until milder remedies have failed. In the remarks I shall make on it I shall confine myself to its probable operation on the revenue of the United States, and on that class of citizens for whose protection it is principally designed.

From the report of the secretary of the treasury at present on our table, it appears that the imports to this country from G. B. & its dependencies amount to thirty-five million nine hundred & seventy thousand dollars We derive from imposts on this commerce a net revenue of five million four hundred and thirty two thousand dollars. The whole net revenue of the U. S. derived from our commerce with all other parts of the world, amounts to six million one hundred eighteen thousand dollars. This resolution goes to prohibit a commerce from which we derive almost one half of our net revenue. The carrying trade which this measure is intended to protect, yields a revenue of eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars. So that for the protection of eight hundred and fifty thousand dollars, we put at hazard a net revenue of five million four hundred and thirty two thousand dollars. I well know that national honor cannot be estimated in dollars and cents. There is no man who feels more forcibly than I do, the correctness of this principle, or will be more ready on all occasions to acknowledge it. Gentlemen, however, ought to remember, that their remedy is a measure of dollars and cents. They profess it to be nothing more than a commercial regulation. In war millions must be sacrificed to protect thousands. In commercial regulations the risque ought to be in some degree proportioned to the object. A nation, deliberately forming a commercial regulation, by which it risques millions to protect thousands, manifests more zeal than wisdom; nothing short of absolute necessity, and a failure of every other remedy ought to induce us in our present situation to risque our revenue. We have repealed the whole system of internal taxes. We have set out with professions of economy and a determination honestly to meet our public debt. This resolution if adopted, may cause a deficiency in our revenue of five millions of dollars; the permanent revenue of the U. S. exclusive of the Mediterranean fund, which I hope soon to see abolished, amounts to eleven million five hundred thousand dollars; the permanent expence of the government amounts to eleven millions of dollars; eight millions of dollars appropriated to the payment of the debt, and three millions to the expences of the government, including the naval and military establishment. No part of the eight millions can ever be divested from its object, without abandoning the principles which brought us into this government; and as there is no probability of our expences being lessened, the three millions may be considered equally permanent, or the wheels of government must stop. From eleven millions five hundred thousand dollars, the amount of our present revenue, take five millions four hundred and thirty two thousand dollars derived from imposts from G. Britain and its dependencies, and there remains six millions and sixty eight thousand dollars, which falls short of eleven millions of dollars, the permanent expence of the government, five millions nine hundred and thirty nine thousand two hundred dollars. Shall we incur this risque until other measures less injurious in their operation on ourselves, shall have failed. Gentlemen have told us of substitutes for British manufactures, and that no great loss will be sustained in our revenue. One gentleman has estimated the loss at a million of dollars; another at two millions; and the same gentleman has furnished us with abundant information as to the places from whence we may procure a substitute for British manufactures. On this subject every thing must be mere conjecture. It is impossible for any human being to say what will be the effect of this measure on our revenue. No man can say what will be the situation of Europe six months hence, and particularly of Germany, from whence we are to derive a part of our supplies. I wish not to risque the substance for the shadow. I cannot consent to trust the revenue of the U. S. to speculative opinions which may be true or false. The gentleman from Pennsylvania who introduced this resolution, talked of a substitue for British manufactures in home spun; he wished to see the people of this country clad in articles manufactured in their own families. There is no man who views with more pleasure than I do, that species of independence to which this kind of industry gives birth. I wish not, however, to wear home-spun at the expense of a federal tax on my land. I know what a federal land tax is, because I have paid it, and I remember it, because it was the only oppressive tax I ever did pay. If this measure shall not produce its effect on the British government and its operation on our revenue be as injurious as there is just cause to fear it will be; either we must repeal our own law, or adhere to a measure manifestly injurious to the United States and lay a direct tax; or we must divert from its object the annual appropriation for the payment of our debt. Never with my vote shall the fund appropriated to the payment of the debt be diverted from its object until the last dollar shall be discharged. Other gentlemen, I presume, would be as little disposed as myself, to resort to a direct tax.

The risk of revenue however is not the only objection I have to this resolution. A total prohibition of British manufactures will be extremely injurious to our own citizens. It puts down at once the occupation and employment of the merchant of small capital. In many parts of our country, and particularly to the south of this place, commerce is carried on principally on credit. That credit is generally in G. Britain. Take away the credit and the commerce is gone. It will seriously affect too the importing merchant of large capital, whose funds are in G. Britain. To withdraw his capital, establish new correspondents, and give an entire new direction to his commerce, would require time, trouble, and expence, and insure at least one year's loss in the profits of his profession. It would operate least injuriously on the merchant whose funds were large, and in this country. With his money he might seek a substitute for British manufactures in other markets, if indeed a substitute can be found. Little or no injury would be done to merchants of this description, while ruin & bankruptcy would be the fate of those deprived, by a general prohibition, of a capital depending on credit. I have no data by which to calculate the number of our merchants embarked in the foreign carrying trade, and of those who are only importers. The whole foreign carrying trade of Virginia amounts to three hundred and fifty thousand dollars. But a small portion of the merchants there of course are interested in the foreign carrying trade. To all the importing merchants throughout the United States, the adoption of this measure would be a serious evil. Supposing one third of the whole number of the merchants of the U. States interested in the foreign carrying trade, and this would be a large calculation, by the adoption of this measure we sacrifice the convenience and interest of two thirds even of this class of our citizens. Upon the whole, I have no doubt, but that the adoption of this resolution would be a serious injury to a large majority of the merchants of the United States, although designed for their protection.

What would be the effect on the planter? It would cause an immediate advance on all the articles of first necessity, particularly coarse woollens, which could not immediately be manufactured at home. It is true that during the revolutionary war, a substitute was made. We were driven to it by necessity, and abandoned it as soon as that necessity ceased. Whilst for all the articles of first necessity, a great additional price must be paid by the farmer or planter, the value of every article of his labor must diminish; his produce be sold at a reduced price or left to rot on his hands from the inability of the merchant to purchase. This will be the effect on the planter, supposing G. Britain will take no countervailing measure. If however she is disposed to carry her principle to its full extent, she can dispense for a limited time with your exports, except the provision and lumber necessary for the West-Indies, with as little inconvenience as you can with her manufactures. Of tobacco she has always two crops on hand. Of cotton she has probably enough to carry her through the present war. A prohibition of these two articles only would be ruinous to the merchants and planters of the southern country. On occasions of great national necessity such sacrifices must be met with firmness. The citizen who shares the blessings of prosperity, must submit to sacrifices demanded by the interest and honor of his country. While however, this is the duty of the citizen, it is equally the duty of the government, not to require such sacrifices until milder measures have failed. Let us test the principle how far commercial regulations may be relied on. The resolution of the gentleman from Maryland is well calculated for this purpose. We know that it will affect our revenue to an extent we can permanently bear. It will be less injurious to our merchants as involving a smaller part of their capital, and allowing time to give a new direction to their commerce. It will enable us hereafter to decide with more certainty on the effect of measures of this kind on ourselves, and how far they may be relied on as an engine to operate on G. Britain. On this subject, however, my observations shall be suspended until that resolution shall be under consideration.

Mr. NICHOLSON said, he had been desirous for some days, to offer to the committee his opinions on the subject now under consideration; but as other gentlemen had manifested a similar disposition, he had yielded the floor to them. It was now his intention to offer such remarks as appeared to him pertinent.

The resolution of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Gregg,) in his opinion was objectionable in all its parts. There was no point of light in which he could view it, in which objections did not present themselves. He read and commented on the preamble; the style of which he said he did not like, because instead of a spirit of amity and conciliation, it breathed little less than defiance. While we profess to speak the language of peace, we declare to G. Britain, that unless she will meet us at that precise point, which we think proper to mark, we will, in the words of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, stab her in the vitals. While we declare that we approach her as friends, yet our style is that of an enemy. The olive branch that is held out, conceals a dagger in its boughs. This threatning manner he said was not calculated to preserve peace in private life, and how could it be expected to succeed between nations? Did gentlemen imagine that G. Britain, even surrounded as she was by her enemies, was yet so tame as to submit to threats? Was the character of her first minister so little known, as to induce a belief that he would tremble at the rod held over him? No, sir, they are not sunk so low; and if we really wish for an amicable adjustment of our differences, we ought to proceed as friends and not as enemies. A mere commercial regulation he said might not, perhaps, produce war; it was the threat held out in the preamble, and the hostility manifested on the floor of the House of Representatives, that were calculated to wound the national pride of Britain, and, therefore, to excite enmity between the two countries. What does the preamble say? We have marked a point from which we will not recede, and to which we demand that you shall come; if you do not, we strike at your most essential interests; in the language of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, we will stab you in your vitals. Is this the way to conciliate? Is this your method of opening a negociation? Believe me, sir, instead of presenting the olive branch, we carry a fire brand, that will kindle a flame, which we may find it difficult to extinguish. G. Britain will feel all this—she will at once ask, is it fair, is it manly, is it honorable to threaten me now, when I am contending for all that is dear to me? Will you insult me in my distress, and while you sustain my enemy on one hand, with the other endeavour to unnerve the arm which you acknowledge is raised in defence of its own existence?

If the subsequent parts of the resolution were unobjectionable, the preamble itself would determine me against the whole. To preserve peace let us proceed to our object in a peaceable manner. If, indeed, gentlemen are for war, then they are right in advocating this measure.

From the course of the debate, Mr. N. said, one who had not attended to the points in dispute, (which he feared was too much the case with the great body of the people,) would really imagine that all the commerce of the country was at stake—that G. Britain had assumed a principle by which the whole of our trade would be involved in ruin—commerce and agriculture had been called the hand maids of each other, and high eulogies had been pronounced upon the intimate connection subsisting between them. No one was so blind or so stupid as to deny that under the peculiar circumstances of this country, commerce and agriculture were the mutual assistants of each other; but did gentlemen imagine that the people were so blind or so stupid as to believe that the commerce which was connected with agriculture, was the subject of dispute with G. Britain? Did they suppose that they could cast such a veil over the real points of difference, as to produce an impression of this kind? If such was the hope, he trusted it would be defeated. No man would pretend to assert that G. Britain had denied our right to carry the products of our own soil to foreign markets, and to bring home in return such articles as were adapted to the necessity, the convenience or the taste of our own people. She did not interfere with the carriage of our corn, wheat, flour, tobacco, cotton, provisions or lumber to those places where we could meet the readiest sale for them; and had never raised an objection to our returning with the products or manufactures of Europe, or of the East or West Indies. It was the *carrying trade* alone which was the subject of difference. A trade so slightly, if at all, connected with agriculture, that the connection, such as it was, did not merit notice in discussing the present question. It was that trade which carried the products of one foreign country to another—which relieved France, Spain and Holland from the pressure of war, by carrying on a trade for them which they could no longer carry on for themselves—which carried the coffee and sugar of Batavia and the West India islands, to the respective mother countries in Europe, thereby relieving them from the necessity of convoy, and the expence of maintaining large fleets. This was the trade, he said, upon which G. Britain had committed depredations. It was not the home trade in articles of our own produce or for our own consumption; but a foreign trade, in foreign articles, for foreign markets and for foreign use. It was the colonial trade which France, Spain and Holland monopolised to themselves in times of peace, but which they could not command in time of war, and had, therefore, permitted us to carry it on for their benefit. It was a trade, therefore, totally unconnected with agriculture and enjoyed by a few merchants only; and it remained with the American people to determine whether, for its protection, they would involve the agricultural interest, and the revenues of the country, in those embarrassments which would necessarily ensue, upon the adoption of the measure proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania. He flattered himself that the people would enquire, and that they would not suffer themselves to be deceived by the misrepresentations which had gone abroad. The question was deeply interesting to them, and he wished them to examine it in all its bearings.

The resolution, he said, embraced two points; the one related to the carrying trade; the other to the impressment of American seamen. The latter had always been a source of great anxiety to him. No man in America had deplored the evil more than he did, and none should be more ready to apply the remedy, when an effectual remedy could be devised. To him, however, it was a matter of no little surprise, that gentlemen had so long slept upon a subject, on which they now appeared to manifest so much zeal. He had himself twice proposed measures with a view to obtain redress, but he had not been able to carry them through the House. Gentlemen, who now so zealously volunteered their services, rendered him no assistance then. At the last session he had introduced a bill on the subject, and such were the variety of objections to it, that it was committed and recommitted several times. Difficulties presented themselves from all quarters; alterations and amendments innumerable were adopted, until finally it was shuffled through the House in so imperfect a state, that it was not worth the time that which had been spent on it. Strong measures were not then the order of the day, nor would they be now, if the impressment of American seamen was the only ground of complaint. G. Britain has pursued this practice for ten or twelve years past, but these patriotic merchants, who are now so clamorous, presented you with no memorials on the subject. No, sir. It is the *carrying trade* alone, which has covered your tables with the memorials of the merchants, because their interests are affected; and it is out of this that the resolution of the gentleman from Pennsylvania has grown. Although I do not admit the correctness of the principle assumed by G. Britain, in relation to the carrying trade, yet I am willing to acknowledge that with me it is an object of secondary importance only, when compared with the other violations of our flag, in the impressment of our seamen.

Why, Mr. Chairman, is the carrying trade a secondary consideration only? Because the depredations committed on it, do not affect the personal rights of our citizens, nor our trade in our own products, or in the products of foreign nations for our own use; but all these are affected, deeply affected by the impressment of our seamen. It has been said, indeed, that this interruption of the carrying trade was peculiarly hostile, because it struck at *bona fide* American property. In many cases this is true, but in many I believe it is not true; for I have no doubt that much foreign property is covered by our flag. Admitting, however, that it is always American property, yet all seizures of this are not considered acts of hostility. It is conceded by all that the *direct* trade between the colony and the mother country, cannot be carried on in neutral bottoms. If, therefore, a cargo of sugar or coffee were purchased at a French island, it would thereby become *bona fide* American property; but by our own acknowledgments it could not be carried directly to France; nor if it was French property, could it be carried in our vessels, as in 1794 we surrendered the principle that "free ships make free goods." Seeing then, that we could not carry on the direct trade between the colony and the mother country, even when the property had become American by purchase, and that we could not cover French property under our flag, a new method was invented by our merchants to evade these regulations. They went to the West Indies, purchased their cargoes there, returned with them to this country, and then reshipped them & carried them to France, and Spain, and Holland, thereby yielding them very important assistance in their warfare against Great Britain. This Mr. N. said was the new principle against which Great Britain contended, and although he was not willing to acknowledge the correctness of her proceedings, yet he was more unwilling to sustain our right at the expence of so much injury as we should incur by adopting the proposed resolution. Negociation, he said, ought to be resorted to—if that failed, then indeed, commercial restrictions might be imposed, but not such restrictions as the gentleman from Pennsylvania and his friends advocated. These, although they might wound Britain, would inflict a still deeper wound on ourselves. It was known that our minister at the court of London, had the subject under his immediate attention, and we had reason to expect that he would succeed in an amicable settlement of our differences. Mr. King had formerly remonstrated against similar practices by British cruisers, and the report of the attorney general of England, transmitted by lord Hawkesbury, fully recognized the justice of our pretensions. No treaty however was made, and until a treaty is entered into, regulating all our commercial relations, we cannot expect that our trade will be free from embarrassments. The points in difference now between the two governments, are fair objects of negociation. The admissions of lord Hawkesbury in his correspondence with Mr. King give us a fair claim on the British government, and I have no doubt they will yield, provided the intemperance of our language and our conduct does not furnish them with a pretext still to resist.

What, I ask, will be the effect of this resolution on Great Britain? She will either disregard it, under the conviction that it will operate much more injuriously upon ourselves than upon her, and that therefore we cannot persist in it; or, inflamed by the threats contained in it, and by those used by its advocates on this floor, she will consider it as cause of war. Will it not be good cause of war, when professing peace, you use the language of intimidation, and the mover of the measure tells you, he brandishes a dagger in his hand with which he means to stab her to the vitals (Mr. Gregg said he did not say so) Mr. N. continued, it may not be found in the Gentleman's printed speech, but I find it in my notes, and I believe they are as correct as those of the stenographer. (Mr. Gregg explained, and said he did not use the word dagger.) Mr. Nicholson said it was of no importance, what the instrument was, whether a sword, a dagger, or a knife, if he was to touch the vitals. It was a figurative expression, and the gentleman might select either of the figures which he preferred. He himself had used the word dagger, supposing it the most appropriate, and the most congenial to the gentleman's own mind. (Mr. Gregg said he would take some other opportunity of explaining.) Mr. N. The gentleman declared the measure was calculated to stab Great Britain in her vitals. I appeal to the committee if such is not their recollection. The gentleman himself does not deny it; he only says he did not use the word dagger. But if Great Britain believes that we can persist in it, and sees that we are determined to sustain her enemy against her, and to stab her in her vitals, she will consider it as cause of war and will make war.

Are gentlemen prepared then to hazard these consequences? are they ready to go to war for the protection of this carrying trade, in which the great bulk of the nation have no interest? I venture to assert that nineteen twentieths of the people of this country have no interest whatever in the trade, for which we are now about to contend. One consolation however yet remains—let this House receive the measure as favorably as they may, the people will condemn it, when they feel its consequences. We may run headlong into war, but we shall not have the trouble of carrying it on. The people will supply our places with other representatives—they will not so readily forgive us, I trust in God they will not.

A gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Crowninshield) thinks the measure will not lead to war, but if he believed it would, this would be no objection with him to the resolution—he would still vote for it.—We can convert our vessels he says, into privateers, and can capture two or three British vessels for one of our own that will be lost. How, I ask, is this to benefit the farmer or the planter? What proportion of these profits are to go into their pockets? The gentleman may vest his capital in privateers, and may make a fortune. Here, sir, he plays the merchant again. Whatever the effect may be on the great body of the people, he is *Shylock* still—the nation may bleed at every pore, but he will have his pound of flesh. This privateering business, however, won't do—Great Britain has eight hundred ships of war, and it ought to be remembered that she can fit out as many privateers as we can. But, Sir, the idea of our meeting Great Britain on the ocean is too ludicrous to be repelled by serious argument? My friend from Virginia, has given the best answer to it, in his prescription of a strait waistcoat, a dark room, depletion and water gruel. It is just as absurd as to talk of fitting out a privateer to fight a seventy four.

The gentleman from Massachusetts has another measure in reserve to wound Britain. He tells us we must confiscate the public debt. This is a strange doctrine for men who talk so much of national honor. I have always believed it most honorable to pay our debts, instead of swindling our creditors. My determination, however, has long since been taken on this point. I will never consent to lay my hands upon the public debt, but for the purpose of fairly extinguishing it. Let our conflict with Great Britain proceed to what lengths it may, I will never lend my aid to defraud her subjects of that debt, for the payment of which the national faith is solemnly pledged. The nation may do it; but if it be once done, the violations of the national honor, which are now so loudly complained of, will weigh but an atom in the scale, when compared with the blow, which you yourselves will level at your own honor. You will set yourselves up as a rare and modern example of the *Punica fides*, for you will so effectually blast your credit, that I venture to affirm you will make no more loans. Had I millions to lend, I would not trust you with a dollar.

To justify the measure now proposed, we are referred to the years 1793, and 1794, and because a resolution somewhat similar to the present, was then adopted, and had well nigh pased into a law, we are called upon to sanction that which is now before us. But will gentlemen undertake to say that our situation at this time will justify such measures as were adopted then? Will they pretend that we have now the same grounds for hostility against Britain, or that the two periods can be compared with each other? What was our situation in 1793, and 1794? We had made a treaty in the year 1783 with Great Britain—ten years after, some of its most important stipulations on her part were unfulfilled. She had pledged herself to restore to our citizens an immense amount of property, which had been taken from them. She had engaged to put us in possession of the Western posts. With neither of these engagements had she then complied. Year after year, she was active in kindling a destructive war upon our frontier, and had let loose the savage of the wilderness upon our peaceable citizens. The Algerines too were at the instigation of Britain committing depredations on our commerce, and in addition to all this she directed a blow at our trade, more injurious than that which is now complained of. For she ordered her cruizers to capture all vessels laden with provisions going to the