cus- tomers would lay out in our manufactures nearly the whole net value of their sugar and coffee, or rather Would barter those tropical products in their own ports, for the goods of Birmingham and Manchester, giving us the carriage of both. This important consideration cannot be fully dis- cussed without exceeding the limits which must be prescribed to the present publication ; but to the reflections of any well informed and dispas- sionate mind, it will be obvious that such views are by no means chimerical ; and* that a thousand hogsheads of sugar brought from the ports of St. Domingo, would perhaps be the medium of more substantial benefit to the manufacturers, merchants, and ship owners of Great Britain, col- lectively considered, than five thousand from St. Kitt's or Jamaica ; with this most important dif- ference, that the former branch of trade would * The rum made on a sugar plantation, of which but a small part is brought to Europe, sometimes defrays all the ordinary expences-of the estate. Generally speaking, however, one- tenth part of the proceeds of the sugar is computed to be a necessary auxiliary fund, to supply deficiencies, and ^provide for contingencies j but this, for the most part, is ap- plied by the consignees in paying bills drawn by the planter for the purchase of American goods and other colonial expen- ces, and therefore forms no part of the returns in European in- yestment and freight. not

34 0024

t 24 3 not involve as a drawback upon its advantages, any part of that enormous expence of life and treasure by which our West Indian colonies are protected. It is needless to dwell on the importance of in- ducements, like these ; for they are in their na- ture, considerations to which the people of this country are more than sufficiently awake, and to which from a British Minister, I should rather in general fear too eager and exclusive an attention, than any improper indifference. An inevitable consequence, on the other hand, of our abstaining from this commerce, would be its falling into the hands of other powers, who would have no motive for a similar sacrifice ; and here the commercial jealousy of the nation will be also sufficiently quicksighted and apprehen- sive, without any argumentative excitement. But the importance of this consideration is still greater in a political, than in a commercial view, as I shall soon have occasion to shew. At present, I will not enlarge upon this topic, as its discussion more properly belongs to a subsequent branch of my subject. The arguments which may be opposed to the permission of commerce with this new people, can only, I conceive, be drawn from the dangers to which our own islands may be exposed by it. That the new state of St. Domingo will be perilous to our sugar colonies, unless great and speedy

35 0025

I « 1 speedy reformation shall meliorate their own in- terior system, it is far from my intention to deny* The danger is real and great, and, as I have else- where endeavoured to demonstrate*, calls loudly for preventative measures from the government» and parliament of Great Britain. Unhappily no such measures have hitherto been adopted ; and therefore though the folly and wickedness of Buonaparte have, fortunately for this country* suspended the progress of the danger, and di- minished its immediate magnitude, our colonies, Jamaica especially, are unquestionably still in very serious jeopardy. But that the cause of alarm would be lessened by our avoiding all amicable re- lations with the negro chiefs, and holding towards them a face of jealous dislike, is a proposition Which it would be difficult to maintain. Among the many advantages which the apolo* gists of the slave trade have taken of the miscon- ceptions naturally prevalent in Europe, respecting the true nature and effects of West Indian bondage, an outcry was raised by them on the score of alleg- ed dangers from the speeches and writings of aboli- tionists ; which, they pretended, would reach the ears of the enslaved negroes, and inspire them with re- volutionary notions. With equal gravity, " thevir- " tuous Le Clerc" declaimed, amidst the details of his destructive campaign, against the "mis- * Crisis, p. 79, 80-124, &c. E " chiefs

36 0026

t 26 1 **chiefs of -abstract principles *.n Were such ideas sindere and well founded, or were not these poor degraded beings placed by their incessant labour, by the domestic police of the plantations, and still more by that dulness* and stupidity to which a brutalizing oppression has reduced them, below the reach of the revolutionary means hsed by the Jacobins of Europe, I admit that a commercial intercourse with St. Domingo might be no less dangerous to Jamaica, than a hostile dis- position in these new and formidable neighbours. Their acquaintance might, even in that case, be more perilous than their hatred. But to those who know the true state and character of those op- pressed fellow1 beings, such grounds of apprehen- sion are not very alarming ; and as to the dread of democratical or revolutionary theories being em- ployed to excite disaffection in a gang of field negroes, a West Indian could not hear of such â notion without laughing; unless* indeed it were in England, where policy might induce him in such a case to do violence to his risible muscles. To Wm, such fears must appear scarcely less ridiculous, than those of a waggoner, who having read the voyage to the Hhuynhymms, should dread the effects upon the temper of his team, of a demo- cratical song from the ostler. * See his dispatches of February 9th, 1802. London Papers of March 24. It

37 0027

C 2£ 1 It is in truth, through the new means of phys- ical force, not those of political suggestion efr intrigue» that the propagation, of freedom from the neighbouring coast of St. Domjngo, is really to be apprehended at Jamaica. Hostility, therefore; in the breasts of the new people, and not an amicable connection with them, should be the subject of anxious prevention. For the justice of these views, more fully «x<* plained in my former pamphlet, I might appeal td our experience during the whole of the last war^ for if precept or example could have excited insur- rection among our slaves, those means were never Wanting tp the enemy ; and revolutionary free- dom was exhibited for many years in a living model of grand dimensions under the very win- dows of some of our colonies, especially at Mont- serrât and Jamaica; yet no insurrection took place among the slaves of those islands ; nor was the contagion felt for a jmoment any where, ex- cept where it was carried by hostile force* But more satisfactory proof how innoxious the new system is in the way of pacific intercourse, may be found in the conduct of those who are most interested in, as well as best acquainted with the subject^ The planters of Jamaica are a body not inattentive to their own peculiar in- terests in public measures, npr badly represented in this country. Haye you then, Sir, had any application

38 0028

C 28 1 application from them to prohibit a trade with St. Domingo ? If so, they have strangely altered their views since the last war; for such an inter- course was openly carried on between the two islands to a great extent, after the convention with Toussaint ; and not a murmur against it was heard, either from the assembly of Jamaica, or from thé very active West Indian committee. It was, on the contrary, so favourite a branch of commerce in that island, that the restrictions which the royal pru- dence had imposed upon it, for the sake appa- rently of diminishing the dangers in question *, were there thought to shackle too strictly the pro- fitable intercourse with St. Domingo ; and were so broadly violated in the face of day, that English ships, belonging to the ports of Jamaica, were seized by his Majesty's squadron, and confiscated for that cause f. When we next hear of danger to the peace of our islands, from the speeches of abolitionists, I hope these facts will be re- membered. Were the intercourse in question really dan- gerous to our sugar colonies, there would be no ne- cessity either to expose them to any such peril, or to forego, for their sakes, the national advantages * Order in Council of 9th January, 1799. f Case of the Achilles, Sutherland, master, heard before the Lords Commissioners of Appeals in Prize Causes, March 3d, 1804. Of

39 0029

29 of the trade > for we have ports, even in the West Indies, from which the commerce might be carried on, without producing any such political inconve- nience, On this hint I propose to «enlarge hereafter. Meantime, supposing enough to have been already said to prove that the commerce which courts our acceptance ought not to be wholly declined, and believing that thus far my opinion is that of the public at large, I will proceed to consider the second of the four projects pro- posed for discussion : w That of allowing trade to ** be carried on with the negroes of St. Domingo " without any conventional basis." This scheme has certainly more practical facility than the former ; but if it be admitted that a com- mercial intercourse of any kind ought to be allowed, it will, I conceive, be difficult to deny, that it Ought to be sanctioned and regulated by some express compact. If in the mercantile intercourse of civilized and polished nations, positive conventions are found useful or necessary, in order to prevent dis- putes, to obviate inconveniencies, and to improve the mutual advantage, surely they cannot be less so in this case, in which, supposing disputes to arise, there are with one of the parties no precedents or known principles, by which they could be decided. By a treaty with the negro chiefs, better assu»> ance

40 0030

t 30 ance might be obtained, for the observance of mer- pantile fakh, and for the security of British subject?, in their property and their persons, while trading in the ports of a country, still perhaps likely to he the seat of much interior disorder. By a treaty also, regulations might be framed whereby such political inconveniencies and hazards as must be in some degree incident to this new branch of commerce, might be materially lessened. Par- ticular ports for instance might be limited, as in his Majesty's order of council for licensing the trade with Toussaint's government, or in the West Indian free port acts, which in like manner innovated upon the general restrictions of our maritime code, and in which it was therefore found necessary to provide many precautions against the probable ill effects of innovation. Fiscal, as well as political regulations, would obviously, on our side, be necessary ; but without a treaty the most salutary and necessary sanctions jn laws of that kind, might in their execution, give umbrage to these unenlightened neighbours, It may be added, that by mutual agreement only could adequate security be" obtained against some dangerous abuses, and sources of future contention, such as the carrying off negroes, to which therç would be strong temptations on both sides, But a still more powerful argument for a com- mercial

41 0031

C 31 1 mercîal treaty is, that without a compact, we can have no permanent privilege or favour in the* ports of that island. We are now in a situation to become not only the most favoured nation at St. Domingo, but even perhaps to obtain from this new people a monopoly Pf their trade ; for we who alone can defy the re- sentment of France, can alone venture to contract with them at this critical period any f deral rela-» tions. Herein consists one material advantage of that opportunity, to which I invite your attention. The considerations which we must probably give for such exclusive privileges, will be pointed out under the next head of discussion. At present, I would only remark that a treaty of some kind, is the necessary medium of such an im- portant acquisition ; and that if we are content with a mere tacit allowance of general trade, we shall be rivalled by other powers ; and soon, in con- sequence of the advantages of neutral navigation now possessed by them, shall be undersold and vir- tually excluded from this valuable branch of com- merce. We shall gratuitously relinquish in favour of America, Denmark, and Sweden a great, and perhaps hereafter an inestimable boon, which the circumstances of the présent war, as some com- pensation for its evils, happily throw within our reach. North America bids fairest to be our great ri- val

42 0032

32 Val in the future trade of St. Domingo ; but as the injured islanders have seen the American flag bringing supplies to their oppressors, during the deepest horrors of the late dreadful contest, they can at this moment have no predilection for the people of that country ; while our present hos- tility to the Republic, and the assistance we have given in blockading the French armies in their ports, must dispose them Very favourably towards ourselves*. Supposing we should acquiesce, as it might be necessary to do, in their importing from North America some articles of provisions and lumber, they would, I doubt not, readily give to our merchants exclusively, the benefit of sup- plying them with all other commodities. Extend your view, Sir, to that future complete restitution of the agriculture of this vast island, which is at least a possible, and in my poor judg- ment, no improbable, or distant event. Reflect, that upon such a restitution, we might import from St. Domingo alone, far more in bulk and value of the rich tropical productions than all the other islands in the West Indies now collectively * If there should be some abatement of this disposition at present, from our conduct, in destroying or carrying away their means of defence at Fort Dauphin, the policy of which I am by no means able to comprehend, the favourable sentiment might, by means hereafter to be noticed, be easily and fully restored. afford,

43 0033

i 33 afford, and have a million or more of new trans- atlantic customers to lay out in our manufactures pearly the whole value of their produce ; and then ask yourself whether such prospects as these, with such present benefits in advance, ought to be wantonly or for slight reasons renounced ï Reject them at this moment, and they will certainly be lost for ever. But it may be asked, what effectual security would be derived from a treaty for the preservation of any privileges which it might concede? I answer, in the first place, that of a faith which there is no good reason to distrust, for it has hitherto been nnviolated, though strongly tried during the last war,- the faith of this new community. Rude na- tions, perhaps, are not the least observant of such engagements. You would, however, have the ad- ditional and ever growing security of established custom ; for they would soon become habitually partial to our manufactures, and our modes of commerce : but what is a much stronger ground of reliance, their self-interest, their love of freedom, and their abhorrence of a dreadful slavery, would bind them to your side ; for a guarantee of their liberty must, as I shall presently show, be the price of the supposed concessions. To all these probable advantages of a commer- cial treaty, there dogs not seem to stand opposed F any

44 0034

34 any sound objection which would not at least equally apply to the project now under review. The countenance and support given to the new t>rder of things would be substantially the same, and the actual intercourse with the people strictly so, whether our trade to their ports were carried on with, or without, any conventional basis. I will here dismiss the consideration of the se- cond plan, and pass to the third. 3d. ** To enter into some treaty or convention * with the negro chiefs, not involving any rela- ** tions closer than those of general amity and f* commerce." This is probably the scheme of policy which will at first view appear the most plausible. " We ought not, it may be conceded, to ab- * stain from the advantages which a trade to " St. Domingo may afford, or contract the suspi- " cion and odium of its new masters, by pro- "*** hibiting an amicable intercourse between their *< territories and our own ; we may even pru- «* dently and advantageously form with them a *" commercial treaty ; but care should be taken f* not expressly to recognise their independency, ** nor to enter into any stipulations which may be " found inconvenient in a future pacification with « France." As these views may be thought to derive some recommendation

45 0035

i 55 recommendation from their seeming conformity to the policy adopted during the last war in our convention with Toussaint, I would in the first place remark, that the precedent is quite inapph* cable, for between the leading circumstances of that case, and of the present, there is not only great diversity, but a direct and manifest opposition. At no time prior to the peace of 1801, was there an opportunity of separating the cause of negro liberty from that of French ambition, had we beeik disposed to adopt that policy. When, by evacuat- ing St. Domingo, we ceased to make war against the sable defenders of that island, a great majority of them were indeed disposed to become our friends and our commercial customers, but no party among them evinced any disposition to become our general allies, or our confederates against the republic. In a considerable part of the island, where General Rigaud commanded, hostility to this coun try continued to prevail almost to the end of the war, and Toussaint himself, was so far from choos mg to engage with us as a confederate, that he maintained strictly the duties of neutrality Though imperious necessity justified in his eyes, and even in the opinion of the French government, the pa- cific convention Which he made with an enemy of the mother country, he never ceased to acknow- ledge her sovereignty, and governed the colony in right

46 0036

C S6 right of successive commissions from the immedi- ate rulers of France. Had we at that period offered a guarantee of liberty and independency, it would in all probabi- lity have been rejected; for the republic, let it be remembered, had not then violated the law by which she had recognised the freedom of her colo- nial negroes, nor shewn any disposition to restore the ancient system. But such measures as I now recommend, would, during the last war, have been, on other accounts also, clearly unwise. That France, when released from the restraints imposed upon her by a conti- nental and maritime war, would attempt a counter- revolution in that great colony, was at least pro- bable ; and that the remains of half a million of uncivilized people, after ten years of revolution and war, would be able to effect in the new world what confederated nations had vainly attempted in the old, by repelling the undivided efforts of that gigantic republic, was an opinion, upon the justice of which a statesman could not safely rely. If it appeared a speculation too bold even in the page of a political pamphlet, to build upon it in the practical deliberations of a cabinet would have been highly imprudent A chance, therefore, seemed to remain of the restitution in St. Domingo of the system to which we

47 0037

t 37 we were determined to adhere in our own colo- nies ; and wilfully to exclude it, would, on our exist- ing maxims of policy, have been inconsistent and absurd. But could even the event of the contest have been with certainty foreseen, it would have been thought bad policy to prevent an attempt by which the armies and the resources of France were to be wasted, and the immediate population of St. Domingo at the same time materially reduced ; and, what is of far greater importance, by which the attachment of the black colonists to the republic, might be converted into enmity and detestation. The invincible stability of the new order of things in St. Domingo, and the opportunity of effectually separating that important island from the dominion of France, are essential foundations of my present advice ; but of these the former was Unknown during the last war, and the latter did not exist. Since then the project now under discussion can claim no sound recommendation from prece*- dent, let us proceed to examine its intrinsic pre- tensions to your choice. If I have thus far reasoned justly, we are already arrived at the conclusion, that a trade with St. Domingo ought not to be wholly declined, and that it should be placed on the basis of some com- mercial treaty to be made with the negro chiefs. It remains, therefore, next to consider whether commercial

48 0038

C 38 commercial arrangements should be the only ob- jects embraced by such a treaty, or whether it ought to extend to relations of a closer and more comprehensive nature. There is obviously no middle point between a commercial treaty, which necessarily implies perfect amity between the contracting parties, and a poli- tical league or alliance ; for any advance beyond mere amity and mutual commerce, must amount in some degree to that society in political objects which constitutes the relation of allies. But to form an alliance with the new people, is virtually to acknowledge their independency ; and that if we make this recognition, we ought at the same time to engage them, if possible, in a defen- sive league against France, seems almost a politi- cal axiom. I shall, nevertheless, shew in the sequel, the prudential necessity of this consequence. Mean- time, as it is sufficiently obvious that my argument is now reduced to a comparison between the third and fourth of the projects proposed for discussion; and that recommendation of the one will, for the most pa'rt, be an objection to the other, it may save time, and prevent repetition, to consider them to- gether. The 3d and ^th Plans compared. The same arguments which have been already urged in favour of a commercial intercourse in ge- neral,

49 0039

( 59 1 neral, and for giving that intercourse a convenu tional basis, will be found to recommend the» going still further ; for if we form commercial rela- tions alone, the expected benefits will, in the first place, be less extensive, and in the second place, far* less permanent, than they might be made by a political alliance. 1st. " They will be less extensive." The beneficial effects to be expected from amity and commerce with the people of St. Domingo, are not only the acquisition of a valuable branch of trade, but a great diminution of the dangers to which Jamaica and our other sugar colonies will be in future exposed from the power of these for* midable neighbours. Now both these advantages will be proportionate in their extent, to the degree in which agriculture shall be re-established and hereafter maintained in St. Domingo. That this is true in respect of the commercial benefits, is sufficiently obvious ; and it is fairly pre1 sumable, that as the mutual advantages of the in- tercourse shall increase, so also will the mutual amity and confidence which they naturally tend to inspire. The more amply these new customers are able to deal with us in the sale of their sugar and coffee, and in the purchase of our manufactures, the more they w ill find their comforts, their enjoyments, and growing prosperity, dependent upon English commerce ; and the more carefully will they ob- serve

50 0040

40 1 serve that pacifie and amicable conduct towards our Colonies, a violation of which would inter- rupt and diminish those blessings. But some negative effects of their agricultural pursuits will be not less important to our future ad- vantage and security ; for that military spirit which their late successes, and long exercise in war, must have strongly tended to inspire, will obviously be less general and less dangerous, in proportion as the cultivators are drawn back to their peaceful employments, and the rising generation trained, through the excitement of commerce, to the cul- ture of the soil. The more of their youth they em- ploy in the cane pieces, and the fewer they send to the drill, the less danger will there be that their in- digenous military strength will soon be engaged in annoying their impotent neighbours. But any great increase in agricultural industry, or abatement of military preparation, is not tp be expected from them at this critical period, unless We determine to form with them more than com- mercial engagements. There is now, let it be well considered, an object infinitely more interesting and important than agri- culture or commerce to engage their anxious atten- tion : for after the dreadful experience they have had, they cannot safely conclude that the French government is e\ en yet disposed to leave them in the undisturbed possession of their liberty. The

The Opportunity. pp. 41-60. 51 0041

41 The present maritime war gives them indeed a momentary security against invasion by the ene- mies of Great Britain; but if left to expect that upon the termination of our quarrel with the re- public, they shall have again to struggle singly against that despotic and merciless power, against all the ruffians of France and all the bloodhounds of Cuba, not only for independence, but for free- dom, and for life itself, the great and almost ex- clusive object of their present endeavours will naturally be to prepare the means of v, ar. In the contemplation of "that horrible yoke which threatens them," to use the words of the illus- trious Toussaint, all minor considerations will be sunk. Instead of planting the sugar cane, the Cotton bush, and the coffee tree, they will cultivate chiefly those provisions of which they may form planta- tions or lay up magazines in the interior, and thereby enlarge the means of subsistence in a new defensive war. Instead of rebuilding sugar mills and boiling houses, they will erect forts and cast up entrenchments. Instead of the manufactures of Birmingham or Manchester, they will import scarcely any thing but ammunition and arms. Of the rising generation, which we know from the best authority to be very numerous, the males, when of an age tô be trained to labour, will be sent, not to the cane piece, but to the drill ; and G a people

52 0042

I At a people, on whose character thé fate of the Antilles is suspended, will become a nation of soldiers. Surely it is impossible that a British statesman, or a philanthropist, should contemplate this pro- spect without dismay. Not only will industry, order, civilization, and all the other blessings of social life, be retarded in their growth, but a na- tional character formed in this new community, equally unfriendly to its own happiness, and tre- mendous to its European neighbours. . . That St. Domingo, whatever course we take, will one day be mistress of the Western Archipe- lago, is indeed highly probable; and that the shock- ing slavery of our colonies cannot much longer be maintained, is sufficiently certain ; but by a just and rational policy, we might be enabled to look forward to the progress not only of African free- dom, but of African sovereignty, in the West Indies, with satisfaction rather than dismay. . The subversion of establishments so guilty, and so fertile in misery and in death, both to Africa and Europe, can be deprecated only from the terrible nature of the means, by which the change, if sudden and hostile, must necessarily be ef- fected, and the ruin in which it would involve individuals : and instead of a misfortune, it would be a great advantage, tothiscommércial and maritime empire, could we hereafter commute by compact with

53 0043

4S with an allied West Indian state, the costly and in- convenient sovere'gnty of those distant islands, for a monopoly of their valuable trade. But if revo- lution, civil or political, should be intioduced into our sugar colonies by insurrection or hostile force, dreadful indeed would be the effects to indi- viduals, and pernicious to the nation al Urge. Let it not then be considered as a question of small moment, to what pohticial chaiacter the In- digenes, as they call themselves, shall be at this cri- tical period inclined. A restless warlike spirit in them will soon carry liberty and African dominion together in a tempest of revolution through all the surrounding islands. On the contrary, a pacifie and industrious disposition in this infant society would at least enable us to meet the approaching change by timely preparation ; and, perhaps, by the spontaneous and gradual correction of existing abuses, to introduce freedom generally into our co- lonies, the only mean of long preserving our sove- reignty pyer them, without any disorder or mischief. The happy effects of liberty and peace in St. Do- mingo would irresistibly influence the policy of all European powers who possess colonies in the West Indies, and incline them to a w illing imita- tion. Prejudice and self love might indeed still dis- pose the colonial party to oppose the salutary change ; but their influence, unhappily now too powerful in this realm, would progressively de- thne,

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C 44 cline; falsehood would vanish before the clear light of experience, the true interests of the nation would be distinguished from the particular inte- rests of the slave holder, and the chains of oppres- sion would at length be Joosened by the hand of an impartial legislature. What sedative then, Sir, can be found for that warlike temper, so likely to mark the infancy of this new community,and so much to be deprecated, in a view both to commerce and security, except the measures I propose ? Tranquillize the minds of the new people on that heart-stirring subject of anxiety, the defence of their freedom, by guaranteeing it against the power of France, and they will be enabled to reduce, in- stead of enlarging, their military establishment and preparations; to restore the cultivators to the plan- tations, and to train up their youth to the peaceful labours of the field. Relying upon the national faith, and the maritime power of England, they will feel no necessity for a larger internal force than such a moderate army as may suffice to maintain industry and order; they will, in a word, revert to the wise policy of Toussaint, and pursuing the maxims of that illustrious states- man and patriot, will apply themselves indefa- tigably to the restitution of agriculture and com- merce. You will reap the reward not only in the rapid increase of a trade, to the mono- poly

55 0045

£ 45 poly of which you will acquire the strongest pf titles, but in the future security of Jamaica and the rest of our valuable islands. Here it may be proper to point out a new and material difference between the present circumstances of St. Domingo, and those which existed there during our last war with France. It was not so necessary in the former case, as the present, to guard with anxiety against the progress pf a warlike character, and to encourage carefully the restitution of peaceful industry; because, after our pacification with Toussaint, Jhat general and his followers had no such power- ful mptives as must at present be felt by the African Readers, for cherishing the one disposition, and .neglecting the other. The black colonists, let it be remembered, had at that time no apparent grounds of uneasiness in regard to the intentions of the mother country ; and naturally relied for the security of their free- dom, upt only upon the assurances of the go- vernment, but uppn the then un violated law of the republic, by which their title to all the rights of French citizens was solemnly declared. It i« no impeachment of the discernment of Toussaint to say, that he seems to have had no jealousy on this momentous point; since even the in- terest of the republic, if rightly understood, would have been a pledge for her good faith towards those

56 0046

46 thpse loyal and useful citizens ; and that the fa- mous Buonaparte would be such a driveller as to act upon the prejudiced views of his wife's West Indian cabinet, and to imbibe their foolish antipa- thies to a black skin, at the expence not only of the colonial importance of France, but of his power of annoying this country, was an event too improbable to be believed antecedently to experience. It was not till after his preli- minary treaty with England, that some broad indications of this extreme foliy for the first time appeared in his public language and conduct. Certain however it is, that the African chief was deceived ; arid down to the moment of Leclerc's invasion, reposed with implicit confidence on the treacherous assurances of the government. Hence that great man felt himself at liberty, after his convention with General Maitland, to indulge freely his beneficent wishes for the res- titution of agriculture and commerce. His army was chiefly employed in the support of a police framed to promote these pacific objects, and it is demonstrable from the French official accounts, that a great part of his military followers must have been restored to their agricultural em- ployments : for his enemies had more temptation to exaggerate than to diminish his force ; and yet Leclerc's dispatches described the regular black troops as amounting only to a few thousands, and.

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t 47 and the cultivators, who quitted their plantations in order to flock to the standard of Toussaint, as composing the bulk, not only of the general po- pulation, but of the army by which the cause of freedom was sustained. We cannot expect that the successors of this hero, unless furnished with better security than that upon which he fatally relied, will pursue, at the present period, the same course of policy. No professions, and no practical measures of the French government, can renew in their minds the confidence which had so dreadful an issue. As Toussaint was fatally in haste to sink the warrior in the legislator, the new leaders will, if left to their own resources, take an opposite course. He was at once the Romulus, and the Numa, of St. Domingo, but Dessalines will be rather the Hostilius. Nothing, in short, but the security which their dear bought freedom might derive by being placed under the safeguard of Great Britain, can prevent this new people from devoting all their resources to preparations for future war ; from neglect- ing those arts which might render them most valuable friends to us, and cultivating those habits which will make them most formidable neigh- bours. I remarked, in the second place, that the ad vantages, commercial and political, of a trade with St.

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48 St. Domingo, wptild, without the proposed alli- ance, " be less permanent" than such an alliance might make them. The negro chiefs will probably be willing enough to enter with us into a treaty simply commercial, should they find that no more can be obtained; or even without a treaty, they will allow us freely to trade to their ports ; and under the circumstances of the moment, amicable conduct towards the subjects of this country will perhaps be carefully observed ; but if we wish for a lasting privilege or preference beyond other foreigners, we must, as already observed, obtain it by com- pact ; and though we are the only people on earth who dare at this moment to accept of such a grant, yet in order effectually to obtain and pre- serve it, we must give in return some equivalent benefit. The reciprocity of commercial advantage alone will not entitle us for a moment to any such dis- tinction ; for in this respect other nations will have* equal or superior pretensions. Their vessels will bring the commodities of Europe and America into* the ports of St. Domingo for sale upon terms at least as cheap as those of the British importer ; and wilt receive West India produce in return, at a price at least as high as our merchants can afford to offer» In order, therefore, to outbid all other competitors, we must add to mere mercantile considerations, what

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C 49 what we alone can offer, and entitle ourselves not only to a present predilection, but future gratitude and attachment, by the offer of a defensive alli- ance. Should it be supposed, that the assistance which has, for our own sakes, and in a very equivocal spirit, been given towards the expulsion of a common enemy, would at the present moment be so favourably considered, as to procure for us, without any further consiJeration, a com- mercial preference to other nations, the perma- nence of any advantages which should upon that account alone be obtained, might still be reason- ably doubted. The powerful motive of self-interest would be wanting to ensure their stability; they would soon therefore be viewed with a grudging eye, as the price of services which were past, and the value whereof had perhaps been o\er-rated: rival merchants would represent our privileges as unreasonable restraints of trade, and labour, not without success, to render them unpopular in the island, till they might at length become, rather sources of contention, than bonds of mutual amity. Not so, if a great or exclusive preference of British commerce, were the stipulated considera- tion for a guarantee of their freedom and a perpe- tual defensive alliance. In that case, our privileges vould stand upon the strongest and most durable II pillars

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C 50 pillars that the gratitude and self-love of the new people, could conjointly raise to support them ; the British flag would be regarded as the palladium of their social happiness and safety, and an attach- ment might be expected to ensue, not less powerful and lasting than their love of liberty, or their an- tipathy to a horrible bondage. So assiduous and successful have been the arts of calumny against this much injured race, that with those who have viewed them only in the pictures drawn by their oppressors, it may not be here un- necessary to assert their claim to human cha- racter in the sense of benefits conferred *. Na- tional gratitude is certainly a virtue which the page of history does not often exhibit in the conduct of polished societies ; but if any one doubts whe- ther the people of St. Domingo can distinguish and * See a shocking instance of misrepresentation on this head in an author of no vulgar name, well exposed bv Mr. Brougham in his able work on the Colonial Policy of the European Pow- ers, -*ol. ii. p. 4j8. This work, though it contains some important erroi», abounds in valuable information, deep reflection, and ingeni- ous argument upon W est Indian affairs. Mr. B.'s views of practical policy m relation to St. Domingo were diametrically opposite to those which were developed in the Crisis, and ¦which it is the object of these sheets to impress; but Mr. B. wrote when, in common with the European public in general, he thought a counter revolution in that island an attainable object. The contrary being now demonstrated, the author may safely invoke much of that gentleman's reasoning as auxiliary to his own. adher<*

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-51 adhere to their public benefactors, let him advert to their unprecedented steadiness of attachment to all their faithful leaders. From the first establish- ment of their freedom, till they were treacherously bereaved of Toussaint, their fidelity to that great man, in peace, as well as war, was truly remark- able; and since his fall, Dessalines and Christophe, who wyere his most faithful adherents, and principal officers, have been objects of as steady an attach- ment. I rely, however, upon principles much surer and stronger than gratitude, which would bind them for ever to Great Britain, should she now become the patroness and guardian of their freedom. We have hitherto adverted only to those com- mercial benefits, and that better security of our sugar colonies from revolutionary dangers, which might be derived from the proposed alliance. But the same measure is necessary to avert some po- litical inconveniences and perils of a more direct and comprehensive kind, which are likely to flow from fhe present state of St. Domingo, These I will proceed to consider, 1st. As they belong to the existing state of affairs. 2d. As they will arise in future, but certain, or highly probable situations. At this moment, the various political relations of St .Domingo are singular, and highly perplexing, The

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52 Ihe new state is at war with all our confederated enemies, and at war also with one of our friends. It is the foe of France and Holland, who are also our foes, and yet is not our confederate ; it is equally hostile to Spain with whom we are in amity, and yet is at peace with ourselves. What makes these cross relations more singular and more embarrassing, is, that the principal par- ties to them are all placed within sight of each others territories. The same visible horizon com- prises, together with St. Domingo, some of the most important colonial coasts of Spain and Great Britain; and for all the purposes of war against the negro people, Cuba, which is one of those neighbouring shores, may be regarded as a colony of France. It is from the ports on the East end of that, island, and from that station alone, that the French cruizers and fugitive troops are now feebly annoying their sable enemies, and menacing them with a new descent. A man must be totally ignorant of the navi- gation and trade of the gulph of Mexico, not to perceive at a single glance the mischievous ten- dency of this state of things to the commerce of Great Britain, and the disputes which it must soon unavoidably occasion between such of the parties as are yet at peace with each other. Let us advert, for instance, to that profitable trade which is carried on between our free ports in

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53 3 in the West Indies, and the Spanish colonies. A great part of the goods which are the subject of that commerce, are, during their transit to and from our ports, the property7 of Spaniards, and of course liable to capture and condemnation by these sable enemies of Spain, the only foes she now has to seize them; and though no inconsi- derable portion of the same lucrative trade is car- ried on upon account of our own merchants, yet from the rigid system of the cabinet of Madrid, the British owner is for the most part obliged to cover his property under the names of Spa- niards, and to send it in vessels really or ostensibly Spanish. The consequence is, that when vessels engaged in this trade shall be captured by the cruizers of St. Domingo, they and their cargoes, though actually British, will be apparently hostile. Such property will, by the law of nations, be fairly confiscable, even though the fact of British ownership should be capable of being clearly esta- blished; for it is a principle in the prize court, that a hostile flag and papers are conclusive against the claimant. But supposing the negro chiefs to be either uninformed of this law, or so indulgent to- wards our merchants as to wave its application, and allow them, on proof of their property in such cases, to obtain restitution ; still very serious ex- pence, inconvenience, and loss, must be sustained before their chums could be established: nor is it easy

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54 easy to say what species of evidence would or ought to satisfy the captors, or a prize tribunal, that property embarked in a transaction wholly con- ducted by enemies, and avowed by all the papers to be hostile, really belongs to a friend. That such captures would at least be a fertile source of troublesome and dangerous disputes, is certain ; nor can it be doubted that they would very greatly discourage, if not wholly ruin, a trade highly be- neficial to this country. The effects of these hostilities between St Domingo and Cuba, will be the more vexatious, because by them on'y, at this period, can the peace of the Gulph of Mexico and of the Wind- ward Passage be disturbed. We shall lose through this cause alone, the profound tran- quillity which our commerce might otherwise, from circumstances unprecedented in any former war, enjoy in that part of the world. Though France has now no port to leeward of Guadaloupe, though St. Domingo is amicable to us, and Spain is still indulged with the rights of neutrality, yet British property may be captured, and British navigation greatly disturbed, in that important gulph, and its outlets, even within sight of Ja- maica. Whether any great inconveniences have hither- to arisen from this situation of things, I am not informed. In some degree its bad effects doubtless have

65 0055

55 ) have already been felt ; but the surrender of the Cape, and the expulsion of the French from St. . Domingo, were, at the dale of the last àavices from that quarter which have been given to the public, very recent events l, and the hostilities between that island and Cuba had but just com- menced. Their noxious tendency therefore in re- regard tb British commerce, could not well so soon have displayed itself, in any very extensive conse- quences. These hostilities, however, will, in all probabi- lity, soon be greatly increased both in their extent and activity. The Indigenes, otherwise called, like all the other brave opposers of French usurpation, Brigands, were able, even during their arduous contest with Rochambeau, to fit out many armed boats and vessels, which greatly annoyed the com- merce of their enemies on various parts of the coast ; but now, when the harbours are in their possession, and when they have no enemy in the interior, their cruizers will naturally become far more numerous; and many of them will probably be of sufficient force to attack openly the largest merchant-men, it not also any armed vessels, by which they are likely to be opposed. Within a short distance of their shores, or in either of those narrow but important channels which divide them from Cuba and Jamaica, it will soon not be easy to navigate without encountering that yet new and undescribed

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56 undescribed phenomenon, the flag of the West Indian republic. Is if asked by what means this rude commu- nity will be able speedily to acquire ships and naval stores ? Every capture which they make will add to their petty marine such a bottom as may be fit for annoying, in those calm seas, the unarmed merchantmen of their enemy, many of which are continually passing within sight of their ports: nor can it be doubted that they have even at the present moment, produce enough to barter with neutral merchants for such naval and military stores as may suffice for the equipment of their vessels. Indeed the valuable cargoes which must fall into their hands, will soon furnish an ample fund to pay for these, and all other ne- cessary supplies. But privateering, let me add, is a species of trade which will never be at a stand through the want of capital, where there is a good prospect of profitable captures ; and if the proper resources of the new state itself should be inadequate to the fitting out of a sufficient number of cruizers effec- tually to annoy their enemies, they will be at no loss for foreign assistance, not even, strange though it may seem, for that of his Majesty's sub- jects. The rich commerce of the Spanish West Indies is a bait which always fascinates the eyes of our seamen, and of all adventurers, accus- tomed

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C 57 tomed td engage in the business of privateering, especially such of them as inhabit or frequent the Bahama and Bermuda islands ; and these men now regard with impatience the delay of a war with Spain ; for as to the trade of the few co- lonies remaining to France and Holland, it offer» to such sportsmen but poor game any where j and in the Gulph of Mexico, or its passages, scarcely any at all. Rely upon it, therefore, that should we much longer continue at peace with the court of Madrid, no small part of the privateer- ing capital and enterprize of British subjects will be transferred from our own colpnies to St* Domingo. At the same time, the remnant of the old Buccaneer race still remaining dispersed in various parts of the West Indies, and who assume always that particular national character which favours most for the moment their love of contraband employment and maritime plunder, will flock with avidity to the ports of that island, to engage under the new flag in their accustomed pursuits. Never since Hispaniola was rendered formidable by the exploits of that piratical race, not even when, during the 17th century, they revelled at once in the spoils both of Spanish and English commerce, were there such dazzling inducements offered to privateers-men, as the same island at the present conjuncture holds forth. Not only will the trade of Porto Rico, the rich com- I merce

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58 1 merce of the Havannah, and the great exports of Cuba at large, increased as they are of late years far beyond all former example, be a sure and easy prey, but a great part also of the trea- sures of Mexico and Peru may be intercepted on its passage to Europe by the cruizers of this centrical island : and the facility of bringing the spoil into port, will be not less tempting, than the ease with which it can be captured. Let the possible effects of these combinations be pursued by the eye of state prudence be- yond the present day. I have already adverted to the consequences of a military spirit being formed in this infant society ; but would an ap- petence for maritime capture, be less dangerous to their commercial neighbours ? Their war with the Spanish colonies may sow deep in this new soil the seeds of a predatory disposition, which, springing up among the first shoots of social habits and institutions, may be found very hard to eradicate, and the independent Africans of the Antilles, may hereafter, like those of Barbary, be a scourge to all mafitime powers. Should it be objected to these calculations, that Spain, not having acknowledged the indepen- dency of St. Domingo, and being at peace with France, might reasonably treat the negro priva- teersmen and their foreign associates as pirates ; I answer, that it would argue great ignorance of the character of such adventurers, and of the spirit

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r 59 i spirit of privateering in general, to suppose that? such severity would materially check their career. It would be much easier indeed for Spain to threat- en such penalties, than actually to inflict them ; for so slender is her maritime foice in the West Indies, when compared with the extent of her possessions and trade in that quarter, that she can- not check, in any tolerable degree, that enormous contraband commerce with her colonies, which notoriously prevails. Although her guarda costa's are sufficiently disposed to make seizures, the smuggler despises their feeble efforts, and carries on, often by day light, and upon the very coasts they are appointed to guard, a trade, which, in case of capture, would consign him to slavery for life. With how much more facility would the hostile cruizers of St. Domingo be able, on the open seas or near their own shores, to elude the few armed ships of Spain, from which her scat- tered commerce might occasionally derive pro- tection; and how inadequate would such slight danger of capture be, to repress the ardent spirit of privateering ! So easy is it on those extensive and accessible coasts to escape into port, that the brigand boats, as they were called, frequently captured the merchantmen which brought sup- plies to Rochambeau, even while a strong French squadron was stationed at the Cape, and while the principal harbours were still in possession of their enemy. Need it be added, that the conse- quence

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C 60 quence of their being made prisoners by the French at that time, would have been death to these en- terprizing men, and death too in some horrible form? The Spaniards, however, will scarcely dare to treat as pirates, men acting under the commission of a government which is de facto independent, and which is well able to practise a dreadful re- taliation. Without dwelling longer on this copious sub- ject, I may safely consider it as proved, that if the harvest of Spanish booty is to be reaped by the cruizers of St. Domingo, and by them only, there will be no want of labourers or sickles for the work. " But would such a treaty as is proposed be a preventative of all the evils, commercial and poli- tical, to which we have adverted ?" It would give us, I answer, the best attainable security against them. Such an alliance with the negro chiefs would, for instance, intitle us in so high a degree to their confidence and favour, that a pass from our go- vernment might be allowed by them to operate as a sufficient protection to British property, even when found in the hands of enemies, and under a Spanish disguise. They would probably go still further, and allow Spanish vessels to pass un- molested to and from British ports, even when trading on their own account. At all events, a full persuasion of our sincere amity in the breast of

The Opportunity. pp. 61-80. 71 0061

61 of the new government, would be a safeguard against dangerous contentions; and would insure to us easy redress, when our commerce might, through the ignorance or misconduct of indivi- duals, be improperly disturbed. Our great influence might, however, extend to purposes still more beneficial and important. We might very possibly engage our grateful allies to renounce their just enmity towards the Spaniards ; and thus, with the concurrence of the latter, com- pletely restore peace to those seas, in the tran- quillity of which we have so large an interest. It would be no unequal condition in the proposed league, to require, as a consideration of the im- portant guarantee we should give, that our new allies should be hereafter the friend of our friends, as well as the enemy of our enemies ; and as to Spain, she would have little right or inclination to complain, should we, in consequence of such an alliance, demand of her the termination of a war, which, without any rational object on her part, must be a present nuisance to her colonies as well as our own, and threatens to both in its pro- gress the most pernicious and destructive effects. The court of Madrid must, doubtless, already view with regret a troublesome and useless quar- rel, in which nothing but necessary complaisance to the French republic, could have induced it to engage; and would rejoice to procure a peace through our mediation, if without violence to the same

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62 3 same necessary principle, that end cpuld he at- tained. I presume not indeed to say whether France would permit such a measure I cannot venture- to conjecture how Jong the neutrality of Spain may be deemed by the consul more important to hi» treasury, than her co-operation in the war would be to his arms; nor, on the other hand, Can I presume to appreciate those considerations,, by which our own court has been induced to treat hitherto, and may be led still to treat, as a friend, this tributary vassal of France» But as Buona- parte must have powerful reasons for permitting so dependent and obsequious a neighbour to pre- serve her pacific attitude, and to admit freely int(| her ports that odious British commerce which he is anxious to banish from the Continent, the same motives may perhaps induce him to relinquish the objec^ of giving to his sable enemies a trivial an- noyance from the ports of Cuba, should he find that a neutrality towards them is firmly demanded from the Spanish court by the ministers of this country. If, on the contrary, a measure essential to the safe passage of the colonial wealth of Spain in its way to Europe, and consequently to the French ex- chequer, should be prohibited by the consul, it might perhaps deserve to be well considered, whe- ther his latent views in such conduct must not be of a kind b^ighly dangerous tp this country> and whether

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C 63 whether the disadvantages of our amity with Spain in the West Indies, were not in that case greater than the balance of precarious profit which we derive from it in Europe. Let it be recollected, that her war with St. Domingo is the only pre- tence upon which that power could compatibly with the general laws of neutrality towards this country, allow French ships of war to be fitted out, and rendezvous in the ports of Cuba; and at the same time let an estimate be made of the an- noyance to which our commerce must inevitably be exposed through this pennission, and of the additional waste of men and money to which we shall in consequence be subjected on the Jamaica station. Remove this nuisance by removing the pretext for it, and France will not have a port to leeward of Guadaloupe from which she can fit out a single privateer. But if, in the case last considered, it should be thought more prudent to submit to some of the inconveniences which have been suggested, than to obviate them at the expence of a rupture with Spain ; still a strict amity and alliance with the negro chiefs, would avert from us a great part of the impending evils. If we could not restore peace to the Gulph of Mexico, and its outlets, at least we should obtain the best chance of pre- serving our pacific and commercial relations with both the neighbouring combatants, and that with the least possible degree of inconvenience and loss. Having

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64 Haviug thus far adverted to the inconveniences and dangers, which, during our existing political relations, are likely to spring from the new state of St. Domingo, let us next, as was proposed, consider those which are likely to flow from the same source, in future, but certain or highly pro- bable situations. If we anticipate, in the first place, an event, which must be admitted to be highly probable, that of Spain becoming a party to the present war, as our enemy, and the confederate of France, it will be found, that the same causes which have already been stated, would still operate very unfavourably to our commerce, as well as to our colonial secu- rity. It was the policy of our government, during the last war, to profit by the necessities of the Spanish colonies, so as to supply them, notwithstanding the existing hostilities, with our manufactures, in ex- change for their produce and bull ion ; and though all commerce with an enemy is in general prohibited, under penalty of confiscation of the property en- gaged in it, yet in favour of this particular branch of trade, that rule of the law of war was dispensed with by orders of his Majesty in council*. British subjects were permitted to trade upon their own account to and from the ports of Spanish Ameri- ca ; and the subjects of Spain were protected by * Orders of Council of 28th March, 1st May, and 7th Au- gust, 1798. the

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65 3 the same authority, in trading as in time of peace to our free ports in the West Indies. Licences from our governors exempted the vessels and car- goes engaged in such commerce from capture ; or in case of their being seized, intitled the British or Spanish owners to immediate restitution. From the same important national consider- ations upon which this indulgence was founded, we may reasonably expect its renewal, in the event of a new quarrel with Spain ; and beyond doubt, our manufacturers and merchants are greatly interested in the maintenance of such commercial policy in that quarter of the globe. But here the hostilities between the Spanish co- lonies and St. Domingo, will present to us new and most formidable obstacles ; for in war, as well as in peace, our trade with those colonies has always, by their own law, been strictly prohibited; and could only be carried on clandestinely, by means of ficti- tious papers, under the Spanish flag, and a tually, or ostensibly, on account of merchants of that na- tion. Even during the greatest straits to which their colonies were reduced by our hostilities in the late war, through the dearth of essential sup- plies, their vessels were seized and confiscated by their own government, when detected in trading to or from a British port. It is obvious, therefore, that the property which may be engaged in this trade during a future war with Spain, will be ex- K posed

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66 posed to the same jeopardy, and be subject to the same inconveniencies and losses, that have al- ready been pointed out, m respect of our now sub sisting intercourse with those colonies. We shall obviously have no right to protect the ships or goods of Spanish merchants from the hostilities of their new enemy, though we may exempt them from our own ; and to elicit the fact of British ownership from the mass of Spanish evi- dences in which it is disguised, would, as before observed, be a very difficult or impracticable task. A trade, therefore, which already not only exposes the property embarked in it, but the persons of the immediate agents, to serious dangers, would be subjected to such new and formidable ad- ditional risques, that it must be greatly discou- raged and diminished, if not wholly destroyed. The operations of war carried on from the neighbouring coasts of Jamaica and St. Domingo against an enemy within sight of both, could not fail to produce other, and numerous, occasions of dispute, and of serious public inconvenience, unless the mutual stipulations of a treaty, and the good will and confidence arising from an ex- press confederacy, were the wholesome expedients of prevention. Cases ofjoint capture, for instance, and of re- capture or rescue, would in those narrow chan- nels very frequently occur; and the necessary but invidious

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67 3 invidious right of search, must be exercised on both sides, between the independent and unallied belligerents. The neutral ships trading to the ports of St. Domingo, and their cargoes, would also be subjects of frequent and dangerous con- troversy; especially as the new people will have occasion largely to import articles of a contraband nature, and as the pretence of a destination to their ports, might be made a specious mask for the conveyance of such noxious goods to Cuba, or to the Spanish main. Questions of still greater deli- cacy and danger might arise, from the opposite principles which would be applied by our captors, and those of the new state respectively, to the na- tives of Africa, or créole negroes, found on board prize vessels; especially should they be the sub- ject of joint capture, or of recapture; or should they, by any other means, be supposed to be pri- vileged by the new sanctuary of African captives and bondsmen. And here another copious source of discord pre- sents itself. To what extent shall the harbours and roadsteads of St. Domingo on the one side, and of Jamaica on the other, be privileged from the operations of war against any cruizers but their own ? or how far shall the property of prizes made within their limits, vest in the government of the country to which they belong ? Without anticipating any further grounds of controversy,

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68. controversy, I may safely affirm, that the most anxious conventional precautions, and that con- fidence which belongs to the most unequivocal amity, can alone secure us, in the case last sup- posed, from pernicious and fatal disputes ; and that whatever chance we may have of avoiding, under present circumstances, a quarrel with the people of St. Domingo, their speedy enmity would, unless prevented by an alliance, be almost an ine- vitable consequence of hostilities between this country and Spain. It may, perhaps, at first sight be thought that hatred to a common enemy, would be a suffici- ent bond of attachment ; and that when at war with the only hostile neighbour of the new state, we should have influence enough over this inferior co-belligerent for every useful purpose, without any express alliance. But as there would be no common cause, or mutual object in the war, much less any claim on our part to be consider- ed as volunteer auxiliaries, the negro chiefs could feel little disposition to abate for our sakes any part of their belligerent rights ; much less to Conduct their war upon principles calculated tQ consult our convenience, interest, or security, at the expence of their own. It would not be forgotten by them, that Spain had been suffered to lend the ports of Cuba to the French fugitives, for purposes hostile to St. Domingo ;

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r 69 i St. Domingo; and that the measure, though dan- gerous to ourselves, had not been regarded by us as any violation of her neutrality to this country, merely because the Indigenes were the immediate objects of annoyance. Perhaps the memory of these chiefs might take a still longer retrospect, and by suggesting to them our conduct towards the illustrious Toussaint, at the conclusion of our former war with France, might admonish them to look in the existing contest to their own security alone; lest by furthering our selfish views, they should only .accelerate a new invasion, and a new surprise, by the armies of the republic. The ex- traordinary measure of our destroying or carrying away their means of defence upon the surrender to our ships of certain fortresses, after those places had been previously reduced, at the expence of much African blood, to the necessity of an im- mediate capitulation, might also be remembered; and, to be sure, no conduct could indicate more plainly a design on our part of resuming towards them our former policy, on the close of our new quarrel with France. But such indications of a separate and selfish object in our war with their enemies, would not be necessary to teach them to take care of*them- selves. It would be enough that we had not acknowledged their independency, much less un- dertaken to defend it ; and that there was no conventional

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70 3 conventional association with them in those hos- tilities in which we had, at length, for our own sakes, engaged. In the selfish and discordant pro- pensities of human nature, at least, the calumnia- tors of the African race will not refuse them a share; and their friends, on the other hand, will neither admit them to be so dull, nor assert that the}' are so preposterously generous, as to renounce, for the sake of our constrained co-operation, the care of their own interest and safety. For my part, I should expect as little regard from them to their reluctant foreign coadjutors, as if they had been educated at Vienna or Berlin ; and should look for as little of practical concert, and mutual deference, between the casual co-belligerents of the Antilles, as was exhibited between those of the late war in Europe. » In the case immediately under consideration, and in all our future wars, much of positive ad- vantage would be lost, as well as very serious evils incurred, should you neglect to avail your- self, as I advise, of the present, happy oppor- tunity. The geographical position of St. Domingo is such, as would make the free use of its ports, of the greatest importance to either party in a war between this country and its ancient enemies. From no station can the trade of Cuba and the Mexican provinces be so effectually annoyed; and that

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71 that it completely locks in and commands the island of Jamaica, an inspection of the map, with attention to the course of the trade wind, will sufficiently demonstrate. The importance of the island in a maritime war has hitherto been infinitely less than it is likely in future to prove ; because, since the colonial inte- rests, and the naval strength of Great Britain and France fully attained to their great and long con- tinued preponderance, and engaged those leading powers in frequent West Indian wars, St. Domingo and the Spanish colonies have never till now been hostile to each other, but have been under the do- minion of allied and confederated sovereigns. The belligerent consequence of this great island, there- fore, has been chiefly felt in the annoyance given by French ships, rendezvousing in its ports, to the commerce of Jamaica; and this effect has been mitigated, not only by the great naval force of this country, which has enabled us to keep up strong squadrons on that station, and to employ very powerful convoys, but from the immense ex- tent and value of the exports of St. Domingo itself, and of the Spanish colonies, which obliged our allied enemies for the most part to limit their maritime efforts in that quarter to purposes merely defensive. Alany of our merchantmen from Jamaica, indeed, were carried into the ports of St. Domingo, but a much larger proportion of the

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72 3 the enemy's ships which sailed to and from those ports, were captured by British cruizers ; so that the balance of prize acquisition and loss, was usually much in our favour. It may be added, that great incidental protection was afforded to our commerce in the windward passage, and the Gulph, by the numerous British privateers which, invited by the hope of falling in with rich St. Domingo-men, made those seas their constant resort. A moment's attention to the singular reverse in most of these circumstances which must arise from the great change that has lately taken place, will suffice to shew the important influence which the amity or enmity of the new state, would have upon our maritime interests, in our wars with our ancient enemies. Hispaniola, no longer under the dominion of the house of Bourbon, or of that power, styling itself a republic, which has seized upon one of the thrones of the Bourbons, will, if hostile to Spain, and in confederacy with ourselves, be found a most important ally. With the numerous ports on the North, South, and West of this large island at our command, and with an aux- iliary army of negroes at our call, our power to distress the Spanish colonies and commerce, would be as wide as our inclination to do so. From the same advantages, the defence of Jamaica, and of all our commerce in the Gulph of Mexico, would

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73 3 would be a work of unprecedented cheapness and facility. Great on the other hand, beyond all former experience, would be the annoyance to which we should be exposed by the hostility of St. Do- mingo, supposing its government to side in fu- ture wars with a maritime enemy of this country. While Jamaica, perpetually menaced with inva- sion by a negro army, would cost us a frightful waste of British lives, as well as treasure, in a ser- vice merely defensive, our trade in that quarter would be harassed by the undiverted operations of such ships and squadrons, as a European enemy, the ally of the new state, might send to rendez- vous in its harbours. Nor would these evils be compensated in any material degree by such rich spoils as were formerly made from the commerce of St.Domingo; for supposing its exports to regain even their former magnitude, the new political re- lations of the island would rescue them from the grasp of om cruizers. Its external commerce, to whatever extent revived, would no longer be con- ducted on account of the islanders themselves, or of our European enemies, but being at all times entirely in the hands of foreign merchants, would m time of war, be carried on upon account of such foreigners only as should possess the advan- tage of ncutial character; the property engaged L in

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C 74 in it would consequently, unless under special circumstances, be exempt from capture. That important belligerent right, the right of maintain- ing against neutral intervention in time of war, the commercial restrictions by which a hostile government had monopolized the trade of its co- lonies in time of peace, will here have no appli- cation. In this, and many other respects, we shall experience the important difference between a trans-atlantic enemy, the satellite of some Eu- ropean power ; and the same enemy, when en- franchised from all exterior connection, and act- ing against us as a principal in the war, or an in- dependent confederate. To undervalue or slight these considerations on account of the present depression of the French marine, and the pacific disposition of Spain, or because Trance has no longer any territory in the Leeward division of the Antilles, would be highly improvident ; for of these extenuatory circumstances, the two latter may be very speed- ily reversed, and the first considerably altered. The Consul could, no doubt, with a single man- date, obtain the cession of Porto Rico, or even Cuba, as well as compel the court of Madrid to join him in the war ; and that the navy of France may be one day sufficiently restored to be trouble- some to our commerce and colonies, is surely no impossible event Whether

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75 3 Whether then, sir, you regard the probable ef- fects in the West Indies of our existing relations,- or anticipate the changes likely to take place in those relations before we can sheath the sword^ or look forward, with a providence which the state of Europe loudly demands, to future wars, the prudence of embracing the present fortunate opportunity is too manifest to be denied. In either view, it is of vast importance to insure, if possible, that the new born West Indian power shall hereafter be propitious to ourselves, and ad- verse to our enemies. But tp this end no half measures will suffice. If a connection merely commercial will not, as has been already shown, be an adequate security against dis- cord and future enmity, much less will it entitle us to the positive benefits, which we might derive from more»intimate relations with the new people, when at war with a maritime power. A commercial treaty might indeed so far abate their reasonable distrust, that they might no longer fear to admit our ships of war into their harbours, as Dessa- lines apparently did, when he declined to fur- nish us with pilots * ; but if we would have the free *ÀttheCape. See Gazette of February 7th, 1804. Itisapity that the whole correspondence upon the subject of the capitula- tion with Rochambeau was not published, because the apparent mutilation

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76 3 free use of their ports for the purposes of naval equipment and enterprize, and avail ourselves in other respects of their very important aid against a common enemy, as well as guard again&t their great power of future annoyance, we must con- ciliate their confidence and attachment, by a de- fensive alliance. Were I to stop here, considerations enough perhaps have been offered in support of the plan recommended to justify its immediate adoption, unless more weighty objections than I am able to anticipate can be placed in the opposite scale. But these, cogent though they appear to be, are by no means the most important or urgent, of the motives that call for such a measure. The grand, and I will venture to add, the con- clusive, arguments yet remain to be opened. Hitherto we have not supposed the possibility of a speedy reconciliation between St. Domingo and France nor have we considered the conse- mutilation of it, leaves room for conjecture, that the negro chief had still better grounds for his conductthan met the public eye. Was it intended to destroy or carry away the military stores at the Cape, as well as at Fort Dauphin ? A refusal of Rocham- beau to permit us so far to frustrate his capitulation with Des- salines, or at least his refusal to capitulate to our squadron on those terms, would appear to have been one cause of the re sentment which his conduct inspired at Jamaica. quences

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I 77 } quences of leaving the republic on the termina* tion of the present war, in possession of her claim to that island but to these most momen- tous and alarming views of our subject, I must now proceed to invite your serious attention. And first, let us advert to the chance of a recon- ciliation, between the Indigenes and their formée masters. If wrongs the most perfidious, cruel, and exas- perating, that were ever offered by a government to a people, could to a certainty preclude the chance of future amity between them, St, Domin- go must be for ever lost tq France, not only as a province, but a friend. It seems at this moment a monstrous notion even, and injurious to the cha- racter of the brave Indigenes, to conceive, that they can ever be brought again to profess them- selves, subjects or friends of the republic. Their unparalleled wrongs appear to justify, and even to demand from them, an indignation against their barbarous oppressors never to be ended or as- suaged. i " Immortale odium, et nunquam sanabile vulnus., But let us not draw precipitate conclusipns upon this truly important subject. That the present despot of France should ever again conciliate the confidence of that injured people,

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78 people, is indeed I hope impossible. He has pro- bably sinned against them beyond forgiveness, and has deceived and betrayed them so basely, as to preclude all future faith in his promises or his oaths. But Buonapaite, let it be remem- bered, is not immortal ; nor is his authority, se- cure from a sudden and speedy subversion. What changes the death or depos'tion of that tyrant might make in the European policy of France, it is not easy to foresee ; but this may with almost certainty be predicted, that in what regards her West India colonies, his measures would be totally reversed. The loss of St. Do mingo, the new infamy brought upon the French name by his detestable conduct in the Antilles, the sacrifice of sixty thousand brave and veteran troops, by a project which both ih its conception and its intemperate prosecution, was superlatively Wicked and weak these are faults which his inimi cal successors would be happy to blazon,and which even a new government friendly to his memory, could such a one be expected to succeed to his power, would find it more politic to exhibit than conceal. Those pernicious measures had, prior even to their ignominious catastrophe, become very un- popular ; especially with the army ; and it may be questioned whether they were not so from the beginning,

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C 79 3 beginuing, with a great majority of the people of Fiance But now at least, their fatal effects must be a source of general discontent ; and would furnish reason enough to a new administration, for condemning the past, andi adopting an oppo* site system How powei fully must these considerations be strengthened by recent events!^-A new war with England, the reconquesk of some of the» Windward Islands, the danger of the rest, and) the ultimate evacuation of St. Domingo, have brought back a state of things such as led the convention, in 1794, to decree enfranchisement to the colonial negroes at large ; and such as must make even the Consul himself deplore his own. egregious folly, in wholly reversing that decree. If not yet heartily inclined to retrace his steps, and to replace on the side of France, allies who could not only make for him a most powerful diversion of the regular British army, but enable him to preserve his remaining colonies, and to stab deep into the bosom of our commerce, it must be because his despotic pride, and the in- fluence of his West Indian connections united, are an overmatch for his policy, and even for his ha- tred of England But his successors, on whom such a reverse of system would reflect no dis- grace, would infallibly be di posed to adopt it ; «tt least in respect of St. Domingo. They

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f «o 1 They would first, probably attempt to regain the sovereignty of the island ; by offering such a solemn recognition of freedom, and such security' for its future maintenance, as might induce the Indigenes to wave, their claim of independency, and again to profess themselves citizens of the Re- publio. But supposing this attempt to fail, poli- tical independency, would probably be conceded, upon the condition of their giving to France the- exclusive right of trading to their ports, and en- tering with her-into a perpetual alliance. If the new governors of the Republic should be en- lightened politicians, they may possibly perceive that such a confederacy would make St. Domingo far more valuable to France, and more formidable to England, than it would become even by the re- newal of its former subjection. Upon such a basis as this, the practicability of a reconciliation cannot reasonably be doubted. But that a submission even to the sovereignty of the Republic, would be inexorably refused to a government, by which the odious power of the Consul had been overthrown, is by no means cer- tain. The new rulers of France would be able spe- ciously, and even truly, to ascribe to the despotic government which they had abolished, those hi- deous sins against the African race, by which the Republic had been disgraced j and credibly to aK ledge

The Opportunity. pp. 81-100. 91 0081

C 81 ledge'that the trans-atlantic measures of the Con- sul had been as opposite to the sense of the French people, as to the dictates of justice and humanity. At the time, it might be said, when the freedom of the colonial negroes was perfidi- ously invaded, that of the French citizens in Europe had been totally suppressed ; and a new reign of terror, had made them irresponsible for the acts of the second Robertspierre. In justice to our unhappy enemies, it must be acknowledged, that they have in this case as fair an apology, as their own enslaved condition can afford. It is a striking fact, that the law brought into the senate by the agents of the Consul, to», revive the slave trade, and abrogate that charter of colonial freedom, the decree of February, 1794, was opposed with much greater boldness, than any of those domestic innovations by which that assem- bly was made to sacrifice its own boasted rights, and the liberty of the Republic. No less than twenty- seven members had the courage and the virtue to vote against that execrable law, in opposition to a government majority of fifty-four *. In an at- tempt to conciliate the negroes of St. Domingo, this fact would not be forgotten, and might fairly produce a very considerable effect. * Paris Newspapers of May 20th, 1802. M It

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t S2 ) It is obvious, that if such apologies for past oon-< duct, should suffice to appease the resentment, and remove the suspicion of the black colonists, or if a new French government should prudently limit its pretensions to a mode of connection of which confidence is no indispensable basis, there are many powerful inducements which would dispose the new people to intimate connections with France, in preference to any other nation. Unity of language is one of these motives, of which among an illiterate people, the effect will be peculiarly great. But a still more powerful sympathy will be found in the unity of religious worship, and te- nets. The slaves in the French islands, prior to the revolution, were by no means wholly neglected hi point of religious culture. Many pious mis- sionaries, laboured earnestly for their instruction and conversion, and were protected and aided by the government, in the prosecution of that charitable work. Nor did the established clergy of those islands, regard this degraded class as unworthy of their pastoral care : so that by the concurrence of regular and irre- gular efforts, a large proportion of the negroes, were brought to as much knowledge of Chris- tianity, as is usually the portion of the poor and illiterate

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illiterate in the Roman Catholic countries of Eu- rope. Masters, or colonial assemblies, were not left at liberty, as in some other colonies, to gratify their own latent infidelity, or their prejudices against the African race, by obstructing either the parish priests or missionaries, in this part of their clerical duty. Religion brought in her train, to these un- happy men, temporal, as well as spiritual comforts. They obtained, during the great annual festivals of the church, periods of repose which the master durst not invade ; and found in their confessor, one of the awfully privileged race, into whose ear they could, when suffering under any illegal or unusual degree of oppression, without danger, pour their complaints, Through the mediation of this patron, not only was the conscience of the master often induced to listen to the dictates of justice or mercy ; but the protection of the ma- gistrate was sometimes invoked with safety to the complainants, against such wrongs as the law would redress. By these causes, not only was their attachment to, and zeal for, religion promoted, but that rever- ence which the Romish tenets and ceremonies are strongly calculated to secure to the priesthood, Was naturally encreased ; so that the clergy had a very powerful influence upon the minds of the slaves ;

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{ 84 slaves ; and the effect survived at St. Domingo the revolution which gave them their fi eedom ; for the priests were notoriously in high favour with Tous- saint, and were supposed greatly to influence his Councils. The popularity of the clergy has since no doubt been much impaired ; but it is probably not entirely lost ; for though Some of the body, seem to have become the dupes, or willing instru- ments, of the Consul's perfidious policy, the greater part of them it is fair to presume, hav e deplored the vile measures of the government ; and if they durst hot oppose, have at least not openly involved themselves in its crimes. But at all events, if the religious principle hai> survived among any large portion of the people, it will be a necessary effect of the Romish faith, to restore the influence of the priesthood. To the independency of the new society, the clergy will probably feel no disinclination, pro- vided it can be placed under the safeguard of a powerful guarantee ; but if not, their prudence, and their European feelings, will conspire with their predilections as Frenchmen and Catholics, to make them desirous of a reconciliation with the Republic: Their powerful influence therefore may in that case be expected to favour any agree- ment which France may propose ; at least, if it be not inconsistent with the freedom and happiness of their converts, Nor

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T 35 3 Nor are these the only adherents by whom the Indigenes are likely to be influenced in favour of a compromise with France, should we leave them unoccupied by a better exterior connection. They bave European inmates and fellow soldiers, whose superior knowledge and talents must naturally have great weight in their public councils ; aud to these, an equivocal or irresolute conduct on our part in regard to the independency of the new state, will create an evident necessity of making their peace with France. The Polish, Ital'an, and French deserters, and even such of the phnters, who either from the first op- posed th»3 violent measures of the government, or forsook the sinking cause of Rochambeau, are now of course inimical to, and proscribed by, the consular government. The situation of these men must at present be one of considerable uneasiness and anxiety ; for though they were in luced by prudence, or driven by oppression, or by just hor- ror at the crimes of the l onsul, to forsake the exe- crable standard of the French army, and join the insurgents, it must be an alarming consideration with them that they are at, present cut off from every European community, and embarked in a cause which no civilized state has yet patronized or acknowledged; at the peril, on the one hand, of the popular jealousy to which their complexion ex- pose!?

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f 86 } poses them among their new associates, and on the other, of the indignation of the Consul, and the perils perhaps of a new invasion. To such men, nothing could be more desirable than to see the freedom and independency of St. Domingo taken under the protection of Great Britain ; but should they find that all our animosity to the Republic, will not induce us at this most favour- able juncture, to coalesce with an African peo- ple in the Antilles, they will perceive that an ac- commodation with France, can alone deliver them from the dangers of their present situation. They will therefore be eager to make their peace with the existing or some future government of that country ; and will be glad to purchase their par-, don, by using all their influence to bring over the African chiefs to such a compromise as may be safely recommended. From these united considerations I infer, that you ought not to rely on the present great and just exasperation of the people of St. Domingo, as full security against the attempts of France to regain their dependency as colonists ; much less against the wiser endeavour on her part, to pbtain their friendship and alliance. There is, however, at this critical juncture, a principle far more influential upon the new so- ciety than the motives $nd the interests to which I have

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ï S7 1 î have adverted, and all other popular feelings united ; and by this, if wisely enlisted on our side, you may raise insuperable bars to their future re-union with France, and perpetuate their animosity to that country. You have only to appeal to that heart-stirring feeling, their soli- citude for the safety of freedom, their dread of ** the horrible yoke," and bid them to look to our maritime power, for the protection at once of their private liberty, and their independency as a nation. Guarantee those important objects make the price of the stipulation a' perpetual alliance against France and their breach with her will be widened so extensively as to close no more. The Republic will thenceforth have nothing to concede, that will not be regarded as already securely obtained no offers to make, that will not be considered as insidious, no menaces to use, but such as will be despised. Then in- deed, you may rely upon the lasting effect of the Consul's cruelties and frauds, may pronounce a final divorce between this injured people and" their merciless oppressors, and effectually say, " pugnent ipsi nepotes.^ ¦ A treaty or an intercourse merely commercial, would be so far from producing these important consequences, that our disposition to form such relations, and to stop short at that point, might furnish

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L «s 3 forhish arguments against us to the advocates of the Republic. Such a half measure under present Circumstances, might speciously, nay, it might truly, be represented, rather as a proof of our in- curable hostility to the freedom of the African race in the Antilles, than any symptom of a con- trary disposition. That we advanced so far, might be reasonably ascribed to commercial cupidity j that we offered no closer relations, could only be accounted for by what may be too fairly im- puted to us, a bigoted antipathy to the new order of things in St. Domingo. The violent and acrimonious nature of our present contest with the Republic, w?ould add great force to such an inference. Our abstemiousness in such a case, could admit but of one solution, a solution so obvious, that neither the emissaries of France, not the sincere friends of the Indigenes, would fail to point it out to them. " England, it would be *' said, is again practising the policy she used tc towards Toussaint. She will take your com- " merce during the war, but leave you exposed " again at its conclusion, to all the vengeance of " the Republic. Nay, she will perhaps again fa- u cilitate, even at the expence of her own hnme- * diate security, new efforts of that power against t your freedom, by allowing French fleets to pass *' the ocean, prior to a d finiti ve treaty, in order that " you may the mere effectually be surprised by a " powerful

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89 3 " powerful invasion. She withholds ihe recognî- " tion of that independency which you now assert ft against France, and avoids an alliance with " you, in order that she may play again this " part, without incurring the reproach of open " perfidy. Nothing, therefore, remains to you, " but to secure, at the expence of this selfish and " bigoted nation, suqh good terms as you may " now make with the republic." If we would estimate rightly the probability of a reconciliation between St. Domingo and France, and form adequate conceptions of the mischievous tendencies of such an event, we must look be- yond the period of the present war. At this moment any conciliatory efforts which the French government might be disposed to employ, however favoured by the hesitating con- duct of this country, and by the particular inte- rests of individuals in the colony, would be made under such great disadvantages, as might very probably render them abortive. The injured co- lonists would naturally regard them as the result of a necessity imposed upon their late oppressors by the renewal of a maritime war, and as mere stra- tagems of a temporising policy %, and there would be no immediate dread of a hostile alternative, to second the other motives which might incline them towards an amicable settlement ; but when the sea N shall

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90 3 shall again be open to the enterprises of the Re- public, she will be able to offer to them the olive branch with a better grace, and with a far more powerful effect. The recollection of past horrors even will then plead on the side of peace, and if no dangerous confidence be demanded, may con- tribute powerfully to silence the lingering voice of hatred and revenge. Should the French govern- ment then be prudent enough not to demand the admission of any army, or the submission to any exercise of its authority in matters of interior le- gislation er police, its sovereignty might very probably be acknowledged ; but the closest fce- deral connection at least, would hardly be refused. Indeed I see not how a reconciliation on such a basis, could at that period possibly be declined : for some exterior connection, of a commercial nature, would be indispensably necessary to the welfare of the new people themselves; and no other power could then venture to accept the ad- vantages of their commerce, since France, as against other nations, would assert to it an ex- clusive, and indisputable title. " But will not the supposed reconciliation be " innoxious to this country, when our dispute "with the Republic shall end?" Such a thick haze of prejudice and ignorance always hang<? over the horizon of our colonial interests, that I should

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91 3 should not wonder were this question to arise in the mind of a British politician. But unless our next peace with France is to be eternal, and unless she shall lay down together with the sword, all her disposition to impair the commercial and colo- nial interests of this country, the restitution of her authority or influence at St. Domingo would be not less formidable to us after, than before, the ter- mination of the war. To demonstrate this propo- sition would be easy ; but it would be to lengthen an argument already too long for your time, if not for your patience. Besides, it is a work which has been anticipated in my former letters *, and if any part of the reasoning contained in them met a pretty general assent, it was that, as I have ground for believing, which applied to this part of my sub- ject. To the Crisis of the Sugar Colonies, there- fore, I beg leave to refer, for the probable effects of negro liberty in St. Domingo, when associated with the power, and directed by the councils of France. To suppose that the Republic will, at the close of her present war with this country, choose rather to embark in a new crusade against liberty in the West Indies, than acquiesce in its establishment, would be to deem the madness of the Consul quite incurable ; or if such a choice be expected * Crisis, p. 85 to 93. from

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92 fiom the successors of that desj ot, it must be from the belief that Frenchmen in general are in- fected with the same disease; for never was in- terest moue palpable than that which the Re- public now has in supporting at St Domingo the system she has vainly attempted to subvert ; nor did experience ever attest any truth more clearly, than the impracticability of the opposite course. But let it be supposed that the pieposterous project of restoring slavery in that great island, will indeed be revived. In that case, an early reconciliation between the black colonists and France is not, I admit, to be apprehended : but will there be no danger to this country, from the new and furious contest which must inevitably ensue ? Will our own colonies stand safe within the wind of such contention ? Here again I must use the right, of referring to arguments which were offered two years ago to the public*. In calculating the probable effects of the then depending French expedition against St. Domingo, and of the armaments which were preparing to follow it, I pointed out. the perilous consequences to which our colonies would, in either event of the contest, be speedily exposed ; and shewed that if the attempt of the Consul * Crisis, Letter 3d. should

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{ 93 3 should prove successful, the new situation of affairs in the West Indies' would be such as to place continually at the mercy of an ambitious and perfidious power, our most valuable transat- lantic possessions. The reality of those grounds of alarm was, I be- lieve, very generally felt, and the defensive pre- cautions employed upon the Jamaica station, evinced that they were not wholly disregarded by his majesty's ministers. If the arguments here referred to were con- vincing in the month of March, 1802, they can- not be less so at this period ; for intermediate events have not tended to detract from their force; every incident, on the contrary, of the war of St. Domingo, and every official letter from the French commanders, might be invoked to verify the grounds of apprehension in question, as they were stated in the Crisis*. Cast * I abstain, in general, from extracts ;_butas a striking con- firmation of one of the opinions here referred to, viz. that France, if successful in her war with the negroes, would al- ledge, and really find, a necessity of forming such a military establishment in St. Domingo, as would enable her, at the commencement of a new war, to overwhelm our colonies by a sudden and irresistible invasion, I request attention to the following parallel passages. Crisis, p. 97. Le Clerc's Letter of March 26, ;* " I pretend not to determine, to the Moniteur of May 22 /, 1802. " what extent her permanent mili- " I hope that Hie diviiions 8$> " taryestablishment mustnecessa- " Flushing aod^ Haue, that wliich " rily " you

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94 Cast y our eye then once again, sir, over the pages to which I have referred, and estimate coolly, with the aid of that light which has been since afforded by experience, the probable effects of a new war between France and her revolted colonists. 1 hough the renewal of such a contest, and with the same extreme and irrational object, on the part of Trance, to exasperate the quarrel, is a sup- position sufficiently wide of probability, let it, be made; and add, if you please, that the obstinate re- sistance of the black colonists will at length be overcome, and the old system restored. This was the supreme object of the vows of our plan- ' rily be enhanced ; it is sufficient ' to say, that beyond the defence ' of the old fortifications, endan- ' gered perpetually by a new in- 1 ternal enemy, she must establish 1 and maintain a military organi- ' zation in the interior, ramified ' enough, and strong enough, to 1 oierawe the slave», and to çive 1 security and confidence to the 1 -masteis, without this the coun- 1 ter-revolution, we are supposing ¦ would be fruitless of every thing ' but blood; and with a permanent ' force like this at her command, '¦ no hostile neighbour could be safe 1 for a moment. Draughts that 1 would haidly be missed from such ' an establishment, would be ade- 1 quate to overpower the strongest 1 garrison we ever maintained dur- 1 ing peace, in the largest of our 1 islands." " you announced to me from Brest, " and that from Toulon, will speç- " dily arrive. The} will be use- " ful to us, by enabling us to oc- " cupy cantonments upon all the " points of th s vast colony ; which " is the only means of arriving at " the re-establishment of order and " tranquillity.'' On this head general Le Clerc's woid may be taken jet be pro- bably had, at the date of this letter, at least thiity thousand men under his command. ters

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C 95 3 ters and slave traders ; " the consummation de- " voutly to be wished ;" and let them again cheat themselves and others if they can, with the hope of such an event. But surely the British statesman will no longer be their dupe, to such a pitch of credulity, as to see in this phantom any promise of national welfare. The problem has now been practically solved ; and it is no longer matter of argument, but of experience, that France cannot reduce to submission, much less keep in subjection, the ne- groes of that large island, but by means utterly inconsistent with the security of the British West Indies. To facilitate, therefore, or permit such a conquest, would be to prepare for an ambitious and unprincipled enemy, the same military pre- ponderance in the Antilles, that he already possesses in Europe ; and wilfully to subject ourselves to the ruinous necessity of maintaining large fleets and garrisons during peace as well as war, in that de- structive climate. It es, Sir, whatever be the interest of the planter in this quest ion, that of the nation is at length become obvious and undeniable. Unless the other powers of Europe would give a gua- rantee in respect of St. Domingo, which they re- fused for Malta, it is not safe for this country that Trance should possess that large island again, by such means as must certainly be employed for the

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C 96 3 the purpose. We must not again suffer fifty or sixty thousand French troops to be trans- ported to the West Indies*; for we cannot rely that the folly and bigotry of the present, or any future French government, will again deliver us from" the jeopardy of such an experiment. Had .not the present war arrived in time to stop the pretended Louisiana expedition, we might have found that even the proud and inexorable Consul, when on the point of a new quarrel with this country, could have sacrificed his thirst for African blood, to his hatred of England ; and found better employment for his recruited army, than hunting down with blood hounds their human game among the Mornes of St. Domingo *. Between * There is abundant reason to conclude that the great ar- mament which was preparing during several months in the ¦ports of Holland., and which was anxiously represented îh Ihe French gazettes, as destined for Louisiana, was in truth intended for St. Domingo. That the Consul should need- lessly send" a large army, which by the best conjecture I caa form would have consisted of about twenty thousand men, with a train of artillery, and large magazines of ordnance land military stores, merely for the purpose of receiving pos- session of a ceded colony, and this at a time when the commanders in St, Domingo were urgently demanding rein* forcements, which from the disposition of the army he found it difficult to send, is too unnatural to be credited. No re- sistance could be feared on the part of the Spaniards, and a «ingle frigate with the governor and his staff would have suf- ficed

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97 Between the opposite extremes of the victory, and the defeat of France, in her late contest at St. Domingo, or rather between the conquest and total . ficed for the pretended purpose ; but if not, at least the ships would have been dispatched separately, or in small squadrons, as soon as they were ready for the voyage ; instead of being detained as they were, at the expence of great inconvenience and delay, in order to be collected in a large fleet, till sick- toess at length broke out among the troops, and the sea stores became unfit for service. If New Orleans was the true port of destination, all the evils of trans-marine expeditions in time of war, were wantonly and preposterously incurred in time of peace. Besides, we have since had ample accounts from Louisiana, and it has not transpired that any preparations were made for Ihe reception of a French army there, or that the arrival of an armament so long preparing, and so accidentally delayed in Europe, had there been at all an object of public expectation ; whereas it has clearly appeared from intercepted letters, that the promise of a new and powerful army had at that period been made to the French commanders in St. Domingo, and was indispensably necessary for the further conduct of the war in that quarter. When to these and other considerations, we add the known necessity under which the Consul labour- ed, of concealing from the soldiers, whom he devoted to West Indian service, the fatal field in which they were to be em- ployed, and that Louisiana was the most convenient mask for this purpose, there will remain little or no room to doubt, that the fleet from Holland would have stopped short of the mouth of the Mississippi, and landed its army at Cape Fran- cois. But was there no ulterior object? Beyond doubt, if the desperate contest with the negroes was to be persisted in, the new army would have found full and final employment O in

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C 98 3 total loss of the island, there was a possible middle event, the effects of which were also considered in the Crisis*, and they were shewn to be still more dangerous in St. Domingo ; and it is, I admit,- probable enough from tbe Consul's character, that he would have continued enor- mously to drain the bravest blood of the Republic without re- morse, in, the pursuit of his nefarious object. But, on the Other hand, there are some strong grounds for suspeoting, that this profound dissembler had a design at this period to abandon an attempt which he at length found would be in- effectual; and that instead of obtaining, at the expence of a new army,-the chance of recovering a desart in St. Domingo, he would by means of his new expedition, and the garrisons of that Island united, have contrived to seize by surprise upon Jamaica; perhaps also on some of our other sugar colonies. To give all the reasons that might be offered in support of this suspicion, would be to enlarge this note into a- disserta- ¦iation. I shall only mention the following. 1st. It appeared by various accounts, that a large embar- kation of cannon and artillery stores, was a part of the pre- paratory measures for this new expedition ; but as the negroes had no artillery, and no longer kept the field in considerable bodies, and as the plan for the new campaign was to hunt them down, and exterminate them in the interior, this part of the preparations, does not seem to point to such a war as that of St Domingo. 2dly. The delay in the Texel, if St. Domingo was the true» ¦object, was of the most discouraging and fatal tendency to the cause of the Republic in that island ; but upon the hypothesis we are considering, this effect was of little consequence ; and might have been well compensated by the encreased effect bf the blow to this country, since length of preparation encreased the magnitude of the armament to be employed against us. * Page S5 to 93. 3dly.

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99 dangerous than either of the former, to the colonial interests of this country. I mean that of a com- promise between the Republic and her sable op- ponents, 3dly. If the further prosecution of the war in St. Domingo was really designed, Buonaparte was persisting in that pro- ject to an extent, and by means, which were not satisfactory to the commanders employed : for though General Rocham- beau had the promise of large reinforcements, he sent a short time prior to his knowledge of the present war, the most re- spectable and imposing deputation his army could furnish, with General Boyer, the second in command, at its head, to make personal remonstrances to the Consul. (This appears hy the let- ter before referred to in page 20.) Now it is hard to believe that the Consul meant to work in opposition to aU his own instruments, though it is by no means improbable on the other band, that he would keep in bis own breast to the last, or corf- fide only to the commander of the intended expedition, th« important secret of his designs against England. 4th. It was disclosed in the French newspapers, during the latter stage of the preparations in Holland, and immediately before the rupture with this country, that the celebrated Victor Hugues was appointed to the command of the expe* dition to Louisiana, and the government *>f that colony. A man less likely to promote the Consul's views at St. Domingo, or better fitted to conduct the supposed design against the Bri- tish West Indies, could not possibly have been selected. 5th. The discontent and desertion of the troops which had formerly been trepanned into the horrible service of St. Do- mingo, and the avowed disgust of tire military in general to that service, must have presented strong grounds of apprehension as to the conduct of the new army, when it should find itself brought by Stratagem into the ports of that island ; but *f at the same period, tbe conquest of the English colonics should be

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loo 3 ponents, upon the basis of private freedom, after a bloody and indecisive contest A new war might possibly be ended by such an adjustment, and be disclosed to them as the alluring object of immediate ser- vice, discontent, it was probable, would immediately subside, and be converted into satisfaction and applause. The same critical period would also have presented a happy opportu- nity, for conciliating the black colonists upon the basis of free- dom ; and glossing over by a compromise, to which vengeance- against England would have furnished a pretence, the disho- nour of a defeat by such enemies. I will only add, in the last place, that upon this hypo- thesis the conduct of the Cohsul towards this country will be found perfectly natural. He provoked a quarrel by frequent insult, because he wished to be on such terms with us as would, in due time, furnish an apology for the meditated aggression. But he was at last very desirous to avoid an immediate rupture, because the Louisiana ex- pedition had not yet departed from the Texeh His plan was broken by that bold, though tardy, decision of our mi- nistry, which, by exceeding his calculations, placed him in a severe dilemma between his policy and his pride. He ad- vanced, however, to the verge of extreme humiliation, in order to defer for a short time a war which all his previous conduct evinced a determination to provoke. St. Domingo alone could present no motive for such inconsistency. A brief interval of maritime peace, could there only have served to aggravate his loss, and his dishonour, while an immediate war with England was his best apology for defeat in that dis- astrous field, as welj as the mean of saving a new army from useless destruction. For these reasons I am strongly disposed to believe, that our complaint of preparations in the enemy's ports was not so groundless as is generally supposed ; and that the measure anticipated

The Opportunity. pp. 101-120. 111 0101

£ 101 and a coalition between the two armies produce that formidable union of European tmd African arms, to the perilous effects of which I formerly called your attention. The fearful tendency of such a coalition is suf- ficiently obvious. It would give to the direction of our inveterate enemy, means of future an- noyance and conquest, to which the whole dis- posable army of Great Britain, could it be spared for West India service, might be vainly op- posed. It would make the establishment of French dominion through the whole chain of the Antilles, a matter of such obvious facility, that the most moderate of governments might find it hard to resist the temptation. Is it thought more likely, that the negroes, should they again triumph over the new efforts of France, would become, by new provocations, too much ex- asperated against her to be afterwards the willing instruments of her ambition, either as her political dependents or allies? Yon would,even by this most favourable result, be at best only replaced in the > situation, and restored to the happy opportunity which you at present possess ; you would still be obliged to acquiesce in the establishment of an anticipated in the Crisis, p. 90 to 92, was on the point of being adopted by France, when averted by the recommencement of war. African,

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I 102 3 African power in the Antilles ; and air the evils, real or imaginary, which that innovation may threaten, would at least remain undiminished. But the case would, supposing it to arise in time of peace, have this fearful aggravation that the remedy I now offer would be then unattainable, except at the price of a new war with the repub- lic ; for you could not hope to be permitted by that power to form any amicable connections with her late subjects, either political or commer- cial ; and to treat with them without such permis- sion, would reasonably be regarded as highly af- fronting and injurious. It cannot be thought that, when obliged to desist from the new war with her colonists, she would make a gratuitous grant of their indepen- dency; since no regard to her own security would demand such a sacrifice. She has, let it be considered, no colony to the leeward of St. Domingo; and her windward islands are divided from it, not only by a long tract of sea, which, from the constant course of the trade winds, forms a yery sufficient barrier ; but by many inter- mediate colonies of England, Denmark, and Spain. Having therefore no offensive enterprises to fear from these sable enemies, and no commerce which they will have power to annoy, the Republic will, in the event last supposed, find no motive for a pa* cification

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103 J cification on the basis of independency, unless the very advantages which I would now persuadé you to secure to ourselves, shall be conceded to her by her late subjects, as the substitutes for her title to govern. To renounce her sovereignty on cheaper terms, would be not only to deliver qur colonies from a nuisance ; but to transfer to this country or other nations, the trade and the power of St. Domingo. The course of conduct which France would pursue in such a case therefore, would unquestionably be this. She would withdraw her armies from the island ; but surround it, to our extreme inconveni- ence, with a powerful naval blockade ; and hav- ing in right of her pacific relations with other states, the power to exclude their interference, would soon or late make the islanders glad to ac- cept of peace and independence, on. the terms of granting to their former sovereign the mono- poly of their trade, and engaging with her in a perpetual treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. In short, Sir, you would in this least adverse event, for such, in cqmparison with a triumph of the French arms in St. Domingo I have elsewhere shewn it to be, gain only a brief respite to our co-* Ionies. You would not be able, as now, finally to prevent the irresistible sword of negro freedom' from falling into the hands of France. Take then, Sir, your choice of future prospects. Place

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104 Place yourself by anticipation in the act of nego- tiating for a new peace, and look forward td whichever of these consequences of the treaty you deem the least to be deprecated. Expect the future policy of the Republic to be of what charac- ter you please, just or nefarious, cautious or rash, rational or absurd ; suppose as you please, either that she will, or that she will not attempt to coerce and subjugate by new armies the people of St. Domingo; and if such an attempt is to be made, imagine it either to be, or not to be, successful. In each of these cases, you will be involved in some of those dangerous consequences to which I have adverted, and the fear- ful extent of which was demonstrated in my former address. Of all the considerations then by which my ad- vice may be supported, the most powerful is that which an adversary perhaps might adduce on the opposite side : to avoid difficulties in the next pacification with France, you should not lose a moment in acknowledging the independence, and securing the alliance of St. Domingo. " What," I seem to hear some timid politician exclaim, " will you obstruct our path to peace by " new obstacles V Have we not differences enough " already to adjust with France, without revolting " her pride, by demanding the abdication of her " most important colony ?" With

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t 105 3 With such Englishmen, if any there be, as are prepared to accept from our haughty enemy une- qual and unsafe conditions of peace, I desire not to reason they may be disposed, for ought I know, to renounce all our West Indian colonies, rather than protract the present arduous contest : but for my own part, I see no prudent medium, between truckling to our insolent enemy at once, and exacting from him such conditions, as are compatible with our own future security, abroad, as well as at home. I am sure too, that this com- mercial country is not yet prepared to give up her trans-atlantic possessions, as the price of the amity of the Great Nation ; and therefore if peace were worth the sacrifice of honour and security, it would still, in my opinion, be unwise to leave France in possession of a title to St. Domingo ; because that title would soon be the means of engaging us, for the preservation of our sugar colonies, in a new and more formidable war. If we must have a West Indian cause of hostilities with the Republic, I would rather it should be such a cause, as would place the arms of the Indigenes, and the interests of the African race, on our side, than one that would range them both under the standard of our enemies. I presume not to say at what exercise of our indubitable rights, the arrogant pride of France P may

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106 may not be offended ; but this I will affirm, that the measure in question, will give her no just or specious ground of complaint. To support the revolting members of a hostile state, is an unimpeachable exercise of the rights of war. By our Elizabeth, and by the Great Henry of France, such policy was practised without scru- ple ; and the haughty Philip was obliged to sheath his sword without avenging the affront. But pf the numerous precedents that might, be adduced, the conduct of France herself in the American war, is at once the most appropriate and recent ; and surely the pride of a French government may fairly brook, what Great Britain herself was obliged to digest, little more than twenty years ago. It is, however, wronging the argument to com- pare these two cases; for France had no pre- tence of any necessity, arising out of the care of her own security, when she acknowledged, and engaged to defend, the independency of the United States; whereas the preservation of our most valua- ble colonies, demands from us an alliance with St. Domingo. I might add, that thç one measure was a violation of the duties of peace : while the other, if now adopted, will be the act of an open ene- my, possessing all the rights of legitimate war. But independently of all precedent, and be- yond the range of all ordinary principle, the pro- posed

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107 posed treatymight bejustified, if necessary, Upon the very singular nature of the case. France, by her own act, whether intentionally or through the unforeseen effect of her domestic revolutions, is immaterial, has created a new politi- cal power in the Antilles ; a power dangerous per- haps in itself, but which in her hands would inevi- tably be destructive, to the security of its colonial neighbours. She has therefore imposed upon us a necessity of treating this new power as indepen- dent ; and of engaging it, if we can, in such con- nections, as may exclude her influence or autho- rity over it in future. Nor is it material to this ground of defence, that the Republic should be considered as still wishing to maintain that work of colonial revolu- tion, which she once openly abetted. The case to be sure would in that case be stronger against her i for such policy might, upon views lately pro- fessed by herself, bejustly regarded, as a direct attack upon the security of other powers, in their West Indian possessions; as an injurious viola- tion, to use the words of Villaret, " of those ** principles, which alone can preserve, and upon " which reposes, the common interest of all the " European powers in their establishments in the "Antilles*." * Villaret's letter to the British admiral at Jamaica, on the arrival of the first expedition at Cape Francois, February 14, 1802. The

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t 108 3 The author trusts he cannot be suspected of concurring in the principle of this quotation. He is far from thinking, that the powers of Europe have a common interest, any more than a common right, in maintaining and perpetuating a system of the most odious and impolitic oppression, that ever afflicted or disgraced humanity. But he rea- sons to many who may differ from him, perhaps, on this subject ; .and as between the nations who still uphold that loathsome despotism, the rea- soning is undeniably fair. But it is enough, that what France did, or per- mitted in St. Domingo, she is found unable to re- pair. Whatever self conservatory rights the in- novation gave to us, they cannot be taken away by an ineffectual attempt to reverse it, and to restore the former state of things ; for that fruitless effort has not removed or diminished the danger, against which we are driven to provide. A man who should, wilfully or carelessly set fire to his own house, would thereby give his neighbours a right to pull it down, if such a subversion of Jhis pro- perty, were necessary to the preservation of their own. Could he plead inevitable accident in his excuse ; the right, though it might be more ten- derly exercised, would not be taken away. But to say, that he had already done all in his power to extinguish the flames without success, would clearly

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109 3 clearly be to strengthen, rather than impair, th* right of his neighbours to apply the only effect tual remedy. What should we say, were he in such a case to claim a right to lock up his doors, to forbid our ascending the roof, and to insist, in all points^ on the exercise of his former dominion, as owner of the tenement ? It ftiay be said, that this illustration proves rather a right in other nations to effect, if they can, a counter revolution in St. Domingo, than to treat it as independent ; on the same principle upon which the late confederated powers of Europe, might have justifiably restored, if they could, the monarchy of France. But I answer, that supposing such a work really capable of being accomplished, and at an expence which other nations could afford, and which they could be reasonably called upon to sustain, there are, in this case, third parties, in respect of whom very serious moral difficulties must first be removed. Such a remedy, however, is demonstrably imprac-r ticable. Even were it fit that the blood, the treasure, and the conscience of Great Britain, should be sacrificed to the effecting, for the be- nefit of France, the re-establishment of the old system in St. Domingo, she has not power to ac- complish such a work. She must therefore resort to the only attainable security against that, which

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f no which is in truth the worst part of the danger, the power of annoyance which the new state of things is likely to impart hereafter to ah envious rival, and an insidious enemy. The conflagration in this case is to be dreaded, chiefly through that connection with France, which is likely to carry the flames. To pull down the roof and walls of that connection therefore, not to subvert the fa- bric of African freedom or independency, is the precaution towards which our efforts must be di- rected, and which we have an incontestable right to adopt. Were we now at peace with the Republic, these reasons might justify, perhaps, our entering into an alliance with her late subjects of St. Do- mingo. They might at least justly warrant our de- manding, as an alternative to that measure, good security against the dangers to which, either by a renewal of her quarrel with the new people, or by a compromise of the subject of that quarrel, we must unavoidably be exposed. But happily, I write at a time when the measure in question can, in point of moral rectitude, demand no such ar- guments in its defence. To the right of self-pre- servation we need not now resort; nor to any moral consequences deducible from the past con- duct of France; since the comprehensive rights of war, clearly entitle us to treat with a revolted colony

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E in 3 colony of our enemy, and to sever it finally, if we can, from his dominions. That a French government would hereafter re-? ject terms of peace, which might in other respects be mutually acceptable, on the score of our having become allies of St. Domingo, and guaranteed its independence, is highly improbable. But if a re- nunciation of her claim to that potent and mena- cing island, be requisite for our future security, it must of course be demanded from her in the next negotiation for peace, although we should not be previously bound by treaty, to prescribe to her such a condition ; and the only question in this case is, whether the condition would be more offensive, and obstruct longer the important work of pacification, because during a time of hostility, we had contracted engagements which bound us to insist upon it, and from which we could not, without dishonour, recede. That the contrary would rather be the effect of such engagements, may safely be affirmed. National pride would be less mortified, and the credit of a minister far less impaired, in such a case, by acquiescing in relations already formed, and engagements already contracted and irrevo- cable, than by giving way to new pretensions, and allowing an enemy to obtain as the price of peace, more than he had ventured to lay claim to» during all the acrimony of war. France

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t 112 3 France herself understands tfie value of this dis-* tinction, and therefore openly bound herself du- ring the late war in compacts with the people she conquered, not only to maintain them in their revolt from their ancient sovereigns, but to retain them as dependants on, or integral parts of, the Great Nation. Far different indeed, was this auda- cious proceeding, from the just and necessary mea- sure, which I would persuade you to adopt ; yet these covenants of usurpation were alledged by the French government itself, in the subsequent negotiations for peace, and perhaps not without ad- vantage. The self-imposed necessity of demand- ing extreme concessions, served probably, in some slight degree, to soften to the feelings of the despoil- ed and injured powers, the arrogant pretensions of the Republic ; or at least, by precluding the hope of peace on cheaper terms^ made them submit a little sooner than they would otherwise have done, to- the urgent calls of necessity. A case more nearly parallel, is to be found in the peace which terminated the American war ; and I appeal to the feelings of Englishmen, whe- ther that contest would have ended so soon, had France previously avoided an alliance with our colonies during the war, and afterwards demand- ed their independency, or security against their re-union with this country, in the negotiations at Versailles. Unless

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U3 ) Unless then, Sir, you are prepared to say, that the Republic, at the conclusion of the present war, ought to be left wholly unrestrained to act as her policy or ambition may suggest in relation to St. Domingo, you ought, even for the sake of future peace, to embrace the present opportunity. If there be no danger or inconvenience in again suffering large French armies to pass, during peace, into the centre of the Antilles, and if there be nothing to be apprehended from that far more probable event, the reconciliation of St. Domingo with France, you may safely proceed in your present equivocal conduct: but if the dangers pointed out to your notice in the Crisis of the Sugar Colonies, had any reality and impor- tance, you should hasten to profit by the present opportunity, of preventing their future recurrence. By delay, you will not only risk all the inconveni- ences and evils which I have shewn to be the pro- bable fruits of the present state of things in the West Indies during the war ; but will enhance the difficulties that may oppose its safe and speedy termination. To pursue to the same important period, the comparison between a commercial treaty, and a close political alliance, it should be observed, that the former would, in no degree, deliver us from the dilemma in a negotiation for peace, which Q the

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«4 1 the latter^ is calculated to avoid > and that the peculiar advantages of the one, cannot be expect- ed to extend* beyond the present war, without the aid of the other. Unless our next peace shall find, or place the inhabitants of St, Domingo, i$ a state of acknowledged independency, France certainly will not allow this Country to trade to their ports &j much less to do so with an exclusive preference, or in right of a treaty which would be derogatory from her* sovereign authority. She will «ot,as I before remarked, spontaneously renounce iherjeoverelgnty, merely to legitimate our trade, and sanction our commercial privileges. The four ^different projects which were origi- nally proposed for consideration, have now been distinctly reviewed. To prohibit all commercial intercourse be- tween flis Majesty'^ ^subjects, and the new masters of St- Domingo, has been shewn to. be neither politic nor safe ; and that such an inter- course, if carried on at all, ought to be sanctioned and regulated by treaty, has, I hope, been suffi- ciently proved. But whether our commercial in- tercourse with that people should be confined to Commercial objects, or should extend to a political league of the nature I would persuade you to fornj, seemed

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1 115 3 seemed the question most open to dispute. 'Those rival projects therefore have been more amply considered, and their respective pretensions com- pared^ The practical result, if I have reasoned satis- factorily, is this That a treaty with the people of St. Domingo, involving a recognition of their independence, and a perpetual alliance against France, ought to be negotiated withoufa mo- ment's delay. No measure less decisive, will se- cure to you the future commerce of that valuable island No other expedient, will guard, our sugar colonies so effectually from the evils with- which they are menaced. No connection less intimate, will deliver you during the present and future wars, from the maritime inconveniences to be dreaded from the independence of St. Domingo, and its new relations towards other powers ; much less secure to you the important belligerent ad- Vantages, which its amity is likely to produce. But the grand consideration of all, is the highly probable, and most pernicious alternative to this alliance, a reconciliation between the new people and France. That they may not speedily be- come your formidable enemies, you must make them your obliged allies. You mUst guarantee their independence against the Republic, that they may not, to the ruin of your colonies, fall in

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{ lié ) in their enfranchised state, and with their hew born energies, under her dominion, or her influ- ence Of such a reconciliation there is danger* perhaps even at the present moment, but upon the conclusion of the war, at latest, such an event Will almost infallibly ensue, Unless precluded by the wise measure which I advise you now to adopt. Supposing the Republic even to be rash enough to recur to her counter revolutionary ef- forts, the folly would only retard, not ultimately prevent, a coalition fatal to our colonic, would subject them tc- new intérmediat perils, and leave them exposed m the sequel, to dangers not less imminent than those with which they are at present menaced, without leaving a British minister at liberty to employ those means of prevention, which may now be unobjection- ably used The evils therefore which exist, and those which are likely to arise, the dangers of the war, and those to which peace will give birth, admit bi t of one remedy, are to be prevented or lessened by bne only expedient. If you would wield the sw rd without new disadvantages if you would sheath it without peril to our colonies, and if you" would diminish the difficulties which oppose the restitution of peace, you must embrace without delay, the present opportunity, you must adopt the

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f W 1 the measure I propose* A wall of perpetual sepa- ration between France and St. Domingo must ne* Cessarily be built ; and therefore the liberty and independency of the new people must be ac- knowledged, and must be placed under British protection. By that wise use of the present op- portunity, and by that mean alone, the great re- volution which has taken place in the West In- dies, ,an event pregnant perhaps with granderj and more lasting effects, than any of the late revolutions of Europe, may be rendered wholly innoxious, nay, largely beneficial to this coun- try; and pernicious only to that unprincipled power, which first rashly made, and then wick- edly tried to reverse it. I hasten to lay down the pen, lest before these arguments shall meet your eye, the opportunity they relate to should be lost ; but it seems neces- sary to notice briefly, before I conclude, some general prepossessions, by which my advice may perhaps be fatally opposed. A contempt, not less irrational, than cruel for the much injured African race, has, I fear, through the prejudiced and self-interested repre- sentations of their oppressors, been strongly im- pressed upon the public mind in this country. From this- sentiment indeed, the sable defend- ers

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C 118 ers of St. Domingo must now have delivered themselves in every generous breast But the malice of their enemies is unwearied ; and though it is now hopeless to represent them as a despica- ble groveling race, fit only for the harness of a brutal bondage, and likely again to submit with tameness to the whip of the driver ; it is attempt- ed, not, I fear, without success, to pourtray them as ferocious and merciless savages, unfit to main- tain the pacific relations of independency with other states, or .even to adhere to each other, in any firm political union ; as incorrigible bar- barians, who will soon split into petty hordes, and relapse into African manners. Were there any sound foundation for these no- tions, the force of some of the motives which I have offered for an alliance with the New State, would certainly be weakened; yet more than enough would remain to support the practical conclus'on. As an experiment at least, and as a temporary expedient, it would still be right to make friends of those, who whether barbarous or civilized, may be troublesome and dangerous ene- mies : nor would their ferocity, I presume, ren- der them instruments less terrible of the future machinations of France, should she be able to employ them against our colonies. But this portrait of the brave Indigenes is trac- ed

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I 119 ed by the pencil of prejudice; and this prediction of their future fate, i? rather the voice of a venal Oracle, bribed by their oppressors ; than the le- gitimate foresight of reason, derived by fair cal- culation from historical truth.*- If we Consider in the first place, their treatment bf their vanquished enemies, at and immediately after the surrender of the toWns, we shall discover ho traits of inhumanity. Reasonably enough 4id the French garrisons, and their white adherents, expect a dreadful retaliation i for never nad cru- elty or perfidy, in the conduct of a war, beert carried to fouler extremes, than by them or their execrable leaders : nor is there upon earth, perhaps, to be found a people by whom, when butraged by such unparalleled wrongs, the expect tation might not have been fully and immediately^ realized ? Yet not a «ingle drop of blood was Vindictively shed upon the occupation of those towns by the Negroes. British humanity indeed in one or two easel interposed^ and complaisance to our commander! may be thought solely to have influenced the con- duct of the Negro chiefs; hut it remains to be proved, that without such interposition, the garri- sons or inhabitants would have been put to death, or unmercifully treated; and the contrary is fairly presumable from the event at those places, where the surrender was made, not to British officers,

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C 120 3 officers, or under British mediation, but imme- diately to the African besiegers. Cape Francois was obliged to capitulate, in consequence of a most gallant and successful assault made by Dessalines, upon the hill forts which command that town. The capitulation was afterwards broken by Rochambeau, who omitted to evacuate the town within the stipu- lated time; and it seems to be the import of our own officiai accounts, that the place was ulti- mately taken by storm; for Dessalines marched hostilely into the town, to enforce the departure of the garrison : consequently the capitulation was totally void, and whatever mercy the inhabitants received, they owed to his clemency alone. It is not pretended that in this case the extreme right of a victor, was waived in complaisance to the British ; and it on the contrary appears, that an exemption of the ships from destruction by the batteries on shore, was all we obtained, or treated for. Rochambeau, who having broken his faith, was not intitled to withdraw the garrison or the ships, saved himself and them, by a tardy sur- render to the British blockading force*, but left the inhabitants to the mercy of the victors. Yet * See the London Gazette of February 7th, 1804- Des- «alines seems at this period to have been dissatisfied with the conduct of pur commanders, and to have reluctantly permit- ted

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121 Yet they were all spared, and treated, fora Jong time at least, with thç utmost humanity*.. At ted the execution pf the compact between them and Rocham- beau. But it is impossible, considering our conduct at other places, to be surprized at, or blame this disposition in the Negro Chief, or his refusal to assist our ships in entering the port by sending them pilots. He probably had still stronger reasons for distrust than are yet before the public : but it was enough, that our system evidently was not only to dismantle their forts, and destroy their works, for which the fear of their re-occupation by France might furnish a slight pretence; but to carry away their ammunition and military stores ; for which no pretence compatible with sincere amity could be found. Dessalines therefore wa» probably actuated as much by huma- nity, as by complaisance for our commanders, when he suf- fered the fleet to escape. He had, it is admitted, the power of destroying them, as he was preparing to do, by red hot shot from the batteries ; and he had, as I conceive, an unquestionable right so to act; in order to compel their surrender to himself, not- withstanding their having capitulated to the British squadron. It is impossible to maintain that we had a right without his leave so to rescue from hi* hands, an enemy who had broken a prior capitulation with him, who then lay at his mercy, and who was not in a condition even to execute the compact, by putting the ships into our possession, but by his permission. If Dessalines did not act upon principles of mo- deration and mercy; his complaisance for this Country was extreme; and intitles him strongly to our favour. * Various reports of a massacre at this town and other places at a subsequent period, have been received from Jamaica and North America. See the London newspapers of the 3d of May. I hope they will prove like a multitude of similar reports from the same quarters, to be either wholly ground- less, or great exaggerations of the truth ; but considering the unparalleled circumstances by which popular rage and panic R are

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122 3 At Tort Dauphin, General Dumont and his staff, having been surprised in a sortie, had fallen into the hands of the besiegers, sometime prior to the capitulation to his Majesty's ships; but upon notice of that event, they were, at the re- quest of a British officer, given up*. According indeed to our official account, this request was made in order to save them from the vengeance of the Negroes : but if such vengeance was impend- ing over them, how happened it not to have been executed? These allies of the blood hounds, and conductors of an exterminatory war, were surely very fortunate, in being preserved alive, and un- hurt, till British humanity could come to their aid, and provide for their ultimate safety. The ven- geance of ferocious savages is not usually so very tardy. At Aux Cayes, St. Marc's, Jeremie, and other captured Towns, a similar clemency was dis- played ; the Negro Chiefs openly challenged praise upon this ground, and by their enemies the claim was allowed j-, are likely to be excited, especially while the French still me- nace and annoy them from Cuba, such events are certainly not improbable. * London Gazette of December 10, 1803. f See a letter of Dessalines, and a proclamation of the Town Council of the Cape, in London newspapers of Fe- bruary 6. To

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C 123 î Te such instances of moderation and mercy at the close of a most enfuriated contest, might be added others not less striking, during the, utmost fury of the struggle. * When a history of that horrible war shall be published by less partial editors than the writers of Buonaparte's ga- zettes, although with no sources of information less inimical than those mendacious papers them- -selves, fairly compared with each other, the de- fence of this persecuted people may be made to- greater advantage, and it will appear that they in general conducted themselves, through the whole of that terrible contest, with a degree of forbearance and humanity such as was never sur- passed by any people upon earth. All the white inhabitants of Cape Francois, for instance, were confessedly in the power of Chris- tophe, at the time of Leclerc's arrival; and when the negro general, in obedience to his orders, and conformably to the clearest principles of defensive warfare, set fire to that town on his retreat into the interior, to prevent its affording cover to the invaders, it was at first alleged by the French, and loudly echoed from Jamaica, and North America, that he had put all the inhabitants to the sword. Yet the contrary was soon acknowledged by his enemies themselves It was admitted in the French

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f 124 3 French gazettes that not one of these inhabi- tants had perished*. We learn from the same authority, that a greafe portion of the French inhabitants, who were car- ried off from that and other towns and districts on the coast, and an aid-de-camp of General Boudet, remained in the custody of Toussaint among the mornes, during the whole of a dreadful campaign, in which his enemies, by their own ayowal gave no quarter to his adherents : yet it is Attested by the Moniteur itself, that they were all brought back in safety, when that hero at length sheathed his victorious sword on the faith of a treacherous compact f. Surely such prominent and unquestionable facts "as these should suffice, if not fully to vindicate the humanity of the African race, at least to dis- credit the channels of intelligence, through which the credulity of the English public has often, been abused, and its feelings tortured, by shock- ing and false accounts of massacres in St. Do- mingo. In some instances no doubt,the keen feelings of indignation, never surely in any age or country * French accounts in London Newspapers of March 2,2, 1802 ; " No person was killed at the Cape ; every one came track into the Town." t See London papers of June 17, 180.2, and the Moniteur of June 1 *. " All the planters who had been carried off are re- turned." excited.

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m ) excited by such cruel and flagitious injuries, have led the multitude to imitate the example of their European inyaders; pud tp retaliate ten thou* sand massacres and murders, of which their bre- thren and dearest connections had been victims, upon Frenchmen that fell into their hands. But instead pf exhibiting, in those trying scenes, a, more than usual portion of human depravity, theiu forbearance on the whole, has been such as may justly excite surprise, and is not inconsistent with the praise bestowed upon their hapless race by travellers in their native Africa, that of being " the mildest of uncivilized men*." Were * To those who have been accustomed to read with im- plicit faith, the insertions in the French gazettes, or extracts frpm Jamaica or American newspapers, these propositions may appear very bold; but whoever will have the patience to look back upon those accounts, and compare them with each pther, wiM find scarcely any accusation against the humanity of these brave men, that has not been refuted by subsequent information, even from the same hostile quarters; while he will find striking instances pf theù" clemency and forbearance, stated on the authority of the French commanders themselves. Pf the news from St. Domingo, received through the United States of America, it may truly be said, that it was in general less worthy of credit if possible than even the French gazettes; and to shew the falsehood of mostof the shocking accounts copied from American prints, General Leclerc's own dispatches might suffice. I.t should be remembered, that there is in the United States a large party as much interested in vilifying the African character, as the people of Jamaica; perhaps still more so ; on account of the great preponderance in that coun- try

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t 126 } Were the defence of the humanity of this people more difficult ; still why the new masters of St. Domingo must of necessity break that bond try of the party inimical to negro slavery, and the consequent apprehension of slave owners, that the state will be wholly abolished. The author is credibly informed that another mo- -tive for misrepresentation, often induces American masters and merchants to spread false or highly exaggerated accounts of horrors supposed to have been witnessed by them in St. Do- mingo, upon their return from that island. It "is often an im- por ant commercial object to deter other merchants from send- ing cargoes to the same port to which they themselves have- been recently trading, or to which they mean to return. After all, however, he desires not to be understood as abso- lutely denying the truth of the rumours now current, relative to recent massacres. If a proclamation of January 1st, ascribed to Dessalines be authentic, such events must necessarily have followed, though their horrors have probably been much en- hanced by report, both in America and Jamaica. In this case Dessalines is indeed a most unworthy successor of the humane Toussaint ; but let the inflammatory language of that Proclama- tion be fairly considered (I will print it for the purpose in an Appendix.) Next let the extreme excitement, of late injuries and of present alarms be fairly estimated, and we shall find more reason to think favourably of the people, to dispose whom to vengeance such exhortation was necessary, and upon whom its effects have been so tardy and incomplete, than to ascribe to them an extraordinary ferocity. In two months it seems not to have produced any outrages, except in the south of the Island. But it seems to be decisive of the general character of the Negroes, that the inhabitants of Cape Francois, to whom they were best known, chose to remain in their power : that it was matter of election, or not of strict necessity, is certain. See the capitulation, and other papers, in the London news- papers of February 6th.

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127 3 bond of union which has hitherto botfrfd thefoa. to each other, renounce those arts of civil life with which they are acquainted, and degenerate into absolute barbarism, is not easy to discover. If we look to the peculiar disposition of ne- groes, or to the little we know of their history, there is nothing in either, from- which the hopes' of the enemies of their race can derive any sup- port. As to the miserable man-stealing districts on the coast of Guinea, I inquire not whether those con-» tempt ible factories, or rather those shambles, of our slave-traders, which are there .mocked with the ap- pellation of kingdoms, are increasing in number, by the splitting of their petty domains ; "but I believe no such fact is alledged. Certainly, it is the natural tendency of the foul crimes we insti- gate, to produce political disunion, as well a# every other species of evil; but to judge of Afri- can character in general, from the inhabitants of that wretched border, would be as unreasonable in us, as it would be in them, to estimate christian morals, and British manners, from what they see of the Liverpool agents and captains. If the ca- lumniators of Africa would point us to its misera-' ble slave coast, for the proof of any of their pre- tences, let thorn first -deliver it from the excite^ ment of their own execrable commerce. Till then, a procuress might as fairly ask ns to read the

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128 3 the character of our virtuous countrywomen in the manners of her own brothel. In the interior of that great continent, nations are known to exist, which unite in one political body, and under a single head, millions of peo- ple, spread over a very extensive ter itory, and we are not told of any s paration, or dismember- ment, by which their magnitude has been lessen- ed. I remember no relation from which it can be inferred that these nations have undergone any such changes, or that their unity is likely to be broken; and much less, that they have retrograded from any advances in civilization or arts which they may formerly have made : on the contrary, it appears, that in proportion as you re- cede from the western coast, and emerge from the foul haunts of Eu op an man-merchants, symptoms of advancing improvement 'n civili- zation, become very conspicuous. But were the case otherwise; still I demand, what are the facts m the history of mankind which wai-* rant the expectation m question, as it applies to Africans already versed in the arts of agricul- ture and commerce, and formed into a single community? Has it been the ordinary conduct of unpol shed societies, to burst the political bonds by which they have been, once united, and to renounce the arts they have learned ? The institutions of Peter, have not be n lost, and it might, for aught I know, be as safe to guarantee

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129 3 guarantee the integrity of Russia or Abyssinia, as of Germany or France. If we look to the immediate subjects of this controversy, that portion of the African race, which has emerged in some degree from the arti- ficial barbarism of the West Indies, we shall find still less reason for the opinion that their political concord will be broken, or that they will go backward in civilization. That no symptoms of such disunion and retro- gression have yet appeared, will, I presume, be admitted; for though several parties originally sprang up, as was natural, from the chaos of their great revolution, a centripetal attraction was from the first very active among them ; and they were drawn by successive conjunctions, into cir- cles more and more comprehensive, till at length the whole population was united in one political system, under a single head ; and this unity was afterwards maintained with the most perfect stea- diness, in peace as well as in war, down to the moment of Leclerc's invasion. Ambitious chieftains, once attempted to dis- turb it; but the effort was wholly fruitless. Their conspiracy was easily suppressed, by the mild but energetic policy of Toussaint ; and even the disorganisers of Europe found it, upon their arrival, a difficult task, to divide by force and stra- S * tagem,

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130 3 tagem, the well-knit fibres of this infant but vi- gorous frame. Had divisions since prevailed, they would fur- nish but a feeble argument to support the opinion I am combating ; for after insidious arts had se- duced some of the negro chiefs to abandon for a while their illustrious leader, and after that great man himself had fallen a victim to the perfidy of Leclerc, the confidence of the distracted multi- tude could hardly find a pillar to rest upon ; and the military dispositions of the enemy made union extremely difficult. It would not hâve been strange, therefore, had different chiefs erected several independent standards in different divi- sions of the island ; and refused afterwards to ac- knowledge a superior, or to unite their authority when the common danger had subsided. It was said, upon what evidence I know not, that a disunion of this nature had actually taken place ; and that a large body of the negroes had agreed on an armistice with Rochambeau at the Cape. But if any such discord really arose, it appears to have had but a small extent, and a very brief du- ration ; for no sooner did the surrender of the French troops open the way to accurate informa- tion, than we learned that the three principal chiefs, Dessalines, Christophe, and Clervaux, had united the whole island again under a single go- vernment,

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£ 131 J vernment; over which, down to the.period of the latest advices, they continued jointly to preside. In this triumvirate, Dessalines appears to take the lead ; and it is worthy of remark, tliat he and Christophe, were the most distinguished and faithful officers of Toussaint. That great man, it should be remembered, from whom the Consul did not disdain to borrow the plan of his present authority*,was elected go- vernor, for life, with a power to nominate his successor; but as the sudden act of perfidy by .which he lost his liberty and his life, precluded the exercise of this power, a grateful people had no better way to evince their reverence for his me- mory, and the stability of their social attachments, than by ranging themselves under the standard of those leaders, whpJield the chief authority under him during his government, and had enjoyed the largest share of his favour and confidence f, His * While I write, rumour imports that this expression i? in- correct. It ,is sajd he is Emperor of the French. I must hasten to publish, lest before my work appears he should be deified ; and my strictures on his West-Indian policy should outrage his humble' worshippers, the free citizens of the Great Nation. f Again the course of events outstrips the progress of this argument, but confirmsmy opinion. It is reported, since the above paragraph was ready for the Press, and apparently upon good authority,- that Dessalines is appointed sole Governor for life, oppressors

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1S2 3 oppressors* had taken care that there should be no hereditary representative, whom popular affection might have deemed a preferable object of choice. I ask, then, what circumstance in the history of this new people warrants the conclusion that the union will not be lasting ? Let a case be pointed out, of a society now upon earth, or which ever existed, in which the principle of political cohe- sion has been more vigorous or perfect. Other nations, let it be considered, have rarely, if ever, been formed under circumstances so unfa- vourable to the socjal union. They have either migrated under a single leader from other states^ and a f tus of civil or military organization has been formed, before the political birth : or they have been formed by gradual accretion, round a mucleus which originally possessed the organs of of municipal life; or they have grown into a nation by the multiplication of a single family, of which the patriarchial government has de- scended upon the elder branch : but in St. Do- mingo, a hew social edifice was to be raised at once, out of a mass of broken and heterogeneous ruins. In a moment, the petty thrones of some thousands of plantations were subverted, and half a million of enfranchised bondsmen, of as many different tribes and nations, and tongues, &s the man-selling regions of Africa contain, were

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133 were suddenly called upon to put on social cha» r^cter, to the first rudiments of which most of them had, to that moment, been total strangers, It would be but a faint image of this transition to suppose the flocks and herds of Circe restored in an instant to their pristine forms, and that prior to their metamorphoses, they had arrived from every different region of the earth ; unless we should add, that their numerous progeny, born jn a brutal form, and instructed only in the du« ties and manners of the stall, started into man- hood along with them. That men, under such circumstances, should so soon and so abidingly unite themselves under a single government, as the people of St. Domingo did under that of Toussaint, is a prodigy which strongly illustrates the force of those feelings which attract anôTbind them to each other : but to believe, after such an example, that negroes are such savages as to be incapable of maintaining their pplitical union in the same identical island, is to exhibit a prodigy of another kind, a preter- natural extreme of credulity and prejudice. I grant that the motives for union were in this case exceedingly strong ; nay, I am ready to ad- mit, that nothing but the unspeakable value, in à physical as well as moral view, of negro freedom, when compared with negro slavery, could possibly have so soon produced, out of the vortex of anar- chy*

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I 134 } çhy, a union so perfect and tenacious. But will not the same peculiar motives still operate in fa? vour of concord ? I fear they will i for J have Jittle expectation that Africans will soon find themselves safe in that part of the globe from the rapacious fangs of European avarice and despo- tism, except by that power of self-defence, which the Almighty has provided in his mercy for a united people every where, and especially for Africans between the tropics, against a, European enemy. With the Indigenes, therefore, the dread of a horrible bondage will long be the cement of their political confederation, Of a retrogression of this people from the point of civilization to which they have attained towards barbarism, there seems still less danger than of their political disunion, Under Toussaint, they advanced, as has been already noticed, both irj agriculture and commerce ; though never to be sure in the history of any society upon earth, was there a situation of affairs more adverse to that progress. Why then should we suppose that, when they are delivered from the miseries of civil and foreign war, and no longer agitated by the fear of a renovated slavery, they will neglect those grand sources of improvement ? Are they indolent ? Indolence itself will plead for the culture of commercial articles. Their rich soil can «upply their necessities, by means of its exportable

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t ÎS5 3 exportable produce, at a less expence of labour, than it would cost them to provide in any other way, food, clothing, and other indispensable ne- cessaries, even in the simplest style. Are they in- temperate ? The charge is in general false, insult* ing and preposterous; but I grant, that of those in- ebriating luxuries, in which «heir masters revelled, some of them occasionally obtained a taste, and have, doubtless, retained the relish. This vice,how* ever, in the degree wherein it exists, will be a sti- mulus operating in favour of commerce; by which alone the means of indulging intemperance, and possessing the objects of luxury, can he obtained. Are they vain : I admit the imputation. They have no scanty share of that universal weakness. They love dress, in particular, in proportion to the* difficulty with which the homely and tawdry attire Which they Used to be proud of, was acquired. Here the foreign merchant will have another hold upon them ; a further allurement, exciting them to the preservation and extension of commerce, and of agriculture,as its necessary source. To these impulses wall be added, that which in a limited field, is perhaps the surest cause of agrU cultural improvement ; a population rapidly en- creasing ; and likely, at no far distant period to ex- ceed the number which the immediate produce of the soil could sufficiently sustain. This

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136 This cause, unless opposed by new territorial acquisitions, is likely to be peculiarly active and powerful at St. Domingo ; because from the great value of the exportable produce of a West India Island, when compared with that of the grain and other provisions imported in return for it, the ef- fects of tillage in multiplying the means of support for a growing population, will there be peculiarly great and encouraging. It may be added, that as long as the complexion of the Indigenes shall constitute a legal presumption of slavery, and a brand of dishonour, in every West India island but their own, and almost in every civilized portion of the western world within the climate they love, they will have little inducement to lessen by mi- gration these good effects of domestic encrease*. The history of mankind in general, lends no countenance to the opinion I here combat. * A free negro who travels in the West Indies, incurs a great risque of losing his liberty ; for by the laws of that country, the legal presumption is, that every black man or mulatto, is a slave, until the contrary appears ; and if his master be unknown, he is liable to be seized aud sold for the use of the public. To avoid this, he must carry with him written testimonials of his enfranchisement ; but these may be lost or contested ; and the righteous law which lays the onus probandi upon him, has provided no means whereby he can make the proof required, or bring the question before any tribunal for discussion, unless benevolence should prompt some person incontestably free, to become his patron or. guardian, and apply to the law on his be- half. Often

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137 3 Often have the arts of agriculture and con> merce been chased away by barbarous inva- ders; and sometimes, as in Spain, they have declin- ed through the depressing effects of bad civil insti- tutions; but lean recollect no precedent in history, in which a people circumstanced like those of St. Domingo, have wholly abandoned those beneficial arts, and gone back into barbarous manners. Indeed, history affords no case in which there has been half so much security against that unnatural retrogression. Not tempted by unlimited wastes, to engage in a wandering life ; possessing but a mo- derate domain, where neither the hunter, nor the . shepherd state, of uncivilized man, would find any local aptitudes ; not cut off by deserts or forests from an intercourse with more polished societies ; but placed in the very focus of the richest commerce upon- earth, and circumscribed by a tranquil sea upon which the canvass of the merchant is perpe- tually visible from all points of their accessible coast ; already expert in the arts of agriculture, and in the manufacture of its most valuable produce; already accustomed to the operations of commerce, and continually solicited to extend them} if under circumstances like these, the Indigenes should ex- pel those handmaids of civilization and social hap* piness, and degenerate into a savage state, the event would be strange indeed. Their stupidity might in that case half absolve the guilt of their op-. T pressors,

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138 3 pressors, and leave the slave trader little more to «nswerforat the bar of eternal justice, than the tormenting a mere animal existence, and the destruction of irrational life. I will not enlarge these gratuitous arguments against an opinion, which though advanced by the despairing enemies of African freedom, and whis- pered perhaps, not without effect, into the ears of His Majesty's Ministers, is a mere unsupported dogma, and is at war with all the experience of mankind. Should this brief attempt to disperse the mist of prejudice which hangs over the dawn of the new state, be unsuccessful, my practical conclusions, let it be again observed, depend not upon a favoura* hie estimate of the character of the Indigenes; or on the hope of their future prosperity. Suppos- ing' them to relapse into anarchy and barbarism, they will, I admit, be less formidable enemies than I have imagined, and less desirable allies : But it is still wise to secure their amity, while they have advantages to impart ; prudent to avert their en- mity ,while they have power to annoy; and necessary to prolong and perpetuate their separation from France, in whose hand, whether united or divided ¦among themselves, whether civilized or barbarous, they would be most formidable instruments', and certain occasions of mischief. Here,

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r 139 i Here, Sir, I might fairly take my leave, did not a sense of moral, as well as patriotic duty, irresisti- bly force upon me another important topic. There is a subject, a most momentous and op- probrious one, which stands not indeed in any ne- cessary connection with my argument, but upon which when recommending measures of West Indian policy, it is impossible not to reflect, and would be criminal to be silent. The Slave Trade I How does that dreadful name dishearten the patriot hopes of an Englishman, who knows its horrors, and who has seen its per- nicious effects! Could I forget, or doubt, that, " Verily, and indeed, there is a God who governs the earth ;" I still could not sincerely hold forth the hope of a result finally beneficial to my coun- try, from the measure recommended in these sheets, or from any other scheme of policy how- ever wise, while that pestilent iniquity is cherish- ed. It would be like promising prosperity to a prodigal, from arrangements of domestic economy, while he refused to forsake the gaming table or the race course; or health to a dropsical drunkard from medicine, while he persisted in the nightly debauch. Yet I see my country still given up without remorse to the unbridled career of slave trad- ing speculators. As if amorous of guilt and of ruin, we plunge deeper every day into that gulph of African blood, Happy

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140 3 Happy had it been, perhaps, if the veil of pub- lic ignorance, which for ages covered the defor- mities of that hideous commerce, had never been withdrawn ; for the monster instead of being cut off, as the first burst of honest indignation pro- mised, has been more fondly nourished than be- fore ; and fattened with fuller meals of misery and murder, into far more than his pristine dimen- sions. While the flagitious wickedness of the trade was exposed by the abolitionists, its gainful effects were blazoned by its defenders ; and the purblind avarice of the country was so strongly ex- cited, that the man-merchant in an apparent de- feat, obtained an actual triumph ; a triumph over national humanity ; and let me add, over all the moral decencies of legislative character. The pleadings of justice and mercy have served only, like the graceful supplications of violated beauty, to display more attractively the object of temp-- tation ; and to inflame that cupidity, which their eloquence could not repress. ¦ A momentary compunction was indeed excited in our senate, as well as in the country at large ; hut its effect has been only to display in the foul relapse, and enormous extension of the crime, the low state of our public morals; and the fatal ten- dency of that vile principle of expediency, upon which immediate reformation was withheld. * Do these strictures, Sir, appear too strong? Ask

The Opportunity. pp. 141-148. 151 0141

1 141 Ask yourself then I entreat you, what would have been said, in the House of Commons, had air abo> litionist ventured to predict in the debates of 1792, events which have since happened, " that instead " of finally terminating the Slave Trade within " a few years, we should within that period dou- ." ble its annual extent; that instead .of limiting " the supply by the alleged necessities of our old " sugar colonies, we should covet and acquire a " large unsettled island within the tropics, and " people it by that detestable commerce*; that '? we should even explore new receptacles for the " miserable victims of our avarice, in a foreign " territory ; and send a hundred thousand slaves, " to fertilize by British capital and credit the " sickly regions of Guiana." Surely, the speaker would have been scoffed at as an absurd dreamer who libelled the fair intentions of* the Commons. "Is thy servant a dog that he should do this?" the indignant reply of a Jewish monarch to a pro- phet upon a like occasion, might have expressed 4he feelings of the house. Such predictions, however, would have been un inadequate expression of our subsequent inconsis- tency and guilts » What use, Sir, are you now making of the- late Charib division of St. Vincent ? Jis to Trinidada, *The Slave Trade, ever since our acquisition of Trinidad^, has been allowed in the ports of that island without qualifica- tion or restraint. I forbear

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t 1*2 1 I forbear, now fully to speak, what must, I fear, one day be spoken. While you hesitate upon the plan of colonization to be adopted m that new island, of which the fate is happily not yet com- jnitted to an assembly of planters, I will endea- vour to hope in silence. But upon what principle, let me ask, is the importation of African negroes into this colony permitted without any modifica- tion or restraint, while we are taught to believe that the murderous old system of slavery is not :meant to be finally planted there? The conquest, or let me rather call it the ac- ceptance, of Dutch Guiana, menaces a new ag- gravation of the guilt of Great Britain, and the miseries of Africa, That this measure was grossly impolitic, must be evident to every well informed mind. Our cruizers, to the great encouragement of our naval service, would have captured and brought into our ports, at least four-fifths of all the produce ex- ported from that country -y thereby checking the growth of settlements, which are a nuisance to the British planter, and leaving to our enemies the deathful charge of their interior defence, Instead of this, Demarara, Issequibo, and Berbice, are al- ready taken again under the fostering wing of Great Britain. The Dutch, and the Anglo-Dutch planters, fondly rush into our arms, in order to be safe from our hostility; and to be nourished again

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I tu I again, as they doubtless hope, with British capital and credit; as well as to enjoy the security during war, of British navigation. In return, they gene- rously allow and engage you to provide for their internal safety ; and to guarantee them against the fearful tendencies of their having lately added to their population a hundred thousand African slaves. Surinam too, if report may be credited, has probably ere now condescended to change its flag on the same advantageous terms: and here, our regular troops, which we so easily recruit, and can so well spare from European service, will have frequent opportunities of gathering laurels, in the unceasing war maintained by that colony against the Maroon negroes of the interior. Per- haps the Dutch Assembly may be more civil than that of Jamaica; and be gracious enough, while we are at all the expence of life, to contribute a little money for their own defence; since the standing contribution to their own government for the support of the Maroon war alone, was six per cent, on all their produce. How many regiments annually the sickly swamps of that settlement may consume for us, I cannot presume to estimate; but Demarara is said to have furnished graves to almost the entire garri- sons sent out to receive it at the last peace, con- sisting

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144 listing of about twelve hundred Batavian regu* lars/in little more than a single year. Could I with propriety here pursue this sub- ject further, it would be easy to shew the cruel hardships imposed upon our own planters, by the diversion made by Guiana speculations, of such commercial capital as is usually invested in West Indian loans; the injustice of opening freely the British market during war to the produce of these foreign colonies ; and the extreme folly of suffer- ing them to be improved and extended by sub- jects of this country'. But these considerations are not strictly within the scope of my present argument. I now wi&h to look to the inauspicious conquests in question, no further than as thev, like the other facts to which I have referred, stand related to the Slave Trade ; and consequently to the plan of policy which it is the business of these sheets to recom- mend. If then, as these measures unhappily seem to threaten, the old maxims are still to prevail if we are still, with insatiable avidity, to prosecute the Slave Trade, to every extent, and in every direction, to which the spirit of gambling specu- lation may invite if to this end, we are to open new lands, plant "new colonies, and manure with British capi|al and credit, every foreign and rival soil between the tropics, where slave buyers can be

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be found if I say we are to persist in this infa- tuated and atrocious career; the advice which I have taken all this trouble to support is certainly not worth your attention. In that case, it matters little whether you avert from our sugar colonies the evils which me- nace them from St. Domingo ; for mischiefs more surely destructive are ripening in those new fields of blood ; and will soon be wafted by the wings of the trade, wind uppn them. It will profit us little in that case, to rescue our army from the hospitals of Jamaica; for graves sufficiently wide to contain the whole of it, are opening in Trinidada and Guiana. It will be a fruitless work to stop by a wise policy the course of revo- lution at pne end of the Charibbean Chain, for its electric shock will soon be transmitted from the other. * Nor is it necessary, as far as the welfare of our old colonies is concerned, to suppose, that the sudden introduction of another hundred thousand of Africans into those settlements, will produce in speedy insurrection its natural effect. The rival- ship of those colonies, should they prosper, will be certain ruin to the old British planter, and destruction to his slaves.* But, * The author regrets that he must here abstain from the discussion of a most important topic. It might be demon- U stated.

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146 But, abstaining from the further consideration of these natural consequences of the Slave Trade, and omitting to state its obvious incompatibility with that permanent friendship which I would advise you to cultivate with the people of St. Domingo ; let me avow, before I conclude, the influence of still higher motives. Yes, Sir ! how- ever it may revolt the prejudices of many who regard the raising our eyes beyond second causes, as no part of political wisdom, I will freely con- fess, that I can hope no good result from the measure here recommended, or from any other precautions of national prudence, while we con- tinue to defy the justice of Omnipotence, by the horrible iniquities of the Slave Trade. I know the unequalled miseries inflicted upon myriads of the children of Adam, by that com- merce ; I know the horrors of the system which it feeds and perpetrates ; I believe that, there is a righteous governor of the earth ; and therefore I strated, from premises which even the West Indian Commit- tee would admit, that the planters of the old islands must be ruined, if the settlement of the cheap lands in these colonies, is further to be encouraged or allowed : and it is a plain co- rollary from this proposition, that slaves bound by mortgages to the soil, as the negroes in the islands almost universally are, must be gradually worked down and destroyed, in the fruitless but necessary attempt, to keep down by parsimony and exer- tion the interest of the growing incumbrances. dare

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I m ï dare not hope well of the fortunes of my doun* try, while she stands with an impious obduracy,) between the mercy of God, and the deliverance of Africa. Nor are there symptoms wanting, which appear to develope a providential plan, for the relief of that much injured race, and the punishment of their oppressors. In thé wonderful events and coincidences Which have planted, fostered, and defended, the liberty of St. Domingo, I seem to see that hand by which the fates of men and nations are directed. I seem to see it, in that strange train of public evils, which, since the first blaze of light revealed the full guilt of the Slave Trade, and since we re- jected the loud call for reformation, have chastized our national obduracy. I seem to see it, in the dark clouds which now menace the domestic se- curity, the idolised wealth, the happiness, and even the liberty and independency, of my country. For that Satanic mind which is now suffered to sway the destiny of Europe, few are more in- clined, in a natural view, than myself, to mingle contempt with abhorrence ; but when I consider what instruments the Almighty has sometimes been pleased to employ in purposes of national vengeance, and when I think of the Slave Trade, I cannot wholly despise the menaces of our haughty

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C U8 1 haughty enemy, even upon British ground. I can only exclaim ¦ Non me tua fcrvida terren t " Dfcta, ferox : Dii me terrent, et Jupiter hostis."

Appendix. 159 0149

APPENDIX. Extracted from THE SUN, of Saturday» Aprils, 1804. St. DOMINGO. LIBERTY OR DEATH ! NATIVE ARMY. THE GENERAL IN CHIEF TO THE PEOPLE OF HAYTI. " CITIZENS, " It is not enough to have expelled from your Country the barbarians whp' have for two ages stained it with blood; it is not enough to have curbed the factions which, succeeding one ano- ther, by turns sported with a phantom of Liberty which France exposed to their eyes. It is become necessary, by a last act of National Authority, to* ensure for ever the Empire of Liberty in a Coun- try which has given us birth. It is necessary to X deprive

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150 3 deprive an inhuman Government, which has hi- therto held our minds in a state of the most hu- miliated torpitude, of every hope of being enabled again to enslave us. Finally, it is necessary to live independent or die. Independence or Death ! Let those sacred words serve to rally us, let them be signals of battle and of our re-union. Citizens, Countrymen, I have assembled on this solemn day, those courageousChiefs who,on the eve of receiving the last breath of expiring Liberty, have " lavished their blood to preserve it. These Gene- rals who have conducted your efforts against ty- ranny, have not yet done enough. The Trench name still darkens our plains; every thing recalls the remembrance of the cruelties of that barbar- ous people. Our laws, our customs, our cities, every thing bears the mark of the French. What do I say ? the Trench still have a footing in our island, and you believe yourselves free "and inde- pendent of that Republic, which has fought all nations it is true, but which never conquered those who would be fiee! What, victims for four- teen years of our credulity and forbearance ! con- quered not by French armies, but by the canting eloquence of the Proclamations of their Agents! When shall we be wearied with breathing the same air with them ? What have we hi common with that bloody-minded people ? Their cruelties, compared to our moderation, their colour to ours, the extension of seas which separate us, our avenging

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isi avenging climate, all plainly tell us they are not our brethren ; that they never will become such ; and if they find an asylum among us, they will still be the instigators of our troubles and pf our divisions. Citizens men, women, young and old, cast round your eyes on, all parts of this island ; seek there your wives, your husbands, your bro- thers, your sisters What do I say? Seek your children your children at the breast, what is,be- come of them ? I shudder to tell it the prey of vultures. Instead of these interesting victims, the affrighted eye sees only their assassins tigers still covered with their blood, and whose terrifying presence reproaches you for your insensibility and your guilty tardiness to avenge them what do you wait for to appease their manes ? Remember that you have wished your remains to be laid by the side of your fathers When you have driven out tyranny, will you descend info their tombs, without having avenged them? No, their bones would repulse yours; and ye invaluable men, in-, trepid Generajs, who, Insensible to private suffer- ings, haye given new life to liberty, by lavishing your blood, know (hat you have done nothing if you do not give to the nations a terrible, though just example, of the vengeance that ought to be exercised by a people proud of having recovered its liberty, and zealous of maintaining it, Let us intimidate those who might dare to attempt de» Driving us pf it again: let us begin with the French

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i îo-â 3 FrenehT; let them shudder at approaching our shores, if not on account of the cruelties they have committed, at least at the terrible resolution we e, to devote to death, whatsoever native of France should soil with his sacrilegious footstep this territory of Liberty. " We have dared to be free let us be free by ourselves and for ourselves; let us imitate the growing child; his own weight breaks his leading strings, which have become useless and trouble- some to him in his walk. ' What people have fought us? what people would reap the fruits of our labours? and what dishonourable absurdity to conquer to be slaves ! ; " Slaves, leave to the French Nation this qua- lifying epithet, they have conquered to be nd longer free let us walk on other foot-steps ; let us imitate other people, who, carrying their soli- citude into futurity, and dreading to leave to pos- terity an example of cowardice, have preferred to be exterminated, rather than to be erased from the list of free people. Let us, however, take care, lest our spirit of proselytism should destroy our work let our neighbours breathe in peace let them live peaceably under the shield of those laws which they have framed for themselves; let us beware of becoming revolutionary fire-brands of creating ourselves the Legislators of the An- tilles^ of considering as a glory the disturbing the tranquillity of the neighbouring Islands; they have not

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r is? i riot beeri, like the one we inhabit, bathed in th£ innocent blood of their inhabitants-*-they have no- vengeance to exercise against the authority that protects them; happy never to have experienced; the plagîie that has destroyed U5, they must wislii well to our posterity. " Peace with our neighbours; but accursed be* thé French name eternal hatred to France; suchv are our principles. " Natives of Hayti my happy destiny reserves-' me to be one day the Sentinel who is to guard th# idol we now sacrifice tô. I have grown old fight- ing for you, sometimes almost alone; and if I have been happy enough to deliver to you the sacred chargé cPnfided to frie, recollect it is for you at present to preserve it. In fighting for your li-f berty, I have laboured for my own happiness; be^ fore it shall be consolidated by laws which insure individual liberty, your Chiefs whom I have as^ sembled here, and myself, owe you this last proof of our devotedness. " Generals and other Chiefs, unite with me for the happiness of our Country: the day is arrived, the day which is to perpetuate our glory and our independence. ** If there exist among you a lukewarm heart, let him retire, and shudder to pronounce the oath which is to unite us. Let us swear to the whole world, to posterity, to ourselves, to renounce France for ever, and to die rather than live under its

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154 r its dominion to fight till the last breath for the Independence of our Country. " And ye, People, too long unfortunate, wit- ness the- oath we now pronounce : recollect that it is upon your constancy and courage that I depended when I first entered the career of Li- berty to fight despotism and Tyranny, against which you have been struggling these last four- teen years; remember that I have sacrificed every thing to fly to your defence Parents, Children, Fortune, and am now only rich in your Liberty. That my name has become a horror to all people, the friends of Slavery and Despots, and Tyrants only pronounce it, cursing the day that gave me} birth ; and if ever you refuse or receive in mur- muring the Laws, which the protecting angel that watches over your destinies shall dictate to me for your happiness, you will merit the fate of an ungrateful people. But far from me this frightful idea: you will be the guardians of the liberty you cherish, the support of the Chief who com- mands you. " Swear then to live free and independent, and tp prefer death to every thing that would lead to replace you under the yoke ; swear then to pur- sue everlasting Traitors, and tbe enemies of your Independence. J. J. DESSALINES." " Head Quarters, Gonaives, 1 1st Jan. 1804, 1st Year of Independence." Since the above proclamation was sent to press, the author has received the following extract from a Boston,

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a Boston newspaper just arrived, which seems to place it out of doubt that vindictive executions, at least, if not massacres, have really taken place in St. Domingo. Extract from a Boston Newspaper of the 5th of May 1804. « The Governor of Hayti has directed the pub- lication of the following Arrêtés in the papers of the United States: v " The Governor General considering that there «fill remains in the Island of Hayti individuals who -have contributed either by their guilty wri- tings, or by their sanguinary accusations, to the drowning, suffocating, assassinating, hanging, and shooting of more than 60000 of our brethren, un- der the inhuman government of Leclerc and Roch- ambeau : considering that every man who has dis- hPnoured human nature hy prostituting himself with enthusiasm to the vile offices of informers, and of executioners, ought to be classed with as- sassins, and delivered up without remorse to the sword of justice ; decrees as follows : " 1. Every commandant of division shall cause to be arrested within their respective commands, the persons who are or shall be known to have taken an active part in the different massacres and assas- sinations ordered by Leclerc or Rochambeau. " 2. Before proceeding to the arrest of any in- dividual (as it often happens that many are inno- cent, who nevertheless may be strongly suspected) we IV. ï f .

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r i46 } r we order each commandant to make all necessary enquiries for procuring proofs; and abpve all,not , to confound with true and faithful reports those denunciations too frequently suggested by envy and hatred. .«* 3. The names and sirnarpes of persons exe-> . fcuted shall be inserted in ajist, and sent to the General in Chief, who- will make them public, in orderfto inform the nations of the world that, although we grant an asylum and protection to those who act candidly and friendly towards us, . nothing shall ever turn our vengeance from those murderers who have bathed themselves witn plea- sure in the blood of the innocent children of Hayti. < « 4. Every chief, who in contempt of the or- ders and unalterable will of government, shall sa- crifice to his ambition, to his hatred, or to any other passiçn, any individual whose guilt sh^ll not .have been previously well ascertained and proved, shall undergo the same punishment which he shall have thus inflicted, and the property of every such unjust officer shall be confiscated, one half t& the t government, and the other half to. the relations pf «the innocent victim, if any there may be in thejs- -rland at the time of his death/ <i ûm « DESSALINES." Pone at Gonaives, 2Ùth of"February, Jtu&copy, B.lâimé, Secretary. î FINIS. ' C. YVHITTINGHAM, Printer, Dean Street. g/tf 191950