National Intelligencer.

& WASHINGTON ADVERTISER.

VOL. VIII. WASHINGTON CITY, PRINTED BY SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH, PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. NO. 1257.

FIVE DOLLARS PER ANNUM, MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1808. PAID IN ADVANCE.

THE *National Intelligencer* will henceforth be conducted by SAMUEL H. SMITH, and JOSEPH GALES, Jun. and printed at the Office of the *former*, to whom subscribers and correspondents are requested still to address themselves.

The annual price, payable in advance, is *Five* dollars. The punctual compliance with this term is at this time of the greatest importance, and is earnestly requested.

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Report of the War Minister to his Majesty the Emperor and King.

SIRE—I have the honor of laying before your majesty the state and situation of your majesty's armies in Poland, in Prussia, and in Silesia, in Denmark, in Dalmatia, in Albania, in Italy, in Naples, and in Spain. I annex to it that of your majesty's armies of reserve, at Boulogne, on the coasts, on the Rhine, and in the interior. Your majesty will perceive that France never before possessed more numerous or better appointed armies, and that they were never better kept up or better proportioned.

Notwithstanding, however, the different events which have taken place in Spain have occasioned a pretty considerable loss, in consequence of an operation as inconceivable as it is painful, the division under gen. Dupont; your majesty has notified the resolution you have taken of assembling more than 200,000 men beyond the Pyrennees, without, however, weakening either the armies in Germany, or that of Dalmatia. For the attainment of this end a levy of 80,000 men appears to be indispensible.—Your majesty can only take these 80,000 men from the four classes of the conscription of the years 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809.

It is ascertained by the registers kept in my office that independently of the men who have married within these four years, the conscription for these years might furnish six hundred thousand. In taking from that number a levy of 80,000 men, your majesty will have called out only one conscript out of 7 and the vacancies in the armies will be filled up with soldiers of 21, 22, and 23 years of age; that is, with men fit and prepared to undergo the fatigues of war.

Nor has it escaped your majesty's foresight, that such an augmentation of forces would necessarily involve an increase of expence of several millions in the war department. It is not your majesty's wish that I should detain your attention with that object in this report—your finance minister has taken upon him to make good that charge without in any wise increasing the taxes established by the last law.

It is true, sire, that the custom observed of late years, might to a certain degree, in a part of your subjects to consider themselves as relased from the duty of the conscription from the moment that upon the total mass, they had furnished the complement required for the year; and under this point of view what I propose to your majesty might appear to require from your subjects a sacrifice; but, sire, there is no one but knows that by the words of the law, your majesty would be authorised to call to your standard the whole of the conscription, not only of the last four years, but even of the antecedent years; and even were the question of a real sacrifice, what sacrifice is it that your majesty has not a right to expect from the love of your subjects? Who among us is ignorant that your majesty wholly sacrifices yourself for the happiness of France, and that upon the speedy accomplishment of this high design, the repose of the world, the future safety and the re-establishment of a maritime peace, without which France can never enjoy calm and tranquility?

In proposing to your majesty to declare, that henceforth no retrospective call shall take on an antecedent conscription, I only participate, sire, your paternal wishes.

I think it expedient at the same time to propose to your majesty to order out the conscription of 1810, and to determine the amount of it, from the present instant, at eighty thousand men, to furnish the means as occasion may require, of forming camps of reserve, and protecting the coast in the spring time. This conscription would be raised only under the apprehensions of war with other powers, nor would it be called out before the month of January next.

Sire, it is a misfortune inseparable from the present state of Europe, that when one power exceeds the amount of the forces proportioned to its population, the other powers cannot dispense with increasing theirs to the same proportion.

England, independent of the immense number of her seamen, has on foot an army of more than two hundred thousand men; nor is she so much occupied in every session of her parliament with any thing as with the increase of her land forces. The armies of Austria have been considerably increased. France, altho' she has armies more numerous than all the other powers, has notwithstanding fewer men under arms than any of them, compared with her population.

Your minister for foreign affairs assures me that a strict alliance subsisted between your majesty and Russia. The armaments of Austria have often excited my solicitude. The same minister assured me that the best understanding was kept up with Austria, and that her levies should only be considered either as precautions, or as the effect of apprehensions, which are forcibly impressed on every court, by the numerous agents which England continues in pay on the continent.

But if it does not belong to the business of my department to dive into the views and interests of states, and explore the tortuous labyrinth of politics, it is at least my duty to neglect nothing to make your majesty's armies maintain, at all points, that just superiority which they ought to possess. The armies of Albania and Dalmatia, of Denmark, and of the Elbe, will not allow of any diminution, under the circumstances of the moment.

What I have to propose to your majesty will give the army of Spain two hundred thousand men, without weakening the other armies; so that, notwithstanding the augmentation of our force beyond the Pyrennees, when the conscription of 1810 shall be called out, your majesty will have increased your armies of Germany, of the North, and of Italy, by more than eighty thousand men.

And when, in order to escape the crisis into which she has been drawn by a false as well as angry policy, the English government, exerting every where its activity does not hesitate to combine with the resources it draws from its inexhaustible finances and its formidable fleets, the arts of intrigue and corruption, and imposture, would it be at all extraordinary that the immense population of France should hold out the spectacle of a million of armed men, ready to punish England and all those whom she may seduce and present every where the same huge mass of force, to protect with the same shield the honor and security of France?

What other result, sire, is to be expected from armies so numerous, and a position so formidable, but the speedy re-establishment of the tranquility of Spain, that of a maritime peace, & of that general tranquility, the object of your majesty's incessant wishes:—much blood will have been spared, because a great number of men will have been ready to shed it. A durable happiness, prepared by the combinations of your powerful genius, will be the effect, sire, of the new proofs of affection and attachment which your people will afford you, and of the noble aspect of that nation which your majesty has pointed to posterity under the name of the Great nation.

War minister, and under this denomination, the organ of the French soldiers allow me, sire, to be the interpreter of their sentiments for you. Your majesty shall always see us ready to sacrifice our lives for your glory, which is inseparable from the national glory, to which you have so powerfully added and for the important interests of the country.

I am, with respect, &c.

(This paper also contains the act of renunciation negociated between the prince of Peace and Doric, by which Charles the IV. and the prince of Asturias, abdicated their right of the crown of Spain to Napoleon.)

MANIFESTO OF THE JUNTA OF SEVILLE.

"The defence of our country and of our king, that of our laws, our religion, and of all the rights of man, trodden down and violated in a manner which is without example, by the emperor of the French, Napoleon I. and by his troops in Spain, compelled the whole nation to take up arms, and to choose itself a form of government; and, in the difficulties and dangers into which the French had plunged it, all, or nearly all, the provinces as it were by the inspiration of Heaven, and in a manner little short of miraculous, created supreme juntas, delivered themselves up to their guidance, and placed in their hands the rights and the ultimate fate of Spain.

"The effects have hitherto most happily corresponded with the designs of those who formed them. The provinces have armed themselves; some have formed large armies of veteran troops, and have united to them the enlisted peasants; all, or nearly all, have fought, and Ferdinand the VII. with a valor and a constancy, of which neither Greece nor Rome, nor any other nation of the world, had any idea. The French are really amazed and terrified, and the hopes of conquering them are as sure as human certainty can reach.

"The only thing which can impair or frustrate them, is discord, and the want of union among the provinces themselves.—Hence the supreme junta paid its first attention to remove that danger, with which view, it printed and published the official paper entitled Precautions, which it communicated in every possible manner to all the provinces in Spain. The bringing this plan to perfection, and carrying it into execution, is now more than ever necessary. Our enemies are anxious to foment our divisions. Human passions, personal interests ill understood, the ignorance, the weakness, the blindness of men, may perhaps, without their knowing it, assist the evil designs of our enemies, and thus destroy a beginning so glorious and facilitate and consummate the total ruin of Spain. This it is that we are endeavoring to guard against, urged only by the most sacred motives, by our honor, by our loyalty, as affectionate subjects, by our duty as Spaniards, by our faith as christians; and here we protest, before God and man, whose aid we invoke with all fervency, that we will write nothing but what is dictated to us by the love of our country, the preservation of our king, and our rights, not mingling with it any thing that appears to partake of passion, of interest or of any other personal motives; but being always ready to hear the opinions of other provinces, and to amend our own errors, wherever it shall be shewn that we have committed any.

"Be it the chief care to avoid every thing which is not absolutely necessary, and which may serve to sow the seeds of disunion in the provinces, and to excite divisions among them; and of this nature we esteem all conversation about the royal house, and of the order of succession in different families which derive a right from it. There is no person so ignorant of the history of Spain, and of the manner in which the throne has been occupied as not to know the changes which have taken place in the succession. It is also known what are the legislative proceedings upon this point; what the manner in which endeavors are used to introduce an alteration into them; the different pretexts for this alteration; and, lastly, the final settlement which was made by the Cortes of 1789, and which ought in future to be the rule.

"But are we in a situation to talk of these matters? Long live our king and indisputable sovereign Ferdinand the VII and long live his august brothers, heirs of the crown, after his attested decease. Why then anticipate those enquiries which can only be necessary in default of these?—This anticipation may produce, by the diversity of opinions which it creates, a cruel disunion, which of itself alone will utterly ruin the only aim and object which Spain at present has in view, and that is, its own entire and independent preservation for its sovereign lord and king Ferdinand the VII. and his undisputed successors; and with its king, the preservation of its own rights and laws, and the unity of the holy Roman catholic apostolical religion, which it has gloriously professed and defended for so many ages. It is therefore, both absurd and dangerous to dispute about the succession in cases evidently remote; all the provinces of Spain ought to confine themselves in this respect to this general expression—Hereditary succession according to the fundamental laws of the monarchy.

"Not so is it with the second question, moved by the various Juntas of the kingdom, which certainly keep the people in a state of disquietude and agitation, is the continual object of public conversation, and may produce divisions fatal to the generous design, and the virtuous obligations into which we have entered of defending ourselves against our enemies, and of preserving our country, our king, our monarchy, our laws, and our religion. This second question is—is there a necessity for erecting a Supreme government, which may unite the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till the restitution of king Ferdinand to his throne?

"This supreme junta declares openly, that from the beginning to the present time it has been persuaded that such a supreme government is altogether necessary, and that without it the country is in danger, and its enemies will find means of completing its ruin; and the reasons of this determination and declaration are so evident, and present themselves with such clearness to the eyes of all, that they cannot fail of convincing all who have the least notion of public affairs, or a correct insight into the nature of man, the passions which move him, and the order of human affairs in all ages. Various supreme juntas and military chiefs have expressed their convictions of this truth.

"A conviction of the same springs from the indispensable necessity of civil government in every nation whose duty it is to attend to the happiness of the kingdom, and to which the military may be subordinate. The confidence of the nation, and, consequently, the public funds and the capital of individuals, must, necessarily, have a civil government for their support. Without it the military power would, indispensably, be under the necessity of employing violence, with the view of acquiring that confidence which it never could attain, and getting a command of those capitals, which it would be equally impossible for it to bring within its grasp; and thus it would ultimately destroy that public prosperity and happiness, which ought to be the sole object of every government. Let us not vainly flatter ourselves with notions of Roman Dictators, and the other military chiefs of the ancient republics: they were placed under very prudent restraints and the duration of their authority was limited to a very short period. The dangers of complete despotism and usurpation kept them in continual alarm, and compelled them to take very rigorous precautions, which are very incompatible with the habits of modern times. Spain has derived a lesson of wisdom from the history of past ages; she has never thought of appointing a military dictator. Her military chiefs (and it is a fact most honorable to the name) have been the first to embrace, with the utmost cordiality, a system of things as ancient in Spain as the monarchy itself. The experience of our times—the confidence of the people in the Supreme Juntas—the facility and abundance with which pecuniary resources have been placed at their disposal—the heroic loyalty with which the military chiefs and the army have acknowledged and obeyed them, and the happy issue hitherto of their civil administration and the military enterprizes which they have directed, have placed in the most conspicuous light, and established beyond all doubt, this fundamental truth and most essential political principle.

"But who is to create this supreme civil government? Who are to compose it? Where shall be its place of residence? What the extent of its authority? How shall it be established without interrupting the public tranquility, and producing disunion among the different provinces? How is the opinion to be so regulated as that, without opposing it, this tranquility shall be attained, and all of risk of disturbance, obviated; These are the important and serious questions which we shall now proceed to examine; and upon which, influenced solely by the love of our country, and our anxiety to promote its welfare, we will enter into a frank explanation of our sentiments

"In the various papers that have been published upon this subject, we are told that the Cortes should assemble; that they should elect representatives; and farther, that the old council of Castile should convoke them, and the whole of the proceeding should be executed under its authority.

"Most assuredly we do not understand the grounds upon which this decisions rests. The council of Castile, though a lawful assembly, never convoked the Cortes. Why then should we give it an authority which it does not possess? Is it because it lent the whole weight of its influence to such important changes, with regard to which it had no powers, nor any authority whatsoever? Is it because it has acted in opposition to those fundamental laws, which it was established to preserve and defend? Is it because it afforded the greatest facility to the enemy to usurp the sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary succession of the crown, and dynasty, legally in possession, and recognized and seated on the throne a foreigner, destitute even of the shadow of a title to it; for it is incontrovertibly manifest, that the renunciation of Charles IV. in his favor gave him no such claim? What confidence could the Spanish nation place in a government created by an authority invalid and illegal, and which had also rendered itself suspected, by the previous commission of acts of so horrible a description, that they may be justly ranked with the most atrocious crimes against the country?

"The council of Castile being thus excluded from all consideration—who should convoke the Cortes?—The authority to convoke them is a part of the peculiar and exclusive perogative of the king. The provinces would not submit to any other authority; they would not unite; there would be no Cortes; and should a few delegates assemble, that very circumstance would expose the kingdom to division—the evil which all wish to avoid.

"Besides, the cities who have votes in Cortes have not undertaken the defence of the kingdom, nor of themselves, nor in their corporate capacity, have they made any efforts to defend it. We entertain the most profound respect both for them and their rights; but truth compels us to speak out.

"Most undoubtedly, however, the cities who have votes in the Cortes, in thus conducting themselves, acted with consummate prudence, and with a due observance of law. The kingdom found itself suddenly without a king, and without a government—a situation indeed unknown in our history and to our laws. The people legally resumed the power of appointing a government; and this truth has been openly avowed by various supreme juntas. The people created these juntas without paying any regard to the cities who have votes in the Cortes. The legitimate power is therefore deposited with the supreme juntas, and in virtue of that power, they have governed and do govern with real authority, and have been and still are acknowledged and obeyed by all ranks of subjects, and by all cities in their respective districts, having votes in the Cortes. Their situation has not changed; the danger still exists; no new authority has supervened; the lawful authority therefore resides entire in the juntas which the people created, and to which they confided it.

"It is, therefore, incontestible that the supreme juntas have the sole and exclusive right of electing those who are to compose the Supreme Government, as the only means of protecting and preserving the kingdom whose defence the people have entrusted to them, and which cannot be accomplished but by the establishment of a