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CARPENTER'S TAKE NOTICE.

Those carpenters that are subscribers to the Theatre, have now an opportunity of working out their shares—Apply to the subscriber,

GEORGE HADFIELD.

September 7. 3t

(By Authority.)

An act making provision for the relief of poor, infirm and diseased persons.

Sec. 1. *Be it enacted by the First and Second chambers of the City Council of Washington,* That from and after the first Monday of September inst. the poor, infirm and diseased of the city of Washington shall be supported and relieved agreeably to the provisions of this act.

Sec. 2. *And be it enacted,* That the mayor shall on or before the said day of September, and every six months thereafter appoint five reputable inhabitants of the city, who are housekeepers, to be styled "Trustees of the poor," and who shall discharge the duties imposed on them by this act. One of the said trustees to be a resident in that part of the city west of sixteenth street west, one residing between sixteenth street and sixth street west; one residing between fourth street east, and sixth street west and north of south E street; one residing between fourth street east and sixth street west and south of south E street; and the other trustee to reside in that part of the city east of fourth street east. The trustees so appointed to serve for six months from the time of their appointment.

Sec. 3. *And be it enacted,* That the trustees of the poor be and are hereby authorised and directed to provide for the relief, maintenance and cloathing of all the poor, infirm and diseased of the city of Washington, also medical aid and assistance for them at such place and in such manner as to a majority of the trustees seems most advantageous for the city, and for the benefit of those coming under their care: Provided, that in all cases they confine their expenditures within the limits of the appropriations made by the council for that purpose. They shall keep a regular account of their proceedings and expenditures (subject at all times to the inspection of any member of the council) and report the same to the mayor for his sanction, at least once in every three months, with such remarks on the subject of providing for the poor as their experience may dictate—which accounts and observations shall by him be communicated to the council.

Sec. 4. *And be it enacted,* That no inhabitant of the city shall be entitled to the provisions of this act, or considered one of the poor of the city of Washington, who has not resided therein at least six months prior to application for relief.

Sec. 5. *And be it enacted,* That the trustees meet once in every month during their continuance in office; and have power to draw on the treasurer for such sums of money as may be appropriated, and necessary for the discharge of the duties hereby imposed.

Sec. 6. *And be it enacted,* That all expenditures shall be authorised at the monthly meetings of the trustees, under such regulations as may be prescribed by them.

Sec. 7. *And be it enacted,* That on the death of any poor, diseased or infirm person, entitled to the provisions of this act, the said trustees shall cause him or her to be decently interred at the expence of the corporation.

Sec. 8. *And be it enacted,* That from and after the said day of September, the act entitled "An act for the relief of the poor, infirm and diseased persons," passed the twenty-eighth day of October, 1802, be and is hereby repealed.

Sec. 9. *And be it enacted,* That there is hereby appropriated the sum of four hundred dollars for the support of the poor of the city.

JOHN P. VAN NESS,
President of the first chamber of the city council of Washington.
DANL. CARROLL of Dud'n
President of the second chamber of the city council of Washington.
Approved, September 1st, 1803.
ROBERT BRENT, Mayor.
Copy from the original deposited in my office.
THOMAS HERTY, Reg.
of the city of Washington.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

A DEFENCE OF *REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENTS.*

LETTER THE SECOND.

Men by nature equal.

No subject that has engaged human research has been more prolific of vain phantasies than that of government.—Whether it be that men, guided more by their interests than by their judgments, by fear than by duty, have lost every motive to regard truth, it is manifest that more crude conceptions and unfounded inferences have been entertained on this than on any other topic, unless it be that of religion. Hence the difficulty of finding or combining any of those elementary principles which enable the philosopher, to treat the subject scientifically, or in such a way as to bring conviction to his own mind, or impress it on the minds of others. Since the age of Augustus to the present day tyrants have invariably found means of corrupting genius and silencing truth; insomuch that, too frequently, those whom nature constitutes the defenders of truth have become her most dangerous opponents, and the most successful apologists of vice.

But truth, though obscured, never divests herself of her native lustre, and the passing cloud, however it may for a time intercept her rays, only serves ultimately to diffuse a more vigorous light. Notwithstanding the insidious sophisms of a Machiavel, and the incautious avowals of a Tilmen, one maxim has found its way to universal acceptance—"*Salus populi suprema lex*"—"The public good is the first law."

That government is the best which most eminently promotes the general good. It is not the happiness of this or that man, however elevated by natural or adventitious endowments, but that of the whole nation, which is the end of all good government. This principle may be assumed as self-evident. Argument can neither increase or diminish its force.

The question to be investigated then is what system of government, partaking of this principle, is the best; or rather what system carries this principle most completely into effect.

On this subject, as on all others, it is proper to consult experience, and so far as her lessons apply be governed by them, in the deductions we shall make. It must never, however, be lost sight of, that as nations are in a state of constant mutation, the laws which are at one period the best adapted to their circumstances may at another period be the least so; and that of consequence, a system which is useful to-day may be useless, perhaps injurious to-morrow.—The dark ages of superstition and ignorance, or those which poets have denominated on account of their simplicity and virtue, the golden age, required not the refined and complicated systems of government rendered necessary in the present state of manners, in which the developement of the human character has given no less to our vices than our virtues a diversity of hue and tendency to good or evil, requiring encouragement or repression.

The only profitable enquiry into the pre-existing systems of government among men is in what degree they have promoted the happiness of those nations for which they were instituted.

In the infancy of society the paternal government seems to have been the universal model to men who emerged from the state of nature into society. To regulate their few and simple concerns, and to defend them from external danger, *they elected* some head of a family remarkable for his virtues, talents, and bravery. I cannot more happily illustrate this part of the subject than in the words of Mr. Locke:

"In the beginning of things, the father's government of the childhood of those sprung from him, having accustomed them to the *rule of one man* and taught them that where it was exercised with care and skill, with affection and love to those under it, it was sufficient to procure and preserve to men all the political happiness they sought for in society. It was no wonder that they should pitch upon, and actually run into that form of government, which from their infancy they had been all accustomed to; and which, by experience, they had found both easy and safe.—To which, if we add, that *monarchy* being simple, and most obvious to men, whom neither experience had instructed in the forms of government, nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative, or the inconveniencies of absolute power, which monarchy in succession was apt to lay claim to, and bring upon them; it was not at all strange, that they should not much trouble themselves to think of matters of restraining any exorbitancies of those to whom they had given the authority over them, and of balancing the power of government, by placing several parts of it in different hands. They had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion, nor did the faction of the age, nor their possessions, or way of living, (which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition) give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it; and therefore it is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government as was not only, as I said, most obvious and simple, but also best suited to their present state and condition; which stood more in need of defence against foreign invasions and injuries, than of multiplicity of laws. The equality of a simple poor way of living, confining their desires within the narrow bounds of each man's small property, made few controversies, and so no need of many laws to decide them, or variety of officers to superintend the process, or look after the execution of justice, when there were but few trespasses, and few offenders.—Since then those, who liked one another so well as to join into society, cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together, and some trust one in another; & therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be how to secure themselves against foreign force. It was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government, which might best serve to that end, and chuse the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars, and lead them out against their enemies, and must in this chiefly be their ruler."

This system of authority appears to have been well adapted to the *existing* state of manners. However great the nominal power conferred on a chief, its *real exercise* was limited by many considerations. It is not material to enquire whether men has universally or even generally in a state of nature the ferocity of a savage; it is certain that in that state, where perfect equality of right exists, he possesses a spirit indignant of wrong and insensible, to a great degree, of superiority in another. This common feeling entertained by the members of the community would in itself constitute a strong and constant check upon the ambition of the chief. The simplicity of manners, too, while in the ordinary intercourses of society, it placed the chief upon a level with his subjects would withhold from the former those numerous instruments of corruption and subjection which inequality in possessions, and its natural offspring luxury, give to one man over another.

But this state of society could not last forever. To the wants of nature were soon added those which administered to the gratification of acquired tastes. These uniting with the invariable tendency of great power to abuse, gradually led the way to usurpation and tyranny. In the existing state of society passion bearing more sway than reason; the chief, who had been first chosen to protect a nation from foreign violence or internal dissention, indulged his feelings in assuming one power after another, under the specious pretext of the public good, and which was, perhaps in most cases exercised with such a view, until opposition mingled with it the passion of resentment to powerful individuals. From this state of things arose internal wars, in which the members of the whole community ranged themselves under the banners of two leaders, the triumph of one of whom not only involved the destruction of the other, but lessened the personal rights of every member of the society beside the chieftain.——————

——————Men, proud in the enjoyment of their rights, but imperfectly acquainted with the means of vindicating them, rarely gained by these collisions. The fabric of liberty, without their being conscious of it, gradually sunk beneath the arm of misapplied power, which admitted of little palliation, and of no radical cure.

NOTICE.

FOR Sale One hundred and fifty acres of land, One hundred acres of which is in wood—it is situated within six miles of the Eastern Branch ferry. For terms apply to

MICHAEL LOWE.

Prince George county, July 22. 3t1aw

For the National Intelligencer.

A VINDICATION OF THE *PURCHASE OF LOUISIANA,*

Or a view of the inconsistencies of Federalism.

BY CURTIUS.

It was confidently hoped, that the issue of our negociation for the possession of New Orleans and Louisiana, would at least have stopped the current of federal calumny, if it did not force the opposition to join the friends of the administration, in their admiration of the wisdom and policy of its measures. When the news of the cession was first announced to the public, party prejudices were for a while suspended in their operation; and every man, who felt for the interest of the union, and in whose heart every spark of patriotism was not extinguished, united in pronouncing it a principal work of political sagacity. Some, who were hostile to the government, bewildered by the magnitude and unexpectedness of the event, and in a moment of general enthusiasm forgetting their hostility, joined in an approval of the conduct of the executive. But the scene is now changed. The cession has become a principal source of clamor and invective against the administration. The silence, which seemed to be imposed upon the enemies of government, was the silence of mortification and disappointment, it was portentous of future calumny and abuse.

We hoped that the federalists would have accorded with us in *this* measure, because their own partizans had previously and publicly declared in the Senate of the union, that possession of that country by the United States, was essential to our prosperity, to our national independence and peace. It was considered of such primary importance to us, that the expenditure of millions, and the blood of our citizens were not to be put in competition. Neither the sacrifice of our national character at the shrine of ambition, of the obligations of justice, nor the great principles of national law, was thought too immense, for the attainment of an object so intimately connected with the happiness, and integrity of the union. But the advantages, which we were then told would be derived to the United States by the annexation of these countries to our territory, seem to have disappeared from the field of federal vision. Louisiana, which was then a "paradise," is now a wilderness, fit only for the skulking savage; its soil, which was then prolific in all the luxuries of life, is now barren and unhealthful, covered with stagnant water which exhales pestilence and death. It remains for the citizens of the United States to determine whether they will credit the federal declarations of *last winter* or those of *this summer*; for *both* they cannot believe. To contrast them will not only amuse, but exhibit in the most glaring colors the shameless inconsistency, if not the depravity of a set of men, whose souls sicken at the prosperity of their country. Either the federal senators or the writers for federal newspapers are actuated by the most abandoned and profligate principles; while the arguments of the former, when urging us to war on the presumption that negociation must prove ineffectual, are sufficient answers to the declarations of the latter, they furnish full and complete evidence, that the executive has acted for the best interest of his country; that the extent of the cession is almost equal to what the federalists wished us to acquire by conquest; and its price, in their own estimation, less than could have been expected. Here follow extracts from the speeches of the federal members in the Senate, to show, that, in their opinion, negociation was preferable to war, had they believed that negociation would be efficient.

Mr. Ross, in his speech says, "They (the possessors of New Orleans) might sell if they saw us armed; in possession and resolved to maintain it. But when we have no army, no military preparations, &c. what would induce them to sell"?

"Beleiving as I do that negociation must fail, I am not for trusting to that alone.—If you treat for an extension of your limits you will be disappointed."

Mr. Wells of Delaware.

"You have already tried negociation. I say you have tried it, because you have a minister in France, *and I am sure the first magistrate of our country cannot have been so negligent as not to pay attention to a subject, which is confessedly of such magnitude.* You have then negociated, and with what success? Why, instead of defeating the cession, (of Louisiana to France) you have closed the river." (the Mississippi.)

Governeur Morris.

Remarks.—From the above quotations it must be evident to every man of common understanding, that Mr. Ross, Mr. Wells and Mr. Morris, conceived that negociation was preferable to war, had they thought that the former would have been effectual; but, as they did not, recommended the latter. The President thought otherwise; and the event has proved the superiority of his foresight, and the wisdom of his measures. Mr. Morris believed, (and very correctly) that the first magistrate of our country had not neglected an object of such moment to the U. S. For, previous to the mission of Mr. Monroe, Mr. Livingston had received instructions to negociate for the purchase of Louisiana from the French government; for it would be absurd to suppose, that the latter would have attempted such a purchase, without receiving authority from the government which he represented. But let us hear what *summer federalists* has to say on this subject.

(Columbian Centinel.) "At length we hear Louisiana is *bought*. For what? To secure the right of deposit. Better assert our old treaty right as derived from Spain, then buy new rights."

Fabricius.

"It is strange that the dearest the dearest, the slowest and the most useful of all ways to vindicate a nations rights should be preferred by such a man? is it strange that Mr. Munroe, the miserable dupe of France, should be sent to crawl once more like a reptile at the chief consuls feet.

Ibid.

"The right of deposit however was secured to us by treaty, and its infraction offered a fair justification to reinstate ourselves by *force*. But this business smelt of gun-powder, and it was of course resolved, to take in meekness, the buffetings of a wanton and contemptible enemy; to yield our cheek to the fist of the smiter, *and to send Mr. Munroe.*"

Connecticut Courant.

"Our national character must be considerably lessened, in the estimation of foreign nations, by the *pussillanimous* conduct of the present ruling party.——Our treaty was violated, our rights were trampled on, and our commerce preyed upon, and still the city was *negociate*.——If any credit is due, it is certainly due to Mr. Livingston, *and not to the executive; for the convention was concluded prior* to the arrival of the minister extraordinary in France, *(this does not appear to be true, but still it is federalism)* and prior to the news of our refusing to go down and take immediate possession of New Orleans.

[Washington Fed. Valerius.

Remarks.——Wonderful are the changes of federalism ! ! *Last winter* Messrs. Ross, Wells and Morris conceived, that if negociation would be effectual, that recourse to hostilities was unnecessary, but *this summer*, since *negociation hasbeen effectual,* & acquired more than the most *sanguine*federalist could expect, it is conceived, not only that it would be *pusillanimous to negociate,* but that our national character is degraded by doing, what the federal senators would have done, had they possessed the power, and if they were *honest* in their declarations. It is hoped that the opposition after *Valerius* has asserted, that our late convention with France was concluded "*prior* to the news of our refusing to go down and take immediate possession of New Orleans," will not assume any merit to themselves by pretending, that France was *affrighted* into the cession, *by their warlike and bloody resolutions.*

Here follow the federal arguments of *last winter* to shew the important benefits, which will result to the United States from the possession of the island of New Orleans, not of the island of New Orleans only, but of East and West Florida, not of East and West Florida only, but of Louisiana.

"The possession of the country on the east bank of the Mississippi will give compactness and irresistable strength to the United States, and in all future European wars, we shall be more courted and respected than we shall be without it—on that score therefore our security will be encreased by this measure," (that is, by taking possession by force—and why will not our security be as great, since we are to possess it by negociation.) "Suppose the western people go & chase away the present possessors, and in the end be defeated. They will make the best compromise they can with the power