of Great Britain itſelf was predicted." It is ſhrewdly and ſneeringly remarked, that the former was the 'preliminary' to the ſubjection of Europe, and the latter the 'definitive treaty:' the one put France in an offenſive poſition, the other deſtroyed the defenſive means of all her neighbours.

From a general review of the ſubject it appears, that

"The political advantages which the republic, in a military point of view, poſſeſſes in preference to her neighbours, are,

"1. An immenſe, ſecure, annual revenue.

'We have already obſerved, that the European territory and induſtry of France, are capable of producing, without inconveniency to the public, thirty millions ſterling to government.

"Or, if we take fifteen per cent. as a medium aſſeſſment by cadaſtre, of the property and income of the nation, it will give the ſaid ſum and upwards.

"From theſe thirty millions deducting about two millions, which the conſulate is yet pleaſed to allow to the creditors of the ſtate, and there will remain a clear and unincumbered revenue of 28,000,000l. ſterling. A ſum equal to, if not exceeding the unincumbered part of the revenues of all the independent governments of Europe. Add to this, that, in all other European ſtates, the public imports, as they are raiſed, amount to upwards of thirty per cent. upon the income of the taxable part of the community.

"2. The military organization of the republic.

"By the conſcription law, every male is liable to ſerve in the loweſt military capacity: there is neither legal exemption nor privileged preferment—and conſequently, there is no ſubject for jealouſy in the army, nor for diſcontent in the community. In France upwards of ſix millions of men are able to carry arms; of theſe, two millions and a half are between 18 and 23—Any number of theſe young men may be armed and put in motion by a parole d'ordre—for both the legiſlation and ſovereignty of the republic are in the ſtaff of the army; the military is the only road to conſideration and power. And ſuch is now the reputation of that profeſſion, that, to avoid the contempt of the public, it is neceſſary either to ſerve or to have ſerved. Theſe are advantages which no other government poſſeſſes.

"3. The frontier and avant-poſts of the republic.

In a definitive point of view, ſince the meridian of the Roman power to the preſent time, no ſtate had ever its frontiers ſo judiciouſly covered as thoſe of the French republic now are.——The ſtrength of the frontier lines of monarchical France has often been proved; the ſubjugation of Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, render thoſe lines now we may ſay, inacceſſible. Thoſe vaſſal auxiliaries, being acknowledged by the reſt of ſtupified Europe as independent ſtates, may either ſerve as neutral outworks, or will have to maintain French armies ſufficient to oppoſe any force that can be brought againſt them. Conſidered as offenſive, the ſtrength of her frontiers, and the localities of her ſeveral dependents, muſt neceſſarily give to the armies of France a decided preponderance in Europe. From the Ems, up the Rhine to Baſil and Feldkirk; from thence by Verona and the Adriatic ſea to Calabria, the republic is covered with a chain of double and triple lines of natural barriers and military poſts. Secure at home, her avant departments, open to her armies every part of the continent from the Morea to Pomerania—Bonaparte's legions may be at the gates of Vienna and Berlin, before the Auſtrian and Pruſſian cabinets have any ſuſpicion of the conſul's hoſtile intentions. Lord paramount of Naples, the ceſſion of Malta, and all other military and naval ſtations on the Mediterranean, by Great Britain, puts the Turkiſh government under the immediate direction of the conſulate. With the command of Conſtantinople, or only enjoying the freedom of navigating the Dardanelles and Boſphorus of Thrace, the republic will check the operations even of Ruſſia itſelf; and may make that mighty empire ſubſervient to her future projects.

"We have already ſtated, that the fiſheries and trade of the republic, in her preſent ſituation, will employ and maintain 120,000 able ſeamen; and by managing other powers with a pacific prudence, ſhe may double the number of her ſailors, and ſecure a dominion on the ocean, before any of her neighbours be aware of her deſign. Commanding the powers, the ports and arſenals of Spain, Italy and Turkey, France may very ſoon poſſeſs the abſolute ſovereignty of the Mediterranean: with the Rhine, ſhe has the foreſts of Germany for the uſe of her dockyards; with Holland ſhe requires an extent of coaſt and a chain of ſea ports, which may enable her to raiſe a numerous navy in a few years."

The leading policy of France has ever been to reduce the power and political influence of Great Britain—with the ſame diſpoſition ſhe has now more power than ſhe ever had. The annulment of the treaty of Amiens, indeed by which we retain poſſeſſion of Malta, and the conſequent ſuperiority in the Mediterranean, has abridged the conſular power in that quarter ſince theſe ſketches were written. If France, however, is miſtreſs of the ſouthweſt half of the continental Europe, Ruſſia claims a ſimilar dominion over the north and eaſtern parts.

"Theſe two mighty empires are come in contact; Berlin, Vienna, Conſtantinople, can only be conſidered as their neutral ports, ſituate in their line of demarcation." The free, ſecure, and independent communication between the ſouthern provinces of Ruſſia and the Mediterranean is of too great importance to be abandoned; nor is the republic of France likely to cede the navigation which it has obtained of the Black Sea. If theſe two powers then do not go mutual ſhares in the trade and government of the Turkiſh empire, an event perhaps impoſſible, which of the parties is to give up its pretenſion?

"The cabinet of Peterſburg muſt certainly know, that ſhould the conſulate be allowed to aſſume an aſcendancy at Conſtantinople, or to intermeddle in the affairs of Turkey, the fate of Muſcow may again be diſputed at Paltava! Will the preſent government of France retract and leave the ſeraglio and St. Sophia to the deſecration of Ruſſians? In that caſe a Coſſack and Highland army, ſeconded by a Ruſſian and Britiſh fleet, might yet confine the empire of Bonaparte to the government of his Gauls of the weſt. Or can the ambition of Ruſſia and the avarice of France be ſatisfied with a partial partition of Turkey?

"Thus between theſe two governments matters ſeem to come to a criſis."

Capt. Gildea, from Cape Francois, ſtates, that in conſequence of a humane effort, on the part of the Americans there to reſcue certain French families, from the ſanguinary rage of the Blacks, capt. Tate, ſecond officer of the ſhip Pilgrim, of this port, forfeited his life. Capt. Gibſon of the Pilgrim, it appears, was ordered to be ſhot; but ſome delay taking place in the execution of this brutal mandate, afforded an opportunity for his friends to interfere by which means his life was preſerved.

The circumſtances of this affair, it appears were, that a ſuſpicion ariſing among the Blacks, that ſeveral Frenchmen were ſecreted in the American fleet, the whole ſquadron were brought to at the Fort; and upon a ſtrict ſearch being made, thirteen miſerable objects of this deſcription, were found on board the Pilgrim. Theſe, together with the officers of the ſhip, were conducted on ſhore, and Capt. Tate, and two of theſe unfortunate men, inſtantly hung on the public wharf!

A proclamation was iſſued three days prior to the ſailing of the fleet, interdicting any maſter or ſupercargo, from retaining any part of the cargoes and obliging them to ſell the whole to the adminiſtration or to one individual merchant.

Another proclamation forbids the maſter of any veſſel from ſecreting on board his veſſel or attempting to carry off any of the Emperor's ſubjects or French reſidents, under the penalty of forfeiting veſſel and cargo and ten months impriſonment, afterwards to be ſent to America, never to appear in the iſland, under the pain of death.

The following extract of a letter from a gentleman in Cape Francois, dated Oct. 23, with which we have been obligingly favoured by a mercantile friend, contains ſome additional particulars relative to this event:

"Since the date of my laſt, the convoy, which intended to depart the next morning, have been detained until now, by an order from the Emperor, he having been informed, that a number of Americans contrary to the laws of this country, were endeavouring and had actually ſucceeded in getting off to the fleet a great many perſons, to whom the commander in chief here had often refuſed paſſports. For a number of days, this clandeſtine affair was conducted with great activity, but with very little caution; for it was obſerved with much regret by General Chriſtophe, to whom advice had been given daily of the perſons thus embarking; yet he hoped, as the convoy would not be ready to ſail for ſome days, that they would repent their temerity, and again return on ſhore, in which caſe, nothing would happen to them.

"In fact, it was only two days ago that there was a general aſſembly of men, women, and children, belonging to the town, when the Emperor addreſſing himſelf more particularly to the people of colour, aſſured them of his wiſh to make them all happy, and would protect them and their families from all kind of inſult and violence. Notwithſtanding they continued to remain, and others to go on board the different veſſels eſpecially on board the ſhip Pilgrim, whoſe conſignee aſſured the Emperor he was ignorant any one being on board but thoſe poſſeſſed of paſſports.

"The veſſels ſtill met with detention, and we were at a loſs to account for it. At length they were permitted to clear out, and yeſterday was the period fixed on for departure. The preceding night a counter order was given for a general embargo; and in the morning guards were appointed to go and ſearch every veſſel in the harbor, when, painful to relate, they found on board the Pilgrim, 15 or 16 perſons of both ſexes, whom together with the firſt officer of ſaid ſhip, were immediately ſent as priſoners on ſhore, the firſt to anſwer for endeavoring to leave the iſland contrary to law, and Mr. Tate for reſiſting the guards ſent to ſearch the veſſel. Three of theſe unfortunate people, in which number, I am ſorry to include poor Tate, were hanged on the quay a ſhort time after their landing, and ſo exaſperated were the different officers and ſoldiers, that it was impoſſible to afford that unfortunate man the leaſt aſſiſtance.

"It is deeply to be lamented, that an act ſo humane as was the intention of the Americans in this inſtance, ſhould ſo ill accord with the laws of the country; but as it was our duty as well as ſafety, ſtrictly to adhere to them, this deviation expoſed us and the poor creatures we were deſirous of ſerving, to the unhappy iſſue that has taken place."

[Relf's Gazette.

From the Boston Independent Chronicle of the 8th Instant.

THE ELECTION.

On laſt Monday, the citizens of Maſſachuſetts voted for the Electors of Preſident and Vice Preſident of the United States, and for Repreſentatives to the ninth Congreſs. In regard to the manifeſtation of the public will, as exerciſed in the town of Boſton, on this important occaſion, we are concerned to ſtate, that it was in our imperfect opinion miſerably ſignificant of a dereliction from all the ſound principles of republican policy. We are morally perſuaded, that the anti-republican reſult of that day's polling, in this eſpecial town, (as thank God, we cannot admit ſuch a diſgrace to be extended beyond its limits) was not fully declaratory of the popular mind, which had been warped from the high intereſt of public virtue. The intrigues, menaces, and perhaps bribery, of that ſmall and diminiſhing *Anglo tory Cabal*, had ſecretly contrived to gather within its influential vortex, many honeſt individuals, who have been unhappily ſeduced from the true path of national glory and political rectitude, through the medium of their neceſſities or their weakneſſes—we hope not through the medium of their vices: for a vice it certainly is, if a man can be perſuaded to exchange his civic independence for any pecuniary conſideration whatever. Whether maſter builder or journeyman, whether principal or labourer, each individual owes his vote to the true intereſts of his country, and to the eſſential principles of its national eſtabliſhments.

In reſpect to the loſs of Dr. Euſtis's election in this diſtrict, the enlightened republicans throughout the Union, will be good enough to obſerve, that his perſonal qualifications and connections, in this town, where he is ſo well known and ſo much reſpected; his political experience, his real knowledge of, and his undoubted attachment to, the ſubſtantial intereſts of New England; has not ſecured him a ſingle vote more than was given for the Jefferſonian ticket, with the name of Sullivan at its head. On the other hand, ſtrange as it may appear, he had one vote leſs than this very ticket! The inference from this event is too ſtriking to need an illuſtration; we ſhall make no remarks, calculated to form an invidious compariſon between the perſonal, mental and political attributes of the rival candidates. This town does know, and in the next Congreſs the citizens of the U. States will know, the real difference between theſe gentlemen, and will be compelled to appreciate them accordingly. We do not envy the feelings of Mr. Quincy, on his triumph; and we have the fulleſt aſſurance, that the defeat of Dr. Euſtis, (no loſs to him, though a great one to the public) will be attended, to his friends and admirers, with no ſort of mortification. His political honor has "moulted no feather."

Although the political atmoſphere has been clouded in this department, and a ſtar of no ſmall magnitude has ſuffered an eclipſe; yet the horizon of Old Maſſachuſetts is irradiated on every point, with renewed ſplendor, which portends a renovated and increaſing power to the republican principle, and a reſtoration of the real character and appropriate influence of this truly virtuous and excellent ſtate in the federal galaxy. We will not preſume to inform our republican friends throughout the Union, that the Jefferſonian ticket will ſucceed on the iſſue of the election, in this ſtate—but this we can aver with great truth, that at no time ſince the patriotic elections of the amiable and munificent Hancock, and the venerable S. Adams (the proſcribed patriots of Maſſachuſetts) has there been ſuch ſtrong manifeſtations of popular energy and Democratic ardor, as has been diſplayed on this occaſion. As far as we have heard the proportion of votes, in the various towns, forming the central force of the commonwealth, the returns have been deciſively republican, by a great and ſtupendous majority, conſidering all that has recently paſſed. We have indeed often wondered, after all that we have ſeen and read, reſpecting the ſtate of public opinion, in this important part of the Union, how the ſame ſtate, and the ſame people, who cheriſhed and ſupported with an almoſt unexampled zeal, the political ſentiments of thoſe illuſtrious citizens, could be perſuaded, under any circumſtances, to act in direct oppoſition to their ſage and ſalutary admonitions. If there ever was a man, who carried with him the unfeigned reſpect, affection and admiration of any two cotemporaries, Mr. Jefferſon (as we are told) poſſeſſed that honorable diſtinction, in the unlimited confidence of John Hancock and Samuel Adams, for his perſonal virtues, and the irreproachable integrity of his political character.

In deſcending from this elevated ſubject, we ſhall merely notice, that there is the higheſt probability of NINE republicans being returned from this ſtate to Congreſs, giving the republicans a majority of one in that honourable body. Mr. Seaver is undoubtedly choſen, by a majority of nearly two to one, in deſpite of all the pitiful arts that have been exerciſed to wound his reputation. Since the ſon of Mr. Adams had no merit to plead of his own, and no pretenſions to advance on the ſcore of his father's popularity in Norfolk, his friends and advocates were lamentably conſtrained to ſupport his election by the pretended faults of the rival candidate, rather than by the recommendation of his immediate endowments.

Such, fellow-citizens, is the preſent florid, healthful condition of republicaniſm in Maſſachuſetts; and we have no heſitation in advancing our belief, that this commonwealth in particular, and the Union in general, will exhibit a glorious inſtance to the Univerſe that it is poſſible for a Democracy, or government by the people, to be created by wiſdom, ſupported by morals, and cemented by virtue.

In the Regiſter of laſt evening, major Jackſon again noticed the Preſident's meſſage—his obſervations are vague—his inſinuations unfounded. His principal object was to perſuade the reader that ſince Mr. Jefferſon had not particularly mentioned the captives at Tripoli, in his communication to Congreſs, he had not made an effort to procure their releaſe—we ſay this is an unfounded inſinuation, a deduction not warranted. The releaſe of the captives could be procured but in two ways—*force* or *purchaſe*: the adminiſtration has employed an *adequate* and even *more than adequate force*, in the Mediterranean, to *compel* the Tripolitans to ſurrender the priſoners; for this purpoſe the American ſquadron, by our lateſt advices, had made every diſpoſition, an attack by frigates and gun boats was to be made, and we may every day expect to hear the reſult. Yet, with the knowledge of theſe facts, the major has ventured to inſinuate what the public know to be *untrue*. Again, if *force* cannot procure the releaſe of the captives without ranſom, it can certainly create ſuch apprehenſion that the tyrant cannot demand ſuch a ſum as under different circumſtances there is no doubt he would. And, again, we hazard the aſſertion, without dread of refutation, that the adminiſtration has been equally attentive to the other mode of releaſe—*purchaſe*. If *force* is the *beſt*, the *moſt efficacious* method of inducing the barbarians to do us juſtice—then has the adminiſtration furniſhed that force; if *ranſom* is the moſt *honorable*, *efficacious* and *prudent* method, the adminiſtration will not heſitate.

The major will not dare aſſert that the force in the Mediterranean, at the preſent moment, is not ſufficiently ſtrong to reduce the petty power of Tripoli; he will not dare to diſpute the ability of the commanders, the courage of the ſeamen—in what other manner then would he have the adminiſtration act? is it his wiſh that our frigates ſhould be loaded with *preſents* and *treaſure*, and thus ſent to ſue for peace, which might be broken the next moment? or is it more becoming to ſend them prepared to teach the pirates that we are neither Spaniards nor Italians?

The truth is ſimply this, if the next advices from our ſquadron announce the releaſe of our ſeamen by *ranſom*, the major will talk of the expence; he will exclaim is this economy? If the captives are releaſed by the employment of *force*, the major will refuſe the adminiſtration any ſhare of the credit. Such is the inconſiſtency of men governed by vindictive, unworthy paſſions, and not by a reſpect for truth or principle.

We aſſert, and are willing to maintain the aſſertion, that the adminiſtration, has been particularly attentive to our fellow citizens, who are captive, and to the general ſtate of our affairs in the Mediterranean.

Aurora.

WASHINGTON CITY.

MONDAY, November 19.

Remarks on President's Message.
[*Concluded*]

The next topic to which the Preſident alludes is that of Gun Boats, ſo fertile a ſource of merriment to the opponents of the adminiſtration. It is not a little curious that theſe gentlemen, amidſt their deep toned denunciations againſt the government, have all-along had ſome light matters which have happily engaged their talent for wit and humour. For a long time the Mammoth Cheeſe was the vehicle of infinite pleaſantry, and now, novelty being a neceſſary ingredient we find their facetious faculties occupied on gunboats. In the former inſtance, the republicans ſatisfied themſelves with ſilent admiration at the bright diſplay of talents on ſo barren a topic; and even in the latter the ſame equivocal indication of aſtoniſhment or indifference ſeems to have prevailed. Without meaning to diſturb the playful ſports of a luxuriant fancy, we proceed to notice the ideas ſuggeſted by the Preſident. Thoſe, who are ſo unfortunate as to be inſenſible to the charms of wit laviſhed on this topic, may expect a ſerious notice of a meaſure connected on one hand with a conſiderable expenditure of money, and on the other with the defence of an important part of the country.

The Meſſage preſents the text of perhaps all that can be ſaid on the ſubject.

It appears:

1. That the meaſure has not ariſen in Executive diſcretion; but has actually proceeded from an act of Congreſs of the 28th of February, 1803, which, ſo far as we recollect, paſſed both houſes of Congreſs with perfect unanimity.

We are informed,

2. That gun-boats are an obſtacle to the naval enterprize of foreign veſſels againſt our ſea parts.

Is this a juſt remark? If it is, the meaſure cannot be too highly approved by the whole community, and particularly by the commercial part of it.—This is a point ſo entirely technical, that an individual unverſed in nautical tactics cannot be expected to diſcuſs it in detail. We muſt neceſſarily reſort to the opinions of the beſt ſeamen.—Having made it our buſineſs to make ourſelves acquainted with theſe, we venture to aſſert that they are unequivocally in favour of the adoption of this mode of defence as the moſt efficacious for this particular purpoſe, in the power of the United States to adopt. Beſides this, every one acquainted with the naval armaments of the European nations knows that a certain number of gunboats forms an eſſential part of them.

3. "Their utility towards ſupporting within our waters the authority of the laws," is a recommendation of them which, it is preſumed, no man will diſpute.

4. "The promptneſs with which they may be manned by the ſeamen and militia of the place in the moment they are wanting, *and* the facility of their aſſembling from different parts of the coaſt to any point where they are required in greater force than ordinary," give them peculiar value to a nation whoſe coaſt is ſo extenſive, and whoſe naval armament is ſo limited as that of the United States.

5. "The *economy* of their maintenance and preſervation from decay when not in actual ſervice, and the competence of our finances to this *defenſive* proviſion without any new burthen, are conſiderations which will have due weight with Congreſs in deciding on the expediency of adding to their number from year to year, *as experience ſhall teſt their utility*, until all our important harbours, by theſe auxiliary means, ſhall be ſecured againſt inſult and oppoſition to the laws."

We are here preſented with two powerful arguments in favour of gunboats—*firſt*, their economy; *ſecondly*, their defenſive character.

With the enormous expences of a navy our readers are doubtleſs converſant. In the Britiſh navy the building & equipping a ſhip of war is ſuppoſed to coſt a thouſand pounds ſterling a gun, a ſum but little below five thouſand dollars. The expences in this country are conſiderably increaſed. When built, the larger veſſels, such as frigates and ſhips of the line, are generally ſo periſhable as not to ſurvive more than twenty years.—The gun boat, on the contrary, is ſuſceptible of ſuch a conſtruction as to laſt a century, and may be built for a few thouſand dollars. The managing of her too, when in actual ſervice, is comparatively ſo ſimple, that common ſeamen will anſwer, ſuch as can be obtained on an emergency. In times, therefore, of peace, all that will be required will be a few men to take care of them.