

DR. EUGENE M. BRADERMAN

Interviewed by: Horace G. Torbert

Initial interview date: April 30, 1990

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Q: Dr. Braderman we're very glad to have you here. I'd like to ask you, if you would, just to start in and tell us how you got into the international economic field, starting whenever you want to with your education, or your first jobs, or even your prenatal influence if you want to. And then we'll go ahead and you can chronologically tell me what went on. But at any time you wish to skip ahead or skip back, it's perfectly all right. How did you first get started in your career?

BRADERMAN: Well, I'm a Philadelphian by birth and was educated in the Philadelphia public schools and went to college at Temple University in Philadelphia.

At Temple University I decided, through a variety of circumstances, to major in the social sciences. Most of my work was in history and political science, with a minor in economics.

In my senior year, a number of my professors suggested that I continue with graduate work. This was the Depression period and jobs weren't easy to come by. So, the prospect of continuing my education was both a desirable one and one that seemed to fit into the general economic picture.

I applied for fellowships at a couple of universities and was awarded one by the University of Illinois. At the University of Illinois, I was in the History Department. My major was history, my minor was international organizations.

Part of the reason for selecting that was the presence there of a professor by the name of Clarence Berdahl who was a very well known authority on the League of Nations, in which I had had an interest as an undergraduate.

I was also very much interested in the problems of Latin America. One of the professors-William S. Robertson-encouraged me to major in Latin American Affairs as part of my work in the History Department.

I was at the University of Illinois on a university fellowship the first year, and the urging of Professor Robertson was important because he was chairman of the committee that determined who was to get fellowships for succeeding years. I was impressed with him as a scholar, and he was satisfied with the work I was doing as a student. So, we meshed pretty well, and I decided to major in Latin American History.

I did a study for my masters degree on the Chaco Dispute, a dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, and also one on the Leticia Dispute, a dispute between Columbia, Peru, and Ecuador.

And then for my doctoral dissertation, I did a study of political parties and politics in Mexico during the Mexican Revolution, actually starting in about 1890 and running it to what was then the present time, which was 1938, when I submitted my thesis and then got my degree.

So, as you can see, I was deeply involved in international affairs. Curiously enough, political affairs, not economic affairs, were the major part of my undergraduate and graduate education.

Q: You had, I suppose, some economic courses.

BRADERMAN: I did. The way in which I got into economics as a part of my career is one of those curious things that occurs.

I received my Ph.D. in 1938. University positions were not generally available. I was recalled by Temple University to teach in a summer session, which I did. It gave me some spending money. I did some research for a period of six months and published a couple of articles, one on my thesis and another one or two on papers I had done while I was in graduate school.

During that period I was in Washington working on another Latin American project, when it suddenly occurred to me that I was really not pursuing any ultimate career objective. It was nice to have papers published, but it wasn't earning me anything substantial, and my resources were dwindling.

So I decided to look around. Among the people I talked to was Luther Evans, who was then head of the Historical Records Survey, one of several federal projects under the Works Progress Administration. He decided to hire me.

He suggested that I go back to Pennsylvania (they had projects in virtually every state of the Union) and become familiar with what was being done. He said the paperwork would take about a month, he'd be in touch with me, and then I could come to Washington.

In Philadelphia, I ran into some internal politics I was not aware of between the State Director and Washington headquarters. At any rate, the State Director was looking for someone on what they called the non-relief payroll who could do some editing and writing for them, and thought if I was good enough for the Administrator in Washington, I was good enough for the State of Pennsylvania.

So, he said it would be useful to him, and it would certainly be desirable for me to go to work immediately, instead of waiting without pay for a month. And I did.

At the end of that period, Washington came through with its job offer, but the State Director offered me the position of State Editor for the state. There were discussions between Luther Evans, the State Director and myself, and we decided I'd stay in Pennsylvania. I did, and a few months later I became State Director and ran the whole project until 1941.

I still haven't answered the question about how I became a professional economist, because in this job we were involved primarily in local, county, and state archival work. We published a number of volumes as a matter of fact.

But I knew this was not my career. Certainly, it was not anything that followed from my graduate work.

I took a number of Civil Service examinations, which were still in vogue at that time, one of which was the junior economist examination.

I qualified for that, both because of my undergraduate work and because I took post-doctoral work at the University of Pennsylvania in economics. That gave me enough credits to qualify me. Curiously enough, I was soon offered a position as a junior economist with the Department of Labor. I left the Historical Records Survey with somewhat mixed emotions, but it was really only a temporary job.

Q: By that time, of course, we were getting into the war period?

BRADERMAN: You're right. As a matter of fact, in 1940 I saw the winds of war coming upon us, and I volunteered for a commission in the US Naval Reserve.

In those days, they took an awful lot of time on their investigations, and it took considerable time. Everything came out fine, except that I was turned down for "inability to meet Naval physical requirements," (my eyes). So, I did not go into the Navy.

I decided I wanted to do some work related to the war and applied for a position at the Board of Economic Warfare. Among other things, they were looking for people who had had either experience on the ground or knowledge of Latin America. While I hadn't had extensive experience on the ground, I had spent time in Mexico in connection with work on my doctoral dissertation. I also had spent two years of intensive study of Latin American Affairs. I was employed in the Mexican Division of the Board of Economic Warfare in 1942.

Q: And that went on pretty much through the war?

BRADERMAN: I worked on Mexico for about a year, and then I was assigned as desk officer for Peru, Chile, and Bolivia.

I had an interesting assignment. I was one of a committee of three, named by Dean Acheson, who was then-Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Department of State, to decide what export licenses we would approve for goods going to Bolivia.

Q: This was basically a question of licensing exports rather than preclusive buying?

BRADERMAN: Yes. Those activities were part of the charter of the Board of Economic Warfare and then the Foreign Economic Administration, but I was involved primarily in the export side.

The Mexican assignment was primarily analytical, supplying basic information on the kinds of goods we could get as substitutes for things that were cut off from the Far East and elsewhere: for example-sisal from Mexico versus the copra we were getting from the Philippines and other parts of Southeast Asia, and so on.

So, I was very much involved in economics. There was no commercial activity of note because it was a wartime situation.

Q: Did this involve some field work? Did you go to Mexico?

BRADERMAN: Yes, I did go to Mexico on a couple of assignments. I also went to Venezuela on another assignment.

And I got involved in peripheral things, because in 1943 I became Assistant to the Director of the Latin American Division. He threw all sorts of odd jobs in my lap, one of the most interesting of which had nothing to do with the normal responsibilities of the Board of Economic Warfare or the Foreign Economic Administration.

The Foreign Economic Administration was essentially a combination of the Lend Lease Administration and the Board of Economic Warfare. I might just say a word about this unusual assignment.

Q: Yes, by all means. Say more than a word.

BRADERMAN: It's an unwritten chapter in the history books.

In 1942, when Rommel was advancing across North Africa, and the British were retreating, they wanted to set up shop in Tehran.

The Persians, at that time, were willing, except that they were then hosting all sorts of other immigrants, not the least of whom were Poles who had suddenly been released when the Soviet Union and the Western Powers became allies in 1941.

These were Poles who had left eastern Poland as the Russians took their half, while the Germans invaded western Poland and took their half. Most of the millions who fled or were driven into the Soviet Union perished, but some hundreds of thousands survived the ordeal.

Then when Sikorsky set up his government-in-exile in London, these people became citizens without a land. Some went into military service, but they were ...

Q: They were not, however, most of them, part of the Polish Army in the first place.

BRADERMAN: No, they had been civilians. Most of the people who did not join the Polish regiments in the Allied armies were women and children and older men. And they had been shipped, temporarily, to Tehran.

They were also beginning, at this time, to talk about some kind of an international organization that might take care of refugees. It was the beginning of the thinking that led to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

As a result of the need of the British for living space in Tehran, the Poles were moved from Tehran to Karachi, several thousands of them. They were just vegetating in and around Karachi.

It was at this time, in 1943 as I recall, that General Sikorsky came and talked to President Roosevelt about doing something for these people.

The President said he would help financially, but he couldn't bring them into the United States, because he had all sorts of immigration problems on his hands. He suggested to Sikorsky that he might talk to President Avila Camacho of Mexico.

Sikorsky went to Mexico, talked to Avila Camacho, who said he would take up to two or three thousand of these refugees, with three provisos: (1) they couldn't engage in any activity that would compete with the Mexicans; (2) financial support would have to be found elsewhere; and (3) they had to go back to Poland at the end of the war.

So, Sikorsky came back and saw Roosevelt and told him what the conditions were. Roosevelt told Sikorsky that he would have to worry about where they go at the end of the war; but that he (Roosevelt) was willing to arrange transport to Mexico and provide the financing.

For want of a better place to put the assignment (since the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was not yet organized), responsibility was given to the Foreign Economic Administration. Since the camp was to be in Mexico, it was put in the Latin American Division-one of those accidents of fate.

As the function didn't relate to exports, imports, and the usual things we were we doing, the head of the division said to me, as his assistant, "Gene, you take care of it. It will only be a temporary assignment because it will go over to the U.N."

Well, when the charter of the U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was drawn, they were permitted to operate everywhere except in the Western Hemisphere. So, I retained this assignment until the end of the war.

Q: This was your full time, your only job, or no, just that you're doing it with your left hand?

BRADERMAN: No, that's right. It was one of many assignments. My principal job in this instance was to see that funds were available (we got funds through the usual funding process), and also to see that the camp-when it was established-was properly managed.

I latched onto a chap by the name of McLaughlin, who had been head of the Relief Administration in the State of California. He went down and was our supervisor at the camp.

The problems were fascinating. I could talk for an hour on that, but I'm not going to.

The end result of all of the activity was that, for political reasons, the Polish Government wanted the refugees to return to Poland. They did not want these people to go to the United States.

I read all the intercepts and letters that they were writing, and knew that almost all of them had some relative or connection in the United States and wanted to come here. I also worked with then-Archbishop O'Boyle and the Catholic Relief Services who were willing to sponsor those who didn't have connections. So, in the end, after the war, they did come mostly to the United States.

Q: Meanwhile, did you provide work for them, or were they just in internment camps and on the dole?

BRADERMAN: We had just a few acres of land. Most of these people were farmers, but it was not possible to farm. So they developed, essentially, an arts and crafts program and a holding operation. It was not a very joyful experience for them. I visited the camp in Mexico. It was located near Leï½n, about 250 miles northwest of Mexico City.

Q: I'd never heard of this operation before, so I think it's very valuable to have.

BRADERMAN: It was suggested that I write a book or an article, but I just never got around to doing it.

Q: Well, we're getting it. So, the net result of this was that we got several thousand additional Polish immigrants at the end of the war?

BRADERMAN: Meanwhile, I was working on various assignments in assisting the Director in running the Latin American Division of the Foreign Economic Administration.

Q: Who was running the Foreign Economic Administration? Who was the head man at that time? Wasn't General Maxwell ... No, he was ...

BRADERMAN: No, that may have been earlier. Henry Wallace was head when we were the Board of Economic Warfare. President Roosevelt appointed Leo T. Crowley to head the Foreign Economic Administration.

Q: This lasted essentially through the war?

BRADERMAN: Lasted through the war. At the end of the war, there was a question of what to do with the functions that were being performed by the war agencies in general, and the Foreign Economy Administration in particular.

Many of the functions had no peacetime purpose. Their usefulness had, hopefully, served us well. But there were a number of functions that were to be continued. And these were divided among several permanent agencies, the largest segments of which went to the State and Commerce Departments.

My natural inclination at the time (if you recall my educational experience, you will see why) was to be in the political end of things. I initially opted to go to the State Department.

My boss, whose name was George Bell, was given the job of Associate Director of a newly created Office of International Trade in the Commerce Department. This was to be the international economic arm of the Commerce Department. He was given the number two job, and he urged me to come with him and I finally decided to do that.

So that was the reason I went to the Commerce Department instead of the State Department. In both cases, at State and Commerce, most of the FEA functions and personnel were essentially liquidated.

Q: What was your initial specific function there?

BRADERMAN: George Bell (since I was still an assistant to him, my functions derived from his functions) was an Associate Director of the Office of International Trade. Henry Wallace was Secretary of Commerce. The Department of Commerce had a grand design on the handling of most international economic and commercial functions.

This was the beginning of one of many disputes among the departments as to who would do what. I got into the middle of many of these because my boss ...

I've got to go back one step. In 1946 (another story), there was a new Foreign Service Act. The Foreign Service Act established a Board of the Foreign Service. My boss was named the Commerce Department representative on the Board of the Foreign Service.

The Board of the Foreign Service, like so many boards, decided to set up a subsidiary body, which was called the Staff Board, to do its day-to-day work. I was named Commerce Department representative on the Staff Board.

It became our duty, under the direction, primarily, of Tyler Thompson, who was chief of the Planning Division in the Department of State, to develop the rules and regulations that would implement the Foreign Service Act of 1946. And for many months I spent about 50 percent of my time working on Foreign Service-related activities.

During the course of that activity, the Director General decided it would be a good thing to have somebody go overseas to explain the Foreign Service Act to our missions. He thought, initially, Western Europe might be the best place to start.

Our new Secretary of Commerce, Averell Harriman, was one of those that believed the United States had to do some things to help Europe recover. The Marshall Plan was just gestating, but hadn't developed yet.

One of the things that was done was to make a conscious decision on the part of the United States, with the State and Commerce Departments playing leading roles, to change the focus of our Foreign Service commercial activities from one of promoting exports to that of encouraging imports.

A colleague and I were named as a team of two to go to Western Europe to tell Western European governments that the United States was prepared to do this. The Director General of the Foreign Service, Christian Ravndal, decided this would be a good opportunity to use the two of us for the function he had in mind, which was to explain the Foreign Service Act to our missions overseas.

So, in the fall of 1947, Emil Schnellbacher and I went to Europe. We visited 13 Western European countries in three months, with these two functions in mind.

Ambassadors arranged meetings initially for us with all of the staff, and then smaller sessions followed.

We developed and perfected what came to be the structure of missions for many years thereafter—the division of an Embassy into the various sections: a political section; an economic section, which later became an economic and commercial section; a consular section; an administrative section; and a cultural section. At that time the cultural function was in the State Department.

Organizational questions were of greater interest to the politically-appointed ambassadors than to the careerists because the latter knew their way around. But, we went through the gamut of questions and issues raised by the new Foreign Service Act.

We also had meetings with foreign government and business people about the new US initiative encouraging imports. It was a revolutionary change in Government policy and it got a tremendous positive response wherever we went, including wide press coverage.

Q: By this time had the Marshall Plan been passed?

BRADERMAN: No. This was '47. General Marshall made his speech in June of '48 as I recall.

Q: In other words, you were very deeply involved in the Foreign Service long before you were directly involved in the State Department. I think that's great. Now you stayed on this for...

BRADERMAN: I stayed on it until 1950. I suppose part of the initiative for the next change was McCarthyism.

The head of the Far Eastern Division in the Commerce Department was one of those who was accused of various things, so far as I recall, never proven. At any rate, he was induced to leave. Somebody had to be named to take over that division temporarily, and I was asked to do that. I became Acting Director of the Far Eastern Division.

So, I moved from being a "Latin American expert" and a generalist on exports and imports and trade to a new arena.

Q: And in a new part of the world.

BRADERMAN: A new part of the world about which I knew virtually nothing. That was part of the reason for this assignment as far as the senior officers were concerned: I had not "lost China." I barely knew where it was.

That temporary assignment blossomed in a great many ways. I spent the next ten years as head of the Far Eastern Division. That was, for me, a challenging experience and a fascinating one because I resolved to learn more about the economic and commercial situation in the Far East than anybody else in the United States. That was my objective.

Q: And probably wasn't all that hard in those days. It was hard work, but there weren't that many authorities.

BRADERMAN: One of the things that ensued was that I provided continuity since Foreign Service officers moved from assignment to assignment. For example, the US was a member of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), one of the United Nations regional organizations.

There were annual meetings of the commission itself, and many meetings in between. The State Department designations to all US delegations changed fairly rapidly because of changing assignments in the State Department.

As a result, even though I was in the Commerce Department, I provided "the memory" for the US delegation for a long time. I think I went to something like 24 meetings of the Commission and various committees of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, over a 10-year period-probably more than anybody in the history of the United States.

Q: That's a lot of meetings!

BRADERMAN: That's a lot of meetings. Through that process and other assignments requiring travel in Asia, I obviously was in the field a great deal. I would be away sometimes as much as two or three months at a stretch.

I naturally got to know our missions very, very well. I knew virtually everybody who served anywhere in South Asia and the Far East. Many of the friendships that were developed then, I'm happy to say, I have to this day.

Q: Well, now do you want to hit some of the high spots during that long period, the things that you feel were the most significant accomplishments or most interesting?

BRADERMAN: Most of the work that was performed during the '50s by a regional division, any regional division, of which mine was one in the Commerce Department, was that of servicing American business, keeping in touch with both our Domestic Field Service in the United States and the Foreign Service, particularly the officers who worked on economic and commercial matters.

Q: Was there also a function of sort of tutelage of the Japanese, we'll say, or any of the other eastern powers in getting started because they were such poor, downtrodden ...

BRADERMAN: There was. One of the things the Commerce Department did, as part of its function, was to send trade missions abroad. In the early 1950s, those trade missions were oriented to promoting imports. That changed, obviously, at a later time.

I headed two of those missions, one to Japan, in 1956 and another to the Philippines in 1960. On the mission to Japan, we had an economic officer from the embassy by the name of Owen Zurhellen, a Japanese local employee, and five American businessmen. I was the only one from Washington.

Q: These were five American businessmen?

BRADERMAN: Five American businessmen. They were prominent in different fields: one was a banker, one was a retailer, one was in transportation, one was in marketing.

The whole idea was to help discuss with the Japanese the nature of the US market and what they needed to do to penetrate the market (lessons which they learned all too well).

We spent eight weeks in Japan. We visited all of the four major islands, some 18 different cities and towns. We got to know a great deal about the Japanese, though, despite 19 visits to Japan, I still feel I don't know the Japanese very well. Absorbing Japanese culture is very difficult, despite, some of the superficial things one learns. It was a fascinating experience for all of us.

We were not the only mission that went to Japan, but you could say that these missions were very successful in view of what the Japanese have accomplished.

There were other aspects to the operation. One related to our export controls. I recall an experience in 1952, when the Japanese were to regain their independence. We were concerned about whether or not they would maintain the newly-imposed controls on trade with Communist China. It was decided that there ought to be a mission to determine the extent to which we could trust the Japanese to carry out that kind of responsibility when they were once more completely independent. As a result a team of State and Commerce Department officers was sent to Japan. I was a member of that team. We spent a month visiting various Japanese government departments and business enterprises to try to determine their attitude towards a continuation of controls.

It was curious, as a generality, but we found a great distrust among the Japanese for the Soviets. But the feeling regarding the Chinese was: they're people we can handle. This stemmed in part from their experiences during the '30s, and in part from their longer historical perspective. That has persisted as a Japanese political viewpoint to the present day.

At any rate, they did agree to become members of COCOM, as it's called, the international committee governing export controls to the Soviet bloc, and CHINCOM, which was the Chinese equivalent. That was another assignment during that period.

There were a wide variety of assignments during that period. I did a lot of speaking before business groups throughout the United States. We had advisory committees in various parts of the country and I would participate in those sessions, always with a Far Eastern perspective.

I recall another significant assignment. I was named a member of the US delegation, in 1954, to renegotiate an agreement made between the United States and the Philippines at the end of World War II in connection with their independence.

We insisted, in 1946, that the United States be given certain special economic rights in the Philippines. In return, we gave the Philippines certain special economic benefits in trade with the United States. They were part of this agreement. That agreement was to be renegotiated in 1954.

Senator Laurel was appointed by then-President Magsaysay to head the Philippine delegation. An American publisher in New Hampshire, by the name of Langley, was appointed head of the US delegation. I was a member of the US delegation.

We negotiated back and forth for a long time. It essentially became a political decision not an economic decision. It was decided to renew the agreement for 20 years, and both the benefits to the United States and to the Philippines were continued.

The continuation of these benefits was undesirable in the sense that the Philippines didn't have to extend itself in the way another struggling, young, developing country might have to in order to become economically self-sufficient, because it was able to rely on protected markets for sugar, for copra, and so on. It also gave American investors certain special privileges in terms of investment in the Philippines. This agreement ran until 1974.

Q: Did you have any particular relations with Korea at that time?

BRADERMAN: Well, that reminds me of another experience, which related to Korea and other countries.

In 1953, when Eisenhower became President, he appointed Harold Stassen head of the aid agency.

Harold Stassen decided that he wanted to make that a very vibrant agency and also had the notion that an aid plan in Asia, similar to a Marshall Plan in Europe, might be the kind of thing that was needed to have the developing countries of Asia get a jump start on development.

He submitted his proposals to the Advisory Committee on International Financial Problems, which was chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury at the time. While there was some question about his regional initiative, it was approved. The Administration went to Congress and got an appropriation of some 200 million dollars, which it could use if desirable in pursuit of this objective.

A team was to go to Asia to sound out the Asian countries on their reaction to this. Stassen was hoping to get as members of his mission political appointees at very senior levels.

The Department of State decided that the Ambassador in each of the countries we visited would be its representative. The Treasury and Commerce Departments, however, appointed careerists, heads of their Far Eastern divisions-much to Mr. Stassen's dismay, at least in the beginning.

We did become fast friends, I may say, and I developed tremendous respect for his ability. Since the Ambassadors were resident in the country, they did not travel with us, and so there were only five of us on an Air Force plane (Stassen, a Special Assistant and the Commerce and Treasury representatives). We had fairly luxurious accommodations for those days before jets; we did have sleeping accommodations, and so on.

We spent three weeks abroad and visited virtually all the countries in Asia. In connection with that mission, Governor Stassen also discussed other issues with the heads of government.

Our procedure was for Governor Stassen to be briefed en route to a particular country. Of course, there were briefing books and all the usual preparatory material, but he relied heavily on the briefings, primarily from the Treasury representative and myself. But, he alone would do the talking at the meetings with foreign government leaders.

So, you mentioned Korea and that was what reminded me of it, when we had our meetings with President Syngman Rhee.

One of the key issues at the time was the exchange rate between the United States and Korea, because the Koreans were really robbing us in connection with the aid program. Our aid representative, Tyler Wood, had been unable to get them to agree to anything. So, it was up to the mission.

Stassen stuck to his guns. It was very curious; Syngman Rhee wouldn't give an inch. But about 30 seconds before we were due to leave, and our plane was to take off as we had a very rigid schedule, one of the military aides motioned that it was time to go. Stassen and the rest of us stood up. And Syngman Rhee then said, "I agree."

Q: That's negotiating right down to the wire.

BRADERMAN: Right down to the wire. That was a very interesting thing to see. I might say, that at a recess we had during that morning, several people, particularly in the mission there, had urged us to give in, that Syngman Rhee would never change, we'd end in stalemate, and that we shouldn't leave on that note. But we stuck to our guns, and it worked.

We also met with Prime Minister Nehru in India and other heads of Government.

Q: How was Nehru as a negotiator? Did he do some of the negotiation?

BRADERMAN: In 1953, he had not become quite as anti-American as he later became. Since we were there offering something, he was very interested. We had a couple of sessions and luncheon, and so on. It was all very amicable.

I was there, in India, two years later at an ECAFE meeting, and the Indians at that time were very bitter, mostly because of our ...

Q: That we wouldn't give them completely free rein with our aid, wasn't that it?

BRADERMAN: No, it was mostly because of what they regarded as our initial tilt toward Pakistan. That became a very difficult thing.

On another trip to India, I remember talking to George Allen, when he was Ambassador, the morning he had to go in and see Prime Minister Nehru to tell him that we were going to give military assistance to Pakistan. He told me at the time that that was an assignment he wished he never had.

And, of course, it turned out that way. He got quite a calling down from Nehru. Our relations soured after that and destroyed itself in various ways.

The Stassen mission did not really result in anything. While the Indians agreed, to take the initiative and the Minister of Finance did issue a call for a regional meeting to try to come up with a plan they never did so. The idea was to get the initiative to come from the countries themselves, as they had in Europe.

But the situations in Asia and Europe were so different. Europe had educated and trained people, the infrastructure, everything else; Asia had none of those things. So, those who had counseled against this while it was being initially discussed, who were overridden, were really right about the outcome.

This was another of those assignments, of which there were dozens, that didn't relate specifically to the day-to-day work of advising American business on the economic situation in Asia, but which added spice to my life in that position.

Q: Well, now, was this the period during which you started negotiating various kinds of agreements, or was that later on?

BRADERMAN: That came later. Actually, I stayed in this position until 1958.

When the Senior Seminar was formed in that year, the Commerce Department was among the non-State agencies that were invited to send a representative, and I was named as the Commerce-designee for the first Senior Seminar. So I spent the year, '58-59, over at FSI in Arlington. It was one of the most fascinating years I've ever spent in my life.

Q: Who was the chair of it that year?

BRADERMAN: Willard Barber was the director. Actually, I had known Willard for many years. He and I had been on a couple of missions to the Caribbean as part of the US delegations way back during the war, so we were friends right from the start.

The most interesting thing to me about that year, of course, was my introduction (in many cases it was introduction) to the military aspects of our security policy: visits to SAC headquarters; to Army and Naval bases, a few of which I'd seen in perfunctory fashion during my career, but never in terms of their missions and how they would operate. All proved to me to be very, very useful.

My little overseas assignment with two colleagues in North Africa was also a very interesting experience. We spent one month in Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco. I gained some perspective of the Arab and Middle Eastern and North African viewpoints.

Q: By this time, you'd covered all the continents, which is more than most of us who spent our entire time in the Foreign Service were able to do.

BRADERMAN: At the end of that assignment, I came back to the Commerce Department, and there was a very real question of what I should do. The State Department was much better organized with respect to onward assignments.

Q: Well, they keep moving people, yes, obviously.

BRADERMAN: The Commerce Department people didn't move, particularly during the '50s. There was not a lot of movement at senior positions because there was no place to go.

But I was given a number of special assignments. I was sort of biding time. My job as Director of the Far Eastern Division was there for me to take, but the Director of the Office of International Trade asked me to take on various special assignments and I agreed.

One of the most interesting was an assignment that related to general aid functions. I don't remember the legislation under which it was carried out, but what is now the Office of Management and Budget (then the Bureau of the Budget) was assigned responsibility for carrying out the task, along with representatives of State, Commerce, and Aid.

I remember being assigned to the White House for three months, and we talked to people in a variety of agencies. This was one of those studies that we completed, but I don't think it was ever implemented in any fashion. I don't regard that as any great achievement, although it was a very interesting assignment.

Then the administration changed-John Kennedy became President. Luther Hodges was named Secretary of Commerce, and he brought in, as an Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, a professor by the name of Jack Behrman.

Jack was an academic who had done a lot of writing, but he also had a great interest in how our foreign economic policy was to be carried out.

Since it was a new administration, you'd expect a lot of political appointments, and there were a great many, but Behrman decided he was going to look among the careerists for his senior positions.

One of any number of reorganizations that had taken place over the course of many years took place then. A new structure was created with two principal bureaus: one dealing with export promotion functions and the other dealing with policy functions.

I was named head of what was called the Office of International Programs, which was part of the Bureau of Economic Programs (which I later came to head, all within a very short space of time).

This was the bureau that was responsible for the Commerce Department's interests in foreign economic policy. It was the first time since shortly after World War II that the policy and promotional aspects were separated.

It was in this connection that I became involved, very heavily, in the work of developing a new Trade Act. There was a bill on the Hill. The so-called Dillon Round (named for Douglas Dillon) had just been completed, and we were going to be heading into the Kennedy round of trade negotiations. The legislative authority for the Kennedy round was on the Hill.

It was decided, for political reasons primarily, to give the job as head of the US team dealing with the Congress to the Secretary of Commerce and not the Secretary of State. So, Luther Hodges became that person.

He had a small group, primarily State and Commerce people, advising him. I was part of that group. For a time we would meet every day. There were also a whole host of inter-agency committees, obviously, that were working on the legislation.

I spent a good deal of time during that period working on the development of the legislation, which was approved by the Congress in 1962.

At the end of 1962, the Secretary and Assistant Secretary came to the view that the business of separating out the policy and promotional aspects of our international work in the Commerce Department was not fully productive, and decided to combine the bureaus. And I was named Director of what became the Bureau of International Commerce.

Q: That was a major job.

BRADERMAN: We had over a thousand people in the bureau. We had a budget of over 25 million dollars-1962 dollars-as I recall. In today's terms that would be hundreds of millions of dollars.

We were running a world-wide program. We still were relying on the Foreign Service as our international arm to do our work abroad. Economic officers were doing the policy reporting, which was utilized by all government agencies, including Commerce. The economic and commercial officers, mostly, were doing the trade promotional work, which was virtually an exclusive responsibility of Commerce's, except for the agricultural function which belonged to Agriculture.

During this period, there were a number of attempts to wean the Commercial Service away from the Foreign Service. Because of my position, I became involved in this process. At one time, as a matter of fact, in the early '60s, with the support of Senator Magnuson who then headed the Senate Commerce Committee, the Senate approved legislation to establish a separate Commercial Service. Many of us had mixed feelings about the virtues of that.

While I contributed to the effort, because I was then in the Commerce Department, I believed then, perhaps because of my very early work with the Foreign Service and my continuing contact with the Foreign Service throughout all of my career, that the most effective work we could do would be through a unified Foreign Service.

I suppose I was always committed to the notion that a unified Foreign Service was best. We almost got it once. I remember a visit to the Secretary of the Treasury in the late '40s to try to get their handful of Treasury Attachés in the Foreign Service. If that had been successful, all the agencies at that time would have been in the Foreign Service, because Cultural Affairs was still in, and Agriculture was still in, as a result of the 1939 agreement that brought in Commerce and Agriculture. But that didn't work.

And then in 1955, as I recall, the Secretary of Agriculture went to the President, and by suggesting that it was no different to have Agricultural Attachés report to Agriculture and be responsible to them than to have military Attachés report to the military, Eisenhower agreed, and Agriculture left the unified Foreign Service. But Commerce never quite did until much, much later.

Reverting back to what I was saying, we utilized the Foreign Service for our overseas activities. We developed many new initiatives that were part of an export promotion program that President Kennedy inaugurated and Secretary Hodges carried out.

This export promotion program resulted from our recognition of the fact that overseas markets were becoming more and more important to the United States.

There was for the first time in 1963 a "White House Conference on Export Expansion," in which the President and five or six Cabinet officers participated, and which I helped to develop and carry through.

We developed programs for enlarging our export expansion activities overseas, which had by now become export-oriented, not import-oriented.

We established trade centers abroad-the first one was in London-and there were eventually trade centers in any number of cities around the world.

We also developed a program of trade fair participation for commercial reasons. We had had a program of trade fairs abroad, which we operated in my Bureau for USIA. They did the general planning and selected the places, but my Bureau put these fairs on.

Well, during this export promotion period we developed the commercial trade fair programs. Thus we ran two fair programs during this period. There were also advisory committees that were established with businessmen to try to encourage them to export as well as to develop closer relations between business and government. There always seemed to be antipathy between government and business in the United States, even in carrying through what was apparently a mutually beneficial endeavor.

I found this period, which runs from 1962 to 1965, in which we were promoting the exports of the United States in ways we had never done before, a very fascinating period.

And unlike my activities in prior years, I now devoted most of my time (though I had the other responsibilities as well) to the promotional aspects. So, for me, this was a new aspect of the work for which I was responsible, and I found it all very, very stimulating.

We did increase our exports. As a matter of fact, I remember testifying before Mr. Rooney, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on our budget on one occasion. He asked me whether the seven and a half billion dollar surplus we were running that year was the result of the activities of the Bureau of International Commerce.

And I said, with a smile, "Of course it is."

He took it graciously. That was something he didn't always do, but he did that time.

Considering that we're running a trade deficit these days of over 100 billion dollars, that was quite something.

Well, of course, we really didn't do it alone. American business, superior products, international marketing and a lot of other things did it. But it was very good to be part of that effort.

Q: Well, I think nothing of that sort is ever accomplished by any one effort or one group of people, but you could be a positive element or a brake. Well, now, how long did this last?

BRADERMAN: This assignment was a continuing one. As part of our export promotion program, we started to enlarge on the kinds of contacts we would have with Foreign Service officers. Just as there were chief of missions meetings (and had been for many years), we decided we'd have regional meetings with economic and commercial officers.

Because of my belief in a unified Foreign Service, I was pushing a consolidation of economic and commercial work, which then were sort of separated. In most of the missions they weren't, as a practical matter, but on paper they seemed to be.

We would have meetings of both economic and commercial officers. I traveled the world in those years, between '62 and '65, at regional meetings where the principal participants from Washington were State and Commerce officers, with Commerce taking the lead on these. From time to time there would be other agency representatives, depending on what kind of agenda was developed in each part of the world.

I mention this not only because it was an activity that took a considerable amount of my time, but also because it relates to the Foreign Service and to the integration of our activities abroad in trying to get more Foreign Service involvement in commercial activities.

Q: It wasn't always easy.

BRADERMAN: No. One of the problems always was that Ambassadors did not necessarily regard themselves as being the principal commercial officer of an embassy. Frankly, they never were really encouraged to do so. Secretaries of State were not so inclined and never pushed.

Q: And, unfortunately, the Economic Bureau of State, in my feeling over the time, was sort of an independent fiefdom that followed its own..., had its own relations around the government and with Congress and so on and so forth, and was not really an integral part of the State Department.

BRADERMAN: Right. What you're saying leads in to the next aspect of my career and my being brought into the Department of State.

During the course of these activities, I got to know, among others, the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Under Secretary of State for Management, as well as substantive officers with whom I had been dealing. I was involved because of my Bureau's use of the Foreign Service to carry out our programs abroad.

In 1965 there was a reorganization of the Department of State's Economic Bureau. They decided to create a Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. Anthony M. Solomon was named Assistant Secretary. He had been, for a short time, Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

He decided, along with Under Secretary Crockett, that there ought to be a major State Department initiative in developing closer relations with American business, and that the Foreign Service should take a more active role in the promotion of American trade and investment.

I was approached to come over and serve as one of several Deputy Assistant Secretaries to head up that function, among others.

So, in the early fall of 1965, I came to the Department of State as Deputy Assistant Secretary with a longish title of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, which was supposed to describe my function.

I was given that as a basic responsibility; "that" being the development of programs which would relate the State Department and Foreign Service more closely to American business objectives as they converge with US policy objectives-in this case the promotion of US trade and investment interests abroad.

Also included in my area of responsibility was the Department's interest in antitrust, which brought me into contact with the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust and international activities in that field.

Another was intellectual property, which gave me the State Department's responsibility for patent, trademark, and copyright affairs. It was in connection with one of our hearings that I first met Mr. Tully Torbert, as a matter of fact.

Q: I was trying to remember when we first met. I thought it was longer ago than that.

BRADERMAN: It may very well have been earlier than that, but I remember going up on the Hill together.

So, there were diverse responsibilities. The new thing the department didn't have, in depth, were programs for encouraging American business to look more favorably on the department and encouraging our own officers to respond better to the needs of American business overseas.

Some programs we enlarged, and many new programs we initiated. One that we enlarged was a program that then existed in the Department of State. It was embodied in what was called the Advisory Committee on International Business Problems, then headed by Clarence Randall, who had served several presidents and had also been head of Inland Steel Company.

I was sort of the Executive Director, and we decided to enlarge the committee. We included chief executive officers of some 12 major companies, and brought a variety of problems to them two or three times a year.

The general pattern was to have substantive discussions morning and afternoon and a luncheon with the Secretary. That was about the way it went.

Tony Solomon was very good about his own participation, and sat in on all of these meetings. Businessmen were good about attending, though their advice was difficult to come by very often. The Secretary, unfortunately, was preoccupied with Vietnam, and most of his talks at lunch related to Vietnam.

Q: I'm afraid he didn't think of much else at that time. He thought of it about 90 hours a week.

BRADERMAN: That was true.

In any event, the Advisory Committee was one activity that had already existed that we enlarged upon. I also established a much larger annual series of meetings with chief executive officers around the country. We had an all-day session, somewhat akin to the way Foreign Service Day is now run. Our invitation list included something like 500 chief executive officers.

It was interesting to note that in the first year, responses were slow in coming in. I later discovered through friends, that one CEO would call another one to find out whether he was going or not. Was this something that he should be seen at or not, because it was new for the Department of State to be asking large groups of businessmen to come in this way.

We had a very successful first meeting, and this continued year after year. Businessmen were given a feel, from people at Assistant Secretary level and up, on what was happening abroad and how, in a general way, their interests would be affected.

Our objective, of course, was to bring them into the process, to show an interest in them. I think this helped a great deal in many ways. More businessmen would come and ask for advice on the political end. They would still go, obviously, to the Commerce Department for commercial information. But they would come to the Department of State for views on broad political and economic issues at that time, and so on.

There were very good contacts that way, but our principal aim (and the one that did pay off) was that more of these people, who had avoided embassies when they were overseas, would go in and see our people abroad.

Now in order to induce Ambassadors to do more, we had to do something about that and developed the idea of sending a letter from the Secretary to Ambassadors telling them that export promotion was one of their important responsibilities (a letter which you have received at various times, and others). It was the kind of thing that, in some cases, may have been acted upon; in most cases, it went from the In to the Out basket because, obviously, it was a one-shot proposition.

I remember, as an example of a lack of interest at senior levels one occasion, when I was going to a meeting of the inter-agency Committee on Export Expansion, it was chaired by the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of State was a member. I was to go along as an advisor. I think William Rogers was our Secretary at the time. The Secretary called in the morning and said he couldn't make it, but Mr. Irwin, the Under Secretary, would represent the Department.

So, I met Mr. Irwin, and as we were driving over to the meeting he said, "Well, how are things going in this field? What are the issues that are coming up?"

I gave him a briefing, and somehow or other he said, "Are you happy with the things we're doing in State?"

And I said, "No, not at all."

He asked, "Why is that?"

I said, "Well, there's no real interest in international commercial affairs on the part of senior officers, either in the Department or overseas."

He asked, "Why is that?"

I said, "Well, it's very simple: first, you're going to this meeting; the Secretary isn't going to this meeting."

He took that all right, I must say.

I added, "That's fine, you're the Under Secretary. But you just came back from a series of meetings in Central America." (I had known he had been on a mission to four Central American countries.) I asked, "Tell me, how much of your time did you devote to a discussion of commercial matters?"

He looked at me sheepishly and said, "None."

I said, "Every Ambassador knows that. They're going to work on matters you discuss. Until you change, they're not going to change."

I was really very bold.

Q: Well, I think Irwin was a guy you could do this with.

BRADERMAN: That's right. I wouldn't have done it with Rogers. I know that from other discussions we've had. Although on other things, particularly jurisdictional issues in this area, Secretary Rogers was very active and very positive. This is an aside to this particular subject, but is related.

Secretary of Commerce Stans made several attempts to take the commercial officers out of the State Department during this period.

I must have written 150 memos on why a unified Foreign Service made more sense than breaking it apart.

I was the Secretary's and Assistant Secretary's principal advisor on this subject. I remember, first with Mr. Solomon, and then our next Assistant Secretary who was Phil Trezise, and we would meet with Rogers, the staff, and others on this issue time and again. Mr. Stans did not gain his objective.

However, it was a very difficult business to get the State Department to change its point of view on commercial matters. There were a variety of reasons for it. Many people in the department looked down on anything that was not "policy." Trade was something to be shoved aside. While there were a few Foreign Service officers who were delighted to have commercial assignments or economic assignments with a strong commercial component, many were not.

It was also true, particularly during the earlier period, that the way to the top was through the political cone. If you will look, during that period, at the percentage of promotions of political officers versus economic and commercial officers (let alone consular officers, who were in even worse shape, and administrative officers), those who worked the political cone did best.

Also, our entrance examinations at the time were not primed to bring in top-flight economic and commercial people. So there were a whole host of things which militated against this.

Q: Once they did bring them in, the officers wanted to shift over, as, frankly, I did. Not that I was a great economic guy, but my background was business.

BRADERMAN: Anybody who wanted to get to the top pursued the political ladder. As a matter of fact there weren't any, commercial officers, except for some of those people who came to State in 1939 when the Commerce and Agricultural Services were consolidated with State. Except for a few of those, at least in the time frame we're talking about, none of the commercial people became Ambassadors. They just plain didn't.

Q: Well, I think this is an extremely valid criticism, and I have never heard it so well put. You were the expert on it.

BRADERMAN: It was my job to flush it out and see what I could do about it. I must say that I got great support from Tony Solomon, support that if there were ever any crucial issue he would go to bat. He didn't spend much time on it personally, because he was interested in the policy side of economic affairs, too. But he gave me free rein and gave me support when I needed it. Bill Crockett was marvelous. There was nothing he wouldn't do. He'd hold meetings, he would do anything vis a vis other agencies that made sense.

As a matter of fact we convinced the then-Assistant Secretary of Commerce (who had been my boss and became Secretary of Commerce), Sandy Trowbridge, that combining the economic and commercial functions was the best line. This was before Stans and the incidents I referred to earlier.

In this period, Crockett and I, meeting with people like Trowbridge and others, were able to make them feel that a combined economic and commercial function within the Foreign Service was the best road to take. I'm not sure we were correct. Later, of course, the Commerce Department got its own service.

Q: Some of the officers went over there.

BRADERMAN: Not all, because in smaller missions, economic officers still promote commercial functions. So, it's a divided function. I don't think that's good. I still am a believer in a unified Foreign Service.

We did many other things to try to encourage commercial activities. The State Department took over and promoted the regional conferences. We held two or three a year. This was meant to encourage greater interest on the part of State, through Commerce, of course, was always an integral part of these meetings.

We tried to do everything we could to encourage the notion that economic and commercial work was a whole; it involved policy and promotion; it was of importance to the United States; and it was something that every Foreign Service officer ought to find worthwhile.

Q: Dr. Braderman, when we left off on the previous tape, you were discussing the problems that you had because so few people in the State Department were really concerned with commercial affairs. I'd like you to continue on that and give one or two more examples if you will, and then get on to the negotiating phase of your function.

BRADERMAN: Very good. I'd be happy to do so.

Well, in some ways this assignment within the State Department to try to induce, seduce, or develop a greater interest in and affinity for commercial work overseas was frustrating.

As I indicated earlier, many of the department officers were not interested; some felt it degrading. At the same time, there were dozens and dozens of officers who did splendid jobs, both within the department and especially overseas in the pursuit of these functions.

There were really two dimensions to the activity. One was what actually was being done, principally in our missions abroad, in furtherance of US business interests which were consonant with US interests. And the other was the administrative and bureaucratic business (that happens mostly in Washington) with respect to who would be responsible for this and that function.

Being in Washington I had an involvement with both problems, but a particularly heavy one in the administrative infighting on this subject.

While it was our intention to maintain and further the concept of a unified Foreign Service (but, within that, provide other agencies with the services they needed abroad), there were a great many things that occurred which made that impossible.

Some of the demands of other agencies were excessive. I think the department was right in rejecting them. But on other occasions, there were requests that were made that made good sense.

Let me give you an example of one of those I regarded as excessive. In order to give greater importance to the commercial function, the Department of Commerce, at one point, suggested that there be regional Ambassadors for Commercial Affairs. One might be stationed in Paris and cover three or four countries. Another would be stationed in Rio and cover several surrounding countries, and so on.

To my mind, that made no sense at all. But it was a serious proposal put forward by the Commerce people and supported by their Secretary (of Commerce). We had to refuse to go along with that proposal.

On the other hand, they pointed to the inadequate number of commercial staff abroad. It was true not only in the commercial area, but we were concerned at the moment with that particular function.

They proposed joint actions with CMB and Congress to try to increase the number of people doing commercial work abroad. This was after Mr. Crockett had gone, I may say. I think his attitude would have been different. But the department administrative people at the time and the Secretary, in looking at their priorities, didn't see why they should push for more commercial officers, which they regarded as conflicting with the effort to increase officer support in other areas. And, therefore, they didn't support the commerce proposals.

Nevertheless, at one juncture, Commerce was able to persuade the Office of Management and Budget to grant, within the Department of State's budget, because that's where the commercial officers were placed, an increased allotment for commercial officers.

As I noted earlier this effort was, in fact, fought by many elements within the Department of State as competing with their own interests and one that they didn't want to support. Some of the bureaus refused, or at least delayed, allocating commercial jobs even after appropriations were approved.

So there were problems of this kind on the administrative side, which deterred the effort, even though individual officers abroad were doing great jobs in sponsoring substantive export promotion activities, which were enhancing the foreign trade of the United States.

Q: Well, that's a very useful part of history to get down, and certainly an apt statement, I think, of the situation. Well, do you want to go on a bit to the negotiating aspects of this job?

BRADERMAN: All right. I'd like to talk about two assignments I had during the course of my service as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

One dealt with the Philippines. I have referred to the Philippines before, in terms of my participation in the 1954 Laurel-Langley negotiations. (I didn't mention I was on a trade mission to the Philippines in 1960.)

In September of 1966, President Johnson and President Marcos of the Philippines met. As is customary after such meetings, there was a joint communique.

One element of that joint communique was an agreement that each President would appoint a team to discuss concepts underlying a new agreement to replace the Laurel-Langley Agreement of 1954. (That agreement, you see, was to run for 20 years-until 1974.)

While this was only 1966 President Marcos believed it would be desirable to start very early and get a new agreement in place before the old agreement expired.

As a consequence of this statement in the joint communique, in June 1967, teams were named.

On the recommendation of the Department of State, the President named me as Chairman of the US team.

The President of the Philippines named Cesar Virata, who at that time was Under Secretary of Commerce and Industry and chairman of the Board of Investments in the Philippines, to head the Philippine team.

The US team was composed of a desk officer, and someone from the legal office, of the Department of State and several people from other agencies.

The first meeting of the teams occurred in November of 1967 in the Philippines.

Anybody who knows anything about the Philippines knows there's a very peculiar ambivalence among Filipinos about Philippine-American relations. It's, in some senses, distant. In other cases, it's family. It stems from a variety of experiences during the course of American involvement in the Philippines.

Though many Filipinos speak English (you hear English everywhere), that's often regarded as just a veneer. Knowledge of Spanish and Spanish culture run deep, and underlying both, of course, are the indigenous languages like Tagalog and indigenous culture.

Filipinos have their kids in school (at college level) in the United States; they have their money invested in the United States; they come to the United States for visits and vacations; and they regard us, in this sense, as family. Yet when it comes to particular business ventures and enterprises, then things are quite different.

I had any number of opportunities, particularly on that trade mission in the Philippines when we spent some six weeks all over the country, to get many different indications of how the same person, within the space of ten minutes, would evoke both emotions with respect to the United States and those who represented the United States: this warm, family feeling and this antagonism.

And I think this reflects our relationships in everything from bases agreement to the commercial relations which we were talking about.

Well, back to the meetings, themselves. There were two principal areas for discussion between us. They were the areas that were embodied in the original 1946 agreement, which had been extended to 1954, and which were due to expire in 1974.

One area was the special trade concessions given to particular Philippine products, which gave them preferential markets in the United States. I've mentioned them before: sugar, copra, lumber, and so on.

The other was the investment area, which was of less interest to the Filipinos because they had less capital to invest abroad, and of more interest to the United States, which had significant investment interests in the Philippines.

What the Filipinos wanted to do was trade-off one against the other and continue the agreement. Our view, the US view, was that the agreement (which was renegotiated as the Laurel-Langley Agreement in 1954) should really have had an end date, not a date for renegotiation, because this kind of relationship between two independent countries was not based on sound principles. That one country, in this case the United States, was inherently ...

Q: Paternalistic?

BRADERMAN: Yes, it created a paternalistic position. (Thank you.) It really made us the father and the Philippines the child-one of those things I noted earlier that the Philippines resented very much.

At the same time, when we discussed the agreement, they wanted to continue it. This is the ambivalence of which I'm speaking.

Throughout these discussions, which we held in Baguio in the Philippines (a very lovely city), I tried to explain the virtues of ending these special relationships-both special relationships. On the investment side, it was not that we weren't interested in continued US investment in the Philippines. We were, but we felt it should be based on Philippine acceptance of investment, as investment is accepted in the United States, because it's good not only for the investor, but good for the receiving country as well.

And that's the principle on which we believed our investments should be received in the Philippines, for which you needed no international agreement.

We, therefore, did not want to perpetuate the principle in an agreement as something special, because when things got ticklish or difficult it would always be pointed to, and the charges of paternalism would come to the fore.

And we felt that the special trade concessions were not desirable because, again, it continued a paternalistic relationship.

The Filipinos understood the implications of the continuation of these special arrangements. But strong economic interests in the Philippines wanted these privileges continued.

So, it was the intention of the Philippines to get an agreement from us that would continue the trade privileges, and they were willing to give us special concessions in the investment field.

We had a stalemate as a result of these discussions. We adjourned for further consultations-the panels (as they called them), teams (as we called them) would report to our respective governments and give additional consideration to the issues.

Well, that was done, in a sense. We had a second meeting of both teams in October of 1968. Those meetings were held in Washington, but they were more of the same.

The Filipinos tried, in Washington, to do what they had done in 1954: put the issues aside and make an appeal on political grounds.

Carlos Romulo used all of his persuasive powers. He was then Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He came and he talked to our Secretary who wavered a little, I must say, just as the people had wavered earlier.

He went up to the Hill (he knew more people on the Hill than some of us did) and tried to use his influence there.

Some pressures were put on us (some properly and some improperly), but we stuck to our guns. Essentially, both departments that were heavily involved, State and Commerce, supported the views of the members of our team.

As a result, the Filipinos went back to the Philippines wiser in the knowledge that we were going to insist on these discussions sticking to the economic and commercial realm, and not being decided on political grounds alone.

But it was clear that having these meetings was not going to get us anywhere. We, as I've indicated, did not see any virtue in a new treaty. The Filipinos only wanted a treaty if it was going to continue the special trade privileges.

And so, through desultory cable traffic back and forth, the teams continued, through our Ambassadors, to "negotiate," discuss, or call it what you will, and the treaty eventually died a natural death, which was what we wanted.

I thought that would be an interesting example of a negotiation that, from our standpoint, succeeded by failing to produce an agreement.

Q: Great. Now, you had another one?

BRADERMAN: Yes, I was going to give you one that ended in a treaty, one of which I feel very proud. As a matter of fact, I consider it perhaps the greatest achievement of my career.

It was in an esoteric area (at least for me), the field of patents, which, as I indicated when I discussed my coming to State, was one of the group of functions that was in my bailiwick.

Shortly after taking over as Deputy Assistant Secretary, one of the members of my staff, Harvey Winter by name, informed me of an international patent meeting in the Department on the following day. Harvey was the one person who worked on patent, trademark, and copyright issues (the chief of that division was primarily interested in our antitrust work). That was the total, in-depth competence of the department in international patent matters, I might say.

Harvey Winter is still in the Department of State, and he's still handling these matters.

Q: Was he an attorney?

BRADERMAN: He was not an attorney. It would have been useful if he had been an attorney; it would have been useful if I had been, as well, for this particular function, because many of our dealings were with patent attorneys.

Well, he told me that the following day we were having a celebration called International Patent Day, which was part of a festivity that had been arranged by the Patent Office to celebrate the 175th anniversary of the US patent system.

It had turned into an international meeting and people were here from all over the world. In the name of the Department of State, he, as the principal person involved, had agreed to participate in the day's activities. So, I got involved and got to meet a good many people who were concerned with patent affairs.

Even though I'd been in the Department of Commerce (and the Patent Office is in the Department of Commerce), that department is so compartmentalized, as are most departments of the US government, that one bureau not only is not involved in, but knows very little about what another bureau does.

I think, when I was Director of the Bureau of International Commerce, I had one person somewhere down the line who worked with the Patent Office on international patent matters, but I was not personally involved. So, I came with great knowledge and great experience to this particular assignment.

At any rate, as so often is the case, Harvey Winter prepared speeches for the Assistant Secretary and for me, and we duly gave them.

But the important thing is that at one of the parties during the course of the three-day session, I began to hear about some of the problems in the international patent field.

One was that if you filed an application for a patent in one country, and you got it eventually, it was good only in that country. If you were an inventor and you filed in the United States, you got a patent in the United States.

Somebody in Germany, say, could steal that knowledge and information, because you had no patent or patent rights in Germany.

That means that a person who wanted coverage everywhere had to file everywhere, or he had to file everywhere that somebody might have had a similar idea or wanted to utilize his idea, if he was going to get patent protection.

I asked some of the experts, including the head of the International Bureau for the protection of Industrial Property (he was the head of the International Secretariat for the Paris union which covered industrial property), why this had been allowed to develop all these years.

And he told me they had made a few attempts during the course of the history of international patent matters, but had never been able to get agreement. There were always those who pushed nationalistic views to the extent of not wanting to give up any of the nation's sovereignty by accepting an instrument issued by another country.

And I asked, "Well, aren't there ways around that?"

He said, "We've never been able to come up with anything satisfactory."

Well, that meeting came and went. I then remember on one occasion having lunch with Harvey Winter, when I raised this issue with him. He gave me the same explanation, because he knew the history.

And I said, "There must be some way we can satisfy that particular impediment, which would be an impediment in the United States as well as in other countries, and still come up with some method by which we could reduce the duplication of effort both for applicants and national patent offices."

So, we played around with ideas, and then decided that the next time we saw somebody from the International Secretariat we would talk it over with that person.

Q: What International Secretariat?

BRADERMAN: The International Secretariat was the Bureau for the Protection of Industrial Property (BIRPI-as it was generally called) at that time. It has now blossomed into a new organization, which I helped to create, called the World Intellectual Property Organization, which covers patents, trademarks, and copyrights as well. But at that time, it was just concerned ...

Q: It was a function of the United Nations, however.

BRADERMAN: No, it was an independent organization with the usual affiliation that other semi-independent organizations have. But it was not a United Nations entity like the World Health Organization or World Meteorological Organization.

We talked to the Deputy Director on one of his trips to the United States. He was interested, I think in part, if I may be honest, for bureaucratic reasons, because anything done in this area would enhance and enlarge the scope of the work of the organization. But he also had a sincere substantive interest. He said some member country would have to introduce a resolution of some kind to get it before the body.

The appropriate body for that purpose was the Executive Committee of the Paris Union, which would be meeting next in Geneva in September 1966.

Well, with that in hand, I then had lunch with Edward Brenner, the Commissioner of Patents, a very knowledgeable fellow who had been a patent attorney for a major firm and had come into government during the Kennedy Administration as Commissioner of Patents.

We talked about it, and he said it sounded like a good idea to him.

I said, "Well, you're the US representative at the Executive Committee of BIRPI, if we draft a resolution; would you introduce it?"

He said, "I'll be glad to."

So, we drafted a resolution, he introduced it, and it was unanimously adopted by the Executive Committee of BIRPI in 1966.

Now here we are, we're starting with an idea. That's all, just a plain idea.

Q: And by this time it was something generated from the bottom up, but the Commissioner of Patents was the guy who had the policy authority to decide what...

BRADERMAN: Well, he was interested in joining with us in having the problem studied. I was fascinated by the prospect of developing a new international cooperative effort. The reason I refer to this is that it is so rare in a Foreign Service officer's career that one can start with an idea and bring it to fruition as a treaty.

To accomplish this, it was important to stay in the same job. Part of the reason I didn't go into the field earlier was because of this. I wanted to see it through. That was a personal desire, and my bosses went along with it. So, I was able to stay with this project for the period of time that it took to do it.

Well, we now had moved from an idea in our mind's eye to an idea on paper as an international resolution to study it.

The Secretariat was great. In a matter of a couple of months it came up with a very rough draft of what might be an agreement. Its tentative title was "Patent Cooperative Treaty"-a name that stuck.

The way they got over the issue of national sovereignty was by eliminating what would have been a very useful thing, but would have been a stumbling block, and that was whether or not a patent issued by one country would be valid in other countries.

In other words, they finessed that particular question. Nowhere in their draft was that result anything we would attempt to achieve. Rather, the core of the proposal was that if you applied in one country, that filing would be valid in other member countries. One could then continue the process and get a patent that would be acknowledged as a patent in other countries without separate filings in other countries. This was the general notion.

Beginning then, in 1966, first through these discussions that we had, and then through a series of international meetings, which began with six countries. It was decided (mostly after discussions between the Secretariat and ourselves) that too many people at the beginning would be unproductive. And, also, we wanted the participation initially of those countries that had the greatest stake in this, and they would be the countries that had the most patent applications.

So, six of the countries having the most patent applications were the countries that started to have a series of meetings.

Q: Do you remember which they were?

BRADERMAN: Well, yes, I think so: United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, France, Japan, and the Soviet Union. A representative of the International Patent Institute also participated.

The six countries met together a number of times between January and April 1967. We enlarged upon and modified this very rough draft.

Then, I think it was in October of 1967, we had our first sizable meeting of 23 countries. This was the first time that the other countries became involved. Various intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations also participated in the so-called "Committee of Experts."

Then, again, we continued a series of working sessions, working committees of various kinds to review this draft and try to perfect it. This process at the international level went on for the rest of '67, '68, and '69. Additional countries became part of the process in 1968. I think at the end of '69 or the beginning of 1970, we had a "final" draft.

While these international negotiations were going on, there were many differences of opinion, but there was a general desire to move ahead, a general willingness to give up those national prerogatives, which were necessary in order to achieve a common purpose, while at the same time maintaining national sovereignty on the basic issue of a country's right to issue a patent. At the same time there were also other discussions going on in practically every other major country, but particularly in the United States, which were much more divisive than the international negotiations.

There are components, I think, of any international treaty that obviously involve other groups, whether it's the environment and you're dealing with the Wildlife Federation, for example and business and everybody else. In this area, we were dealing with the Patent Bar as well as the American business community with international operations.

There was that part of the Patent Bar composed of independent patent attorneys. They were people who made their money from handling patent cases. A great deal of money was made by filing patent applications. They were not interested in a procedure that would make one patent application good in ten countries. They fought this tooth and nail from the beginning to the end.

There was that part of the Patent Bar composed of in-house patent attorneys at major international firms. They were generally in favor, because superseding their peculiar patent interests were the interests of their companies. If they could find money-saving procedures, they were obviously interested in it.

Because of my other contacts with chief executive officers, as a result of other programs that I referred to earlier, in terms of trying to strengthen ties between business and the department, I got to know many CEOs.

There were a number of recalcitrant patent attorneys that I was able to induce to change their minds by talking to their CEOs and explaining that the companies' interests happened to be the US interest at the time. And they gave walking papers or marching orders to their patent attorneys. But most of the in-house patent attorneys and industrial firms supported it.

I, obviously, had to argue the case in the patent forum. I made more speeches at state and local patent and bar associations in this short period of time, than I had ever thought possible.

While I was not an attorney, and it would have been useful to be one, I found matching wits with my soon-to-become attorney friends and colleagues, as well as antagonists, very interesting.

One of the most gratifying was a debate, which was deliberately set up as a debate, at the American Bar Association annual meeting in Philadelphia where I was pitted against one of their stars.

Following our debate, the patent section voted to support the international initiative we were undertaking.

Q: By that time, you were a patent attorney.

BRADERMAN: It required study and hard work, but it was a lot of fun. One has to become a student of all of these things, just as any of us does, whatever the assignment.

The most difficult part of this negotiation was the domestic negotiation. Then there were the issues of getting people on the Hill convinced that these were things we ought to do.

We needed support in a variety of ways-for appropriations for some of the initiatives early on, and then later when we decided to have the diplomatic conference to negotiate the final treaty in Washington.

I must say that the then-chairmen of both the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Kastenmeier, and Senator Burdick on the Senate side were very supportive. Both are still in their respective jobs, I think, on the Senate and House sides. They were on delegations of some of the major meetings we had as this process developed.

We went through the process of getting support, domestically, from most of the groups Patent Bar.

I did a number of things during the course of this project, on the advice of various people, to try to induce some of the die-hard people to come aboard. I even put one or two of our antagonists on an advisory committee that the department had on international patent matters to advise us through this whole process.

Incidentally, that was a very good technique for keeping all elements of the patent community informed on what we were doing on the international side, as well as keeping ourselves informed on what the strengths and weaknesses of our position were going to be. And there were things we learned and positions we adopted that were modified by suggestions that were made. It was really a working advisory committee, a very good one, and a number of members of that advisory committee served on US delegations at some of our meetings.

Well, we had a final draft developed, as I say, early in 1970, and we set a meeting for May and June of 1970 in Washington. It was called the "Washington Diplomatic Conference on the Patent Cooperation Treaty."

That meeting was convened on May 25, 1970. There were 55 member countries of the Paris Union officially represented. In addition, there were 23 other countries that came as observers. There were 11 inter-governmental organizations present, and there were 11 international non-governmental organizations represented-with a total of some 300 participants.

We met continuously until June 19 and worked over this draft treaty line by line, sentence by sentence. There were areas where there was easy agreement, and there were some very difficult issues. One of them that was difficult wasn't settled until the final plenary session.

I served as president of the conference. We were using our facilities at the Department of State, so we met in plenary session in the Loy Henderson Room.

I remember deviating from the line-by-line approval process that we'd been going through, to take up a whole article, because it was the only way I thought we could get approval. I asked for an up-or-down vote on that article. It kind of confused some of the opponents who approved of 90 percent of the article, but not the other 10%-but they had no chance to vote on that portion.

At any rate, it was approved unanimously. The treaty was signed by 20 countries initially; others followed. It was ratified by the Senate for the United States in 1973. There was implementing legislation that was required (I was no longer involved), but that was approved in 1975, and the treaty went into force.

That is why I say I went from an idea, which I started to identify over lunch, to an international treaty.

Q: A great many of us are jealous of you-I am already-to have accomplished something like that. That's absolutely great.

BRADERMAN: It was fascinating to do that.

Now, once that treaty was done, I felt kind of relieved. I had felt guilty, really, staying in the department. I enjoyed my assignment as Deputy Assistant Secretary, and I had a wide variety of responsibilities, as you can see from a few of the things I've identified. But I really wanted to get out into the field. I felt that I should have a long time ago. I hadn't many years to go because we were still operating under the rule of retirement at age 60.

Q: What were you by this time, a reserve officer, or regular FSO, or what?

BRADERMAN: That's an interesting side light, as a matter of fact. When I was asked to come to the Department of State and I was offered the job as Deputy Assistant Secretary, I said, "That's all well and good, but ..."

I was, incidentally, not only Director of the Bureau of International Commerce, but I was also a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce, so the title wasn't all that significant to me.

I said that if I ever went to the Department of State I wanted to be an FSO. I didn't believe any officer should be in the Department of State, other than the required civil servants and the political appointees we had, unless you were an FSO. Well, you can appoint somebody Secretary of State, but you can't appoint him an FSO.

Q: You have to go before a board.

BRADERMAN: You have to go before a board. What I wanted was an understanding that I could take the exam. This was one of two or three things that I asked about. One of the things that was a sine qua non was my being given an opportunity to become an FSO if I could.

So, Assistant Secretary Solomon talked to Crockett, and Crockett said it was fine with him. So I came on with that understanding, and, therefore, I was appointed an FSR-1. (I was actually a GS 18 at Commerce which was a little better.)

Q: A little higher, probably. I took a cut to come into the Foreign Service, too.

BRADERMAN: I was an FSR One. Actually, the same kind of attitude that governs anything that's new or different governed there. The people down the line in the appointments process didn't want to have anyone come in at the top.

A number of months passed. I would see Crockett regularly because of his personal support of those activities I was undertaking on the department's behalf. He would ask me how things were going, and generally I would say, "Just fine."

But once, after about three or four months, I said, "It's a little disconcerting. Nobody's called me from the Board of Examiners about an examination.

He said, "I'll see to that."

The next day I got a call from the Board of Examiners, and the Executive Director said, "We've been trying to put a proper panel together. After all, you are a very senior officer, and we have to have a couple of Ambassadors, so it's not just run of the mill."

I said, "I understand."

"At any rate, we'll be very prompt," he added.

And in a few weeks, they did get a panel together.

I met with the panel, which was chaired by Ambassador Howard Cottam. The panel was determined to, I'm sure, be fair, as a panel is supposed to, but also to probe deeply as to why this individual, who had so much to do with the Foreign Service and Foreign Service people all his life, was just now getting around to taking an examination for the Foreign Service.

Actually, there's something I didn't mention, but is relevant to that particular point. After I got my Ph.D. and was doing that research I referred to very early on, and didn't have a job, one of the professors at Temple University (as a matter of fact the head of the department who had given me the summer assignment and who later hired me, although I didn't accept the position) said he knew someone by the name of Joe Green in the State Department, and if I were interested he'd be glad to write him and arrange for an interview. And I said, "That would be fine, I'd like that."

So, when I went to Washington later, I had a session with Mr. Green, who was just a name to me then, but someone I got to know much better later when I sat on the Staff Board of the Board of the Foreign Service. I was also an alternate on the Board of Examiners-I didn't mention that. But he interviewed me, and he took me in to see the then-Assistant Secretary, I think his name was Shaw.

Q: Howland Shaw.

BRADERMAN: G. Howland Shaw. In those days, any applicant for a position would see senior people in a way that doesn't happen today. I did have a session with Mr. Shaw, and he indicated two things: one, that at that time, which was 1938, they were not hiring, and I don't believe there was an examination given at the time.

But he also proposed something I have never forgotten. He urged me to go home and reflect on it. He said, "You know, you have a marvelous educational background for a Foreign Service assignment." (Since at that time it had practically all been in history and political science, with a little bit of economics.) He said, "But there's something else one needs in the Foreign Service and that's a call, similar to that you might feel if you were going to become a minister." He wanted me to go home and see if I got the call. And in that sense, I didn't. But, that's an aside, I suppose.

In any event, there was no examination except for the other Civil Service examinations that I mentioned, one of which I took and it resulted in that economics job in the Labor Department.

But back to the Board of Examiners and the panel that was talking with me. I knew them all, which was helpful, but that also meant that they knew of things they could ask in some greater depth than might have been possible had they not.

They asked me all kinds of questions. I thought every question was very appropriate. Some were very penetrating and some were lighter in tone. It was a grueling experience.

I can well understand how someone who is junior taking the orals, a much younger person without the experience I'd had, could be frightened and put off-balance.

At any rate, we had the session, and I was informed shortly thereafter that they had approved my appointment. Then it went through the usual processes, but was held up in the Senate.

There were two names on the list: mine, and the other was Michael Blumenthal, who had been a reserve officer and a Deputy Assistant Secretary, having come from private industry.

Our two names went up, but the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was having some kind of a battle with the department and held up all appointments, including ambassadorial appointments, and our two nominations were among them. So it was several months ...

Q: Was this still J. William, or was it Church by this time?

BRADERMAN: It was J. William Fulbright.

But it was approved, and in 1966 I became a Foreign Service Officer Class One, a Secretary in the Diplomatic Service, and so forth. That, obviously, didn't change the nature of the work I was doing or anything of the sort. It just changed ...

Q: It gave you a certain kind of job insurance.

BRADERMAN: That's right, and met one of the criteria I had set for happiness in the job. That was satisfying.

We were also talking about where I was headed after the completion of my role in the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Actually, they are not causally related, but it did make it easier for me to break away.

It would have been almost impossible for the department in the latter stages to find someone who could fill in in the same way that I could at that stage of the negotiating process. Harvey Winter had the technical knowledge, but he didn't have the general contacts and clout, although a very able officer.

The usual wheels started to turn and various positions were looked at. I was told that there were no decent ambassadorial assignments available. Having lost my principal sponsors, who might have been interested in pushing a significant Ambassadorial assignment, I knew that that was probably not in the cards, certainly not in any country I'd care to serve in. So, the personnel people looked for number two slots at embassies or Consul General posts. I preferred to be my own boss.

Q: Well, that's a tremendous advantage.

BRADERMAN: So, I was offered either Milan or Amsterdam, and I picked Amsterdam.

It was still thought, at that time, that it would be useful for the Consul General, the chief of the post, in addition to at least one other officer, to know Dutch.

So I enrolled in a Dutch course with my wife. We were the class, as a matter of fact. It was very good. We had two different instructors. There wasn't enough time to do the full 24 weeks, which is regarded as the minimum for the achievement of a 3.3 level. We took 11 or 12 weeks, and I think we both got a 2 level out of that. Dutch is a difficult language. I knew some Spanish and ...

Q: Dutch is closer to German.

BRADERMAN: In getting my doctorate, I had passed the written examination in German, but that was a case of memorizing words and then promptly forgetting them-unfortunately, but that was the case.

While I thought Dutch was very difficult, we did learn a good deal. And I must say here, in reference to the Foreign Service's language requirements, that I think knowing the language is a very important ingredient, even in a country like Holland where most all the people you meet at senior level speak English. They speak four languages, of which English is usually their number two.

We traveled the country; we saw more of Holland than most Dutch do. When you get to the small towns and you speak the language, they invite you into things that you'd never get into otherwise. That was one thing. Also, they appreciate the fact that an American has learned their language, because so few of us do.

Q: Especially one that's limited to a one-country language.

BRADERMAN: Only 14 million people around the world speak the language.

But, also, I had promised myself I was not going to be a prisoner of staff in reading the newspapers. And I was able to read the Dutch newspapers, because there's no substitute. While there is the European edition of the Herald Tribune and so on, it does not cover Dutch events. The only way to keep up with the news in the Netherlands is either through listening to Dutch radio or reading the Dutch newspapers. I had some difficulty listening to the news, I could get some of it, but I had no difficulty reading the Dutch newspapers.

I continued my Dutch studies in the Netherlands. I had lessons three times a week with a Dutch teacher and became more proficient. Wherever I went it was useful, and it makes more friends for the United States, which is part of our purpose. So that was a very useful, as well as a wholesome, thing.

The post, itself, for me at this stage of the game, was small potatoes in terms of administration. We had a staff of fewer than 40. I had been running staffs for 30 years that were larger than that.

It was a new experience in that it was not part of a headquarters staff. It was a new experience in that it was semi-independent, in the sense that the Ambassador always rules the roost overseas. But, even though distances are small, the 35 miles between The Hague and Amsterdam was enough of a distance so that there was no interference.

I served under two political Ambassadors, Middendorf and Gould. Both relationships were excellent—we got along very well.

Q: Were you in charge of all the commercial activities in the country?

BRADERMAN: No, no I was not, and I understood very well why it had to be so. As a matter of fact, I had had close relationships over the years with both the Economic Counselor and the Commercial Attaché. I won't mention their names, but I was partly responsible for keeping the Economic Counselor in the service when he had some difficulties early in his career, and the Commercial Attaché had worked for me on two occasions in the Commerce Department.

But they both said, you know, this is our job and it's countrywide, and while we know that you know this and that, do you mind if we run economic and commercial activities here. And there was no question in my mind that they were right.

I had a Commercial officer on my staff, and he's the one who kept those contacts. I regarded my job to be running the Consulate-general and running it well, hopefully.

There are 11 provinces in the Netherlands and my Consular District included seven. So I was responsible for our relationships with seven Commissarisen, who were the equivalent of state governors, as well as with city and other local officials.

That was another essential difference in my experience, not working in a headquarters as I had all my life, but working with local authorities. The people I knew best were Commissaris, the Mayor and the Chief of Police and people of that sort, not the Minister of Economic Affairs or his staff.

Now, there were a couple of highlights (or lowlights) in this experience.

My wife was a great help. This was a period of change in the status of wives in the Foreign Service, when they were asserting their independence and so on. My wife was not under the heel of an Ambassador's wife. In any event, though independently minded, she stepped in and did the things that a traditional Foreign Service wife should do, in terms of local and community activities and all of those things, and she enjoyed them.

She had done a lot of volunteer work in things like the League of Women Voters and so on, earlier. It appealed to her and she did them well, and also the usual amount of entertaining that one has to do.

As a matter of fact, we were able to do more than usual. This is an aside that might be useful to somebody who listens to this.

Like every chief at a post, you have a very limited amount of representation expenses. Not being independently wealthy and having been careerists, we were limited in what we could do with our own resources. So, we devised a variety of techniques for entertaining more modestly.

Her Dutch helped her. We learned of somebody who was just starting out in the catering business. He had a restaurant and was very much interested in the diplomatic end. He was Dutch and knew only Dutch, and he didn't know where to go or who to go to. There was a local resident, that I happened to meet, who introduced him to us.

My wife was able to establish a relationship with him, initially, purely on the basis of the fact that she could converse with him in Dutch.

She made an arrangement, which continued throughout our stay, in which he charged us something like 50 percent of what he would charge any other customer for running these affairs. What he got out of it, of course, were the contacts he made by doing a good job for us.

To mention one or two other things: when I had been in Washington as Deputy Assistant Secretary, one of my contacts was with the Motion Picture Association.

The Vice President for International Affairs was a former Assistant Secretary of State, named Griffith Johnson. I had known Griff before, in other ways, but we had official relationships because of problems for the US motion picture industry abroad, particularly in repatriating earnings in US dollars.

As a result of our relationship, I used to receive invitations to come to the Motion Picture Association's preview showings of new films.

I always found that people who were invited to those, came. Even very prominent people, who would not go to the best of cocktail parties, would come to his private showings.

During a party that was given just before I departed for Amsterdam, and at which he was present, my wife went to him and said, "Griff, you know it would be a great idea if we could do some of this in Amsterdam. Is there any way we could do it?"

He said, "Well, there are a number of representatives of American picture companies. I'll tell you what I'll do, I'll write to our regional representative in Paris and ask him to get in touch with you. You tell him what you want and see if something can be worked out."

Soon after I got to Amsterdam, I got a call from Paris. The chap introduced himself and said that one of the company representatives in Amsterdam who handled the Netherlands for the association had asked him to call me, which he did.

We had a meeting, and I told him what I was interested in doing, which was to have some movie house offer to give me their private screening room, and then let me show current movies.

Well, out of this initial conversation, I developed relationships with three of the people who had private screening rooms, and about once every month or two, I would put on a private screening.

What worked in Washington, worked there. Whether they were important local officials, or American businessmen, or whoever-I mean, to be able to walk into a private screening room and sit down ...

Q: And see a new film.

BRADERMAN: Correct. This movie-entertainment socializing was a great success. The Dutch drink a lot of sherry. I learned that at my first party when I was trying to figure out what drinks to serve. So, my wife and I would bring sherry and cookies and a few other things. We'd have a little party beforehand, then have the movie, and then sip something afterwards.

It turned into a very nice social evening for some 15 to 25 couples, depending on which theater we used. And that supplemented other official-social events. The movie people donated their screening rooms, and all I'd have to do was pay for the screen operators. So, for something like \$50 an evening, I'd entertain an average of 20 couples. It was really a great thing.

I also found that companies, on some occasions when they were having regional meetings abroad, or things of that sort, would want to arrange parties with local officials. I was often able to add a guest list to another guest list to get them in on it. You know, I did the usual things one has to do with those you regard as important, but there were peripheral contacts that I could toss into those parties. It worked out very well.

So, I did an awful lot of party-giving that I wouldn't have been able to do otherwise.

Q: Great, you learned the ropes awfully fast. Since you started in the Foreign Service in 1947, you had some experience for it.

BRADERMAN: As I said, we decided to tour the country. We used our weekends thus, since the Dutch, like so many Europeans pretty much keep official engagements to weekday evenings. We found ourselves very busy Monday through Friday, but weekends not so much.

Later in our tour, as we developed a number of Dutch friends, we'd be invited to everything from picnics to hunting parties, which might include a weekend. But in the earlier period, our weekends were free.

We had decided to pick a different area each weekend, and either drive or take a train, go out and wander around and see the country. This was very useful in many ways.

One related to the attitude of a couple of the major newspapers toward the United States.

I've got to go back and remind you that this period was 1971-1974, when we were at the tail end of the height of some of the feeling on Vietnam.

Anyone over 35, who knew our participation in World War II, the Marshall Plan, and so on, loved the United States. Our relationships with the older generation were great.

But anybody under 35, roughly speaking, hated the United States with a passion. Since the Dutch have a propensity for involving themselves in other people's affairs, particularly the youngsters, they decided we were "the enemy" at that time. (Later it was the Greek Colonels, and so on.)

They always have somebody they want especially to love or hate and in that period it was the United States, and the antagonism to our role in Vietnam. They really took off on us.

Now The Hague was fairly quiet, because it is a quiet city, so the Ambassador was not unduly harassed. He got some attention, but not much.

But Amsterdam, that was the place. I was not only Mr. Nixon, I was the personification of everything these young people hated about the United States. There would be demonstrations almost daily.

In the beginning, many of them were small. I would go out and discuss Vietnam with these youngsters (it would usually turn into argument), and I would do it in their language. I had been in Vietnam, they had not, so it gave me an advantage. And I would argue the case.

But when the groups got to be very large, you just couldn't do that. Once or twice I invited them into the consulate general for discussions, but that didn't work very well.

The demonstrations escalated. We had two, more or less serious, events. One was an occupation of the Consulate General.

This was a period when these kinds of things were just beginning to happen around the world. The Department of State was definitely not geared up to handle, not even to understand, this kind of thing.

I think the only international event of consequence in this regard had been the Pan Am plane incident in Jordan, where they'd been blown up. But nobody expected anything in a nice country like the Netherlands.

I would report from time to time, either as part of an embassy report or my own, on some of these demonstrations. But when they got to be a daily event, they appeared routine and our reports were ignored. The people back home were not interested in reading that kind of stuff, anyhow.

But on one occasion one morning, we were occupied. Shall I go into it?

Q: Sure, by all means.

BRADERMAN: I don't know whether we were the first establishment that was occupied, but we were one of the early ones at any rate.

What essentially happened is that when we opened our doors about 8:30, the demonstrators planned it so that they could rush in behind the officer who opened the door.

I should point out that the previous evening the administrative officer at the Embassy called to say that someone at a tavern was overheard to say an American establishment was going to be taken over at some unspecified time.

Curiously enough, I had gotten word that something might be happening to an American installation, somewhere in the Netherlands, sometime in the next two weeks. I had heard that the night before.

It could have been a military base. We had two consulates general and the embassy-it could have been one of them. It could have been a business establishment, one didn't know. Nevertheless, I took it seriously.

I called the Chief of Police and alerted them to it, and he said he would put some cars on watch around the Consulate General.

I learned later that he did (they assigned a Volkswagen, which they were using to roam around the city in those days), but that officer had gone off duty at eight o'clock.

So, at 8:30, our door was rushed. I was just getting ready to leave the house, which was a half-mile from the consulate general, to come to the office.

We generally opened at 8:30; though we didn't open for business to the general public until 9:00. And opening for business was important because we were one of the largest visa-issuing posts in the world. I think in my last full year, 1973, we issued 42,000 visas-it was a lot of visas.

I got a call from my Commercial officer saying that he had barricaded himself in his room. We had been occupied. There were two local employees in the building that he knew of, and that was about it.

He had taken one peek in the hall before he pushed a desk or something up against the wall. They hadn't disturbed him, but he didn't know when he could get to the phone again.

I called The Hague, spoke to the Ambassador, and I asked for instructions.

He asked, "What are you going to do?"

I said, "As soon as I get off the phone with you I'm going to call the Chief of Police, and get up to the Consulate-general, and we'll get these people out."

He said, "Well, that's fine with me. Go to it."

Q: Patted you firmly on the back and...

BRADERMAN: Those were Middendorf's instructions to me.

I called the Chief of Police, and we met at a corner near the consulate general.

These people had taken over the building. They had banners up from the top floor saying: "We won't get out until the US gets out of Vietnam," or something to that effect. They had horns and they were blaring forth and what not.

We discussed ways of getting into the building. There were some little foul-ups-they didn't bring any ladders that would get to the second floor and so on, but within a half-hour they had the necessary equipment, and they started to do that.

And then I remembered that one of our back doors had a broken latch (it was a metal sliding door). The building was very easy to get out of; it was very hard to get into once you bolted everything up. In addition to bolting all the doors and windows they had put file cabinets up against all the doors. But the back door was a weak spot, so we were able to get that open.

And then they told me, under Dutch law you had to give the people who were occupying the building a chance to get out. So, I asked for the leader.

They said, "We're all leaders."

So I shouted that they'd accomplished their purpose, they'd taken over the building, now wouldn't it be a nice thing if they got out peacefully, or something to that effect.

They refused.

I was discursive that day and I made three separate appeals, asking them to get out.

Later, when the matter went to court, I learned that if I hadn't done it three times, it wouldn't have been legal.

After the third time they still wouldn't get out, so we had the police break through this already partial opening. They took them all into custody and arrested them. We went back in the building and it was ...

Q: They hadn't destroyed files or anything?

BRADERMAN: No, in that we were fortunate. They used files only as barricades, used desks only as barricades. They didn't try to get into any classified material, which we only had in limited amount, and almost all in one secure place in the consulate general. So, there was no security problem from that standpoint.

They were interested in making a point. They had planned to stay 24 hours, I learned later. Instead of that, they were in there an hour and a half.

I was on the board of the American Schools. I had offered to have a Board luncheon that day in the consulate general, which is not set up to serve lunch, but we were going to do it.

By God, at 12:30, we had lunch. Everybody on the staff pitched in, got every desk back, files straightened up, everything all ready. And we were back in business by noon. That show of team spirit and loyalty was really great.

But, at any rate, that was a very unpleasant experience.

Another, that was also unpleasant and more fraught with potential danger, was this incident. We contracted with a firm to have our establishment cleaned regularly. What they would do was generally clean waste baskets, tidy up bathrooms, and so on, every day, but do the heavier cleaning once a week.

The consulate, on the ground floor, had a big, waiting room area where people interested in visas, passports, and services of various kinds would come in and then be serviced by our employees. That waiting room still had some of the old overstuffed furniture that was a relic of by-gone years.

Incidentally, the consulate general had been used by the German commander of Amsterdam as his headquarters during the war, and the residence was used as his residence. There were some things, including security stuff, in the basement that were still a remnant of the German occupation.

But the point was that this was a big, open room in which people sought services. We generally closed at five o'clock for outside visitors, and then our staff used the next half hour or so to get things organized and files away. The American staff, most of them, would stay as long as whatever they were doing required.

About 4:30 one afternoon, I got a call from one of my local employees, who handled visas, saying that he thought we had a bomb, could I come downstairs. I was on the second floor US (first floor European.) I came down to the ground floor, and I said, "Hans, what is it?"

He said, "There was a big package (something that would resemble a Safeway or Giant grocery package here in the United States), which I found behind that sofa." And he said, "I picked it up and I took it out and threw it in the bushes."

And I said, "You thought it was a bomb, you say?"

"Yes."

"Well, you should never have picked it up."

He said, "Well, I didn't think about anything. At any rate, it's sitting there in the bushes."

I gingerly went over and listened, and I thought I heard something ticking away. So I called the police. They said they would send somebody right over. Well, it took them almost ten minutes to get anyone. A squad car came by, an officer looked at it, and he said, "There's a bomb in that."

I said, "Well, what are you going to do about it?"

He said, "Look, we don't know if it's a big one, a little one, or what it can do, or anything of the sort. We need an expert."

I asked, "Do you have an expert?"

He said, "We have one man on the force who specializes in this."

(This takes on, somewhat, the characteristics of a not-so-funny comedy, but anyhow ...)

So I said, "Well, get him, quickly!"

They didn't have any walkie talkies, so they said they'd send one of the squad cars out to find him. Well, it took 20 minutes for them to find this fellow, who came riding up on a bicycle.

He took one look at the bag in the bushes and said, "That's a bomb." He said, "I wonder if it's a percussion bomb because if it is I don't want to touch it."

I said, "It's not a percussion bomb. It was inside, it was carried out here."

He said, "Oh, okay." And he turned to me and asked, "Does anyone around here have a pair of pliers?" (This is in the year 1973, a big-city's expert on bombs.)

So we went to one of our cars and got a pair of pliers. And he defused the bomb. Then he took it apart, and I have shots of all the parts and everything else.

He said, "In five minutes that would have gone off."

I asked, "And what would have happened in five minutes?"

He said, "If it was in the building where it was placed, it would have blown the building to pieces and everyone would have been killed."

Q: Boy! That's something for your memory book.

BRADERMAN: What do you do at that stage? By this time there were crowds around, newspaper people, including a couple of stringers for the US media. I made a quick decision. (And remember we didn't have much experience in that sort of thing at that time.) I decided that one of the things that whoever had put it there wanted to do, aside from killing some of us, was to get publicity. So, I offered no interviews. As matter of fact, we closed the consulate general and I quickly left. And I was unavailable that evening.

The next day, I got several calls. I said things had worked out all right and so on and so forth. As a result there was very little publicity about it.

The mayor, of course, called me, and he was very hopeful that I wouldn't try to make a big thing out of it.

The mayor and I had become good personal friends, although politically we were at odds. He was a Socialist, and I am not. He was 100 percent against our participation in Vietnam. We used to have tremendous arguments on this score. And by 1973, a lot of Americans were very much against our ...

Q: Even before that. I mean when you have two boys in college in the '60s...

BRADERMAN: Yes. Well, he thought I might, or somebody might make me, use this against the city in some way. And I told him that I was going to keep it quiet, and he was very much relieved. And we did.

But, you sit there and you wonder: Is this person going to try tomorrow? The next day? Where? How?

Q: Did you ever have any indication of who did it? They wouldn't have claimed credit until it blew.

BRADERMAN: Nobody indicated anything, and nothing on that score ever occurred again. Our house was broken into, but I don't think it was related to that. At any rate, it gave me pause.

One of the things we began to do was to change the physical nature of the consulate general. We got funds to put up barriers and bullet-proof windows. We employed a security guard.

As we began to move into the latter part of 1973 and early 1974, with much of the activity continuing, I found that instead of spending my time making friends for the United States, as well as handling the routine tasks that one has to, I was spending an awful lot of time on security.

Q: I'm afraid that's the history of a lot of the Foreign Service in the last ten years or 15 years.

BRADERMAN: And it went against the grain. I always felt that when a foreigner came to the US Embassy or the Consulate-general, his first vision of the United States should be that we are a free and open society. That's what he should see. But when he had to come and find barriers and so on ...

Q: And yet, still, a solution to the problem is of immense importance. Well, we're practically at the end of this tape. Do you have any final thought?

BRADERMAN: My final thought is that of all my experiences and so on in my varied life, I've had a relationship with the Foreign Service all these years. One of the reasons I feel such a deep interest in DACOR is because it's an organization of Foreign Service people.

I think the Department of State does a better job than most agencies in keeping contact with those who served in one way or another-Foreign Service Day and other things being examples. I think it was a mistake to have revoked passes. That was a good indication that people were still part of the heart of the Department. And I don't think security would have suffered very much. But I feel a close affinity with the Department and with those who serve and have served there, not only because there is this shared experience but because there is a continuing intense concern with world affairs.

End of interview