ways retreated when our troops advanced towards them—she had no other troops within an immense distance of the place, and could not reinforce them in any short time. There could not therefore be much danger to be apprehended from that quarter. Those were the circumstances under which it was proposed to raise an army in 1805—6. I was then of opinion, and the event has proved the correctness of that opinion, that the circumstances did not require or justify such a measure. The situation of our country at those periods, which have been spoken of, was not therefore such as it is at this time. But in order to shew this the more clearly, it may be proper to enquire what our present situation is in regard to foreign powers.

On this subject it will not be in my power to say much that has not already been said, and I do not wish to repeat what others have advanced. In regard to G. Britain, it is said that we have no reason to apprehend any attack or invasion from her. Is it necessary for me to state that she has been for years committing aggressions on your commerce, and impressing your seamen. Has she not murdered your citizens in your merchant vessels as well as in your ships of war? And has not the scene of aggressions been completed by the unexampled outrageous attack on the Chesapeake? Have there not been negociations from time to time attempted on our part, and long pending between the two nations? Has not the late extraordinary mission been considered more important than any other—and what has been the result? A total failure, sir—a total denial on her part of reparation for an offence which she acknowledged she had committed. Instead of making reparation, it would seem as if the object of that nation was to mock negociation—to send a minister here under pretence of negociation, whose very first act was to call upon you, the injured party, to make concession for feeling the injury which she has done you, and for expressing those feelings and demanding reparation for the same. This was in substance the requisition; and the demand itself was in fact adding insult to injury. If we had public officers who would submit to such demands and degrade the nation by making such concessions as these, they would deserve to be immediately removed from office—they would be reprobated by the nation. I do not wish to be understood by saying so, as having any desire to go to war, no, I do not—but I trust the people of America are determined never to surrender or barter their honor, their rights or independence for a shameful peace; and should we ever concede one point, they would make further demands, and no one can say when or where they would stop. Let me ask them where is there a single circumstance which ought to quiet our feelings and calm our apprehensions—there is none. Some months ago, it was expressed on this floor by certain gentlemen, that we were either actually at war or that we acted wrong in not going to war. And here I cannot help remarking as a singular fact, that the same gentlemen now tell us that we are in no danger, not even sufficiently so to induce us to make any preparations, who told us in the commencement of the session that we ought to have gone to war the moment the affair of the Chesapeake took place, that we ought to have seized upon Canada and made a descent upon Jamaica; they were in favor then of such decisive steps as these, and yet at this time they think it unnecessary to adopt any measures calculated to resist aggressions and put the nation in a state of defence. Surely, sir, the failure of the negociation is a strong reason to induce us to prepare for any event that may happen. It is the strongest proof that G. Britain is not favorably disposed towards us.

You are told however, that G. Britain and France press each other so severely and yet so equally at the same time that there is no danger of our having occasion to go to war with either. What evidence have we, supposing the reasoning correct, (which is not admitted) that this equal pressure will continue for a day, a week, or a month; must not one power eventually prevail and the other give way—and will it not be in the power of that nation which prevails to strike a decisive blow, if disposed to do so, which even now may be preparing for us. But if these powers at this moment do press each other so severely that they cannot turn their attention towards us, I ask how it is that one of them has refused to do you that justice which she seems to confess she owes you? I wish gentlemen to attend to this circumstance and they will see that this conduct is no evidence of a friendly disposition towards us—but directly the contrary. If when all the continent of Europe is in arms against her, she refuses to make reparation for an act which she acknowledges to be hostile, I ask what have you to expect when this pressure upon her is removed? Have you any thing to hope from her justice? And if it is not her interest now to make reparation, will it be more so when this pressure upon her ceases. And, if that is the only reason why we are not in danger, viz. that those powers press equally upon each other, this would seem to be the inevitable result: if they are prevented from attacking us because they are opposed to each other, that moment in which they accommodate matters, they may and probably will wreak their vengeance on us. Let us then prepare as well against the one as against the other of those powers. Here it may be proper further to observe, that G. Britain, not satisfied with these extraordinary aggressions on your vessels and seamen, has gone on by her orders of council to interdict your commerce from the whole continent of Europe. I am not disposed to go into a particular detail of the effects of these measures. They are known to all. It is sufficient to state that they are clearly understood in this country, as well as in that from which they originate, to have this effect, that every ship belonging to you that sails the ocean is either made liable to confiscation by G. Britain, or subjected to such conditions as to make it liable to certain confiscation by her enemies. I state this without hazarding a doubt of its correctness or a belief that it will be contradicted. Not a vessel can sail from your ports but is liable to be confiscated or subject to such conditions as will expose to confiscation by another nation. This is understood here as well as there; and though we do not choose to go to war yet it proves her disposition to injure and cripple us as far as it is her power.

Gentlemen do not believe her disposition hostile, or that she will make war because she professes to be friendly to us. If we rely upon such professions we may be lulled into security and remain quiet, until it is her good pleasure to remove her restrictions from our commerce, or until she attack our towns and march her armies into our country, and then gentlemen will consent to commence the work of preparation. But when her armies are in the bosom of your country it will be too late to raise your force to resist them, this must be evident to every man. I hope therefore we shall not adopt such short-sighted dangerous policy; it is an insult to the understanding of any country to be told that it shall not prepare till war is actually commenced against it. War threatens and we should make preparations to provide against it—not to raise large armies, and pour our whole energy into the field "whenever a speck of war appears in the horizon," but to make such preparation as will meet the first attacks, resist encroachments and sustain the contest until the energies of the nation could be called into actual service. But let us inquire, what is our situation in regard to France? I wish not to be misunderstood; I declare that I have no other enmity to Great Britain than what results from her acts of hostility towards us, and perhaps I might say that I have with others, very strong reasons to feel the contrary. I am disposed to prepare to meet any attack from whatever quarter it may come. But let us enquire what is our situation in regard to France? It is true, France has not impressed our seamen; she has not harrassed our commerce until very lately, as much as Great Britain, nor has she murdered your citizens, nor attacked your ships of war; but she has joined Great Britain in her commercial restrictions, and in her interdictions of your trade. Her blockading decrees operate on our commerce in the most injurious manner, and contribute very much to cut off our trade from Europe. They subject to confiscation every ship that is bound to a British port, that has British goods on board, or that submits to examination by a British ship of war—this is certainly no evidence of a friendly disposition on her part—no proof that we have nothing to fear from her, if it was her interest to attack us. We know that both those nations are disposed to bring us into the contest. We know it now officially; we knew it from newspapers long since; and I cannot believe it proper that we should lull ourselves into security with respect to France, any more than in respect to Great Britain. You are told that France and Spain were identified in 1805—6; if they were so then, they are much more so now, when Spain is indeed but the vassal of France and there is much more probability of her being supported by her in any attack she might make upon our country. On that ground then we are not safe, and should not repose in security with regard to either. I need not on this occasion bring to the minds of this House the consequences which have resulted from such security as that in which we are called upon to rest. I need not bring to your recollection the case of Copenhagen, so often noticed on this floor—From the best information obtained on this subject, from the statements made in the British Parliament, it is manifest, that the Danish government apprehended no danger, that they were lulled into a state of security, that their troops were on the continent, in Holstein, maintaining inviolate their neutrality—that they had given no just ground of offence to G. Britain, and were reposing in security on the good understanding that appeared to subsist between the two nations, when she was suddenly attacked by a British fleet and army, and spoiled of her richest treasure. The so much famed British *Lion*, stretched forth his merciless paw—fastened its fangs upon her capital, *murdered* her people, and *robbed* her of her navy, the most valuable possession on which was placed her chief reliance for defence. This great *national robbery* may by some be considered excusable, which if committed in private life would be a criminal offence liable to capital punishment. But if Denmark when innocent, was treated in this manner, what sufficient reason have we to rest assured that a similar line of conduct is not meditated, and will not be adopted in regard to us? What evidence have we that we are safe from the effects of the overgrown power and ambition of either G. Britain or France? For I do not mean to say that France would not pursue the same line of conduct, if it was her interest so to do. When threatened with danger from each of those powers, ought we not to prepare to meet a treatment similar to that other nations have experienced? I presume no one will deny that we ought; and the only difference of opinion must be as to the means to be employed. I cannot see the force of the arguments urged against the bill—to me they are incomprehensible—and gentlemen seem to speak as if they viewed the present state of our public affairs through the medium of jaundiced eyes, and not through clear optics.

There is another circumstance which deserves notice—the disposition which the British government has manifested in her colonies bordering on our territory towards the north east. Have not her officers from the best information which we possess incited the savages on those frontiers to prepare to make war on our citizens, and has she not fortified her towns, and thrown a considerable number of troops into that quarter? For what purpose are those measures adopted? Are they not proof of her disposition to act offensively? We are told indeed that she does all this for her own defence, and that it is evidence of her pacific disposition, as she is apprehensive of an attack from you. In my mind it wears a very different appearance—I consider it as a proof of her hostility to this country, and such as ought to induce us to put the nation in a state of defence. She may not indeed intend to attack us by a force from Canada, but to prepare for an attack by us on Canada in consequence of an assault by her on some quarter of our territory. She may mean to make an attack on New-York or N. Orleans, and may thus prepare herself to repel retaliation on our part.

Your attention is called to our finances, and you are told that the expence ought to prevent you from raising these troops. It is true that the present state of our commerce will affect the revenue; but surely that is no argument in the present case; for if the measure be necessary, the expence ought not to prevent its adoption. Will gentlemen tell you that they are willing to risk the lives, the property, and the liberty of their fellow citizens, rather than incur such expence as may be necessary to preserve them. I presume they will not. The expence can be no objection if the measure be necessary. If it be not necessary, it ought not to be adopted, even suppose it cost you nothing.

You are also told by some gentlemen that the embargo will effect all your purposes; that you have nothing to do but to continue that measure and you will bring those nations to terms. I am extremely happy that gentlemen who formerly thought otherwise, have now come into opinions which a great majority of this House entertained in substance, and expressed when the measure of the embargo was discussed in this House; they are certainly at liberty to change misconceived opinions, and are correct in so doing. I have myself considerable reliance on the embargo, and believe it has had, and will have a good effect; but I would not rely on it alone. It is not a measure to protect us in case of war—it is not a measure to keep off an invading foe. And if in fact there be danger of war, we cannot rely on the embargo, to repel it. It was intended to preserve our resources, and prepare us for war, and it is calculated to have that effect.

But another objection is made to this bill, which seems to be a kind of forlorn hope: that it is a half-way measure, neither calculated for war nor peace. One gentleman tells you he would vote for troops to take Canada and drive the English out of the continent, and yet that he will not vote for this bill. I cannot understand the correctness of this doctrine. If the crisis be such as to justify us in raising such a force as would be competent to make war, and conquer and take possession of Canada, it certainly is sufficient to justify the raising a few troops to defend our country in the first instance, and, if it should be necessary to assist in carrying into effect that great design [Mr. Stanford said that he had said if gentlemen in the majority would come forward and say that the invasion of Canada was the object, he would vote for that number of men which experienced gentlemen should say was proper. If it were judged proper to root out the British name from the continent, he would vote such a force as was sufficient.] Mr. Campbell—The gentleman's meaning then is, that if gentlemen declare that to be the object, he will call for raising a sufficient force to effect it, of course I must understand him as saying that this is such a crisis as would induce him to give his vote for a force sufficient to conquer Canada, if other gentlemen thought it expedient; that is, this is such a crisis as would induce him to give his vote to drive the subjects of Great Britain out of this continent and destroy her power therein, and yet it would not justify the raising 6,000 men to meet any emergency that may happen. I cannot comprehend this sort of reasoning. It is saying that you must remain in perfect tranquility, and submit to every insult and injury, or you must make war in the first instance before you prepare for it. But, sir, war or peace does not depend upon us. We do not wish to go to war, if we could preserve peace, this however may not be in our power. But it is our duty to prepare to defend ourselves from impending danger, from which we ought not to shrink. But this has been reverberated in your years as a half way measure; and you are asked what this force can effect. It might as well be asked what 60,000 men can do, as to ask what 6,000 are good for. It is only pushing the argument a little further in order to shew its absurdity. One thousand men even at New York would be of considerable advantage to assist the people against an attack there. Regular troops well trained, give spirit to the militia. Why then ask the use of six thousand men? They will be of proportionate use with a body of an hundred thousand. With respect to this half way measure, I believe it is the first time that it was ever argued that we must not raise a force except it be sufficient for conquest. It has been considered proper when you raise a force to make the number proportionate to the emergency of the times. But that we should calculate the precise number that may eventually be required is impossible.

I am sorry to detain the House so long; but will make one or two remarks on what fell from the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana.)

I am not much acquainted with commercial transactions or the hardships experienced by our seamen, but really there can be no great difficulty in answering the question asked by the gentleman, what injury the impressment of her own seamen by Great Britain from our vessels can do our own seamen. It has exposed and still does expose our seamen to impressment by her; they have been impressed from our ships, and forced to serve in British vessels, and treated in a manner which need not be repeated here. The gentleman meant, no doubt, that this principle of impressing her own seamen would not do injury to ours if it were not abused; but it has been abused, and will still be abused in practice; and when the expediency of permitting the principles to be acted upon is enquired into, the result must depend on the effect of the practice. Abuse is the necessary consequence of the practice, and there are more American seamen taken out of our ships under it, than there are British subjects—as the principle is therefore radically wrong, and also highly injurious in its practice, it ought not to be submitted to.

The same gentleman, in shewing that the British were so much engaged in other parts of the world that they could not attack us, told us that they held in subjection 40 millions of souls in Asia. This I believe to be correct; and it is the strongest proof on earth of their tyrannical disposition, and the determination on their part if in their power to add the American people to those millions. If then these powers have no principle but that which results from power and interest, what confidence can the American people have either in British humanity or French friendship? I presume very, very little.

I need not state to this House that the 6,000 men proposed to be raised by this bill, are not the only force, nor indeed the chief force we rely upon for the defence of the nation. We have authorised the erection of fortifications and the building of gun-boats. These are intended for the protection of your towns and sea coasts; and it would seem equally important that a sufficient force should be provided for the defence of our extensive and exposed frontiers. If the country was not in danger, why erect fortifications and build gun-boats?—If it was and still is in danger, why refuse to raise this force to aid in defending it against such danger. We who are more immediately interested in the security of the western country joined you in those measures, calculated to protect your sea coast, because we considered it our duty to promote the general welfare of the nation; and we trust that you will join us in raising this force, which may be highly necessary for the defence of our frontiers. Every part of the union ought to be protected; and experience has sufficiently shewn, that we ought not to place too much reliance on the justice or forbearance of those powers when their interest comes in question. In addition to those measures, the President is authorised to call into actual service 100,000 militia, should the exigency require it. Should the bill on your table pass, we shall then have, including the present peace establishment, a regular force of about 10,000 men, which together with the 100,000 militia, would be sufficient to repel any foe that dare attack us. I would however be willing myself to go still further, and organise an additional body of volunteer militia, of 20 or 24,000 men, as proposed by a message to this House. This would in my view provide in a very great degree for the national security. It would furnish, in case of danger, a disposable force of about 130,000 men, which would be sufficient to meet any emergency we have a right to calculate upon. These, I presume, ought not to be called half way measures.

Gentlemen insist that these 6,000 men are not adequate for defence in case of war. If they were alone relied upon this might be true; but that is not a fair way to judge of their efficiency or usefulness. It might as well be said that one gun-boat is not sufficient to defend your coast, and therefore you ought not to build it, or indeed that 100 are not sufficient, and then you ought to build none, unless you can build as many at once as will defend you against the whole world; or that a single fortification will not defend all your harbors, and therefore, though it would defend one important point, it must not be erected. Such logic as this I do not pretend to understand, such reasoning will not go down with the American people, their good sense will detect its fallacy and discover its weakness. This force taken in connection with the other forces and means of defence provided by law, will, we trust, be found competent to answer all our present purposes, and in case of hostility, will be the commencement of a war establishment; but in case of peace will be immediately disbanded.

I sincerely wish these troops may not be called into actual service. I hope there may be no occasion for them. Should this be the case I shall rejoice at the event; but I shall still think I have discharged an important duty to my country, in providing the means of defence against the apparent impending dangers; and I shall consider that duty as honestly and faithfully performed, as if this force should actually have repelled an invading foe.

RUNAWAY

WAS committed to the jail of Washington county, district of Columbia, as a runaway on the 11th inst. a black man who calls himself STEPHEN, and says he belongs to Letty Claxton of Montgomery county, Md. and he is about 24 years of age, 5 feet 9 inches high, stout made; had on when committed, an old black hat, white kersey jacket, striped kersey pantaloons, coarse linen shirt, old shoes, and no other clothes with him, limps very much in his right leg. His owner is desired to come and prove him and take him away, or he will be sold for his jail and other expences as the law directs.

C. TIPPET, Keeper
of the jail for Washington
Boyd marshal.

April 27—w3t