-dolph further objected, that during the "five months which our ministers had spent in fruitless discussion at Madrid," it had entered into the head of nobody to suggest any proposition of a coercive nature in relation to Spain, and that, even after the total failure of that negociation no such measure had been proposed; that G. Britain had indeed impressed our seamen, and advanced certain injurious principles of national law, which, if carried into their full extent, would materially affect our commerce, but that Spain, after having refused to make good her solemn stipulations to compensate us for former spoliations committed on our commerce, had "renewed the same practices during the present war." She had not, it was true, impressed our seamen, but her cruisers had "plundered and sunk our vessels, and maltreated and abandoned their crews, in open boats or on desart shores, without food or covering:" her courts of admiralty had indeed advanced no "new principles of the law of nations," but they had confiscated our ships and cargoes, without the pretext of principles of any sort, new or old. She had moreover insulted our territory, violated the property and persons of our citizens within our acknowledged limits, and insolently rejected every overture to accommodation. With Spain all our attempts to negociate had failed—with G. Britain we had a negociation actually pending, and which the dispatches of our minister at the court of London gave us every reason to suppose would have a prosperous issue; and even admitting, for the sake of argument, that our vote of money to purchase Florida was, in itself, no derogation from the national honor; inasmuch as we proposed to receive a fair equivalent for it, yet, having refused to take any coersive measures for the unparalleled indignities of Spain, who had peremptorily rejected all our propositions for pacific accommodation, how could we with any face of impartiality towards the belligerent powers, assume this elevated tone towards G. Britain? Mr. Randolph further declared, that the proposed measure was in itself, inefficient to every valuable purpose; that its sole operation would be to pique the pride, and rouse the resentment of our adversary, and whilst it indicated a strong spirit of hostility on our part, would afford her a fair opening to strike the first effectual blow; that it was indeed to shew our teeth without daring at the same time to bite: that G. Britain would have until the next session of Congress, ample time to devise means for annoying us in the most effective manner, and that meanwhile she might withdraw her property from our grasp, and guard every vulnerable point from our attack. He conjured the House not to suffer themselves, from the honest prejudices of the revolution, from their ancient partiality to France, and their well grounded antipathy to England, to be legislated into a war, which would involve the best interests of their country. Above all, he trusted that their measures would in no wise be influenced by any wish to avenge on G. Britain the wrongs and injuries of Ireland; he declared that his sympathy with that insulted and oppressed people was too strong not to lead him to fear, that the same sentiment might operate on other members, in this case, whilst they themselves were unconscious of it; that whilst he deplored the subjugation of that gallant and generous nation, it was his duty to remember that he was legislating for the U. States, and bound to consult their interests alone. On this occasion Mr. Smilie, who, since the incapacity of Mr. Bidwell had become manifest, was considered as the efficient leader of the majority, avowed, that, although an Irishman by birth, he felt no greater predilection for that country than for any other in Europe or in the world. This declaration was conceived by many, not to confer much honor upon that gentleman, whether true or false.

Another strong objection to the non-importation bill arose from its bearing the aspect (especially when taken in conjunction with our recent conduct towards France and Spain) of a disposition on our part to aid the views of the French government in cramping the navigation, and destroying the manufactures of G Britain. This constituted one principal source of animosity between those rival nations, and the American government could perhaps take no step which would so strongly excite the resentment of the English ministry. The prompt and decisive conduct of that government towards Prussia, so soon as she manifested a disposition to come into the views of France on this subject, forms the best commentary upon this opinion, and the sudden change in the tone of Mr. Fox towards the U. S. is no bad criterion of its truth.

When Mr. J. Randolph declared, that if any coerceive measures were to be pursued against G. Britain, they should be of the most energetic stamp, and mentioned an embargo as that which he deemed, the most efficient at the outset, he was asked by some "why he did not move such a proposition" and they declared at the same time, that if he would bring forward the measure, they would support it. To this the answer was obvious:—That he wished to try the fair experiment of negotiation in the first instance: that he deemed it impolitic, pending that negotiation, to take any step which might defeat it: and that it was astonishing to him, that gentlemen who had remained entirely passive under the aggressions of Spain, who had refused to concur even in measures of self defence against her inroads—made too after a peremptory rejection of every overture to accommodation, should advocate an opposite course towards another power, with whom we were at that moment actually treating. The bill nevertheless passed by a large majority.

The wisdom of the measure is yet to be tested by its effects.

DECIUS.

From the ENQUIRER *of the 21st of November.*

IMPORTANT FACTS.

Decius has directly encountered but few of our statements. The rest he has evaded, but not expressly contradicted. A few words will illustrate our remarks.

1. It is not true that "our ministers proposed to surrender our claims," *even in the sense intended* by Decius.—Granting that "their ultimate payment was to be assumed by the United States," it was *not therefore* "fairly requivalent to a surrender of them." Will Decius pretend that our claim upon the French government was "relinquished," by the convention of 1803, although it assumed the payment of 20 millions of francs by the government of the United States? The arrangement in both cases would have been precisely the same. The value of Louisiana *was estimated* at 60 millions of francs, of which 11,250 000 dollars only were to be paid to the French republic; the remaining 20 millions of Francs being reserved to the American claimants. In the same manner, the value of the Floridas would have been estimated at some particular sum, from which would have been deducted the amount of American claims; and the balance would have been paid in money or in stock to Spain. In both cases, the amount of American claims would have been deducted from the price of the purchase. In both, "the claimants" would have been more conveniently "provided for;" for they would have looked to their own treasury for payment, instead of the coffers of Spain: Our own government would have advanced the amount of the claim, but would have received repayment in the value of the land.

2. Decius has strangely confounded his own inferences with facts; and mere probabilities with positive assertions. In his first number, he asserts, that "our ministers had proposed to establish the Colerado as the western boundary of Louisiana." In his last, he enquires whether it is "not probable" from certain circumstances, that they had made such a proposition. Now what are those circumstances? "In their correspondence with the Spanish ministry, our ministers" may have "stated, that they had exceeded their instructions." But Decius may have misunderstood the words of our ministers. Decius may have misconstrued that mysterious language and even those bargaining expedients of policy which are so common in diplomatic concerns. Decius has forgotten to state the conditions, which we required on the part of Spain, and in those conditions may be found an explanation of the difference which exists in our statements. Our ministers may have as much exceeded their instructions by proposing to establish the Colorado as the western boundary without stipulating the conditions on which that concession was to have been made, as if they had proposed it without receiving the smallest instructions.

It is true, that such a proposition would not have exceeded the instructions of our ministers, if they had taken care to accompany it with the proper conditions. Our ministers "were authorised to relinquish so much to the Westward, as they could obtain to the Eastward of the Mississippi;" and thus successive sacrifices were marked out, of which even the Colorado was not to be the last. Had then our ministers advanced any other propositions than these, they would have certainty overlooked their instructions; but what other reasons have we for such a belief, than the *ipse dixit* of Decius?

It is true that Decius "has no where positively asserted" that the Louisiana treaty was antedated; and yet Decius had asserted his belief, that such was the fact.—But Decius merely suggests, that "the treaty was signed, subsequently to the date expressed on the face of it." The suggestion is equally probable, that the date expressed upon the face of it, was the very same as the day of signing it. But this is not the true point at issue. Decius suggested, that the Louisiana treaty was antedated, for the purpose of "obviating" the objections, which the British ministry might please to make to it. Granting then that the present explanation of Decius is correct; that a few days did intervene between the making and the signing of the convention; it does not therefore follow that this short interval of a few days was intended to provide against any apparent breach of neutrality. The true reason was to allow time enough to transcribe the convention in that splendid manner, which distinguishes all Bonaparte's treaties. It was a mere matter of form; and no diplomatic trick to evade a fancied breach of neutrality. But this last was the sense, in which Decius expressed and intended it. How far it was proper to advance such an insinuation against his government, upon such deficient evidence as he seemingly possesses, it is left to his ingenuity to determine.

3d and 4th. We agree with Decius, that "the messages" may be left to "speak for themselves." If the public message led the nation to breathe a spirited language, it was not because they believed a war with Spain was necessary, but because they wished to manifest to her that we would not, if necessary, decline it. If the private message did not excite the same sentiments among the people, it was only because it was not laid before them.

5. Is Decius correct in asserting, that "several of the best informed members, who had voted for the majority, declared that Mr. Monroe's dispatches" had produced such an "important effect" upon their minds? Decius seems not very scrupulous in bringing the members of Congress into notice; why then does he hesitate to designate the names of those new converts to his doctrine?—Why was not this "important effect" manifested in the Senate, before whom these dispatches were duly exhibited? It is impossible to believe, that Decius could have meant any thing more by the word "information" than facts; but what were the facts displayed in these dispatches? Does not Decius well know, that they contained nothing but "opinions?" Would even the opinions of Dr. Franklin under such circumstances, have sufficed to controul the decisions of Congress? Is it not a fact, that there is no "documented" communication between our ministers at Paris and London; and that the only channel lays between Paris and Washington; and Washington and London?

6th. "The veracity of Mr. Randolph is in no wise implicated" by our assertions. We know not what communications passed between Mr. Randolph and the secretary of the Treasury. But Decius has left two other facts of equal importance in equal obscurity. He has neither condescended to inform us, whether the "two members" of Congress obtained their information from the cautious Secretary of the Treasury; nor whether Mr. Randolph did "amicably consult the President on the truth of these vague insinuations." Had such a communication existed, the thunders of Mr. Randolph could never have fallen on this ground.

From the VIRGINIA ARGUS.

ON COMMERCIAL RESTRICTION

On the 15th of this month a change took place in the commercial regulations of this country, which may, or may not be important in its practical consequences, according to the result of a negociation probably not yet determined. It is almost unnecessary to add, that the law of Congress prohibiting the importation from the British dominions of certain articles of merchandize, is here alluded to. It was equally the hope and expectation of all the friends of this measure, that the evident and immediate prospect of the commercial injury which the actual execution of the prohibitory law would present to the view of the British ministry, would operate as a serious appeal to their feelings, and induce them to check the course of injustice, of insult and of wrong, which America, for so many years, had patiently sustained in the persons of her seamen, the lawful exercise of her commerce, and in all her maritime concerns. In this point of view, the restrictive law might rather have been considered as a diplomatic measure, calculated to answer a temporary purpose, than as a permanent, commercial regulation. But if contrary to expectation, the British government shall prove as regardless of the interest of its people, as of the rights of neutral nations, as the execution of the law will require on our parts, some sacrifice of wealth and enjoyment, and possibly, may subject us to the evils of maritime hostility, it becomes necessary that we should be prepared for the worst, and assume a tone of mind, adequate to encounter the inconveniences of the one, and the dangers of the other.

The probability of war as a consequence of the measure in questions, was certainly too remote, to form any serious objection to its adoption. Diplomatic as well as military operations must frequently be regulated by a calculation of chances; and the worst consequences which in the present instance can ensue, will be preferable to a tame summission, to systematic, incessant and avowed injustice.

The efficacy of regulations of this nature, in checking the lawless use of superior force, by a strong nation against a weaker, depends upon causes which can only exist between countries peculiarly situated in relation to each other; and it is consolatory, to reflect, that the power of violating to any great extent, the rights of maritime neutrality on one side, must always be attended by the means of retaliation on the other. To shew that such is most emphatically, the relative situation of Britain and this country, we beg leave, to call the attention of our readers to some general observations, to which the present occasion seems to give rise.

The commerce of nations, like that of individuals, depends upon a dissimilarity of wants and a reciprocity of benefits.—If it were possible that each person could produce by his own labor all those conveniencies, with which he is now supplied by the art and industry of many, there would be no trade among individuals, nor commerce among nations. Although with respect to individuals, such a state of independence is chimerical and illustrative only, yet it may be strictly true and practicable with respect to a nation. If a country comprehends within itself a soil and climate suitable to all the varieties of natural and agricultural production, for which it may have occasion, a population and mechanical skill sufficient to supply the demands of its manufactures as well as agriculture, then foreign commerce becomes superfluous. Such a situation alone, constitutes the true commercial independence of a nation. Place a nation in this condition, and every ship she possesses, may be annihilated, she may not be able to navigate a cock-boat, and she will be rich and powerful, her agriculture will flourish and her manufactures prosper. Such a country was Egypt, such is China, and to such a condition, is France now rapidly aproximating.

It is evident, that no country can be farther removed from a state of commercial independence than Britain; but nature, as if willing to equalise her benefits, at the same time that she has rendered foreign commerce essential to her wealth and greatness, has placed her in a geographical position so favorable for carrying it on, that by means of her manufactures and her navigation, she has been enabled to attain a rank among nations, more elevated than nature seemed to have assigned her. It has been the combined effect of her necessities and her advantages to have given her industry such a direction, as to cover every sea with her shipping and every country with her manufactures. These are not the superfluous fruits of an exuberant wealth, they constitute the vital principle which gives it being. It is to this peculiarity in the physical and geographical situation of Britain, that she is indebted for her naval superiority, and for the power which she possesses of oppressing the commerce of other nations. Britain can only find a market in foreign countries, for the immense product of her manufactures, and so long as that demand continues, her people will be employed in the preparation of manufactures, and her shipping in the transportation of them.

It may not be very gratifying to British pride, to consider her importance as derived from the anvil and the loom—but it is impossible to trace her opulence and naval power to any other source than the one which has been here stated. From hence it results, that her greatness depends upon her relative situation to foreign countries, in three respects; first, the demand which exists in those countries for her products, their ability to give something in exchange, and their willingness to admit the importation of them; and that a combination among foreign nations, to exclude her merchandize from their ports, would inflict a more fatal wound on her prosperity, than all the fleets and armies which they could equip. It will never be the interest of any foreign nation to adopt such exclusive regulations except as measures of self-defence—for in a mere estimate of profit and loss, the injury on one side, is as great as on the other.

There is no county on the globe, which in proportion to its population and wealth, affords a market to so great a quantity of foreign productions as the United States, nor is there any country so favorably situated for supplying that market as Britain. The commerce between these two countries, is strictly analogous to that primary, simple & most important commerce which takes place between the town and country, consisting in the exchange of natural and agricultural productions, for those of art and industry. This species of commerce is certainly beneficial to both parties, but to one only, is it essential. The agriculturist may be coarsely, and indifferently supplied with such articles of manufacture as he may want, without the assistance of the mechanic or tradesman; but the manufacturer can procure neither his sustenance nor the materials of his work, without the aid of the agriculturist. From this obvious analogy, it will appear, without the necessity of formal arguments that we possess the means of injuring Great Britain in the sources of her opulence and power, by prohibitory regulations, to a greater degree than any other nation; and that a suspension of commercial intercourse would be more essentially injurious to the interests of the latter than of the former.

As the U. S. possess no other check, upon the violence and injustice of Britain, but that of commercial restriction; it remains to be considered whether there existed, previous to the passage of the law we are speaking of, any just and sufficient grounds for the exercise of this species of commercial retaliation.

In the discussions, to which the controversy, between Britain and this country, has given rise, many arguments have been introduced, which are totally incompatible with such an investigation of its merits, as would lead to safe and just conclusions. The merits of the war now raging between Britain and France, the means of annoyance to which it may be expedient to resort, in order to distress the commerce of an adversary, are subjects capable of endless and doubtful discussion, which if suffered to affect the determination of a question respecting neutral rights, would derange every system of public law, that has been sanctioned by the consent of nations, as necessary to mitigate the horrors of war and to secure to neutrals, an exemption from its evils.

If Britain has exhausted all the accustomed modes of warfare, and is reduced to the necessity of annoying her enemy at the expence of other nations, the expediency, of such a resort, neither justifies the transgression nor alleviates its evils. But it would not be difficult to prove that the perilous situation in which she now stands, has been induced by causes more connected with the impolicy and injustice of her own government, than with the prosecuting hostility of France. At all events the acquiescence of America in the abuse of superior strength which is contended for can affect but in a slight degree, the important contest, which now suspends in frightful doubt, the prosperity & existence of Britain. An eloquent English writer has made a forcible appeal to the feelings of sympathy on this occasion; but it is apparent that rapine and plunder are the *real* objects of pursuit. The trivial produce of the contemptible source of naval heroism, which is furnished by maritime depredation, is eventually destructive of the subject which creates it. Commerce gives activity to every species of industry, yields to its votaries an annual and permanent harvest of opulence, civilization and strength; but plunder consumes, not only the fruits of industry, but the vegetating trunk on which they grow.

The subject of which we have undertaken the discussion, is too interesting and important, to be hastily and crudely treated. It will be resumed in the next Argus, and as a second number of DECIUS has been announced, it may be expected to afford new matter, both of fact and observation on this momentous subject.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

Foreign intelligence received by the ship Liberty arrived at New-York, in 50 days from Liverpool.

LONDON, SEPT. 29.

The Mails due on Sunday se'night and Wednesday last, arrived this morning. It is quite certain that Cattaro is still in the hands of the Russians. It also appears, that Napoleon has been disappointed in one effect which he expected from D'Oubril' streaty. The signing of this treaty was notified to the Russian Commandant at Cattaro, in the hope, that without farther orders he would give up the place. He seems, however to have been too well acquainted with his duty as a soldier to be surprised into a surrender by such a stratagem as this—though the Austrians were to have been made instruments in the deception.

Appearances become every day more hostile on the Continent. Both France and Prussia prepare with great activity. Saxony is to furnish to the latter 26,000 men, and Russia has a well appointed army ready for the field. Even Austria, greatly to the credit of Archduke Charles, has already restored her army, and supplied her wasted magazines with arms and military stores, and may soon be able to take a decided part in any new war that may be provoked by the insatiable ambition of Bonaparte.

Our private Correspondent at Hamburgh, states a report current there, that the Emperor of Russia has taken possession of Prussia, proper, and even Koningsberg itself, as a security that Prussia, will act in concert with the Allies, in the approaching war. If this be correct, we may soon expect to see Lord Lauderdale in London.

By letters from the Hague it appears that the greatest activity prevails in the military preparations of the army of Holland.

A French army of 40,000 men, comprising 13,000, Dutch, is to be stationed on the Ems, in Bentheim.

A Decree of Divorce has been formally published at Paris, of the marriage between Jerome Bonaparte, and Miss Patterson. Report says that Brother Jerome is to be immediately united to a Foreign Princess.

DOWNING STREET, SEPT. 25.

The King has been pleased to cause it to be signified by the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Howick, his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the ministers of friendly and neutral powers resident at this Court, that his majesty having been pleased, on the 10th of May last to direct that the necessary measures should be taken for she blockade of the coast, rivers, and ports from the river Elbe to the port of Brest, both inclusive; his Majesty is now pleased to declare, that so much of such blockade as extended from the river Elbe to be river Ems, both inclusive, is for the present discontinued and that from the date hereof, the navigation of the coast, rivers, and ports from the river Elbe, to the river Ems, both inclusive, is as free as if such blockade had not taken place.

LONDON, SEPT. 29.

At one o'clock this morning a messenger arrived in town with dispatches from Lord Lauderdale.

The important intelligence of an accommodation with Prussia, which we exclusively announced on Saturday, was officially confirmed in the Gazette of that evening. The blockade of the Prussian ports and rivers in the German Ocean is ordered to be discontinued. As the final adjustment of the differences between the two countries is yet to be arranged, we shall not hazard a premature opinion as to the conditions of this preliminary proceeding. We may, however, presume that the obnoxious order issued by the Court of Berlin, in mean obedience to the mandate of Bonaparte, has been retracted, and that the Prussian ports will be opened as usual to British produce and manufactures. With respect to Hanover it is said that Prussia has agreed to restore it to its legitimate sovereign, and to protect it during the continuance of hostilities between Great Britain and France. We trust that some such arrangements for the protection of that unfortunate country have been agreed upon; for we should consider its immediate restoration at this instant, as one of the very greatest calamities that could befal it. The moment the Prussians marched out of it, thousands of hungry and irritated Frenchmen would march in; and the country would feel ten times the oppression it has before experienced from Bonaparte's army of execution.

The complete re-establishment of the customary relations between Prussia and this country cannot be a work of much time or negociation. Lord Morpeth, we understand, set off last night for Yarmouth, where a frigate was in waiting to take him to the Elbe, from whence he is to proceed by Hamburgh to Berlin. A very few interviews between his lordship and the Prussian minister will be sufficient to bring the dispute to that termination to which it is equally the interest, and the wish of both nations that it should arrive.

It will, we are persuaded, give gener-

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