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WASHINGTON CITY.

MONDAY, MARCH 28.

In the present crisis, when the affairs of this country with G. Britain have assumed so solemn an aspect, it is cause for high felicitation to find those men, who have hitherto in that nation stood forth as the champions of justice and the friends of the U. States boldly and unequivocally avow their reprobation of those measures which are the cause of the existing rupture—We say the cause of the rupture, for it is but too true that it must have been known to the British government that the powers given to Mr. Rose were altogether incommensurate to a settlement of the affair of the Chesapeake, and it doubtless was calculated upon by them that a rupture on this point would produce an entire suspension of the negociation.

We have been told by the apologists of Britain here that her existence depended on the harsh and unjust measures lately taken by her; that her only resource was either to monopolise or to make the trade of the whole world tributary; we were told that her best men, however they may have once thought, perceived and acknowledged this necessity; and that, consequently, the orders of Council, and our worse than colonial subjection, would be maintained amidst every change of administration or vicissitude of politics in that country. The late accounts from England have taken this film from the eyes of these prejudiced politicans; and, however they may regret, it belongs to us to rejoice that the Grenvilles, the Erskines, the Petty's; in short the best talents and the purest and most unsuspected patriotism of England condemn these usurpations in terms as strong as those which are expressed by ourselves. In the late debates in the British Parliament—

"*Lord Erskine* observed, that he was amazed to hear noble Lords talk of the necessity or policy, of the measures under discussion—"Did they shelter themselves under the principle of retaliation? If so, the House had long since been apprised that this measure of our government outstripped that of the enemy—it could not be defended on the principle of policy. The French decree, he said, as far as it affected America, had, he maintained, been satisfactorily cleared up to the minister then in France, and was deemed so even by the President of the United States—hence he concluded, that America was no party in the decree of the French Emperor. This he said, was evident also from her subsequent conduct; when aware even of our orders in council here, she ordered a general embargo.—Much had been said of the right of retaliation, on which these orders were founded; no body denied the right to resort to such a system, when the conduct of the belligerents justified its necessity—but even that law has its limitations, it should not ever overstep the nature of the evil which it went to redress; yet, in these orders, all limitation was lost sight of, and convenience alone regulated the extent. It would seem that if the French Emperor declared the Moon in a state of of blockade, Great Britain would have a meeting of the Board of Longitude, and our most celebrated astronomers, to retaliate by a prohibition on the Satellites to Jupiter—when he commanded a dessation of the Lunar motion of her conjunctions and opposites, they would react by a declaration that the whole Planetary Sytem, should stop till—(a loud laugh from the ministerial bench)—he really conceived notwithstanding the manner in which the comparison was received, that the cases were in a great degree similar: inasmuch as he believed Bonaparte had as much efficacy over the moon as he had in his declaration of placing the British Isles in a state of blockade.

"*Lord Greenville*, in his speech, asked, was it not more natural to expect that ministers would defend their system of policy by a full discussion of the merits and necessity; that at last there would be an end to that eternal circle of arguing present questions from past transactions? With that feeling he entered on the discussion, blieving in his soul, that on the *Revocation or Non-Revocation* of these orders depended the *ultimate existence of the Country*. He continued the most animated appeal to the House, to interpose between the country and its destruction—to retread its steps, as the path through which it moved led quickly to the grave—He warned them against the renewal of a system of taxation, either directly or indirectly upon American trade; and conjured them to seize the opportunity afforded them, by the pre-eminence of France in this rivalry of injustice, of erasing from the records of the country, and of obliterating from the minds of the people, the least intention of acting upon a system of policy rashly introduced and wantonly pursued, calculated for no other purpose, than to involve the nation in an UNJUST WAR."

"Lord Lauderdale thus expressed himself—"He wished the orders to be discussed on their own positive merits, and not on their comparative merits. He believed that they had been infinitely mischievous. They injured neutrals much more than the enemy; and were, in his opinion tantamount to a declaration of war against America."

Lord Auckland concluded his speech in the following terms: "It is true, that the French decree professed at first to operate as widely and as severely as any of the British orders: but it was well known, that on the remonstrance of the American minister at Paris, the French government gave a new interpretation to the decree, and consented to relax considerably of its severity in favor of the Americans. Now, how must we stand with regard to America in the eye of justice, or of policy, if we determine to act against her trade with all the rigor of the French decree, & retaliate against her all the injury which France meditates and would inflict upon this country. Do, Noble Lords, recollect the nature and extent of the connection of this country with America? Have they well weighed the immense advantages we derive from that intercourse? Do they bear in their minds the amount of the imports by America from this kingdom? Have they seriously considered what the consequences of a rupture with America must be to so many descriptions of persons in this country? Have they examined why the last year has brought such an accession to our exports, such an increase to our general commerce; and have they not discovered that the main source from which that increase of commerce has sprung, was the condition in which America stood between the two belligerents, and the facilities which it afforded to enrich us by enriching America. If, Noble Lords, have seriously turned all these considerations in their minds, and yet feel not the impolicy of these orders in council, their minds must be very differently organised from his. Their operation with respect to America, was the chief point to consider: he must entreat their Lordships more narrowly to examine that point and the various consequences to which it gave rise; and he doubted not they would begin to think with him. It was not yet too late to prevent the mischief. The noble Lord next proceeded to enquire into the nature of the retaliation into which we entered against France, and asked what could be the object of it. Did ministers mean to starve France, and the countries depending on her by the operation of these orders; or did they wish to teach those countries to forego the use of the commodities they derived from this country, or to set their ingenuity at work to contrive substitutes for these commodities? He was at a loss to know what useful or rational purpose they were at all likely to answer. Noble Lords, he observed, would also please to take into their consideration the endless embarrassments in which neutrals, but particularly Americans, must be involved, by the crossing provisions and enactments of these orders. They varied according to the nature of the cargoes, and the places for which they were destined. Whatever may be the nature of their cargoes, or the course of their destination, they must all come first to England, and be subject to a duty in this country, before they proceeded to any other destination. The certificates of origin were also liable to the most serious objections; in short, the orders of council appeared to him to be contrary to every law; to be as irreconcilable with policy as with justice; and to be pregnant with mischiefs for which we should find little consolation, in reflecting upon the character of the measure that must bring them on the country."

Lord Grenville again said, "There could not be a rational hope entertained that America would submit to this measure. He thought a rupture with America would be one of the most ruinous external calamities that could befal this country, and was ready to make any effort to prevent it. If they had then to discuss the propriety of the measures that had been taken, he was sure they would never sanction them with their approbation. But his majesty's servants had taken the whole responsibility upon themselves, and done away the deliberation of Parliament. They had now nothing to do but to tread back their steps, and not to continue in error to avoid the shame of retraction. It was not from any distrust of the resources of the country that he feared a rupture with America, but because the war with that country on the ground of these orders would be unjust, and in the prosecution of it they could not expect the same feeling would animate their defenders, as if they were convinced of the justice of their cause. The boon that was said to be given by these orders to America, was no more than what she had a right to, and what this country had no right to take from her. As to the duties proposed to be levied under these orders of council, he should only say, that when the peace of 1782 took place, he never thought that he should have lived, or that the British Parliament should have lived to see the day, when a proposition would be made to impose a tax upon America. He had hoped that the duties proposed would have been confined to articles of colonial production, and that no duty would be imposed upon American produce. He was sorry, to find, therefore, by certain resolutions on the table, that certain articles of the domestic produce of America were to be liable to a duty. America could never submit to such conditions, and it was an act of gross injustice to impose any duty upon goods not intended to be imported into this country, when forced into our ports under the execution of these orders of council."

Such are the sentiments of noble, high minded Britons—Britons educated in the principles of whiggism—men who have shewn themselves ready to save their country; but unwilling to retain power the moment it ceases to be consistent with honor and justice. These are the men, these the principles, which must eventually triumph even in England, provided we have the nerve to resist these audacious aggressions on our rights, these insolent and *unatoned* outrages on our honor.

Since we penned these remarks, we have received the *Protest* of Lord Erskine against the Danish Expedition. For vigor of mind, precision of ideas, energy of expression, and splendor of diction, it may proudly challenge competition with any state paper extant. There is not a sentiment in it which is not as orthodox here, as it ought to be in Britain and in every other part of the civilised world. Read it, Americans, with attention! Listen to the sentiments of one of the best of men in the worst of times! Restrain not the just sensibility which such a portrait ought to excite! Feel for Denmark as you would for yourselves! For the arrogant power, that "has lost her moral station in the world," wants but the impulse of a sordid interest to hurl on your shores as much detruction as she has already breathed defiance. For this Paper see the last page.

Documents accompanying the Message of the President of the 22d March, relative to the Chesapeake.

(Continued.)

Mr. Monroe to Mr. Canning.

Mr. MONROE presents his compliments to Mr. Canning, and has the honor to inform him that he called at his office yesterday, for the purpose of making some remarks on the subject treated in the note which he addressed on the instant to Mr. Canning. Mr. Monroe regrets that he had not the pleasure of seeing Mr. Canning at that time, and requests that he will be so good as to give him an interview to-morrow, at such hour as may be most convenient to him. Mr. Monroe will be happy to attend Mr. Canning in the country, should it be more agreeably to Mr. Canning to receive him there.

Portland Place, Sept. 9, 1807.

From Mr. Canning, in answer.

Mr. CANNING presents his compliments to Mr. Monroe, and will be happy to have the honor of seeing him at the foreign office to-morrow at 12 o'clock.

Mr. Canning has but this minute received Mr. Monroe's note.

Burlington House, Wednesday, September 9, 1807.

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Duplicate. No.

London, Sept. 16, 1807.

Sir—I had the honor to receive your letter of July 6th, by Dr. Bullus, on the 31st ultimo, and did not lose a moment in entering on the business communicated to me by it, in the manner which seemed most likely to obtain success. The details shall be communicated to you in my next dispatch. All that I can state at present is, that the whole subject has been placed fully before this government in as strong an appeal to its interest and judgement as I could make, and that as a week has elapsed since my official note was presented, I am in daily expectation of receiving its decision on it. The moment is in many views very favorable to a satisfactory result, but still it is not in my power, from any thing that has occurred, to speak with confidence of it. The joint negociation committed to Mr. Pinkney and myself, was suspended by the intelligence of the affair with our frigate, and has never been revived since. That intelligence reached this about a week after Mr. Purviance, so that we had only been able with the utmost diligence, to take the preliminary step of presenting to Mr. Canning, in conformity to our instructions, a project, and of explaining to him in the most minute and comprehensive manner that we could, every circumstance appertaining to it. No answer was given to our communication; the suspension therefore of the negociation, was imputable to Mr. Canning: had he answered our communication and proposed to proceed in the negociation, it would have become a question for the commission to have decided, how far it would have been proper under existing circumstances to comply with the invitation; his silence however relieved us from that dilemma.

Permit me to present to you Mr. Jos. A. Smith, of South Carolina, and to refer you to him for much information of a general nature, on the subject of our affairs with this country. Having been long in Europe, and visited almost every part, he possesses great information of the political state of its several powers, especially of Russia, from whose sovereign he received very distinguished marks of attention. In much communication which I have had with Mr. Smith for a year past, I have found him to be animated with strong sentiments of patriotism towards his country, and as he has expressed a desire of being personally known to the President, and yourself, I have been happy to promote his object, by giving him this introduction.

I am with great respect, sir, your most obt. servant.

JAS. MONROE.

P. S. A copy of my note to Mr. Canning is enclosed.

JAMES MADISON,
Secretary of State.

From Mr. Canning.

No. 16.

Foreign Office, Sept. 23d, 1807.

SIR—I have laid before the king my master the letter which I had the honor to receive from you, on the 8th of this month.

Before I proceed to observe upon that part of it which relates more immediately to the question now at issue between our two governments, I am commanded, in the first instance, to express the surprise which is felt at the total omission of a subject, upon which, I had already been commanded to apply to you for information: the proclamation purported to have been issued by the President of the United States. Of this paper, when last I addressed you upon it, you professed not to have any knowledge, beyond what the ordinary channels of public information afforded, nor any authority to declare it to be authentic.

I feel it an indispensible duty to renew my enquiry on this subject. The answer which I may receive from you is by no means unimportant to the settlement of the discussion which has arisen from the encounter between the Leopard and the Chesapeake.

The whole of the question arising out of that transaction, is in fact no other than a question as to the amount of reparation due by his majesty for the unauthorised act of his officer: and you will, therefore, readily perceive that, in so far as the government of the United States have thought proper to take that reparation into their own hands, and to resort to measures of retaliation, previously to any direct application to the British government, or to the British minister in America, for redress; in so far the British government is entitled to take such measures into account, and to consider them in the estimate of reparation which is acknowledged to have been originally due.

The total exclusion of all ships of war belonging to one of the two belligerent parties, while the ships of war of the other were protected by the harbors of the neutral power, would furnish no light ground of complaint against that neutral, if considered in any other point of view, than as a measure of retaliation for a previous injury: and, so considered, it cannot but be necessary to take it into account in the adjustment of the original dispute.

I am therefore distinctly to repeat the enquiry, whether you are now enabled to declare, sir, that the proclamation is to be considered as the authentic act of your government? And, if so, I am further to enquire, whether you are authorised to notify the intention of your government to withdraw that proclamation, on the knowledge of his majesty's disavowal of the act which occasioned its publication?

The light in which you are directed to represent admiral Berkeley's conduct, and the description which you give of the character of the measure imputed to him,—that "he acted as "if he had the power to make war, "and to decide the causes of war;" sufficiently evince the necessity of comprehending in this discussion, all the circumstances which have led to, or have followed the action with the Chesapeake.

Undoubtedly the attack upon a national ship of war, is an act of hostility, and the very essence of the charge against admiral Berkeley, as you represent it, is the having taken upon himself to commit an act of hostility without the previous authority of his government.

The provocation which may have led to such an act, without such previous authority, if it cannot justify, may possibly extenuate it; as the steps which have been taken in reprisal, though they cannot alter the character of the original act, may and do materially affect every question concerning the reparation claimed for it.

On this ground it is, that, while I am commanded to repeat to you (what you consider as so satisfactory) that the general and unqualified pretension to search ships of war for deserters, is not asserted by this country, "I "am precluded from concurring in "the inference, that therefore the "national character of the men who "were violently taken from on board "the Chesapeake, makes no part of "the present question."

If the right to search ships of war for deserters is not insisted upon by this country, it is not because the employment and the detention of British mariners on board the national ship of any state are considered as less injurious towards Great Britain than their employment on board of merchant vessels (a proposition which would be manifestly absurd:) It is not intended to allow that the sailors of Great Britain may be justly employed, against her consent, in foreign ships of war; but merely that redress is, in that case, to be sought for by government from government; and not to be summarily enforced by the unauthorised officer of any of his majesty's ships of war.

It follows from this reasoning, that not only the "national character" of the men taken out of the Chesapeake is matter for consideration; but that the reparation to be made by the British government to that of the U. States, would depend, among other circumstances, on the question whether an act, which the British government would be justified in considering as an act of hostility, had been committed by the government of the U. States, (in refusing to discharge the British seamen in their national service) previously to commission of an act of hostility of an officer of his majesty.

The act of the British officer would still be an unauthorised act, and as such liable to complaint and disapprobation; but the case, as between government and government, would be materially varied.

At the same time that I offer to you this explanation of the principles upon which his majesty has authorised me to discuss with you the subject of your representation, and that I renew to you the assurances of the disposition to conduct that discussion in the most amicable form, and to bring it to a conclusion satisfactory to the honor and to the feelings of both countries; it is matter of regret that you should have been instructed to annex to the demand of reparation for the attack of the Leopard upon the Chesapeake, any proposition whatever respecting the search for British seamen in merchant vessels; a subject, which