in time of danger for means that may protect our country from the dangers which we have them ready at all seasons in time of peace: If this is a reasonable and good policy, he could hardly himself be averse to a stanger to it. Mr. C. asked if it was very reasonable necessary, that they should employ their resources in a system of defence that could be planned in time to meet the threatening danger? It appeared to him that no doubt could exist on this subject. If the system proposed by gentlemen as a substitute to that under discussion could not be prepared in time, there was no doubt, he thought, they must adopt that of gun-boats, the only one which could be speedily brought into service, or they must remain without defence in times of the most imminent danger. These gun-boats proceeded in a few months, they can be ready to meet the exigency, and may be used as occasion shall require. Mr. C. said, he might here remark with respect to some gentlemen who opposed this bill as not being sufficiently extensive and a wish that part of the number of gun-boats proposed should be sunk in the rivers, that it would be well for them to consider how they would account to their constituents for their conduct in sinking agents, or diminishing the only mode of defence which was practicable; it amounted to saying to the country, we consider our cities shall not be defended at the present time, it shall continue exposed to the attacks of the enemy." Mr. C. said if no efficient means of defence were adopted, it would be in the power of the enemy to levy your money in contribution; to carry ruin and devastation along the whole extent of our sea coast whenever he chose, and strike a general terror in the people near the margin of the ocean. This might be avoided by the government not only at such terms of accommodation as the enemy should prescribe; he did not say that they should adopt the degradation, but that it would certainly be the case, but he would say, that it would be certainly would be the consequence of such a course of proceeding as had been advocated on this floor.

If then it appeared sufficiently clear that the mode of defence proposed in the bill was the only one that could be resorted to with safety, it would seem that no question could exist, except as to the extent to which it was necessary to adopt it. Much, indeed, had been said respecting the expense of these gun-boats; Mr. C. was not at this time disposed to enter into a minute enquiry on that subject—the expense he believed, had been highly exaggerated on the one side, and probably diminished on the other. The estimate made by the Secretary of the navy in 1809 in his report on this subject, do not precisely agree with those given by him during the present session. Perhaps this difference may arise from the kind of gun-boats contemplated in the respective estimates, being different. In his report of 1809, he estimates the expense of building a 24 gun ship at 228,889 dollars, and that of building a gun-boat at 4,625 dollars. He also states the annual expense of a 24 gun ship at 152,200 dollars, and that of a gun-boat in service at 7000 dollars. According to this estimate, the building of one 74 gun ship would cost more than the building of 71 gun-boats; and the annual expense of a 74 in service would be equal to that of 28 gun-boats. It may be observed here that the expense of building, in this estimate is believed to be much under-rated—it is stated upon good authority that one could not be built for less than 500,000 dollars, which would be sufficient to build 120 gun-boats at least. It is also the opinion of the present session, has estimated the expense of building a gun-boat, he believed at 8,000 dollars and the annual expense of one in service at 11,000 dollars. The difference in these estimates in this session has been stated be supposed to arise from a difference in the kind and size of the boats, as some carry two guns and others three—and in the manner of manning them, some being made much larger than others, and requiring a much greater number of men to man them. But suppose you could only keep in service 71 gun-boats, still the same expense necessary for one 74 gun-ship, would it be contended that 53 gun-boats would not contribute more to the defence of the country, than one 74—he presumed it would not. According to the opinion of the best informed on this subject, you gun-boats would force any ship of war from her moorings. But he did not deem it necessary to enter into a minute enquiry respecting the expense of gun-boats; for if they were really necessary for the defence of the country, the expense ought not to prevent them from building them, their object ought to be to afford to the nation, the most efficient protection in their power, and whatever might be the necessary expenses of the measures, adopted for that purpose, they would be cheerfully submitted to by the country.

Mr. C. said he could never agree to barter away the blood and liberty of American citizens for dollars and cents; he was sorry that our good blooded calculations would not be made at this time, they would not be required to account to their country for such conduct; they would be told by that country that they were ready to give "millions for defence, but not a cent for tribute." No, nor one cent towards humiliating concessions; nor would the American people shrink from any contest that might be rendered necessary in obtaining a just reparation for the injuries, violated rights and murder of their fellow citizens. Some had objected to the number of gun-boats proposed to be built. Mr. C. observed that if the bill only given to the President to build the number stated in the bill, that authority would not, he presumed, be exercised to the full extent, unless circumstances should render it necessary; or if the number proposed should be built, they would not be required to be employed on every occasion might require. Such part only would be manned as the exigency of the occasion required, but the rest of the U. States ought to be organized into a marine militia, in all the seaport towns, for the purpose of manning those gun-boats when called into actual service. By passing this law they put in the power of the executive to provide and call into service so many of those gun-boats as he should think proper; not all at one time, unless, indeed, the attack should be so general, or the danger so imminent as to render it necessary. The measure appeared to him to rest nearly on the same footing with that by which the Executive had been given to the Executive to call out the Militia. They had by that authority, the President, power to call into actual service 100,000 militia on occasion might require, and appropriated money to meet the expense that might be occasioned thereby. This expence, if the whole number were called into service would not be great; but would gentlemen say, that because the expence would be very considerable, that they would call on them to be called into service when the safety and interest of the country required it? Would any one, he asked, venture to say so who was a friend to his country—for the whole power of the nation would be called into action, unless, when necessary to repel any attack that might be made on any part of our country. If therefore it can be shewn that gun-boats are the best means of defence in our power, by precision, the expence must not, and could not be a sufficient objection to building them. So much had already been said by gentlemen on the efficiency of gun-boats as a means of defence, that he did not propose to enter into a minute investigation of that part of the subject. He would however remark, that although he had heard many arguments in their objection, he had not heard one opposed to this system in order to ascertain the grounds upon which they rested it sufficiently, he had not heard any evidence advanced, either from the experimental knowledge of gentlemen themselves, or from the experience of others, or from any other source, which in his opinion supported the doctrine advanced. On the contrary much evidence had been adduced to prove the efficacy of gun-boats. This evidence had been drawn from the success of gun-boats in many important actions against ships of war. It could not be necessary to recount the House of the affair at Boulogne in 1801, when Lord Nelson, with thirty vessels of war, attacked the advanced guard of the French Flotilla and was compelled to retire with great loss and in a second attack made by him some days afterwards, he was equally unsuccessful, and suffered a much greater loss. The successful attacks of the gun-boats at Algesiras on the British fleet which was greatly superior in force; and how galling and distressing these attacks were considered by the British, he had been informed by all who have attended to the history of those times. The affair between the Chesapeake and Boxer, recorded in the President's Message, furnishes the strongest proof that could be required of the efficacy of gun-boats. This case was in point—it was a trial of the power and success of gun-boats opposed to vessels of war. It will not be supposed that the weight of this evidence is diminished by the little criticisms of the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Elliot) no man who has heard them will think so. They do not merit, nor will they I presume, receive any notice on this floor—they will sink into obscurity as those ephemeral effusions of embittered inventive, unsupported by facts or reasoning. To these instances of the successful operations of gun-boats, may be added, in support of their efficacy, the fact that they brought into very general use, for defence, by all the northern powers of Europe, as well as by the Russians, powers, France and G. Britain. Mr. Campbell asked, what stronger proof of the efficacy of gun-boats could be subject? They had the opinions of the higher officers of the navy—men of experience, and whose unbiased opinions of Gen. Gates, of Commodore S. Barron, and others stated in the documents on their table, were these not entitled to respect? Were not the successful operations of gun-boats in the instances stated, and the general use of them by European nations entitled to respect? Would gentlemen take this dismissing of the