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DECLARATION.

The Declaration issued at St. Petersburgh by his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, has excited in his majesty's mind the strongest sensations of astonishment and regret.

His majesty was not unaware of the nature of those secret engagements which had been imposed upon Russia in the conferences of Tilsit; but his majesty had entertained the hope, that a review of the transactions of that unfortunate negociation, and a just estimate of its effects upon the glory of the Russian name, and upon the interests of the Russian empire, would have induced his imperial majesty to extricate himself from the embarrassment of those new counsels and connexions which he had adopted in a moment of despondency and alarm; and to return to a policy more congenial to the principles which has so invariably professed, and more conducive to the honor of his crown, and to the prosperity of his dominions.

This hope has dictated to his majesty the utmost forbearance and moderation in all his diplomatic intercourse with the court of St. Petersburgh since the peace of Tilsit.

His majesty had much cause for suspicion, and just ground of complaint. But he abstained from the language of reproach. His majesty deemed it necessary to require specific explanation with respect to those arrangements with France, the concealment of which from his majesty could not but confirm the impression already received of their character and tendency. But his majesty, nevertheless, directed the demand of that explanation to be made, not only without asperity or the indication of any hostile disposition, but that considerate regard to the feelings and situation of the emperor of Russia, which resulted from the recollection of former friendship, and from confidence interrupted but not destroyed.

The Declaration of the emperor of Russia proves that the object of his majesty's forbearance and moderation has not been attained. It proves, unhappily, that the influence of that power, which is equally & essentially the enemy both of G. Britain and Russia, has acquired a decided ascendency in the councils of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and has been able to excite a causeless enmity between two nations, whose long established connexion, and whose mutual interests prescribed the most intimate union and co-operation.

His majesty deeply laments the extension of the calamities of war. But called upon as he is, to defend himself against an act of unprovoked hostility, his majesty is anxious to refute, in the face of the world, the pretexts by which that act is attempted to be justified.

The declaration asserts, that his majesty the emperor of Russia has twice taken up arms in a cause in which the interests of G. Britain was more direct than his own; and founds upon this assertion the charge against G. Britain of having neglected to second and support the military operations of Russia.

His majesty willingly does justice to the motives which originally engaged Russia in the great struggle against France. His majesty avows, with equal readiness, the interest which G. Britain has uniformly taken in the fates and fortunes of the powers of the continent. But it would surely be difficult to prove that G. Britain, who was herself in a state of hostility with Prussia when the war broke out between Prussia and France, had an interest & a duty more direct in espousing the Prussian quarrel, than the emperor of Russia; the ally of his Prussian majesty the Protector of the North of Europe, and the guarantee of the Germanic constitution.

It is not in a public declaration that his majesty can discuss the policy of having, at any particular period of the war, effected, or omitted to effect, disembarkations of troops on the coasts of Naples—But the instance of the war with the Porte is still more singularly chosen to illustrate the charge against G. Britain of indifference to the interests of her ally: a war undertaken by G. Britain at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining Russian interests against the influence of France.

If, however, the peace of Tilsit is, indeed, to be considered as the consequence and the punishment of the imputed inactivity of G. Britain, his majesty cannot but regret that the emperor of Russia should have resorted to so precipitate and fatal a measure at the moment when he had received distinct assurances that his majesty was making the most strenuous exertions to fulfil the wishes and expectations of his ally (assurances which his imperial majesty received and acknowledged with apparent confidence and satisfaction;) and when his majesty was, in fact, prepared to employ for the advancement of the common objects of the war, those forces which, after the peace of Tilsit, he was under the necessity of employing to disconcert a combination directed against his own immediate interest and security.

The vexation of Russian commerce by G. Britain is, in truth, little more than an imaginary grievance. Upon a diligent examination, made by his majesty's command, of the records of the British court of admiralty, there has been discovered only a solitary instance in the course of the present war, of the condemnation of a vessel really Russian—a vessel which had carried naval stores to a port of the common enemy. There are but few instances of Russian vessels detained, and none in which justice has been refused to a party regularly complaining of such detention. It is, therefore, matter of surprize, as well as of concern to his majesty, that the emperor of Russia should have condescended to bring forward a complaint which as it cannot be seriously felt by those in whose behalf it is urged, might appear to be intended to countenance those exaggerated declamations by which France perseveringly endeavors to inflame the jealousy of other countries, and to justify her own inveterate animosity against G. Britain.

The peace of Tilsit was followed by an offer of mediation on the part of the emperor of Russia, for the conclusion of a peace between G. Britain & France, which it is asserted that his majesty refused.

His majesty did not refuse the mediation of the emperor of Russia; altho' the offer of it was accompanied by circumstances of concealment which might well have justified his refusal. The articles of the treaty of Tilsit were not communicated to his majesty; and specifically that article of the treaty in virtue of which the mediation was proposed; and which prescribed a limited time for the return of his majesty's answer to that proposal. And his majesty was thus led into an apparent compliance with a limitation so offensive to the dignity of an independent sovereign. But the answer so returned by his majesty was not a refusal. It was a conditional acceptance. The conditions required by his majesty were—a statement of the basis upon which the enemy was disposed to treat; and a communication of the articles of the peace of Tilsit. The first of these conditions was precisely the same which the emperor of Russia had himself annexed not four months before to his own acceptance of the proffered mediation of the emperor of Austria. The second one which his majesty would have had a right to require even as the ally of his imperial majesty; but which it would have been highly improvident to omit, when he was invited to confide to his imperial majesty the care of his honor and of his interests.

But even if these conditions (neither of which has been fulfilled, although the fulfilment of them has been repeatedly required by his Majesty's ambassador at St. Petersburg) had not been in themselves perfectly natural and necessary; there were not wanting considerations which might have warranted His Majesty in endeavoring, with more than ordinary anxiety, to ascertain the views and intentions of the emperor of Russia, and the precise nature and effect of the new relations which his Imperial Majesty had contracted.

The complete abandonment of the interests of the King of Prussia (who had twice rejected proposals of separate peace, from a strict adherence to his engagements with his Imperial Ally) and the character of those provisions which the emperor of Russia was contented to make for his own interests in the negociations of Tilsit, presented no encouraging prospect of the result of any exertions which his Imperial Majesty might be disposed to employ in favor of Great Britain.

It is not while a French army still occupies and lays waste the remaining dominions of the King of Prussia, in spite of the stipulations of the Prussian treaty of Tilsit; while contributions are arbitrarily exacted by France from that remnant of the Prussian monarchy, such as, in its entire and most flourishing state, the Prussian monarchy would have been unable to discharge; while the surrender is demanded, in time of peace, of Prussian fortresses, which had not been reduced during the war; and while the power of France is exercised over Prussia with such shameless tyranny, as to designate and demand for instant death, individuals, subjects of his Prussian majesty, and resident in his dominions, upon a charge of disrespect towards the French government; it is not while all these things are done and suffered, under the eyes of the Emperor of Russia, and without his interference on behalf of his ally, that his Majesty can feel himself called upon to account to Europe for having hesitated to repose an unconditional confidence in the efficacy of his Imperial Majesty's mediation.

Nor, even if that mediation had taken full effect, if a peace had been concluded under it, and that peace guaranteed by his Imperial Majesty, could his majesty have placed implicit reliance on the stability of any such arrangement, after having seen the emperor of Russia openly transfer to France, the sovereignty of the Ionian Republic, the independence of which his Imperial Majesty had recently and solemnly guaranteed.

But while the alledged rejection of the emperor of Russia's mediation, between Great Britain and France, is stated as a just ground of his Imperial Majesty's resentment: His majesty's request of that mediation, for the re-establishment of peace between Great Britain and Denmark, is represented as an insult which it was beyond the bounds of his Imperial Majesty's moderation to endure.

His Majesty feels himself under no obligation to offer any atonement or apology to the emperor of Russia for the expedition against Copenhagen. It is not for those who were parties to the secret arrangements of Tilsit to demand satisfaction for a measure to which those arrangements gave rise, and by which one of the objects of them has been happily defeated.

His majesty's justification of the expedition against Copenhagen, is before the world. The declaration of the Emperor of Russia, would supply whatever was wanting in it, if any thing could be wanting to convince the most incredulous of the urgency of that necessity under which his majesty acted.

But until the Russian declaration was published, his majesty had no reason to suspect that any opinions which the Emperor of Russia might entertain of the transactions at Copenhagen, could be such as to preclude his imperial majesty from undertaking, at the request of Great Britain, that same office of mediator, which he had assumed with so much alacrity on the behalf of France; nor can his majesty forget that the first symptoms of reviving confidence, since the peace of Tilsit, the only prospect of success in the endeavors of his majesty's ambassador to restore the ancient and good understanding between Great Britain and Russia, appeared when the intelligence of the siege of Copenhagen had been recently received at St. Petersburgh.

The inviolability of the Baltic sea, and the reciprocal guarantees of the powers that border up it, guarantees said to have been contracted with the knowledge of the British government, are stated as aggravations of his majesty's proceedings in the Baltic. It cannot be intended to represent his majesty as having at any time acquiesced in the principles upon which the inviolability of the Baltic is maintained; however his majesty may at particular periods have forborne, for special reasons, influencing his conduct at the time, to act in contradiction to them. Such forbearance never could have applied but to a state of peace and real neutrality in the north; and his majesty most assuredly could not be expected to recur to it, after France has been suffered to establish herself in undisputed sovereignty along the whole coast of the Baltic sea, from Dantzick to Lubeck.

But the higher the value which the emperor of Russia places on the engagements respecting the tranquility of the Baltic, which he describes himself as inheriting from his immediate predecessors, the empress Catharine and the emperor Paul, the less justly can his imperial majesty resent the appeal made to him by his majesty as the guarantee of the peace to be concluded between G. B. and Denmark. In making that appeal, with the utmost confidence and sincerity, his majesty neither intended, nor can he imagine that he offered any insult to the emperor of Russia. Nor can his majesty conceive that, in proposing to the Prince Royal terms of peace such as the most successful war on the part of Denmark could hardly have been expected to extort from G. Britain, his majesty rendered himself liable to the imputation, either of exasperating the resentment, or of outraging the dignity of Denmark.

His majesty has thus replied to all the different accusations by which the Russian government labor to justify the rupture of a connexion which has subsisted for ages, with reciprocal advantage to G. Britain and Russia; and attempts to disguise the operation of that external influence by which Russia is driven into unjust hostilities for interests not her own.

The Russian declaration proceeds to announce the several conditions on which alone these hostilities can be terminated, and the intercourse of the two countries renewed.

His majesty has already had occasion to assert that justice has in no instance been denied to the claims of his imperial majesty's subjects.

The termination of the war with Denmark has been so anxiously sought by his majesty, that it cannot be necessary for his majesty to renew any professions upon that subject. But his majesty is at a loss to reconcile the emperor of Russia's present anxiety for the completion of such an arrangement with his imperial majesty's recent refusal to contribute his good offices for effecting it.

The requisition of his imperial majesty for the immediate conclusion, by his majesty of a peace with France, is as extraordinary in the substance as it is offensive in the manner. His majesty has at no time declined to treat with France, when France has professed a willingness to treat on any admissible basis. And the emperor of Russia cannot fail to remember, that the last negociation between G. Britain and France was broken off upon points immediately affecting, not his majesty' own interest, but those of his imperial ally. But his majesty neither understands, nor will he admit the pretension of the emperor of Russia to dictate the time or the mode of his majesty's pacific negociation with other powers. It never will be endured by his majesty that any government shall indemnify itself for the humiliation of subserviency to France by the adoption of an insulting and peremptory tone towards G. Britain.

His Majesty proclaims anew those principles of maritime law, against which the Armed Neutrality, under the auspices of the Empress Catharine, was originally directed; and against which the present hostilities of Russia are denounced. Those principles have been recognised and acted upon in the best periods of the history of Europe; and acted upon by no power with more strictness and severity than by Russia herself in the reign of the Empress Catharine.

Those principles it is the right and the duty of His Majesty to maintain: and against every confederacy his Majesty is determined, under the blessings of Divine Providence, to maintain them. They have at all times contributed essentially to the support of the maritime power of G. Britain; but they have become incalculably more valuable and important at a period when the maritime power of G. Britain constitutes the sole remaining bulwark against the overwhelming usurpations of France; the only refuge to which other nations may yet resort, in happier times, for assistance and protection.

When the opportunity for peace between G. Britain and Russia shall arrive, his majesty will embrace it with eagerness. The arrangements of such a negociation will not be difficult or complicated. His majesty, as he has nothing to concede, so he has nothing to require: satisfied, if Russia shall manifest a disposition to return to her ancient feelings of friendship towards G. Britain; to a just consideration of her own true interests; and to a sense of her own dignity as an independent nation.

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The arrangements for the emigration of the House of BRAGANZA, as we stated some time since, were originally suggested by, and formed in concert with the British government. So far back as the latter end of August, an order was signed by the Prince Regent, directed to the governor of Madeira, for delivering into the hands of the English that island. This order has long been in the possession of our ministers, and as soon as the proper time arrived for carrying it into execution, without detriment to the Prince Royal in his very delicate situation in Portugal, it was entrusted to Sir Samuel Hood, and in compliance with it, the island is probably ere this in possession of the forces under his command. Previous to the departure of the Prince Regent from Lisbon, he made out and signed a Commission of Regency, the members of which consist of some of the ancient nobility who had determined to remain. These hishighness empowers to execute the offices of government, during his absence; by which judicious expedient he deprives the enemy of any just plea of his having abdicated a throne, his right to which he will in due time advance. Bonaparte will doubtless declare the throne vacant, and transfer it to one of his own upstart race or minions; but here at least he builds his hope upon a shallow foundation, for the interest of her faithful ally will never be abandoned by G Britain.

CONGRESS.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Debate on the bill for the classification of the Militia of the United States.

CONTINUED.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20.

The question being about to be put on filling up the blank as yesterday moved by Mr. M. Clay.

Mr. CHANDLER made some observations tending to shew that this was a bill of much importance, and expressed a wish that the term during which the militia should be liable to service, were further extended. As he had not had time to consider the bill maturely he moved that the committee should rise.

Mr. MACON hoped the motion would not be agreed to. No principle had yet been settled, and it was useless to give time to prepare amendments till the opinion of a majority on the principle was obtained.

Mr. VARNUM (Speaker) hoped the committee would rise and be refused leave to sit again on this bill. He believed that the situation of the United States at present would by no means admit of the classing of the militia; this was not the proper time if it was ever necessary.

It had been said that the classing of the militia had been recommended by the several Presidents of the U. States. This might be true; if it were however he had not observed that to be the case. He could see no kind of advantage to be derived from the proposed modification of the militia system. Were not the militia equal to every service that could be required of them, under the existing laws? Certainly they were. If particular states had failed to carry into effect the part assigned to them by the constitution of the U. States—if there were any states which had neglected that duty, would any other plan induce them to attend to it? He should suppose not. It was a fact that where the state governments had taken up the subject of the organization and discipline of the militia, and carried it into effect as far as in their power, those states had a respectable militia, who considered themselves as a band of brothers, from the age of 18 to 45, and from their habits of discipline under the present system and officers, would consider it an invidious distinction to take men at particular ages from the mass—so much so that they would not have such an efficient militia to which they looked as the best part of the physical strength of the nation, as if the system were suffered to remain as it now stands. He knew that it was said that the militia were inefficient in some parts of the United States. What was there wanting? That subordination which existed in other parts, and nothing more.

It had been said that in the course of the revolutionary war, the militia in some instances abandoned their posts. This might have been the case in some instances; but he was well assured that the credit due to the military of that part of the country had not been given to them. We know, said Mr. V. of some of the hardest battles of the revolutionary war, in which the militia were the principal actors. But were this not the case, how can we select any particular part of the militia and exempt from service the remainder? Is it expected that young men will be better able to perform military duty than those who have been in service, who had exprienced the advantages of liberty, and who have families and property to defend? I should suppose such men likely to render more service than young men who have not formed their minds.

But there is a radical difficulty in this system. The bill provides that none shall be called into general service, except from the age of twenty-one to twenty-six. The constitutions of some of the states do provide that the captains and subaltern officers in each company shall be chosen by the whole company from the age of 21 to 45. Is it to be supposed that they would be voluntarily so scrupulous as to choose men between the ages of 21 and 26? The officers would generally be over the age of twenty-six. In that case how can we get along?

Gentlemen may suppose that it is a very easy thing for the state governments to alter their systems in compliance with the requisition of the general government. It is thing which some of the states will not undertake to do. The militia at the present time in some parts of the U. S. are well organized and disciplined, and display a spirit of emulation which does them honor. In the state which I have the honor to represent, there are seventy thousand militia. These men are all armed; no man is suffered to go into the field without arms; they are subject to a fine of eight dollars for every time they appear without arms; and if not always provided are subject to a fine of ten dollars per annum. This severe regulation produces universal arming. very few troops, take them from what part of the world you will, are better disciplined than our companies of artillery, every man of which is completely uniformed at his own expence, and every company of artillery is supplied with brass field pieces by the