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DECLARATION OF THE KING OF GREAT BRITAIN.

The negociations in which his majesty has been engaged with France having terminated unsuccessfully, he thinks proper to make this public declaration to his subjects and to Europe, of the circumstances which have led to an issue which his majesty deeply regrets. He had no object nearer to his heart than the conclusion of a secure and permanent peace. He laments the continuance of a war affecting the happiness of so many nations, and which even amidst all the successes that attend his arms, is so burthensome to his faithful and affectionate people. But he is confident that there can arise on this occasion no other sentiment, either in his own dominions, or in any other part of Europe, than that of an increased conviction, that the restoration of general tranquility is retarded only by the injustice and ambition of the enemy.

The French government, unsatisfied with its immense acquisitions on the continent, still openly perseveres in a system destructive of the independence of every other power. War is pursued, not for security, but for conquest; and negociations for peace appear to be entered into for no other object, than that of deluding the neighboring powers into a state of false security, while France is herself preparing, arranging, and executing her unremitted projects of encroachment and aggression.

Her conduct in the recent discussions has afforded but two many proofs of this disposition.

The negociations originated in an offer made by the French government of treating for peace on the basis of actual possession which was stated to admit of mutual compensation; and a distinct assurance was added that his majesty's German dominions, which had been attacked without even the pretence of any cause of hostility, should be restored.

Such a proposal appeared to his majesty to afford a just foundation for negociation; it was therefore accepted with this reserve, that the negociation should be conducted by his majesty in concert with his allies.

No sooner had this business been mutually admitted, than it was departed from by the enemy, and that too in points of so great importance as to call for an immediate declaration on the part of his majesty, that unless the principle proposed by France herself was adhered to, the communications which had been opened between the two goverments must at once be closed.

This produced new professions of the disposition of France to make considerable sacrifices for the attainment of peace, if the discussions were suffered to proceed; at the same time that a difficulty was started on account of the want of the full powers in the person intrusted by his majesty with his communications. Steps were thereupon taken by his majesty for opening a regular negociation by ministers duly authorized, in order to ascertain, in a manner the most satisfactory and authentic, whether peace could be obtained on terms honorable to the king and his allies and consistent with the general security of Europe.

During these proceedings a minister, sent by the emperor of Russia to treat for the same important object, in concert with his majestey's government, was induced, by the artifices of the enemy, to sign a separate treaty, on terms equally repugnant to the honor and interests of his imperial majesty.

Unmoved by this unexpected event, the king continued to negociate precisely on the same principles as before. he relied, and with a confidence which experience has amply justified on the good faith and steadiness of an ally, in concert with whom he had begun to treat & whose interests he had maintained throughout with the same firmness as his own.

The French government on the contrary, elated by this advantage, of which it boasted as equal in importance to the most decisive victory, departed in every conference more and more widely from its own honor and engagements. Not only did it take upon itself to change at its own will the basis of the negociation with Great Britain, but it violated, in points still more important, every principle of good faith with Russia. The chief inducement offered to that power as the price of all the sacrifices extorted from her minister, had been the preservation of Germany. Yet before the decision of Russia on this treaty could be known, France had already annihilated the whole frame and constitution of the Germanic empire; had reduced under her yoke a large proportion of the states and provinces of Germany; and not content with this open contempt of obligations so recently contracted, had at the same time instigated the Porte to measures directly subversive of her subsisting engagements with Russia.

While such conduct was pursued towards his majesty towards his allies, and towards all independent powers, there appeared so little hope for any favorable issue to the negociations, that his majesty's plenipotentiaries demanded their passports to return to England.

This demand was at first eluded by an unusual and unexplained delay, and the French government afterwards, by some material concessions, accompanied with intimations that others of still greater consequence might be the result of further discussion, procured a renewal of the conferences, which were protracted from day to day, till at length it was announced at Paris that the emperor of Russia had indignantly rejected the unauthorised separate treaty signed by his minister.

In consequence of this important event, the strongest assurances were given to his majesty's minister, that France was now prepared to make sacrifices to a great extent, in order, by securing peace with G. Britain, to reestablish the tranquility of the world.

The object of these assurances appeared, however, to be, that of engaging his majesty in a separate negociation, to the exclusion of his allies, a proposal which his majesty had rejected in the outset, and which he could still less admit of at a time when the conduct of Russia had imposed on him an increased obligation not to separate his interests from those of so faithful an ally. To these insidious overtures, his majesty steadily refused to listen; but he took the most effectual method to avoid all appearance of delay, and to accelerate, if possible, the favorable issue of the negociation. The confidential intercourse which he had constantly maintained with Russia, enabled his majesty to specify the terms on which peace with that power might be obtained; and his minister was accordingly instructed to state to France, in addition to his own demands, those of his ally, to reduce them into distinct articles, and even to conclude on those grounds, a provisional treaty, to take effect whenever Russia should signify her accession.

The form of negociation was, after some objection, acceded to by France. Terms were now offered to his majesty more nearly approaching than before the original basis of negociation; but these were still very far short of what his majesty had uniformly insisted on, and was now more than ever entitled to expect; and the decisive rejection of the just demands of Russia, as well as of the conditions proposed by his majesty in behalf of his other allies, left to his majesty no other course than that of ordering his minister to terminate the discussion and return to England.

The foregoing short and simple exposition of facts stands in need of no comment. The first overtures which led to negociation were made by the enemy, and they were accepted by his majesty in the sincerest spirit of peace. Every opening which seemed to afford the most distant prospect of accommodation has been anxiously embraced, nor was the negociation finally broken off while any hope of a favorable issue could be entertained. His majesty's demands were uniformly just and reasonable; directed to no objects of personal aggrandizement, but to such only as were indispensibly required by the honor of his crown, his engagements to his allies, and a due consideration of the general interests of Europe.

It is with heartfelt concern that his majesty contemplates the continuance of those evils always inseparable from a state of war; but it is with his enemies that this awful responsibility rests; and for the issue of the contest his majesty trusts, with confidence, to the justice of his cause; to the resources and bravery of his people; to the fidelity of his allies, and, above all, to the protection and support of Divine Providence.

In contributing to the great efforts which such a contest must unavoidably require, his faithful and affectionate subjects will not forget that all their dearest interests are at stake; that no sacrifices they can be called upon to make are to be compared with the certain disgrace and ruin of yielding to the injurious pretensions of the enemy; that with the inviolable maintenance of the good faith and public honor of their country, its prosperity, its strength, and its independence, are essentially connected; and that in asserting their rights, and upholding the dignity of the British empire, they defend the most powerful bulwark of the liberties of mankind.

The subscriber wishes to purchase a NEGRO GIRL from 16 to 21 years of age, that is well acquainted with House work, &c.

BENJAMIN HODGES of Thomas,
Upper Marlboro, Dec. 10—3w

CONGRESS.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

THURSDAY, DEC. 11.

Speech of Mr. CLOPTON, on the amendment proposed by him to the Constitution, on the 11th of December.

(CONCLUDED.)

Should this melancholy state of things ever arise, what will be its ultimate issue Heaven only knows. Whether this great and flourishing country, which at this time sheds its glories far, very far beyond the limits of its own territories, will then continue to be the fair nursery of liberty, or whether it will become the frightful seat of political slavery: whether, indeed, the very great, the beloved, the inestimable principle of representation itself, the discovery of which has been of infinitely more importance to the political world than the art of navigation has been to the commercial world—of infinitely more importance than any art ever was to the human kind—a principle, without which, under whatever form a government may exist, it is impossible that liberty should exist, except it be in a perfect democracy; every idea of whose existence under any other government destitute of that principle is perfectly chimerical: every such government, be its structure whatever it may be which pretends to maintain its existence, verily indeed exhibits one of the merest farces that ever appeared amongst the scenes of any political drama: whether, I say, this all important principle will then continue to actuate the government of this country, or whether it will cease to maintain its just empire, lose its energy, and even at length be spurned from the American shores in order to make way for the introduction of a monstrous system, which reverses the natural order of things—transfers the sovereignty from the people, who alone are, the natural, who alone can be the legitimate possessors of it—places it in the hands of an individual—fixes a diadem on his head; and that bauble, according to the principle then brought into operation, communicates to him the whole majesty of the nation, which is transmitted as an inheritance through his family from generation to generation; whether the heir, on whom the inheritance should devolve at any time, be a knave or a fool: and by the history of mankind it is shewn to us, that very often these possessors of the sovereignty of nations completely unite in their own persons both these characters. Sir, what appellation shall I give to a system like this?—A system as truly preposterous in its nature as it is tortious and wrongful in its operation; but to which nevertheless a vast portion of the human race have been blindly devoted from the earliest ages of society down to the present day. That very circumstance however, contributes not a little to the appreciation of the American system. That it has been the peculiar felicity of the American people to understand their own rights—to institute governments better adapted to the important purpose of securing to themselves a permanent enjoyment of those rights, than any nations of the old world ever have done; and moreover to derive additional benefits from the happy combination of a federal government with those of the particular states—are all circumstances which eminently characterize this system, and distinguish it from every other political establishment. While, far from rejoicing, we deeply lament, that the ancient darkness which had bound the world in chains for more than forty centuries, still covers an immense portion of the globe where every thing exists under the gloomy reign of despotism; the republican principle, maintained in its genuine spirit, like a rich gem placed in the midst of a rude collection of worthless things, must shine with augmented brilliancy, when viewed in contrast with so many horrible systems containing not a single trait, which resembles the faintest outlines of liberty—not one of its dimmest features—but exhibiting on every side vast multitudes in all the variety of wretchedness, who never tasted of any other than the bitter cup of slavery!

Oh! sir, how supremely valuable ought our happy institutions to be esteemed! What ardent zeal should animate our efforts to preserve them unimpaired—to cherish and cultivate their vital principles in their original purity and perfection—to transmit them down to posterity untainted by corruption, unassailed by violence!

Sir, while I express these sentiments under a full persuasion that I shall not be contradicted as to their propriety, I cannot but believe that I may also affirm, without fear of being resisted in opinion by many, that amongst the excellencies of the federal government, there is none more important—there is none more valuable than its limited character as it respects the state authorities. Vested with powers duly proportioned to its own proper objects only, which are of a general nature and alike regard all the states, it leaves them in full possession of their own [illegible] sovereignty; while on the other hand, amongst the powers surrendered up by the states to this government, there are very few but such as, if exercised by either of the states individually, might materially affect the interests, and in some instances endanger the safety of the other states. Thus each individual state participates in the benefits resulting from the united and combined energies of the whole; while it retains the rights of sovereignty, and all the powers requisite for a complete administration of its own affairs. Here then is the true character of the federal government. The powers properly appertaining to it are limited to those, which are purely of a federative nature, and to such as the states by this compact have consented to yield up to it for the common benefits of the union. The former could not be communicated to nor be exercised by either of the states individually without destroying the independence of the others. The latter, if not thus yielded up, might be exercised by any of them to the detriment of the rest. Thus it is that each particular state by consenting to yield up to the union those powers, and those alone, the retention of which might be injurious, provides for itself a security against injuries by the same act which divests itself of the power to injure either of its sister states: while the federal government derives from this cession no manner of right to trench upon those powers which have been deemed proper to be retained to the states—no manner of right to diminish their sovereignty as distinct independent states.

What is the relation, therefore, which subsists between this federal governmenx and those of the particular states? If its true character be such, as has been stated, (and this, I think, will not be denied, or, if denied, I would challenge the most subtle genius who ascribes to it more extensive powers, to support such a position without utterly demolishing the fundamental principles of the confederacy) this government cannot justly claim to itself the supremacy of a paramount government with a right to restrain and controul the states in the exercise of their own legitimate powers—those powers which remained to them when the constitution was adopted. To exercise such an authority over them would be to destroy their independence—totally to annihilate their sovereignty as states. For one sovereignty cannot exist under the dominion of another sovereignty. The subjection of one power to the controul of another power, another separate over-ruling authority, supposes a state of subordination in the former power, and that all supremacy resides in the latter. Should it be imagined, therefore, by any one that such a sort of power over the states exists in this government, and that, nevertheless, they retain any portion of their original sovereignty, of a more complete absurdity it is not within the compass of the human intellect to conceive. It is, then, unquestionable that either this government possesses no manner of controul over the states, as such, or the states possess no manner of sovereignty as states; but that they do possess ample rights of sovereignty, I believe, will not be denied by any one. It follows then of course that any attempt in this government to exercise such controuling authority over them, would be an attempt to destroy, and the actual exercise of such authority would actually destroy their sovereignty as states. So also the assumption of any power properly appertaining to the states, and not granted to this government, is an invasion of their sovereignty—a series of such invasions in progression must have a fatal tendency to produce the same effect, as a general controuling authority; and must ultimately operate a total destruction of the state institutions. In what relation, therefore, to each other and to the federal government, which connects them together, can we view the members of this grand confederacy, but in that of so many distinct independent communities. In this relation they all stand as well to the federal government as to each other. In this relation alone can they be justly viewed. They are not only distinct from, and independent of, each other, though connected together in this confederacy: equally are they distinct from, and independent of, this general government, though connected together by it. To cement this connection between them, as so many distinct, independent communities, was indeed, the original and primary object of this government. From such connection between independent states retaining their distinct separate governments, it has been rightly judged by the people of these states, that greater benefits might result to each and to all of them, than could be expected without any connection at all—greater too than could be expected to flow from any connection founded on different principles. Hence arose the institution of the present system of government—a system analogous to which the annals of man, either ancient or modern, scarcely present us with the smallest traces of any other. Such, then, being a leading principle of this government, and the objects of it being special or particular, as before observed, its *limited character*, as it respects the state authorities, must necessarily be one of its principal distinguishing properties; otherwise it would not be conformable to that principle. It is essential to the prosperity of the union that this *character* be preserved—it is essential to the general happiness of the American people. Let not this government, therefore, assume to itself any power, in the exercise of which this character will be changed—the true relation between this and the state governments will be entirely destroyed. Let not this government, proud in the contemplation that the arm of its authority extends over this great continent, disregard state rights, and take upon itself the exercise of powers which the constitution has withheld, wisely withheld from it, and retained in other hands. Let it not forget its own true character; but always recollect that, although its authority extends to all the United States generally, yet it is not a general authority, but an authority *special* and limited to particular objects. It should ever be remembered also that between this government and the states mutual and reciprocal duties and obligations have arisen from the compact, by which this government was established. It is no less incumbent on the federal government to confine itself within the sphere of its own appropriate powers, than it is incumbent on the states not to attempt a resumption of any of the powers which they have surrendered up to this government. The states are bound by the cessions they have made, and the federal government is bound to claim no more nor greater powers than those, which have been ceded and granted to it. It is the duty of this government to regulate its proceedings according to the measure of powers assigned to it under the constitution; as it is the duty of the states to direct their operations to those objects only, which peculiarly belong to them as distinct communities: Equally is it the duty of each to move in its own constitutional orbit. If either of them wanders from this course, the harmony of the whole system will be interrupted; and such interruptions must have a tendency to defeat the principal ends of its institution. I do not imagine, however, there is ground for apprehension that either of the states will attempt to invade the authority of this government or to resume any of the powers which they have surrendered up to it. This opinion, I think, will appear to be a rational one when we consider the nature of the powers vested in the federal government—that they are of two descriptions, (as before observed) some of them being of a nature purely federative, which never did appertain to the states and cannot be exercised by either of them in its individual capacity; when we consider those of the other description, which originally did appertain to the states and have by them been surrendered up to this government: when we consider that the inducements to make the surrender arose from a conviction that the safety of each particular state was involved in the establishment of a firm union and connexion between all of them; that to ensure the attainment of this object it was necessary to vest the federal government with those particular powers, thereby enabling it to combine the general interests of all the states as a mean of cementing this political connection between them, which otherwise could not be expected to be of any long duration. To suppose, therefore, that either of the states will attempt to make encroachments on the known established powers of the federal government, thus solemnly assigned to it under the constitution, would be to suppose the existence of a very great degree of capriciousness in that state. Extreme, indeed, would be its folly and rashness in thus arraying itself against the union by endeavoring to repossess itself of powers so solemnly granted to this government, with its own consent and that of the other states, for the great purposes of securing its independence and of promoting those general interests which appertain to itself in common with all the other states. Scarcely can it be presumable that such a step, the evident tendency of which would be to contravene these purposes, will ever be taken by either of the states. Nor should it be presumed that the federal government will pursue an eligible course for effecting these purposes by endeavoring to enlarge the sphere of its own powers and to contract those of the states. The powers assigned to it under the constitution are amply sufficient for all these purposes; and mistaken, indeed, is that zeal for the federal government, which would stretch its authority or extend its operations beyond its own constitutional limits. For there exists in the American people a jealousy for state rights and authorities. There is, sir, a jealousy strong and vigilant—a jealousy, which will take the alarm whenever those rights or authorities are invaded; in proportion to the extent of such invasion it will be impassioned; and the dissatisfactions, which may be apprehended from such a state of public agitation,