Appendix 6

Selected Excerpts from Hearing Testimony

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Hearing: Administration's Overview

Tuesday, November 5, 1991 at 9:30 a.m.
Room 216, Hart Senate Building

PANEL 1: **Paul Wolfowitz**
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

PANEL 2: **Gen. John W. Vessey**, U.S. Army (Retired)
Special Presidential Emissary to Vietnam for POW/MIA Matters

PANEL 3: **Duane P. Andrews**
Assistant Defense Secretary for
Command, Communications, Control, and Intelligence

PANEL 4: **Ken Quinn**
Chairman of the POW/MIA Interagency Group and
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs

PANEL 5: **Carl W. Ford, Jr.**, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs

Major General Michael E. Ryan, U.S. Air Force,
Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), The Joint Staff

Major General George R. Christmas, U.S. Marine Corps,
Director of Operations (J-3), Pacific Command

PANEL 6: **Dennis Nagy**, Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Robert Sheetz, Chief of the Special Office
for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action,
Defense Intelligence Agency

Charles F. Trowbridge, Jr., Deputy, Special Office
for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action,
Defense Intelligence Agency

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Hearing: U.S. Efforts to Find Missing Soldiers

Wednesday, November 6, 1991 at 10 a.m.
Room 216, Hart Senate Building

PANEL 1: Operations on the Ground

Garnett E. Bell, Chief, U.S. Office for POW/MIA, Hanoi

William R. Gadoury, Jr., U.S. Joint Casualty Resolution - Laos, Joint Casualty Resolution Center

Col. John Cole, Director, Stoney Beach, Thailand Defense Intelligence Agency

PANEL 2: Families' Perspectives

Ann Mills Griffiths, Executive Director, National League of Families

Dolores Apodaca Alfond, National Chairperson, National Alliance of Families

Dr. Patricia O'Grady and Robert Apodaca, Vessey Discrepancy Cases

PANEL 3: Veterans' Perspectives

Robert E. Wallace, National Commander, Veterans of Foreign Wars

John F. Sommer, Jr., Executive Director, American Legion

Joseph E. Andry, former National Commander, Disabled American Veterans

Bill Duker, Chairman, POW/MIA Committee, Vietnam Veterans of America

J. Thomas Burch, Chairman, National Vietnam Veterans Coalition

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

Hearing: Critics' Perspectives

Thursday, November 7, 1991 at 9:30 a.m.
Room 216, Hart Senate Building

PANEL 1: **Bui Tin**, Vietnamese Defector and former Communist Party member and editor

PANEL 2: Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican Staff Report on U.S. Policy toward POWs and MIAs

PANEL 2: **Gen. Eugene Tighe**, U.S. Army (Retired) [tentative]
Former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency

Col. Millard Peck, U.S. Army (Retired) [tentative]
Former Chief of the Special Office for POW/MIA at the Defense Intelligence Agency

PANEL 3: **Monica Jensen-Stevenson**, author, Kiss the Boys Goodbye

Nigel Cawthorne, author, The Bamboo Cage

PANEL 4: **Jeff Donahue**, author, POW/MIA Timeline and MIA relative

Ted Sampley, Homecoming II Project
U.S. Veterans News

PANEL 5: Recently Publicized Photos

Jack Bailey (Carr case)

Hamilton Gayden (Borah case)

Albro L. Lundy III, Barbara Robertson, Gladys Fleckenstein (Lundy/Robertson/Stevens case)

PANEL 6: Administration response

[After the conclusion of testimony from the final panel, the Administration will have an opportunity to respond to Senators' questions. The Department of Defense team will be led by Carl Ford].

John F. Kerry, Massachusetts, Chairman
Bob Smith, New Hampshire, Vice Chairman

Select Committee on
POW / MIA Affairs

Tom Daschle, South Dakota
Harry Reid, Nevada
Charles Robb, Virginia
Bob Kerrey, Nebraska
Herb Kohl, Wisconsin

John McCain, Arizona
Hank Brown, Colorado
Charles Grassley, Iowa
Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Kansas
Jesse Helms, North Carolina

Frances A. Zwenig, Staff Director
Alan C. Pick, Deputy Staff Director
J. William Codinha, General Counsel

United States Senate Washington, DC 20510-6500 (202) 224-2306

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
January 15, 1992

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202/ 224-2075

FORMER U.S. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS TO TESTIFY JAN. 22

ABOUT POWs ALLEGEDLY HELD AFTER THE VIETNAM WAR

WASHINGTON -- The Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs will hear charges that American POWs were held after the Vietnam War ended, Chairman John F. Kerry, D-Mass., and Vice Chairman Bob Smith, R-NH, announced today.

The hearing on Wednesday, Jan. 22 begins at 11:30 a.m. in Room 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Two former National Security Agency analysts will testify about tracing American POWs in Southeast Asia -- and possibly to the USSR -- after the Vietnam War. The witnesses are Jerry Mooney, of Wolf Point, Montana, and Terrell Minarcin, of Tacoma, Washington.

The former KGB head of foreign counterespionage, Maj. Gen. Oleg Kalugin, has said that Soviets interrogated American POWs in Vietnam as late as 1978 -- five years after the war ended. Kalugin will testify **Tuesday, Jan. 21 at 2:30 p.m. in Room 216, Hart Senate Office Building.**

At the Committee's first round of hearings in November, Bui Tin, a former top North Vietnamese official testified that Soviets interrogated U.S. servicemen in Vietnam during the war. The Pentagon contends that no American POWs who returned at Operation Homecoming reported being interrogated by Soviets.

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

June 24, 1992

Panel 1: An Overview of Wartime Casualty Accounting 1961-73

Robert Sungenis, Chief
Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports,
Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Charles Trowbridge, Deputy Director
Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office
for POW/MIA Affairs, 1971-1992

Senior Service Casualty Officers
- Col. Michael Spinello, U.S. Army
- Brig. Gen. Michael McGinty, U.S. Air Force
- Capt. Peggy Debien, U.S. Navy
- Col. A.A. Quebodeaux, U.S. Marine Corps

Representative, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Panel 2: Accounting Efforts During Operation Homecoming, January - June, 1973

Robert Sungenis, Chief
Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports,
Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Charles Trowbridge, Deputy Director
Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office
for POW/MIA Affairs, 1971-1992

Admiral Thomas Moorer (USN, Ret.), Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff 1971-1975

Lt. General Eugene Tighe, Director
Defense Intelligence Agency 1977-1981, and
Chief of Intelligence at CINCPAC, 1972-1973

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

June 25, 1992

Panel 1: POW/MIA Accounting 1973-1992

Dr. Roger E. Shields, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Economic and POW/MIA Affairs,
Defense Department 1971-1977

Robert Sungenis, Chief
Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports,
Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Charles Trowbridge, Deputy Director
Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office
for POW/MIA Affairs, 1971-1992

Frank Sieverts, Special Assistant for POW/MIA Matters,
Department of State, 1966-1978

Gen. Robert Kingston (USA Ret.), Commander,
Joint Casualty Resolution Center, 1973-1974

Michael Oksenberg, Staff
National Security Council, 1976-1978

Panel 2: Status of Current Efforts to Account for POW/MIAs

Gen. John Vessey, (USA, Ret.)
President's Special Emissary to Hanoi on POW/MIA Affairs;
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1982-1986

Maj. Gen. George R. Christmas (USMC), Director
of Operations, U.S. Pacific Command

Bob Sheetz, Chief
Defense Intelligence Agency,
Special Office for POW/MIA Affairs

Robert Sungenis, Chief
Directorate of Information, Operations and Reports,
Office of Secretary of Defense, 1973-1992

Senior Service Casualty Officers

AUGUST 11, 1992

PANEL 1:	H. Ross Perot
PANEL 2:	Harry McKillop, Perot Associate (1969-present)
	Murphy Martin, Perot Associate (1969-1973)
	Thomas Meurer, Perot Associate (1969-1973)
PANEL 3:	McMurtrie Godley, US Ambassador to Laos, 1969-1973
	James Murphy, Aide to Ambassador Godley
PANEL 4:	Closed Session CIA Station Chief in Laos

AUGUST 12, 1992

PANEL 1:	LTG Leonard Perroots, DIA Director, 1985-1988
	Richard Childress, Nat'l Security Council (Reagan Administration)
	Richard Armitage, Defense Department (Reagan Administration)
PANEL 2:	Sen. Howard Baker, White House Chief of Staff 1987-1989
	James Cannon, Deputy to Baker 1987

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS

September 21, 1992 - 8:30 a.m.
Paris Peace Accords: Negotiations for POW/MIAs

Panel 1: Central Intelligence Agency's Input

James R. Schlesinger
Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1973
Secretary of Defense, 1973-1974

Panel 2: State and Defense Departments' Input

Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense, 1969-1973

William P. Rogers
Secretary of State, 1969-1973

Panel 3: U.S. Negotiating Team

Winston Lord
National Security Council, 1969-1973
Special Assistant to National Security Adviser, 1970-1973
Director of Policy Planning at State Department, 1973-1977

George H. Aldrich
Legal Adviser to State Department, 1965-1981

Peter W. Rodman
Staff, National Security Council, 1969-1977

Vernon A. Walters
Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1972-1976

William H. Sullivan
Ambassador to Laos, 1964-1968
Chief of U.S. Mission to Laos, 1968-1969
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1969-73

Panel 4: National Security Council/DoD Efforts through 1973

Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (USA, Ret.)
Assistant to National Security Adviser, 1969-1973
White House Chief of Staff, 1973-1974

Paris Peace Accords: Negotiations for POW/MIAs
September 22, 1992 - 9:00 a.m.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
National Security Adviser, 1969-1975
Secretary of State, 1973-1977

Expectations about POWs in Laos
and Questions after Operation Homecoming
September 24, 1992 - 9:30 a.m.

Panel 1: Expectations about POWs in Laos

Admiral Thomas Moorer (USN, Ret.)
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1970-1974

G. McMurtrie Godley
Ambassador to Laos, 1969-1973

John H. Holdridge
Assistant Secretary of State, East Asia and the Pacific 19__-1983
China Specialist, State Department 1948-1985

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy (Ret., USN) (Thursday, Panel 1)
Dep. Director for Intelligence Community, CIA, 1977-1980

Panel 2: Laos Questions

Maj. Gen. Richard Secord
Laos Chief of Air, Central Intelligence Agency. 1966-1968
Laos Desk Officer, Defense Department, 1972-1975

Elliot L. Richardson
Secretary of Defense, 1973

Panel 3: Four-Party Joint Military Commission;
Questions Remaining after Operation Homecoming

Gov. William Clements
Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1973-1976

Dr. Roger E. Shields
Deputy Asst. Secretary for Internat'l Economic & POW/MIA Affairs,
Defense Department 1971-1977

Col. Lawrence Robson (USAF, Ret.)
POW Subcommission of Four-Party Joint Military Commission

Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

November 10, 1992

Panel One

Alan Ptak
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for POW/MIA Affairs

Charles Kartman
Director, Office of Korean Affairs,
State Department

Lt. Col. James Caswell
Joint Staff, Defense Department

Dr. Paul Cole
Researcher, Rand Corporation

Panel Two

Lt. Col. Philip Corso (USA, Ret.)
National Security Council Staff,
Eisenhower Administration

Serban Opricka
Former engineer in North Korea

Col. Delk Simpson (USAF, Ret.)
Former military attache in Hong Kong

Steve Kiba
Former Korean War POW held in China

Panel Three

James Sanders and Mark Sauter
Authors, Soldiers of Misfortune

John M.G. Brown
Author, Moscow Bound

Thomas Ashworth
Researcher

Richard Boylan
Archivist, National Archives

Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

November 11, 1992

Panel One: Russan Delegation to the Joint Commission

Gen. Dimitri Volkogonov (Ret.)
Military Adviser to President Boris Yeltsin
and Co-Chairman of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission

Panel Two: [Other members of the Russian delegation, if available]

Panel Three: U.S. Delegation to Joint Commission

Richard D. Kauzlarich
Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs

Maj. Gen. Bernard Loeffke
Chief, Task Force Russia

Al Graham
Select Committee Investigator
posted to Moscow since May

Panel Four: Family Members

Dolores Alfond

Bruce W. Sanderson

Greg Skavinski

Jane Reynolds Howard

Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

December 1, 1992

Panel One: Internal Reviews of DIA

John H. Wiand
Head of February 1983
Inspector General investigation

Ken deGraffenreid
NSC Staff, author of report on DIA to
National Security Adviser in 1983-84

Col. Glenn F. Hargis,
Head of February 1985
Inspector General investigation

Dennis M. Nagy,
Head of March 1985
Inspector General investigation

Cdr. Thomas Brooks,
Author of Sept 25, 1985 Memorandum

Col. Kimball Gaines,
Head of Gaines Task Force
(Report issued March 1986)

Gen. Eugene Tighe,
Head of Tighe Commission
(Report issued May 1986)

Col. Millard Peck,
Author of January 1992 Letter

Panel Two: DIA's Response to Critics

Lt. Gen. Leonard Perroots,
Director of DIA, 1985-88

Richard Childress,
National Security Council
(Reagan Administration)

Ronald J. Knecht
Defense Department

Gen. James Williams,
former Director, DIA

Col. Joseph Schlatter,
Member of Gaines Task Force;
Chief of Analysis Branch, 1986-87; and
Chief POW/MIA Office at DIA, 1987-90

Gen. James Clapper,
Director, DIA

Panel Three: Interagency Group

Ann Mills Griffiths,
National League of Families

Richard Childress,
National Security Council

Kenneth Quinn,
State Department

Robert Sheetz,
Defense Department

Carl Ford,
Assistant Secretary for Defense

Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

December 2, 1992

Panel One: Public Awareness Activities

Patty Sheridan
River Rats (of Kansas)

Marty Eddy,
POW Committee of Michigan

John Sommer,
American Legion

Bill Duker,
Vietnam Veterans of America

JoAnn Shaw,
Georgia POW Committee

Panel Two: Fundraising Activities

Bruce Eberle and Linda Canada
Bruce Eberle & Associates

Marilyn Price,
Creative Advantage

Joseph Salta,
Response Development

John Curtis,
Infocision Management

Panel Three: Regulation of Fundraising Activities

Ken Albrecht,
National Charities Information Bureau

Charles Brown,
Charitable Trusts Division, NC

Richard Allen,
National Ass'n of Attorneys General

Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

December 3, 1992

Panel One

Admiral James and Sybil Stockdale

Panel Two: POW/MIA Wives

Donnie Collins (VA)

Janis Dodge Otis (CA)

Carol Hrdlicka (CO)

Panel Three: Other Family Members

John Kustigian (MA)

Pat Plumadore (NY)

David and Steve Morrissey (AZ)

Robert Brown (CA)

Panel Four: Casualty Officers

George Atkinson,
USAF Casualty Affairs

B.J. Andrews,
DoD Family Liaison

David Geraldson
Former Casualty Officer

Lt. Col. Mack Brooks,
U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs

December 4, 1992

Panel One

General John Vessey,
Special Presidential Emissary to Vietnam

Panel Two

Admiral Charles Larson,
Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces

Maj. Gen. Thomas Needham,
Chief, Joint Task Force-Full Accounting (JTF-FA)

Maj. Gen. George Christmas,
CINCPAC's Director of Operations

Panel Three

Alan Ptak,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs,
Defense Department

Kenneth Quinn,
Department of State

Panel Four

Carl Ford,
Assistant Secretary for Defense

Col. John Cole,
Defense Intelligence Agency

Robert Sheetz,
Defense Intelligence Agency

Robert DeStatte,
Defense Intelligence Agency

Ted Schweitzer,
Researcher

Garnett Bell,
Investigator, JTF-FA

William Gadoury,
Investigator, JTF-FA

MSGT Bill Deeter,
Investigator, JTF-FA

Accounting - Left Behind	Admiral Stockdale 12/03/92	Chairman Kerry: Based on that concept of morality that you have been driven by and the entire process that you felt drove all of you that you would come back together speaking to us today, to a matter of moral certainty in your heart and under oath, do you believe that you left anybody behind or that anybody was alive? Stockdale: No. No. I would not have come back...
Accounting - Left Behind	Admiral Stockdale 12/03/92	It was the Son Tay Raid of November 1970 that prompted the North Vietnamese to bring them all -- all of these chickens out in the satellite camps back, all back to Hoala Prison, where in January 1971 every American prisoner -- with two exceptions which I'll cover in a minute -- where every American prisoner who had ever been sighted, whispered to, tapped to by any other American over the last 6-1/2 years were all locked up in a ring of contiguous large cell blocks around the largest west courtyard of Hoala Prison, and it's half the prison.
Accounting - Left Behind	Admiral Stockdale 12/03/92	Found in those dungeons -- all of this activity found in those dungeons, a meaning of life centered on being your brother's keeper emerged, keeping a memorialized chronology of contacts and acquaintances that could some day, God willing, when papers and pencils were available, allow you to present to the world a history, in the worst case, of who was last known to be where.

Accounting	Admiral Stockdale 12/03/92	And then there's a kind of an unreal -- as we've come along in this 20th century, we've become litigious... where we believe that somebody owes us an explanation and an apology and a payback if something is not quite right. And when you start talking about warriors last seen alive, never being -- that the Government owes you a blow-by-blow description of what happened to them to bring about either their demise or their missingness, there's never been a war in history that any government could do that. To say that the Government owes us an explanation for what happened to a guy who was last seen alive out on the battlefield. Can anybody see that as a possible reality? At night or in storms, people get buried under avalanches. There's any number of things that have happened over history. That's just an unrealistic goal somebody has cooked up, and now it's a demand.
Accounting	Andry 11/06/91	Mr. Chairman, let me say we don't expect this committee to take on mission impossible by trying to account for every single POW or MIA. But we do believe that every effort should be made to determine why the Government has been unable to do a better job of accounting for these soldiers. Furthermore, every effort should be made to determine what plans our Government has made to prevent this intolerable situation from happening again.

Accounting	Bell 12/04/92	...we're not talking about one man being the only one privy to this information, we're talking about hundreds of thousands of analysts at the time of intercept having access to the same information that Mr. Mooney saw and that Mr. Minarsin saw. And they have all reached the same conclusion, that just never happened, that there is no indication that people were singled out based on their air crew status, based on their technical capability or their technical knowledge, as Moscow-bound, and our review -- and this is, as I said, the third time that it's been reviewed to look for that information -- supports that.
Accounting - Left Behind	Bell 11/06/91	We had information of Americans being held at that time [after Operation Homecoming], sir, but it was not correlated to any specific individual.
Accounting - KIA/BNR	Brooks 12/01/92	I, too, have wondered why some cases were left MIA when all good, in my estimation, evidence suggested that the person never survived the plane crash, bailing out of the aircraft, whatever the situation happened to be.
Accounting	Chambers 08/04/92	As I have explained, our analysis sets an upper limit on the number of MIAs who could possibly be POWs. It does not suggest that there are POWs, or that any POWs were in fact held past the time of Operation Homecoming. What we are talking about here are those MIAs who potentially could have survived. We do not know if they survived. I cannot overemphasize this distinction.

Accounting - KIA-BNR	Chambers 08/04/92	The Defense Intelligence Agency, as we were just discussing, reviewed all 2,266 cases to identify those people who had the best chance for survival...However, our investigation of the loss incidents revealed that not all of the 1,171 were likely candidates for survival... We also have cases where information on an individual's fate is mixed, or evidence of their fate is lacking... These are the most difficult cases, because it is almost impossible to know where to begin an investigation unless more information becomes available. In some of the 1,171 cases, we know the individual didn't survive, even though he wasn't declared killed in action by his commander, and I think Mr. Sheetz mentioned that there are cases where all identifiable traces of an individual were eliminated by the sheer force of an explosion... Finally, there are those who are known to have died in captivity...
Accounting - KIA/BNR	Chambers 08/04/92	This leaves us with 100 to 125... Sir, the 269 total are the individuals who were likely candidates for survival and possible captivity, but within that sub-category there are several groups..
Accounting - KIA/BNR	Chambers 08/04/92	The difficult task of identifying who might have survived, and remained a prisoner after the war, began even before prisoners were released during Operation Homecoming in 1973 and continues today...the total 2,266 unaccounted for Americans, 1,095 were killed in action, leaving 1,171 Americans missing in action.

Accounting - KIA/BNR	Chambers 08/04/92	As shown here, the 269 individuals for priority investigation are drawn from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and have been the focus of our field investigations that began in Vietnam in September of 1988... However, not all 269 individuals are likely candidates for survival and possible captivity...Based on our field activities in Vietnam, 61 of these people are known to have died. An additional 78 cannot be considered as possible POW candidates for one of the following reasons: They are known to have died but happen to have been lost in the same incident with a last-known-alive person.
		They are known to have died in captivity, but are incorporated as priority cases because at one time they were carried by their respective services as a POW or they do not meet the criteria for a last known alive designation but are included as discrepancy cases because we believe the Indochinese Governments are withholding information concerning their fate. And finally, there are remains still under analysis at the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii that we expect will lower this number further once they are identified. There are also several cases where we have information that points strongly but not conclusively to death at the time of loss. loss.
Accounting	Cheney 11/05/91	I feel we are closer than we have ever been to a full accounting on those who are still missing.

Accounting - KIA/BNR	Clapper 08/04/92	...I need to make clear as well that the determination of status as to whether someone is or is not KIA is not totally an intelligence call. There are others that play in this, and obviously not all the families or next-of-kin would necessarily accept that categorization of 1,095 were killed in action, body not recovered. Chairman Kerry: Well, I'm troubled, you know, folks, if there isn't sufficient evidence to put them on a KIA list, they don't belong on it. I mean, this is part of what lends so much controversy to this issue.

Accounting - Left Behind	Clements 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: Let me ask this question, Governor, in that second paragraph that you were just reading, this is a July document, correct? Governor Clements: July the 17th. Chairman Kerry: And you said in that document of this number, 67 are officially listed as prisoner of war. Governor Clements: They are officially listed as prisoner of war based on information that they reached the ground safely and were captured.
		Chairman Kerry: Correct. That is exactly the point I want to make. . . . You have 67 people in July that you have recorded as on the ground and captured.
		Governor Clements: That's right. Chairman Kerry: Last known alive captured, correct? Governor Clements: That is correct. Chairman Kerry: Seems to me that is an indication you have people alive in Southeast Asia.

Accounting - Status Changes	Clements 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: May I ask you what the rationale was, and there may well be a very good one, but what was the rationale for taking this long-time standing position of the Secretaries of the Service and changing it. Why did you suddenly have to make these reviews? Governor Clements: This was most, most delicate situation. There were some very legitimate reasons and cases for changing of status. . . . Chairman Kerry: So if there was a legitimate reason for somebody to be made POW, why did you have to step in and be the arbiter of that? Governor Clements: What I am trying to explain, and I think it is a very understandable situation, there were all kinds of nuances to this particular question.

Accounting - Status Changes	Clements 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: ...Approximately how many cases, individual cases, do you remember being brought to your attention after Homecoming, that is for reclassification? Clements: Well, quite a few. And for me to put a number on it would be very difficult. Chairman Kerry: Was it more of the magnitude of five or 100? Can you give us some idea of how many cases would have brought to your attention? Not with any accuracy, was your answer. Question: I'll understand that it's just an approximation. Answer: Over a four-year period there could easily have been 50 or 75 cases that were investigated in-depth that would have been brought to my attention. So, the range was 5 to 100, you picked 50 to 75. Now that is a lot of cases that potentially the service secretary sent to you saying we want to reclassify this person as a POW. If it had been left to them, that person would have been. It was not left to them. You had taken over that authority. The result was none were.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Clements 09/24/92	...There was never any discussion or argument between us that statement in all likelihood probably was true. Chairman Kerry: That they were all dead. Governor Clements: That they probably and in all likelihood were dead. Chairman Kerry: Was that the prevailing attitude at DoD? Governor Clements: Absolutely...

Accounting - Status Changes	Clements 09/24/92	Governor Clements: I want to correct one thing there. I did not take over that authority, and my actions in this regard were strictly on a review basis... Chairman Kerry: You used the word review, but when the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Acting Secretary at some periods of time, says, I want a memo sent to all departments that any reclassification from MIA to POW must first be cleared by me, that is a clearance. MIA to KIA is OK within each service. So it was OK to take MIA and put them into KIA, kill them off. But do not make them prisoners. I have got to see it. And nothing happened. Nobody was made a prisoner.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Clements 09/24/92	"I don't think there's any question at all that I said -- not in those exact words, but I said that in all likelihood those people over there are probably dead..."
Accounting - Status Changes	Clements 09/24/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ...Why did you, Governor Clements, make a decision to not allow your service secretaries, which as far as I know has never happened before and has not happened since -- to not allow your service secretaries to upgrade an individual from an MIA category to a POW category? Why did you make that decision? Governor Clements: I don't think that I made such a decision.
Accounting - Status Changes	Clements 09/24/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Governor, I have got it in your own handwriting... 'I want a memo sent to all departments, services, ASD, DIA, JCS, that any reclassification from MIA to POW must first be cleared by me -- me.' That is what you said.

Accounting - Status Changes	Clements 09/24/92	Governor Clements: I have no recollection of making a decision of that kind. Let me tell you something, Senator, it is very, very clear that only classification can be changed within the services. And let's don't get that confused. Vice Chairman Smith: 'I request that all actions which recommend reclassification of military personnel from missing in action to captured status be submitted to me for approval. Proposed reclassification action should be first routed through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for a preliminary review before referral to me.' That was June 8th, 1973.

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Daschle 09/21/92	From my perspective, and listening to the data and reading the documents, there was a sea change attitude immediately following the President's assertion that everybody has now come home. Even somebody with your credibility and dedication and determination, for whatever reason, even though you were in the White House and obviously assigned to a different responsibility, chose not to raise the issue, in spite of the fact that you did feel strongly about it and took the actions that you have so capably described this morning. But you did not raise the issue. No one raised the issue, apparently, inside the Government after the President made his assertion in March of 1973. And I guess I would just like you, if you could, to describe what it was, with all of those who felt as strongly as you did, that this was no longer a time within which to raise the issue, and we are going to put it behind us. All I am asking -- and I do not mean it to be in any way an accusatory question. I just would like you to describe the atmosphere that apparently permeated the White House and the administration in June when you arrived, re-arrived, about this issue? Why was it such that no one chose to challenge the President's statement and recharacterize it in a way that would be less positive, as you described it? Laird: I cannot explain that, Senator. I believe that that's something you should pursue.

Accounting	Daschle 06/24/92	...you might as well have been in two different countries trying to look into this thing, for as little cooperation and coordination that there was.
Accounting - Left Behind	Dole 09/24/92	Though without suggesting that it is the intent of the committee, there is certainly a fact of life that the media is reporting your work as a kind of who shot John exercise. The headlines are all full of finger-pointing about, quote, who abandoned, unquote, our POW/MIAs; about who is to blame for the situation where too little was done for too long; and trying to find out the truth about the fate of our POWs and MIAs.
Accounting	Duker 12/02/92	...I don't know that I'll ever be totally satisfied that the resolution is there personally. I do believe a beginning would be, though, to -- at least for every American that was last known alive or last known alive in captivity, if we could resolve every one of those cases that would at least be a beginning towards coming to some kind of an accounting.
Accounting - Left Behind	Ford 11/15/91	I have not seen anything that would convince me that there are not some Americans still alive... how many, I'm not sure, but I think that the reports suggest that there was one for sure, that the Vietnamese didn't tell us about until much later. That was one, but there are also some reports suggesting that people might have been alive we didn't know about. We didn't know where they were -- and they probably died afterwards. ...As we accumulate evidence and as we go through that process, we are able to begin to piece together a little bit better what happened back in 1972, or 1973, or 1975, and the evidence, as we accumulate it, more and more suggests that there are probably some left alive in 1973.

Accounting	Godley 09/24/92	This is an important distinction. The MIAs were men in aircraft, principally, shot down. They were carried as MIAs until they were either reported as POWs or their graves were located, or a large number of their wing men or other aircraft in the air at that time reported shot or downed in flames.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Grassley 06/25/92	Without this statement, that the President made and of course those attendant follow-on policy decisions, there is absolutely no electrifying conflict. People are incensed. I don't suppose people are incensed with bureaucratic incompetence, they have learned to handle that, but they are incensed because of the deception around this issue, deception by our own government.
Accounting	Grassley 10/15/92	...the Paris Peace Accords hearings gave the live-sighting reports a context, a plausibility quotient. In my view, we must revisit this issue before our work is complete, and we must certainly get a response on the discrepancies.

Accounting - Comptroller's Records	Grassley 09/24/92	Presently, there are 1,278 military personnel who are unaccounted for as a result of the hostilities in Southeast Asia. Of this number, 67 are officially listed as prisoner of war based on information that they reached the ground safely and were captured. Now, that is from Clements to President Nixon. And that is on, I believe, the 17th of July, 1973. Now, the point that I want to raise and that I would like to have you respond to is, as I see it, the bottom line is that we may not have known with 100 percent certitude that these men were prisoners. But it seems to me that we sure as heck believed that to be the case, to the point that we would list them as current captured. We believed it to the point that we had a list entitled ``Current captured.'' And, at the least, it seems to me, this information conflicted with both the Nixon statement on March the 29th and the Shields statement on April the 14th.
Accounting - Comptroller's Records	Grassley 09/24/92	I have got in front of me documents that are entitled number of casualties incurred by U.S. military personnel in connection with the conflict in Vietnam. And the bottom line has a figure that is current captured. And I do not know whether they are daily or weekly reports, but probably weekly reports. On March the 31st, 1973, there are 81 listed; 7 April, 73, 80; 14 April, 73, and that is the date that Shields made his statement that there are not any alive. We had 75. April 28th, 72.

Accounting - Status Changes	Kerrey 09/22/92	My own belief is that a full accounting of our people will not occur until the Vietnamese Government itself is accountable to its own people. This is a Government that has lied to its people ever since they seized illegitimate power in 1975. They have continued to lie and misrepresent facts to their own people.
Accounting	Kerrey 09/24/92	It is very important for us to try to figure out what we are going to do today, not [just] what we should have done 20 years ago.
Accounting - Left Behind	Kerry 06/25/92	So there is certainly that measure of information that we have received. There are other acknowledgments that I think are not insignificant; acknowledgements that we are not really dealing with a universe of 2,266, [that] it is smaller. In fact the committee, through its exhaustive review, suggest that somewhere in the vicinity, in 1973, of 244 is a reasonable number, minus those immediately determined to have died in captivity, which leaves you somewhere in the vicinity of 133, which is close, as Vessey said, to the numbers he has come up with.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Kerry 09/22/92	Before Operation Homecoming, our officials in the military, and you in the executive, expressed the conviction that POWs were about to be left behind because the Laos list was incomplete. But after Operation Homecoming, the statements seemed to have shifted and been calibrated more towards putting people at ease, and urging an acceptance or encouraging the belief that the goal had been achieved.

Accounting	Kerry 09/21/92	Chairman Kerry: President Nixon won in 1968 on a peace platform and indeed, no sooner was he elected than he began withdrawing troops. Our withdrawal was forestalled in 1968. For four more years the war went on. More prisoners were created and finally, we negotiated with the recognition that the country was fed up and South Vietnam was to either stand alone or fall alone with enormous military support, I might add, from us... We are here 20 years later trying to understand in the dynamics of where we got to, whether or not we got our prisoners out or not...It was not us who stated that we do not have all our prisoners back, that was in memos that your colleagues in Government created. The families, however, knew this and for 20 years they have sought an honest accounting from us, so we are here today to do that and I am sure you are sympathetic to that.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Kerry 06/25/92	Dr. Shields, do you not think that it is a little disingenuous to stand up before the Nation and have a policy announced that says we have no indication that there are any Americans alive when you know people are carried as POW and have nothing to suggest they are dead? Why did you not say, "You know, we have got 244 questions. We have got people we list as POW, and we do not know," instead of saying, "There are no indications that anybody is alive." Because the last thing you knew was that they were alive.

Accounting - Left Behind	Kerry 09/24/92	Evidence was available to American policy makers in 1973 that some POWs might have been alive. Clearly, there were people listed as POW who did not return. That does not mean that they were alive. It also does not mean the converse; that they were dead.
Accounting	Kerry 06/25/92	What we did say unequivocally is that there were a body, a group of people listed as POW for whom there was a reason they were listed as POW, about whom we knew enough to call them POW. And we did not get an accounting at that time. And we had reason to believe that many of them were alive.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kerry 09/24/92	Well, I would say, Admiral [Moorer], I think your effort to explain it that way is understandable and noble, but the fact is I read this morning a series of statements made by the President which did not refer to we are getting back the people on the list, it said all our prisoners are home. ...Secondly, on May 24th, in a speech to the POWs once they were all back, he said 1973 saw the return of all our prisoners of war. He did not say to them, we are still concerned about some of your friends; we are going to pursue it. He said you are all back. And in a speech on June 15th, he said that for the first time in eight years all of our prisoners are back, all our prisoners are home here in America. So I must say to you that the evidence is overwhelming to the committee that there is a gap between the stated public policy and between reality at that point in time.

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kerry 09/24/92	If there were a clearer way for the Commander in Chief to send a message to Hanoi, or to the Pathet Lao, or to the American public and to our defense and intelligence officials that the active search for a live American prisoner was at an end, I do not know what that might have been. Now, no question, there is reference after reference in these documents to our continued desire for a full accounting for those listed as missing. But nowhere is there a reference to a belief in the likelihood that live Americans might still be held.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Kerry 06/25/92	(Tape) Question: Do you think there still are POWs alive and well somewhere in either Laos or Cambodia? Answer: We have no indications at this time that there are any Americans alive in Indochina. (End tape) Chairman Kerry: That was your statement at a press conference on the 12th of April, 1973. We have no indications at this time that there are any Americans alive. Now it is a fact, is it not, that as of February of 1973 you personally had information about an EC or an EQ-47 shot down in Laos, and you believed that four member s of that crew survived, did you not?

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kerry 09/24/92	So I frame that we have not got a full accounting in the context of having heard there is no evidence that anybody is still alive, and my immediate next thought is, OK, that must mean we have got to find out who is dead or how they died. There is a huge difference. I mean I am in politics. I understand what it means to give a message. I remember those days too. I was riveted to the television set the night the President said all the prisoners are coming home...I thought they were all coming home too. I must tell you, and I thought I was pretty aware back then, I never knew what I am learning today. I never knew you guys had a list of people that you thought were still prisoners. I never heard of it.
Accounting	Kerry 11/15/91	I am a little disappointed that you folks do not have at your fingertips those numbers and the ability to tell me, Senator, here is how many went down. Here is exactly how many were unaccounted for.

Accounting	Kerry 06/25/92	If you have evidence to show that somebody ought to be on a list, now is the time to come forward. But it is not sufficient for anybody to simply say gee, it ought to be bigger. We are dealing with reality. And we have taken and put together lists from every possible list we have been able to find, subpoena, summon, locate, uncover in the archives, and there just are not any other lists. Moreover, there is a finite universe of people who went to Vietnam and either came back or did not. We know their names and we know the locations and the dates and times and we have records. And we are going to deal with records. We are not going to deal with hypothesis, theory, supposition, fantasy, and ultimately even hope, no matter how deep that hope may be. We have to base this on reality. We all have hope, but we are trying to figure out what is real here. Now, I want to emphasize again that the committee does not assert that every one of the names of the 133 were alive. We do not do that. We cannot do that. No one could do that.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kerry 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: Well, does that raise a question in your mind today as to whether they were, in fact, all home on the March -- Admiral Murphy: Well, yeah, if I'm looking at a piece of paper that says there are 67 of them left.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Kerry 09/24/92	...while there is truth to the statement that I could not say where so-and-so was specifically on this day, we did have evidence that individuals had been captured and that individuals were not returning. And I think that is the centerpiece of the quandary we find ourselves in 20 years later. That those families know that, and now the country knows that. Those families knew that for 20 years. We also have evidence that there were people within the military, and in the State Department and elsewhere, who believed that.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kerry 09/21/92	The President mentioned the MIA issue in conjunction with a number of issues that were not meeting with full compliance...he did not personalize and raise the issue of noncompliance on POWs with the notion that we believe there were people that could be accounted for who were not being accounted for. There was just sort of this general sense of, well, MIAs are not being accounted for, which is distinct from the notion that you believe you have prisoners that were held and they have not returned. I think the Americans would have reacted, obviously, very differently to the latter than the former. Secondly, his broader comment was not, we have gotten back all the prisoners that they have given us a list of. It was that all the prisoners have come home. So, there was a real distinction between what we knew or thought we knew about prisoners versus MIA generically. And that is, I think, something that lingered.

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kerry 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: You would agree with me, Mr. Secretary, there is a distinction between someone listed as POW and someone listed as MIA. Richardson: Definitely. Chairman Kerry: And you would agree with me, then, that the people listed as MIA, some of them did not come home, correct -- excuse me, people listed as POW, some did not come home, correct? Richardson: Yes. Chairman Kerry: Therefore, a statement that all POWs are home is also incorrect, is it not? Richardson: Yes. This is a colloquy... He could have rationalized it, I suppose, on the basis that all the ones we know of have been accounted for.
Accounting - Comptroller's Records	Kerry 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: You, in July, are still left with 67, by your own account. Now, you have already taken into account the people who came back and who died. Those briefings are several months prior. You are reporting to the President, memorandum of the United States of America on 17 July, you folks yourselves are saying 67 are officially listed as prisoner of war, based on information that they reached the ground safely and were captured... I do not want this to be contentious, but do you not see the problem here? If you have 67 people that the Secretary of Defense is telling the President are prisoners because they reached the ground and they were captured? Do you not understand why people say hey, wait a minute, there is a prisoner of war over there that we have not gotten back?

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kerry 09/24/92	And they are on the list that Senator Grassley has provided of the 67 still listed as captured, and you say by March we had decided there were none there, and yet people were still listed as prisoners. So what was it that allowed this decision to be made that just sort of -- wiped it away? What strikes me is that there was this group that we believed were POWs that somehow slid off into a category other than POW in people's minds, into a sort of MIA category without really having been accounted for, quote, as POWs.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kerry 09/22/92	...we have found statements where the President said we are still worried about the full accounting, but it was for MIAs. The problem is there was this distinction drawn between MIAs and those that we believed were POWs.

Accounting - Status Changes	Kerry 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry [to Clements]: Now, I want to come to the next critical point. Governor, this was your memorandum of 17 July, and you talk about Public Law 37 U.S.C. 551558, where the Service Secretaries are specifically charged with the responsibility for status changes. You say at that time this system has been used effectively to make status changes for missing in action, and you send over to the President, for some reason, a fact sheet discussing the provisions of the law, which raises in our minds the question of why the President might have been interested in the status changes, and if he was, why then, at a prior time, had you made a decision personally, in your own handwriting, to require the Service Secretaries for the first time to go through you in order to change somebody? Now, I understand there were 50 -- according to your own deposition -- there were some 50 to 75 requests by the secretaries to list somebody as POW, not as MIA, and you did not approve any one of those, correct?
Accounting - Left Behind	Kingston 06/25/92	On 19 November 1975, I testified before the House Select Committee Missing Persons in Southeast Asia [Montgomery Commission]. I was also asked, how many cases did you have of men that were seen alive in captivity but not heard from subsequent to that time? I replied, I do not know accurately. I was then asked, can you estimate how many there were? I replied, around 100.
Accounting - Left Behind	Kingston 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: When you were head of the JCRC, did you ever see any hard evidence that Americans were alive? Kingston: Not to my recall.
Accounting	Kingston 06/25/92	I interpreted that my mission was to search for, recover and identify dead and missing U.S. personnel.

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kissinger 09/22/92	On March 29th, President Nixon announced that all of our American POWs are on their way home.
Accounting - Left Behind	Kissinger 09/22/92	If servicemen were kept by our enemies, there is one villain and one villain only; the cold-hearted rulers in Hanoi.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Kissinger 09/22/92	Either people were known as prisoners, or they were missing in action, and therefore what President Nixon conveyed was that those we knew were prisoners were on their way home, and he also said those who were missing in action we were not satisfied with, and that was the state of our classification at the time.
Accounting - Left Behind	Kissinger 09/22/92	Nor did any Administration know that there were live Americans kept in Indochina.
Accounting - Left Behind	Kissinger 09/22/92	Fundamentally, I would have to say I can find no rational reason for them to hold prisoners.
Accounting - Left Behind	Kissinger 09/22/92	Personally, I have no proof whether Americans were kept behind by Hanoi. My present gut feeling is that probably no prisoners were left behind in Vietnam. Possibly some prisoners were left behind, were kept behind in Laos, which has been my feeling more or less since the middle Seventies, but I'm not dogmatic about this... But I want to make clear, they were left -- if so, they were kept in violation of the agreement, in total ignorance of the American Government.

Accounting - Left Behind	Kissinger 09/22/92	Secretary Schlesinger was not exactly shy in expressing his disagreements with the views of the Administration. I do not believe you can find one memorandum, one phone conversation, one meeting, or one anything in which he expressed at the time the views he expressed yesterday. And I can assure you, if we had known, if we had heard this, we would have acted on it, because nobody was more dissatisfied with the performance of the Vietnamese than I. Nobody was more eager to enforce the agreement.
Accounting - Left Behind	Kissinger 09/22/92	Some prisoners may - I repeat may - have been kept behind by our adversaries in violation of solemn commitments. No prisoners were left behind by the deliberate act or negligent omission of American officials.
Accounting - Left Behind	Kissinger 09/22/92	The committee also owes to the American people a statement of this simple truth. Some prisoners may -- I repeat, may -- have been kept behind by our adversaries in violation of solemn commitments. No prisoners were left behind by the deliberate act or negligent omission of American officials. Anyone suggesting otherwise is playing a heartless game with the families of the MIAs.
Accounting - Left Behind	Kissinger 09/22/92	I think it is possible that they were held, and it would have been in total violation of the agreement. We did not have any information at the time that I was in Government that was considered reliable.
Accounting	Kissinger 09/22/92	The return of POWs and accounting of the MIAs was an integral part of every American proposal and was always declared as non-negotiable by us.

Accounting	Kissinger 09/22/92	...until October 8, 1972, the Vietnamese had never agreed to give any accounting of anything. So the issue that you're addressing did not arise until we were down to 25,000 [troops].
Accounting - Left Behind	Kissinger 09/22/92	Healing those wounds preoccupied me then, it has preoccupied me since, and it is one reason I find this inquiry so painful. Mr. Chairman, you have stated that this inquiry was designed to heal the wounds of Vietnam. I agree, but it cannot be done by blaming American officials for Vietnamese transgressions, nor by innuendos, distortions and outright falsehoods being leaked out of this inquiry, nor did any-- So let us stop torturing ourselves. The United States kept faith with those who served their country. No administration knew that there were live Americans kept in Indochina. American prisoners may have been kept in Vietnam by a treacherous enemy in violation of agreements and human decency, but no one was left there by the deliberate act or negligent omission of any American official.
Accounting - Left Behind	Laird 09/21/92	Now, it was a 50-50 chance on that situation that prisoners of war would not be there, but I submit to you as members of this committee that every prisoner of war in North Vietnam and also in the South knew about that raid, and it gave them hope that we cared about them and it was a successful raid, and the idea from my standpoint that it did show that we in the United States cared about our POWs, and we did recognize them.

Accounting	Laird 09/21/92	When I first became Secretary of Defense, the total number of letters that we had received since January 1st of 1960 to February of 1969, the total number of letters we'd received were 620. After we went public in January of '72 the number of letters had gone up to almost 5,000. 1,000 of those particular letter did come through various peace activists.
Accounting - Left Behind	Lord 09/21/92	Chairman Kerry: There is no question in your mind, is there, that those represented legitimate questions of people who were held as a prisoner? Lord: Absolutely.
		Chairman Kerry: So, in effect, when we got out in January and the prisoners started coming home and the President said all the prisoners are on their way home, you knew that could not be accurate based on the information you had seen.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Lord 09/21/92	Chairman Kerry: ...it is very hard for the committee to understand that if the United States Government is publicly saying we do not have any indication of anybody alive, it would kind of be meaningless to sit with [the North Vietnamese] and make real your notion that you are worried about discrepancies or that they have to worry about it...

Accounting	Maguire 12/04/92	What Mr. Mooney seems to have done is, in every case where it either mentions a shoot down, a parachute being seen, a search being conducted for an individual, he put that person in a POW status, and that just -- that's a jump in logic that's not supported by the other evidence. The problem is that Mr. Mooney was really restricted to a small body of intelligence with which to make his assessment, and that body of intelligence was the known U.S. losses at the time of the report. What we have information on is the search and rescue efforts that happened after the loss incident. We've had subsequent intelligence reports from other sources, and when you put that all together, you can't support 300 or more people ever even being captured through signals reports. So if he saw a report that said on the 22nd May the 283rd AAA Battalion shot down an F-4, he would go to a list of F-4 losses on that day, and any F-4 that happened to have a person unaccounted for, he would put that person into a POW status, totally disregarding any other losses where we may have rescued an individual, and in many cases he totally disregarded the losses of anything other than U.S. aircraft.
Accounting - Left Behind	McCain 09/22/92	...if both former Secretaries of Defense knew or believed at the time that there was Americans left in Southeast Asia, then I think they have a great deal of answering to do as to why they did not do more, especially before the Woodcock and Montgomery Commissions, to bring these concerns or their beliefs to light.

Accounting - Left Behind	McCain 09/24/92	[to Moorer] Your message on March 22nd says, the JCS message says, "Do not commence withdrawal of the fourth increment until the following two conditions are met: the U.S. has been provided with a complete list of all U.S. POWs, including those held by the Pathet Lao, as well as the time and place of release; and the first group of POWs have been physically transferred to U.S. custody." That was the criteria on March 22nd. Then, on March 23rd, a message was sent, and I know, Mr. Chairman, this is part of the record, both of these messages, it said: "Seek private meeting with North Vietnamese representative. Our basic concern is the release of the prisoners, as we do not object to the PLF playing the central role as long as the men are returned to us. We need precise information and understanding on the times and place of release of the prisoners on the list provided by 1 February. Of course we intend to pursue the questioning of other U.S. personnel captured or missing in Laos following the release of the men on the 1 February list."

Accounting - Nixon Statement	McCain 09/22/92	I would like to, again, refer to the full statement made by President Nixon on March 29th, 1973. The chairman and others continue to refer to a statement where he says all of our American POWs are on their way home. I think it is important to add that he one sentence later said: "There are still some problem areas: the provisions of the agreement requiring an accounting for all missing in action in Indochina, the provisions with regard to Laos and Cambodia, the provisions prohibiting [et cetera] have not been complied with." So the President of the United States did not just say all Americans are on their way home. He caveated it, and very strongly. . . . So both Dr. Shields and the President of the United States in 1973 stated unequivocally that there were still serious problems with the full accounting of the MIA/POWs.
Accounting - Left Behind	McCain 09/24/92	One reading this would reach the conclusion that the Joint Chiefs of Staff dictated a certain policy: suspend everything on one day, and then the following day said go ahead and move forward with the proceedings.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Mooney 01/22/92	Chairman Kerry: What did you do in 1973, when you saw Operation Homecoming? At that time you knew that there was a discrepancy between those coming home and those who most readily, in your memory, were on the list. Mr. Mooney: Yes sir. I was not really concerned, because we still had the highest requirements on the book, and we did not expect many of these people to come home.

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Mooney 01/22/92	When President Nixon made his statement that all the men are back, that wasn't even taken seriously. . . . [because] when Nixon made his statement. . . the highest tasking on every reporter's desk in the field was to continue to search for, identify, isolate, locate American POWs, particularly in Laos. And that requirement stayed on the books.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Moorer 09/24/92	Yes, could I make a comment please, sir? I believe that you will find that when the President made that statement he was in Key Biscayne. He made it through Ziegler, the public affairs officer, and I'm confident he was referring to simply the package that we had ready to come out. And all of those, 150 or so that were ready to come out except one that was found a little later down in South Vietnam, but they were on the way back. And I think that is probably what he meant when he said all. He meant all of the ones that we had scheduled. There is another sentence in that public announcement, I think, that goes on to say but there are probably others we've got to search for. Sen. Grassley: It is unfortunate, but I believe the public then and now has not read that statement any other way, and I do not think there has been any effort on the part of Nixon to clarify it.
Accounting - Left Behind	Moorer 09/24/92	...I think that for all practical purposes we really lost the war, particularly from a political point of view, because we couldn't get in an airplane and go to each point of contact where we thought there might be a POW confined and held against his will.

Accounting - Left Behind	Moorer 09/24/92	...the question arises now whether you would be willing to detain those boys who thought they were coming home while we went through another long discussion and negotiation with North Vietnam. So my position was, let's get those we have home and continue to press to find out whether there are any more.
Accounting - Left Behind	Murphy 09/24/92	...in my personal view there were no confirmed reports of live U.S. military personnel left behind in Vietnam or Laos. I do not recall seeing any such reports, and I would have been very upset, as you would be, if you had to read such a report in that position.
Accounting - Comptroller's Records	Murphy 09/24/92	It would seem to me, somebody in the comptroller's office would have to testify to just how they were using these numbers. I will admit that it says current captured, is a real number going down to 67 by the end of this period.
Accounting - Left Behind	Nagy 12/01/92	There certainly was a change in attitude on the part of the Reagan administration that was evident during the 1980's. That certainly let, and I believe throughout the period of the seventies and eighties that it was basically a continuation inside of DIA, and that was that there remained the possibility that there were still live Americans present in Southeast Asia remaining after the departure of the United States from that area.
Accounting - Left Behind	Oksenberg 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: Did you see any hard evidence or any evidence that Americans were alive? Mr. Oksenberg: I saw no hard evidence that Americans were alive. Obviously, with the upsurge of refugees came increasing reports of live sightings.

Accounting - Left Behind	Oksenberg 06/25/92	I can assure you, Senator, that at no point during my time on the watch did we come to the conclusion that there were certainly no live Americans in Indochina.
Accounting - Left Behind	Otis 12/03/92	In spite of the high visibility of Commander Dodge's case, the North Vietnamese chose to deny any knowledge of him. Commander Dodge was not repatriated in 1973. I was extremely concerned about the media reports that proclaimed all POWs returned. I received letters from President Nixon, Vice Admiral David Bagley, Chief of Naval Personnel, and Roger Shields, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, all assuring me of their commitment to securing the fullest possible accounting. The only letter that even mentioned live Americans was that of Dr. Shields, who stated, quote, there is no specific knowledge of any live Americans left, unquote. In other words, fullest possible accounting meant search for remains. There was no public challenge of the Vietnamese by the United States that captured servicemen were left behind. There seemed to be a naivete that all prisoners had been returned and that remains would be forthcoming. I was shocked and bewildered, but I could not believe that the missing were already abandoned by our own Government, press, and public.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Perot 08/11/92	...[the Vietnamese] said, your own Government declared these men dead in 1973. Why should we think your Government wants them back?

Accounting - Shields Statement	Perot 08/11/92	I said Roger, I'm surprised that you declared all the man dead in April 1973. He said, I was ordered to do it. And he said he was ordered to do it by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements. Then he said words to the effect that he protested, because just two weeks earlier these memos were going around.
Accounting - Left Behind	Richardson 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: Looking through this, obviously retrospectively, but looking at it as we're trying to look at it and looking at it as the American people are looking at it 20 years later, unfortunately, would you say that the record suggests that the American people and certainly the families were not leveled with respect to this? Richardson: I would say that information on the face of it was withheld from them, and one would have to use some rationale for doing that -- that is, for withholding it.

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Richardson 09/24/92	Well, I tried to call attention to the distinction of the degree of certainty with which a given proposition can be stated. For purposes of our best estimates as to the number of current captured, the intelligence resources of the Government would put together all the bits and pieces they had and come up with a number which represented the weight of that evidence, and I suppose that is what this number reflects. The President's statement would presumably be tilted in a direction designed, as I suggested earlier, not to raise false hopes and so on, whatever may have been the considerations. Somebody could rationalize the distinction between the basis for this number and the basis for his statement. But how it actually came about, for all I know he deliberately chose to lie. But I don't -- I try to give him the benefit of the doubt, I would say that he -- what he meant was that every prisoner as to whom we have definitive information.
Accounting - KIA/BNR	S. Stockdale 12/03/92	I don't think we're as close to it as some might like to believe, but I think that there will come a point in time when you have to take the responsibility to make the judgment that some people are never -- no remains -- nothing is ever going to be returned. And that's your job.

Accounting	S. Stockdale 12/03/92	I can see why they are that convinced, because of the long history of the deception. And maybe a lack of recognition that there are always some people in war who are lost. There will never, in my opinion, be a satisfactory accounting. In our Leaque's list of objectives we said that we wanted to get the fullest possible accounting. When you lose a war, you don't get to go in and account for your people. Even if you win the war, you don't find everybody.
Accounting - Left Behind	Schlesinger 09/21/92	Chairman Kerry: I think I want to start by asking a very simple question. In your view did we leave men behind? Schlesinger: I think that, as of now, that I can come to no other conclusion, Senator. That does not say that there are any alive today, mind you. But in 1973, some were left behind.
Accounting - Left Behind	Schlesinger 09/21/92	Despite the Paris agreement, there was no reason, in my judgement, to assume that the North Vietnamese would release everybody.
Accounting	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Why has it taken 19 years for us to get to this starting point, is probably the most important of these three questions... First, the U.S. emphasis has been on live-sighting reports, and much of the POW/MIA community simply wasn't interested in researching existing proof that these men were dead. This lack of vision has cost us years in the search for answers.

Accounting - Left Behind	Secord 09/24/92	Sen. Kassebaum: It seems to me one of the major debates after Operation Homecoming was how to rate the intelligence. You made the comment earlier that creditable evidence, I believe, led you to argue that there were Americans still Laos. Is that correct? Secord: Yes, Senator, that's right.
Accounting - Left Behind	Secord 09/24/92	Sen. Grassley: I would like to have you describe for the committee how confident you were in the data, and how specific it was. And just give us some examples. Secord: I think a lot of the data was flaky, but there is a law of large numbers that comes into play here. And we had a lot of case studies on each and every one of these downings, or nearly every one of them. Some of them were just gone, and we had nothing, but many, many hundreds of downings. We had all kinds of operational data, including some that I described earlier -- everything from good beeper, good chute, good beeper on the ground, transmitting on the survival radio.
Accounting - Left Behind	Secord 09/24/92	Sen. Grassley: In your view, were there prisoners left behind in Laos after Homecoming? Secord: Yes, sir. Sen. Grassley: Were the number of prisoners significant enough to warrant military action? Secord: We believed so.

Accounting	Sheetz 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: Why is it that it took 20 years to get one list, in your view? Sheetz: 20 years to get one list? We always had access to the files of the JCRC in paper files. What's been difficult is every time a team goes out into the field in one of these joint iterations we learn something that we didn't know before, and that information causes you to then reevaluate what you know about a particular case, and our databases are always sort of chasing after one other as new information comes in. This is not -- these numbers are not static numbers. They are always in fluidity.
Accounting - KIA/BNR	Sheetz 08/04/92	...some of the KIA cases, the descriptions that you read, are more compelling than others, but having reviewed each and every one of them, we do not find that there are fatal flaws in the documentation and the judgments that were reached by the field commanders who were responsible for reporting the status of their lost men.

Accounting	Sheetz 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Let me understand. You have 196 discrepancy cases?...
		Sheetz: Fate has been determined on 61 of those. So, when you subtract that out, that gets you down to the 135 figure. The 196 is the actual cases that existed, and we've been able to get answers on the fate on 61 of those. So, 135 are still to be determined; fate to be determined.
		Chairman Kerry: And 90 in Laos? How many fate determined in Laos?
		Sheetz: None, sir. But I might add, again, from prior sessions we have explained that 85 percent of the losses that took place in Laos that are still unaccounted for took place in the Eastern-most provinces, right along the Ho Chi Minh Trail area, and only 9 of those 90 discrepancy cases are cases in which they took place clearly in areas of Pathet Lao control.
		So, essentially, 80 to 81 of those cases are in the border, Vietnamese-controlled areas where we are going to be working in the tripartite arena with the Vietnamese and the Lao to try to get answers on those cases.

Accounting - KIA/BNR	Sheetz 08/04/92	Chairman Kerry: ...And the person is listed as KIA in that particular category based on first-hand reports from people within a unit or aircraft, or whatever, is that correct?... So what I am saying is that in the case of almost 100 percent of those 1,095, there are sufficient multiple reports of the incident to permit you to draw the conclusion you've drawn, are there not? Sheetz: Yes, sir... Chairman Kerry: So I ask you again the same question I asked you a moment ago. Is it not fair to say, and even more appropriate to say, that there ought to be, maybe, a new category that in the case of those 1,095, while their body has not been returned, in some cases based on the report it is clear, is it not, that a body will never be returned? Sheetz: That is true, sir... Chairman Kerry: So that person is in effect accounted for. The family has accepted the accounting, and in point of fact it does not belong on a POW/MIA list. It is not POW, it is not MIA, it is KIA, body not recoverable.

Accounting - KIA/BNR	Sheetz 08/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Now, if you are saying that 1,095 were KIA, well, they have not been returned. Are they not accounted for? Mr. Sheetz: The fullest possible accounting has three levels of evidence, if you will. [Level] 1, the most ideal outcome would be the return of a live American prisoner. Level 2 would be... recovering their remains and repatriating those remains to the United States. The third level of outcome is for those who perished, where remains cannot be recovered, to develop sufficient documentation as to confirm the fate of the individual... Chairman Kerry: These 1,095 fall into the third category, correct? Mr. Sheetz: At the present time, they do.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Shields 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: Why did not the President of the United States stand up and say, the prisoners are not back? Why did not the Secretary of Defense say, I stood up a few months ago and I had 14 people I said did not come back and, by God, they are still not back, and why will Americans not care about it?

Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: Now look at the cause and effect. Here are the papers coming off your press conference. [Headline] "POW unit boss: no living GIs left in Indochina." Here, [Headline]: "Rumors that there were hundreds of U.S. servicemen still left in Laotian prison camps do the families of the missing a disservice." Headline: "All U.S. POWs free Pentagon maintains." Headline: "Unreturned GIs are feared dead..." Shields: I never said that the men were all dead. I never said that. I've never said that to this day. Chairman Kerry: No indication that any of the missing are alive in Indochina. We went through this last time; there were indications. Shields: Senator, I don't believe that I could tell Mrs. Hrdlicka or Mrs. Van Dyke or the Van Dyke parents or anyone else that I had indications at that time that their loved ones were alive.

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Shields 09/24/92	Vice Chairman Smith: But from March 28th to April 12th a heck of a lot of things have happened here that reversed all information that we had in the pipeline on prisoners of war, in Laos especially. And in 2 weeks we went from a memorandum to the President of the United States via the National Security Advisor from the Secretary of Defense saying there are POWs in Laos. Not alleged, there are POWs in Laos, and we had better do something in terms of getting them out before we get out of here. Now that is essentially what the memorandum said. We went from that to a press conference by the President of the United States the next day which says all POWs are coming home. There are no more living Americans in Indochina, you then said on April 12th.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 06/25/92	Shields: Senator, there is a difference in saying people are alive and in captivity and saying we don't have indications now that they are. Chairman Kerry: That is the disingenuous piece of this. Shields: It is not disingenuous, Senator. This was and still is a very serious issue. I read in the newspaper yesterday that your committee has information that an American was alive in Indochina in captivity in 1989. Chairman Kerry: No, no, no. That is wrong.
		Shields: It was reported in the paper, Senator. Chairman Kerry: Let me just make it very clear. Senator Smith has an opinion personally as to that. I will tell you I personally do not share a judgment on that or that opinion, nor do I think has the rest of the committee come to any conclusion whatsoever as to anyone in 1989, and I will tell you that this committee has no evidence today of any specific individual in any specific place being alive now. Shields: And that's exactly what I said, Senator. Chairman Kerry: But it's not. Shields: And the information you have on an individual in 1989 is more recent than a lot of the information that I was dealing with, and that's exactly why I did not say they were all alive nor did I say they were all dead. I did not know that.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 06/25/92	...we really did not have proof positive, at that time, of current information that would allow us to go back. I'm sure that had we known at that time of the evidence of people, had Senator McCain or some of his comrades said, we left a man in this camp, I'm sure we would have done something about it. There were three foreign nationals and we did.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 06/25/92	... we had no hard, specific current information at that time. And I think we had done enough of our debriefings at that time, because we had asked men immediately if they knew about living Americans.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: I am not challenging your honor. I am trying to determine whether or not you do not see what America saw out of your statement. Not your fault, maybe, but what America saw out of your statement were the headlines that I read. You may not have willed that, but that is what happened. Shields: ...I have given that statement to innumerable people since we met last time. And they have looked at this statement; no one has come up with the impression that the said all the men dead. Chairman Kerry: But do you not see that when you say that there is no indication that anyone is alive-- Vice Chairman Smith: What is the difference between that and they are all dead? Chairman Kerry: You are basically taking somebody in POW status, and you wrote that, and saying we no longer believe that person is a POW.

Accounting - Returned POWs	Shields 06/25/92	We hoped that our returnees would be able to provide us with substantial information about the missing, but relatively few cases were cleared up on the basis of returnees information.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Shields 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: How do you account for the President of the United States saying all POWs are home? Dr. Shields: Senator, I don't control the statements of the President of the United States. I did not at that time. I was as dismayed at that statement as anyone else was.
Accounting - Left Behind	Shields 06/25/92	Shields: We did raise those issues, and we raised them with a great deal of vigor. Chairman Kerry: You recall that being a sort of publicly perceived grievance that was expressed, or you raised them in private channels? I do not recall this Nation being in turmoil over the notion that we thought Vietnam might be holding people. Shields: I think, Senator Kerry, that the Nation was probably ecstatic that the conflict was over, and that we were not adding to those POW/MIA lists.

Accounting - Left Behind	Shields 06/25/92	You are aware of the efforts that were expended on behalf of Chi Chan Harnaby, Lieutenant Dodd, and so forth. They were men that you and your comrades said had been left behind. And even though they were not Americans, we left no stone unturned to bring them home. And in fact, they did return home to their loved ones. In the case of Emmet Kay, we knew he was a prisoner, and we pursued that and he was returned. In the cases of Charles Dean and Neal Sharman, we knew that they had been captured. That was not a secret. We made that evidence available to anyone, and we acknowledged that. We did not bring them home. We were not able to do that.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 06/25/92	Chairman Kerry: No one on the committee is suggesting that the 1973 policy should have suggested that you say yes, they are all alive. Shields: What is the difference between saying they are alive and we have no indications now that they are alive? Chairman Kerry: We did have indications that some people were alive. We had absolute intelligence. You in your own deposition,... you agreed that recent information could go back 6 months, 12 months. And we had recent information 6 months and 12 months that so and so was seen alive or so and so was alive. Shields: I'm not aware of that, Senator. Within 6 months? Recent information specifically relating to a man? I'm not aware of that information.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 06/25/92	Shields: Senator, people were asking if we knew whether we had left anyone behind, and the answer was we do not have indications at this time. Chairman Kerry: That has been the official line... But the questions is what did we know in 1973 and what did we do? Shields: We know that men had been alive in captivity at one time... And those that returned did not know of men who had been left. Chairman Kerry: To say all prisoners had returned as the President announced on the 29th of March, a week before your press conference, was wrong. He knew it was wrong. Let me tell you why. You recall going to see Secretary of Defense William Clements in his office in early April, a week before your April conference, correct? Shields: That's correct. Chairman Kerry: And you heard him tell you, all the American POWs are dead. And you said to him, "You cannot say that." Shields: That's correct. Chairman Kerry: And he repeated to you, "You did not hear me. They are all dead." Shields: That's essentially correct.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 06/25/92	At the termination of Homecoming we had no current hard evidence that Americans were still held prisoner in Southeast Asia... None of those who returned had any indication that anyone had been left behind. We knew that there was a possibility that defectors were alive in enemy-controlled areas, but had no firm evidence to confirm this either. Robert Garwood was an example of an American whom we felt might be alive and in an enemy-controlled area, But according to the returnees who saw him last, he was not being held as a prisoner.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 09/24/92	[Describing 1975 testimony] Then the famous question, do you think that there are still POWs alive and well somewhere in either Laos of Cambodia. And this is the statement with which you have had such great trouble. We have no indications at this time that there are any Americans alive in Indochina. What the people at the hearing did not hear, and what was never reported in the press were these words, as I said, "we do not consider the list of men that we received from Laos, the recovery of 10 individuals, nine of whom were American and seven military, to be a complete accounting for all Americans who were lost in Laos. Nor do we consider it to be a complete statement of our information known to the Pathet Lao in Laos. With regard to Cambodia, we have a number of men who are missing in action there. Some that we carried as captive." Again, the statement of people who were carried as prisoner who did not return. "We intend to pursue that, too... even though we have no indication that there are any Americans still alive, we are going to pursue our efforts in the process of accounting for the missing... we anticipate that if any Americans are yet alive...that we would be able to ascertain that through this process..."
Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 06/25/92	Admiral McCain... repeatedly asserted that he felt a small number of American were still alive in Indochina. When asked how many, he opined that perhaps 20 to 30 were alive. When asked whether he had any evidence at all that there is anybody alive, he admitted he did not.

Accounting	Shields 06/25/92	...the practical impact of lists relating to status was always limited... it had a mixed impact on family members, depending on what status a man had. It appears also to have had a limited impact on prisoners and missing. Ronald Ridgeway was classified as killed in action, but that did not prevent his repatriation. Frank Cius was carried as missing in action in Laos, but he also returned home to his loved ones. David Demmon was carried as a prisoner in South Vietnam, but to this day, he remains unaccounted for.
Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 06/25/92	Chairman Kerry: ... we have uncovered some 244 people... were carried by DoD as POW, prisoner of war. You did not know until after the debriefs that 111 of them died in captivity. When you made this statement, those debriefs had not been completed, had they? Shields: No, they had not.
Accounting - Left Behind	Shields 06/25/92	The only individuals whom hard, and at that time current, information indicated were in captivity and for whom no accounting has yet been received were two civilians; an American, Charles Dean, and Neil Sharman, an Australian, who were captured in 1974. They were unquestionably in the hands of the Pathet Lao when the events that led to the fall of Saigon and Vientiane in mid-year 1975 occurred. Our intelligence capability and our ability to track them in captivity ended with the collapse of the friendly governments. It is unlikely, I believe, that an accounting is obtainable now which will resolve the doubts of many families about the status of their loved ones missing in Southeast Asia. The record has become too convoluted and distorted for that to happen.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 06/25/92	Sen. Robb: Why was not some effort made, either institutionally or individually, to say hey, we have information that is simply at odds, at variance with the information that you have just announced or articulated through either policy papers or official pronouncements, whatever the case may be? Why was there not some critical questioning or skepticism that can be raised at that time, and why was there a passive acceptance? Shields: Senator, there are statements by General Walters at the CIA. I don't know him well, but my understanding is he doesn't accept much passively at all... I don't think that the United States Government possessed the kind of information that you are speaking of.
Accounting	Shields 06/25/92	There has been some concern, I believe, over the fact that DIA carried some men in classification, in particular the prisoner category, which differed from those of the services. The reason for this is simple, and I believe valid.
Accounting - Status Changes	Shields 06/25/92	By law, only the service secretaries have the legal authority to determine an individual's status, and the law was observed in this regard during my tenure in the Department of Defense.
Accounting	Shields 06/25/92	The facts regarding individual cases were not in dispute. If a man listed by the Navy as missing was carried by DIA as captured and that led to better correlation of intelligence reports, then our own efforts were improved.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: [citing Shields' comments] "We do not consider the list to be a complete accounting", then you went into MIA and some who were listed as captive. That is not a phrase that grabs me in any way as if you believe somebody is still a prisoner...
Accounting - Shields Statement	Shields 09/24/92	Vice Chairman Smith: I want you to tell me about the Nixon meeting. That is where we are now, April 11th. I want you to lead me into that meeting. Did anybody say anything to you? I just want you to give me some very specific answers, and I want a long discourse. Did anybody say anything to you prior to that meeting, at any time, about what you should or should not say to the President of the United States, yes, or no? Shields: Absolutely nothing...
Accounting	Shields 06/25/92	We understood long before we received the DRV-PRG list in Paris in January 1973 that Operation Homecoming would only be one phase of our work. It was evident that the process of accounting for those who did not return would be long, arduous, and complicated under even the best of circumstances.

Accounting - Left Behind	Sieverts 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: ... if Mr. Shields said -- in his memorandum, he says DoD had no specific knowledge, that is different in my view than no indications. That is a very different use of language. I think, frankly, that in your memorandum no specific knowledge is a defensible position. No indications, I think, is not. I think what I am trying to get at here is what was the thrust of the belief? Is it that the President of the United States said there are no more Americans alive in Southeast Asia and we closed the book until the agitation on the part of families and other Americans brought this back to the attention of the American people? Or has there been a good-faith effort? Or is it somewhere in between, in the view of many of us, that during the 1970's the issue was ignored to a certain degree because of the desire of the American people and the American Government to put this issue behind us, which could have led us to some failed opportunities to return some Americans who may have been held alive. I know that is very difficult, but I think it is a philosophical question that is important to be cleared up, and maybe we could begin with you, Mr. Sieverts. Mr. Sieverts: The root question is whether there were any opportunities to achieve the return of living Americans. That's the sole question. And no, I don't think there were any. I don't think we had any indications of Americans in captivity. Some of my testimony is intended to bear on that question, because of our past experience, of the lengths to which Americans would go -- we're talking about POWs held

Accounting - Left Behind	Sieverts 06/25/92	The root question is whether there were any opportunities to achieve the return of living Americans. That's the sole question. And no, I don't think there were any. I don't think we had any indications of Americans in captivity... the lengths to which Americans would go-- we're talking about POWs held against their will in captivity-- the lengths they would go, one way or another, to let us know of this. It bears on the photographs, for example. The idea of Americans cheerfully being photographed and not using the opportunity to somehow convey who they are and what the circumstances are is beyond my imagination.
		But it's beyond my experience, more importantly, of being responsible for this subject during the long time when we really did have Americans in captivity and we did get indications which were quite solid.

Accounting	Sieverts 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: Mr. Sieverts, was that the policy on your watch, that we did not know whether they were alive or dead? Or was it that we assumed they were all dead, or what? Sieverts: ...Our approach during that entire period was to present information in a positive spirit through the channels that were available pursuant to the Paris agreement and, to the extent that it was possible, and it was not at all easy, to do so in Laos, as well. At every opportunity, we would shade the interpretation of cases and lists in a favorable direction... In the direction of saying we know you have more information.... Over a period of time, we broadened those lists. We added to them, we gave specific case records, detailed case records. The difficulty was that at the same time if you overstated that assumption for a domestic audience you would create what was clearly exaggerated and possibly an entirely false hope among families.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Smith 09/24/92	Dr. Shields, all I am saying to you is based on the documents that I have read -- not on my opinion, the documents that I have read, the depositions we have taken, the witnesses we have talked to, the information that I have been able to glean from whatever I have been able to see, that is not what went into the pipeline prior to March 28th. It was not gut feeling, it was not visceral, it was simply -- it was so factual and at least so definitive that the Secretary of Defense made a recommendation to resume the war and risk bringing home the last group of American POWs. And that changed, that changed. So my question to you is what is the point of a press conference after the President speaks and says all the POWs are home?..You had a private meeting with the President of the United States and you come out of that meeting and you hold another press conference. And you say, in addition to what the President already said, there are not any more living Americans.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Smith 06/25/92	...the point is that we continued operations in a third country that we were not supposed to be at war with, and we were losing people while we were bringing home American POWs from Vietnam. We were still losing people and still standing up saying that there are no prisoners when we had no idea what happened to them. And somebody has to be accountable for that.

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Smith 09/24/92	...the document says on June 30th that we are listing and distinguishing between missing and POWs. We now are listing 67 hostile captured people as prisoners of war on June 30th, when in fact the official position as announced by the President and others is that there are not any more POWs. Am I correct? Sen. Grassley: Yes. President Nixon made his statement on March the 29th, and Dr. Shields made his statement on April the 14th. Vice Chairman Smith: And this is June 30th, listing 67 people as prisoners? Sen. Grassley: Yes.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Smith 06/25/92	... on January 27th and 28th there were lists exchanged and provided. But we still were flying missions over Laos after those lists were exchanged. We were losing Americans in Laos in a secret war... So when you say on April 12th that you do not have any information on live Americans, that is simply not true.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Smith 09/21/92	...Actually, there were two policies, one right after the other, with the same data base...the first policy was full accountability. Then there was a statement when the President said all the POWs are home. The policy then changed to everybody is home, all the POWs were home. But the data base, the intelligence information that you had, did not support that claim, as you have all as you have all said.

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Smith 09/24/92	...as to why this data base was apparently looked at differently as we came down to this period of March 28th through April 15th, in that period of time when President Nixon made his statement, Mr. Shields made his statement? What happened differently? Was there something there that we are missing that caused this change in analysis of the intelligence? Or do you believe that there were people there after Operation Homecoming, based on what you knew? General Secord: Well, yes, of course I believe there were people after Operation Homecoming. This memorandum was written contemporaneously.
Accounting - Nixon Statement	Smith 09/24/92	...I am just trying to say to you that you had a tabulation; it was a running tab, it was coming into you by the week. Nothing changed in the way it was reported, nothing changed in the documents that went into the pipeline, the information that went into the pipeline. Nothing changed. On the contrary, it was reported to the Secretary of Defense that it was valid information. The only thing that changed is you guys made an announcement, or the President made an announcement on March 29th which was totally at odds with all of that data...

Accounting - Nixon Statement	Smith 09/24/92	...II A has provided U.S. delegation folders with background information on about 80 persons in the category of POW, and then even today, here is a list that we have just received from -- the committee received on the 20th of March, 1992, from Margaret R. Munson, director, DoD, POW-MIA Central Documentation Office. It lists 50 people who are in Category I survival code in Laos. I mean, there is just no way that any reasonable person can conclude based on the documents and the information that this committee has received, that you could make the kind of statement that the President made and know that it was correct. And I will tell you, to speak for myself, this one Senator just does not accept it.
Accounting	Sungenis 06/25/92	Sungenis: The first casualty reporting requirement from the services was in 1963, and that was a numerical report only. In March of 1973 the requirement was made that the services provide us with individual casualty reports. And what they did in '73 was provide us with a DD form 1300 for each individual and a punched card with that information. Since that day we have maintained the file. But as you know, this was after Homecoming when we got into the business.
Accounting	Sungenis 06/24/92	To the best of my knowledge, at no time did this office engage or participate in any policy determination or jurisdictional matter concerning the reporting criteria used by the respective military services.
Accounting	Sungenis 06/24/92	...at the time the official file was transferred to the Archives, the back-up materials, such as the hard copy DD Forms 1300 and other supporting documentation, we discarded.

Accounting - Left Behind	Trowbridge 06/25/92	That we had no current information at the time where we could go and put our hands on some individual that was alive at that time.
Accounting - Left Behind	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Some [names] were written on the walls. No one ever saw these individuals in a prison environment.
Accounting - Left Behind	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Sen. Kerrey: Do you have any recollection of ever having anybody say to you during that period of time in 1973, after Operation Homecoming, that we should just let this matter rest? Trowbridge: No sir. Sen. Kerrey: Were you ever told by somebody, the war is over, let us not drag this our any further with energy expanded in areas that are not apt to be terribly useful? Trowbridge: No sir, never.
Accounting - Left Behind	Trowbridge 06/24/92	... the U.S. Government carried 97 individuals listed as prisoners of war that did not return. This is at the completion of Operation Homecoming.
Accounting - Left Behind	Trowbridge 06/24/92	...When I said 97, or to use your term 80, actually at the completion of Operation Homecoming our agency held 115 individuals in a prisoner status who did not return home.

Accounting - Left Behind	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Sen. Kerrey: Do you not think it fair to say there was an attitude in 1973 that we were indeed glad the war was over and that we wanted very little further discussion of anything in regards to the war, including the status of our prisoners. Trowbridge: Oh, I think that there may have been some very well individuals that thought that way, but I think the moral fiber that runs through the American citizen is a, we don't leave our unaccounted for. We go get them.
Accounting - Left Behind	Trowbridge 06/24/92	We are left with slightly less than 100 men who are officially listed by the service as POWs... in no instance did we have current intelligence to indicate that these men were currently held in captivity.

Accounting - Shields Statement	Trowbridge/ Shields 06/25/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Is there evidence or is there not evidence that Americans remained alive as prisoners of war, taking out Garwood, from 1973 to 1989? That is a simple yes or no question. Is there or is there not, based on your opinion? Trowbridge: Based on my opinion and what I have seen, we have nothing that would indicate that an American prisoner -- confirmed information or evidence, firm evidence, or convincing evidence, that an American prisoner was being held against his will. Vice Chairman Smith: Do you agree with that Dr. Shields? Shields: Senator, the second definition -- indications. We certainly knew that people were alive at one time. I do not have anything that would allow me to make the judgment, which you suggested is the first definition, that would allow me to make the judgment that those Americans were still alive, and say that to a family member, for example. And say, I am confident that based on the information I have your husband is alive. I could not have said that.
Accounting	Trowbridge 06/24/92	That was our responsibility, correlating information to somebody who may be missing. But, until somebody told us he was missing, he was not on our roll.

Accounting	Trowbridge 06/24/92	In some cases, we had very good information that the individuals had been held but had died there. In many other cases, there was no information beyond the original loss data. There were also a few cases where the services listed men as prisoners of war based on data which they later learned was erroneous in that it correlated to a different man. Much of this we learned through debriefing all of the returnees, who also told us of men who had died before entering the prison system.
Accounting	Trowbridge 06/24/92	...the war years within DIA, our office was the focal point for POW/MIA information.
Accounting	Trowbridge 06/24/92	...the agency's position at the time was that we held no information that individuals at that time were being held against their will.
Accounting	Trowbridge 06/24/92	DIA thought it possible that a man was a POW, yet the services carried him as missing in action. The status the service assigned was always their legal status.
Accounting	Trowbridge 06/24/92	DIA did not and does not determine the legal status of a serviceman. That is the sole responsibility of each of the military service secretaries.
Accounting	Trowbridge 06/24/92	We had a very close relationship. Our agency supported Dr. Shields with intelligence information.
Accounting - Returned POWs	Vessey 11/05/91	We know through extensive debriefings and subsequent investigations that all Americans seen by U.S. prisoners of war who did return in the Vietnamese prison system have been accounted for as either returned POWs are through the return for remains, or having been reported as died in captivity.

Accounting - Left Behind	Walters 09/21/92	Sen. Grassley: What happened in your view to those who we expected back who did not come back? Walters: I think they killed them. They're that kind of people.
Accounting- Left Behind	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Until Homecoming, you expected them to come home alive. When they did not come home alive, you ceased to think they should be home alive.
Archives	Admiral Stockdale 12/03/92	Yes, they were just kind of -- the bureaucratic, the group we were dealing with, were the second-generation communists, the bureaucratic elite. They were inveterate note-takers, and they would have pockets full.
Archives	Childress 12/01/92	Childress: They will be very productive in Laos and continue to be. Archival records will give you fate. Unilateral Vietnamese action will give families answers. Chairman Kerry: Well, archival records are also going to give you answers and oral histories are going to give you answers. We collected four of them in person, myself, four answers. And they came through oral history and archival information.
Archives	Childress 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: Well, we are now getting access to a lot of those shoot-down reports and to the archival documents, obviously. Childress: I've heard there's some summary documents coming in... from what I saw, that I think it's the tip of the iceberg and I think a lot of analysts feel that way as well.

Archives	DeStatte 12/04/92	Vice Chairman Smith: What is your sense of what we are getting? Is there more in the archives? DeStatte: It's too early to make any definitive judgments on that right now, but some things we can say. Some of the information that we need to resolve, questions concerning the fate of our missing people, and ultimately to recover the individuals or their remains can be found scattered in the files and archives of individual units, local and province commands, regional commands. But it's also certain that elements of the ministry of defense's general political directorate compiled records on U.S. POWs, and also on many of our MIAs. Those are records that were compiled at the central level... if the Vietnamese political leadership can persuade the general political directorate to share the information from those central records with our joint research teams, then we can get the quickest possible answers on the largest number of people. And I think that's what we should be pressing for.
Archives	Hrdlicka 12/03/92	Now, could we take a reality break here and apply simple logic? If we have these men, and in many cases we know they did, where are they? If they kept as meticulous records of shoot downs, subsequent capture and internment, as we know they have throughout history, as we have witnessed first-hand in Senator McCain's case, if they held our men past the end of the war, as they historically have in past conflicts with other powers, where are they?

Archives	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Most people assert and there is evidence, in fact, that documents, that they kept pretty good records of the prison system, of the flow of information during the war. Is there not an easy way to unlock the key to what might have happened to that particular flyer or to some other person about whom we have a question and to recover the remains? Schweitzer: Well, the key word in your question is, it ought to be, yes. There were orders from Hanoi throughout the war that any American who was captured or any American who was killed, there was to be a complete report made and sent to Hanoi. But in the heat of battle in the war years where most, I think most of the soldiers -- a lot of times these reports just didn't get made. Sometimes they did get made and they didn't arrive in Hanoi. One specific case I was told about... a report was made and then before the group taking the report back to Hanoi could get there, they were all killed in a bombing attack. So that report never made it.
Archives	Schweitzer 12/04/92	When I told them that the documents and photos that they had in their archives were precious, back in 1989, they brought them to me by the thousands. They simply never knew what they had. And, to quote Benjamin Hoff, America took a thimble to the fountain in Hanoi, and then came home and complained that they hadn't been given enough.

Archives	Schweitzer 12/04/92	...some people may ask if all this information is available in Vietnam, and if Vietnam so badly wants relations with the U.S., why don't they just give it all to us right now? Unfortunately for us, as well as for the Vietnamese, it's just not going to be that simple. If all this information were already available, collected, and cataloged, and in some warehouse in Hanoi, the Vietnamese Government would like nothing better than to turn it all over to us, and then request a lifting of the embargo and the establishment of diplomatic ties. However, while information on many missing Americans is available in Vietnam, it is not in official Vietnamese Government hands. The majority of this information is in the hands of retired People's Army Vietnam soldiers or civilians who are scattered all over Vietnam. There is a mountain of information out there. But even with the fullest possible cooperation from the Vietnamese Government, it will take an enormous amount of goodwill, time, and work to locate these materials, collect them, and then catalog them. Even though 19 years have passed since Operation Homecoming in 1973, we are just now beginning this massive undertaking which lies before us. Nearly every day, common people from all over Vietnam come to my office in Hanoi with some items of American memorabilia from the war. The work of the dedicated American analysts over there is just beginning.

Archives	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Well, generically, when people say the Vietnamese have the answers. They have all these documents. Is there a central depository of a whole lot of documents that they could suddenly take a key and unlock it and it will answer all these questions? Schweitzer: In the first place, really, the Vietnamese don't know exactly what they've got. It is not a system, a computerized system with an index to everything that's held in the central government's archive files. There may be more information there than we know of now. I think there's a lot of information there.
Archives	Smith 12/03/92	Vice Chairman Smith: So the answer is that nothing came back to give you a definitive time of death from the Vietnamese? Otis: No. Vice Chairman Smith: And certainly, you would agree, that they must know, if they are that meticulous, when he died and how he died. Otis: Of course they knew when he died. They had him in captivity. As you say, they kept great records... I never really felt one way or the other whether he was alive or dead. I just know I didn't know and it was extremely frustrating because I knew the Vietnamese knew and they didn't bring him back one way or the other. Vice Chairman Smith: So you knew nothing even at Homecoming. You had not heard a thing, correct? Nothing? Otis: No, I heard nothing.

Archives	Tin 11/07/91	Once a POW is put in jail, he then had his own file in which detailed information was kept, such as what he had to eat, if he was sick, what medicine he used. The cadre had to report his behavior and thought process. And I believe that the files are still in Vietnam.
China	Mooney 01/22/92	...in the Vietnam War, the Chinese had opportunity and motive to take American pilots. They were losing their Soviet connection for aircraft, so they were developing their own military-industrial complex... why go out and spend for research when you can quantum leap with an individual? There is very little intelligence that we saw on the Chinese. . . They had the opportunity to shoot them down. They were shooting down American aircraft. They had motive. They were losing their technological base for aircraft from the Soviet Union and they had to start their own industrial complex. Pilots with experience would represent a quantum leap. So the only intelligence that we had was opportunity and motive.
Classified	Andrews 10/15/92	We have willingly made all of our documents available and we will willingly answer all of your questions. If we can't answer them in open session we will answer them in closed. We just have to do so in a responsible manner when dealing with sensitive intelligence or escape and evasion matters. If we divulge their trade craft used in either area it may cost American lives in future conflicts.

Classified	Andrews 10/15/92	Much of what we have discussed in closed meetings is based on current intelligence sources and methods. This is not, as some have charged, an attempt to hide a perceived Government failure to liberate our POWs. Rather, it is the fulfillment of our obligation to protect those intelligence means and methods vital to our global responsibilities in the defense of the Nation.
Classified	Bell 11/06/91	To be honest with you, sir, except for the 105 live-sighting investigations that are now still active, I don't see any reason to classify any of the other information... I think the only thing that needs to be sanitized or declassified from those reports is the name of the individual who provided the information.
Classified	Clements 09/24/92	At that time, those classifications were held within the services. In other words, the Navy classified their people, Army did theirs, and the Air Force did theirs. I want to make that very clear because it's important that your committee and the public at large understand that the office of the Secretary of Defense and/or the State Department and/or the National Security Council, nor the President had any control whatsoever over classification. That was strictly within the services.

Classified	Donahue 11/07/91	You see, here the problem is but one thing. It is secrecy. The war in Laos was a secret war. The POWs in Laos were secret. The POW and MIA intelligence is a secret still classified. And the roadmap is a secret, highly classified. Everything is a secret and is so only because of one thing. And that is because some people are hiding the truth. For them, the truth is too powerful for this country, too destructive for the morale of armed forces, and too debilitating to our national honor for it to be told.
Classified	Ford 11/15/91	Our ability to continue to collect information for the families and for other intelligence projects requires us to try to keep our sources and methods protected. We've used that more times than I would like to admit as an excuse, rather than as the real answer. I'm just simply telling you that that's over. We're going to find a way to do this.
Classified	Griffiths 12/01/92	The families voted against declassification of information under ongoing investigation or information that would jeopardize returning our loved ones alive or dead. That position still holds, and that is the position I continue to reflect.

Classified	Kerry/ 06/25/92 Smith	Chairman Kerry: ...First of all, there has never been an issue about this committee seeking declassification... So there is a vote that is set and we have a process in place with Senator Robb and Senator Grassley, who are reporting to the committee; I think a letter is being drafted today. We are proceeding in a responsible way to try to figure out how to ask for the declassification to get the maximum declassification, but to protect those who deserve privacy in the process. All 12 Senators will vote on this issue, and the chair set out that would be an objective of this committee the day that you and I stood up together months ago and announced we should do this. So there is no new news in this call for declassification. We are going to do it, we have always been going to do it, and it is going to happen.
Classified	Kerry 11/15/91	...I emphasize on behalf of the entire committee, and we have just in our own meeting with Senators confirmed, our inclination to proceed efficiently and quietly to a certain degree in these first months with a significant number of depositions and a significant number of private meetings in order to gather facts, and separate fact from fiction, and do the best job that we can of trying to lay out reality here. I will confirm that every Member feels very strongly that no stone should be unturned, but every Member also feels very strongly that at the appropriate moment, obviously it all has to be laid out in public, or we become part of the problem and we do not intend to let that happen.

Classified	Kerry 06/25/92	Now the Committee is going to vote next week to declassify massively. I will state as a guiding principle, there is nothing the Committee does not want declassified, with the exception of something that can be legitimately shown to 12 Senators as being in current national security interest or something that protects sources and methods of the United States Government. Beyond that, we will have to have a strong showing of cause for why it should not be made public...
Classified	Perroots 12/01/92	Another valid criticism from my point of view is the over-classification of information on this subject.
Classified	Schlesinger 09/21/92	...from time to time the restriction on intelligence simply to protect sources is such that many who might benefit from having that intelligence are denied that because it would reveal certain sources.
Classified	Schlesinger 09/21/92	...from time to time intelligence is denied not simply to protect sources but to hold that intelligence in a narrow circle; to deny it to those who are outside of that circle either for reasons of internal bargaining or the like.
Classified	Sommer 11/06/91	We actually received more hard information from the Vietnamese than we have from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other American entity involved with this issue.

Classified	Wallace 11/06/91	Few pieces of information seem insignificant enough to avoid the secrecy stamp. If we are to believe our government, we must also believe that the POW information buried in their classified files is so sensitive that its declassification would have dire consequences and perhaps even pose a clear and present danger to the national security. Otherwise, why would the government continue to classify the overwhelming majority of the information gathered on this most important issue? I do not believe the government can regain credibility on this issue or adequately defend itself so long as the very information needed for honest evaluation is kept from public view...
Committee	Grassley 06/24/92	...expecting calm and order on this issue os like expecting cars and dogs to live in perfect harmony... the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this Committee have done next to the impossible in terms of keeping this Committee together, to keep it focused and conducting its oversight.
Committee	Grassley 11/15/91	The hearings have been, in my view, quite successful and surprisingly so to me because, Mr. President, I must admit that at first I had reservations about the utility of the committee's work starting with hearings... for fear that precious time would be diverted from the investigation aspects of the committee's work.

Committee	Kerrey 09/24/92	This Committee could very easily itself have moved in a direction where it accomplished nothing. I believe if we ended today, which some would argue we should -- if we ended today, this Committee will already have accomplished a great deal. Mr. Chairman, I have undying admiration and appreciation both for you and for Vice Chairman Smith for pursuing this, and I want to pay special tribute to, again, Senator Grassley, whose interest in declassification was early, was active, was strong, and I think has provided enormous benefit to the American people.
Committee	Kerry 11/06/91	...the time has come for these kinds of allegations to be laid on the table, and for the sources not to be hidden from the Committee, at least. There is no way the Committee can proceed without that kind of information being put in front of it. So I ask you and anyone else who has that kind of information -- and you can hold this Senator and Senator Smith accountable, and I am sure you will if something happens... we rely on your cooperation to make that happen.
Committee	Kerry 12/03/92	That process of finding answers is what this Committee is all about. I can speak for every member of this Committee when I say that determination will continue on an individual level and with the other standing committees of this Senate even after this Committee itself has opened the doors on this issue and has ceased to exist.
Committee	Kerry 01/22/92	I hope you also appreciate that when I push you or when I push the line of questioning, it is without regard to who is sitting in front of me. I am going to push both sides as much as possible to be able to help the Committee make its judgments.

Committee	Kerry 01/22/92	[Intelligence service employees] are not permitted to deny information to this committee on the basis of that [secrecy] oath... we intend to put them under oath and depose them, and we will subpoena them if necessary. So in terms of enticement, they are invited today to come forward with an understanding that if they do not come forward on their own, the greater likelihood is that the committee is going to find an opportunity for them to have to appear.
Committee	Kerry 01/21/92	I want people to understand, again, that the committee is not withholding information or deep-sixing anything. All of it will be made public. But the Committee feels that when it is given a name, as a matter of investigative integrity it is sometimes more important for the Committee to be able to get investigators to the people before they are publicly identified so that there is less time or less capacity for fabrication of a story, and so that the Committee has an opportunity to determine whether there are any outside pressures or other influences that might be affecting that person's capacity to give us a straight story.

Committee	Kerry 09/22/92	I know this is difficult, I wish there was a way to make it easy, and it is not, and we acknowledge that. But we are not here seeking to re-fight the Vietnam War. We are not trying to renegotiate the peace agreement or to reopen wounds of that era, as difficult as it is to avoid them... We also are not trying to question dedication or patriotism or commitment to the task that existed back in 1972. All Americans of a certain age, whether Senators or former Government officials, POW families, veterans, or just plain citizens, bring to any discussion of Vietnam a set of emotions and memories, some of which may be among the strongest and most vivid of a lifetime. We cannot ignore or deny those memories, or simply wish them out of existence, but neither should we let them control or influence the purpose or integrity of this committee's work... We remain in the process of gathering information and insights and trying to understand why certain things were done, why certain things were not done, what options were available to those who had the tough task of making decisions at one of the toughest times in American history.

Committee	Kerry 09/24/92	...folks, this issue was not created by the United States Congress 20 years later. This issue is an issue of grassroots momentum. There is not a place I have gone in the last years in this country where someone has not come up to me and said, why are you not doing anything on this? Where are the answers? And the families, particularly, have carried this with them for these 20 years. Now, at a time in our government when American citizens feel that the government has broken most bonds of trust with every citizen, it is hardly appropriate for us to just turn our backs and say, this is not relevant. I view these hearings not just as an effort to get to the truth of what happened. I view them also as an effort by elected officials to try to prove that we can do our job, and that we can reestablish that sense of credibility between citizens who expect us to ask tough question.
Committee	Kerry 12/03/92	I hope we not limit our focus this morning to the past. A big part of this Committee's job is to translate lessons learned and experiences that have been felt into recommendations for future action and into our understanding as a Committee so that we can share that understanding with the American people.

Committee	Kerry 11/15/91	I want to ensure all people who are interested in the public aspect of this inquiry that the fact that we are not having a public hearing does not mean we are hiding anything, nor does it mean that we are not doing anything. It means we are going to proceed to do our homework. There clearly will be public sessions as we proceed, and all data that we can conceivably make available to the public -- with the exception of compromising national security, as a judgment made by 12 United States Senators -- will be made public as we proceed.
Committee	Kerry 11/15/91	This Committee is not going to tolerate folks who want to use us as some kind of springboard or platform for wild-eyed, cock-eyed theories that have no basis in fact whatsoever. We are going to be tough with respect to that, and we have a process set up to try to do it -- but we do not want at the end of this process anybody who has legitimate information to feel that this committee was not receptive to it.
Committee	McCain 09/24/92	...the fact is that you and Senator Smith have conducted these hearings in a fair and unbiased manner...
Committee	Mooney 01/22/92	Most of the negotiations on this issue have been by policy makers. They go there with a specific opinion and they're not going to breach from that. For the first time, you're going to have Senators going there. You guys know how to wheel and deal. You know how to compromise. Maybe this is the proper approach... Maybe if you would go there with this attitude of specific knowledge and talk to these people and show them respect and gain respect from them, it might open doors.

Committee	Mooney 01/22/92	...when this committee was formed, and it was announced that this committee would investigate the MIA/POW issue, I had doubts, serious doubts. Because in six years, I had not one success. All I had was criticism and to be debunked. When I was asked to visit with your committee people last week, I was eager to come because I had to find out for myself what this committee was about. Was it going to be another dog and pony show, or were you for real? I was deposed for a day and a half. It was professional, it was thorough, it was incisive, it was tough, and in one particular case it was painful. But it was the best deposition or best questioning I've had to date. Based on that, I am sitting here to tell you, and to tell everybody who is watching or listening, that you are for real. You will get to the bottom of this issue. And I am willing to pass the torch on to you. I will keep the matches just in case I have to light up again, but the torch now belongs in your hands. That deposition proved to me that you will fulfill your promise to leave no stone unturned, to find not my truth or anybody else's truth, but the truth. I hope those listening who have knowledge will believe that and come forward.

Committee	Mooney 01/22/92	Over the years, I've had many people call me from the business; 99 percent of them will not identify themselves, and they say one thing consistently: "I will not come forward because I do not think you can win... "They feel they will not be believed. I think if this committee applies its mission with honor, with dignity, and with clear objectives, the people will step forward... I hope they do, because it is that important. This is our best chance and this is, in my opinion, our last chance.
Committee	Mooney 01/22/92	I'm just the tip of the iceberg... You need more than people like me, people who work in the field and who have the first blush with intelligence. You have to get beyond us, you have to get up to where the intelligence is interpreted and used for policy and politics.
Committee	Quinn 11/15/91	As a citizen, I sort of grieve over the fact that we have this problem so long after the war. It still is a sore that has not healed and has not been dealt with. I think that what you and the Committee are doing is going a long direction in letting our citizens know exactly what is involved.
Committee	Smith 09/21/92	Vice Chairman Smith: The American people, I believe, are a great people, and I think they will accept anything as long as they are told the truth... There could be 500 people in Vietnam and Laos. There could be none. But the point is: the reason why the Committee is in existence, the reason why you are here, and the reason why the debate is still raging is because the American people do not believe that their government has told them the truth...

Committee	Steadman 12/02/92	...Perhaps because the issue has been so contentious over the years, maybe Congress didn't exercise its oversight role as strongly as it could have. And this panel, this Committee, has reversed that, and in doing so you've brought the issue squarely in front of the American public and squarely on the doorstep of the Southeast Asian governments. You've also brought information forward which allows the American public now to make informed judgments about this issue, and I think your final report should state whether Congress should continue its investigation. You should make an informed judgment on that, whether investigation is required, further investigation is required, further oversight is required, or perhaps both are required.
Committee	Tighe 06/24/92	I believe that you are compiling the largest and most comprehensive body of evidence on the subject of missing in military action that has ever been assembled.
Committee	Vessey 06/25/92	...more needs to be made public and I commend the Committee. I think I saw the broadcast of your Southeast Asian trip, those were superb. The clips from those, that trip and the American public desperately needs to see the whole picture rather than sensational tidbits that come out. So I certainly commend the Committee for its work and I think the Committee's report eventually will turn out to be one of the most important documents we have in the public record.

Conspiracy	Andrews 12/03/92	...I believe that neither this Committee nor the American people can expect that the whispers of conspiracy will ever go away. I am convinced that no matter how many files are opened, no matter how many witnesses are interviewed, no matter how many crash sites are sifted through, there will always be those who will see it in their own selfish interest to inject distrust into this issue. The antidote to this is openness.
Conspiracy	Baker 08/12/92	I cannot think of a single thing that suggests to me that there was a conspiracy of silence or any active conspiracy or any other kind of conspiracy...
Conspiracy	Bell 11/06/91	I don't think there's been a cover-up, sir, but I think it's possible that information was not acted upon.
Conspiracy	Burch 11/06/91	The media have been whispered off the track with anonymous comments that there are no live POWs...
Conspiracy	Christmas 06/25/92	Mr. Chairman, my experience is that most people who become well-informed on this issue have no trouble agreeing that the accounting for our missing men means obtaining information from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Those who maintain that there is some secret set of files being kept by misguided U.S. Government personnel intent on maintaining some bizarre cover-up are deluding themselves and the American people. The answers are in Southeast Asia and that is where the U.S. Government is, correctly in my view, putting its emphasis.

Conspiracy	Clapper 12/01/92	To suggest that we are somehow part of a conspiracy is certainly absurd, if not insulting. I take it as a personal insult that anyone would suggest that I've had any part in a conspiracy.
Conspiracy	Ford 11/15/91	There is no conspiracy to purge records. The Department of Defense does not maintain fingerprint records. The FBI is the sole agency with that responsibility.
Conspiracy	Kassebaum 6/25/92	I am just not one who believes in conspiracy theories, but I think unfortunately because we have been such a long time coming to terms with this and doing it in a way and being as forthright as possible we have created and added a great deal of sorrow and confusion to the process.
Conspiracy	Kerry 11/15/91	I do not, in God's name, know how you can begin to do this process unless we will trust some people on the ground in Vietnam to build some relationships and make some judgments about those relations. Somewhere along the line here, somebody has got to begin to believe that not every American working for the United States Government is going to become part of some process to hide Americans in Vietnam.

Conspiracy	Kerry 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: ...in any of your review or at any time that you have been in contact with this issue, did you find any evidence whatsoever to suggest to you that there was a conscious cover-up on this issue or conspiracy to withhold it from proper analysis and pursuit? Mr. Wiand? Wiand: No... Hargis: No... Nagy: No... Brooks: Absolutely not... Gaines: Absolutely not...
Conspiracy	Kissinger 09/22/92	What has happened to this country that a Congressional committee could be asked to inquire whether any American official of whatever administration would fail to move heaven and earth to fight for the release of American POWs and for an accounting of the missing? Can anyone seriously believe that any honorable public official would neglect America's servicemen, and especially those who suffered so much for their country or, even worse, arrange for a conspiracy to obscure the fate of the prisoners left behind? Personally, I have no proof whether Americans, live Americans, were kept behind by Hanoi. The Vietnamese are certainly capable of such a cynical act, and of lying about it. If any prisoners were held back, however, there can be only one guilty party.

Conspiracy	Kissinger 09/22/92	There is no excuse, two decades after the fact, for anyone to imply that the last five Presidents from both parties, their White House staffs, Secretaries of State and Defense, and career diplomatic and military services either knowingly or negligently failed to do everything they could to recover and identify all of our prisoners and MIAs.
Conspiracy	Lord 09/21/92	Chairman Kerry: ...But as major public policy makers of that period and also public servants helping the American public understand this and looking at this can you understand why still today there are people who believe that they were misled, that the government was in a conspiracy, that they were lied to and that they have been led down the path over the years after those comments, given the evidence, is it understandable? Lord: I think it's understandable. I think some of the terms you used are unfair, but I can understand why people might harbor these doubts.
Conspiracy	Lundy 11/06/91	...my father had top-secret security clearance, nuclear, intelligence... How could there not be fingerprints in my father's file?... there is a letter in his file that says, 'attached are forms and fingerprint cards on the above subject'... This is a smoking-gun letter that there is cover-up in our government.

Conspiracy	McCain 09/24/92	Sen. McCain: Do you believe that there was any conspiracy to cover up the existence of any live Americans either in Laos or anywhere in Southeast Asia? Secord: No, sir, I don't. I've never seen any evidence of that. Sen. McCain: Do you believe that it would have been possible, without the knowledge of a number of military officers and enlisted people such as yourself who were in some way in the loop? Secord: No. There are so many people in that loop that it would not have been possible, in my opinion.
Conspiracy	Perroots 08/12/92	Sen. McCain: In order for a cover-up to be successful as has been alleged, it would have taken the active participation of hundreds if not thousands of military personnel? Perroots: Yes, sir.
Conspiracy	Perroots 12/01/92	...most emphatically, Mr. Chairman, the allegation of a cover-up or a conspiracy, [is] the most serious invalid, criticism.
Conspiracy	Sieverts 06/25/92	...a great many dedicated people... worked on this subject for many years, and we are well aware that the passage of time has not healed the wounds or brought comfort to the families whose hopes have been repeatedly raised and dashed.

Conspiracy	Vessey 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: Have you ever seen any evidence of any conspiracy or cover-up? Vessey: No, sir, I have not. Sen. McCain: Did you when you were in your position as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Vessey: No, sir. Sen. McCain: Or at any other time in your military career? Vessey: No, sir.
Conspiracy	Vessey 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: In order for there to be a conspiracy or a cover-up of this issue, do you agree with me that it would have required the active participation of hundreds of members of the military? Vessey: Yes, sir. And I think that's an improbable sort of thing. American soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines are not conspirators. It's hard to keep military secrets long enough to get the operation going along without the enemy knowing what's going on. Even at the time when we were at low ebb, we still had 100-and-some-odd people involved, and those rotated. Many of them rotated every two or three years. So I'd say the prospect or probability of a conspiracy being kept without it being blown wide open is almost zero.
Cooperation	Armitage 08/12/92	Just to sum up clearly, the governments of Vietnam, Laos, and what passes for a government in Cambodia, have to open up and give full and complete access to Americans upon request, with no waiting periods, et cetera, before we can begin to put it at rest.

Cooperation	Bell 11/06/91	Bell: ...I think the Vietnamese right now today are just as far along in this issue as they choose to be. Chairman Kerry: Does that mean they could choose to be further along? Bell: Yes, sir.
Cooperation	Bell 11/06/91	To resolve these cases, as well as the live-sighting reports, we need to meet with cadre who were involved in the detention of American POWs and also to have access to Vietnam's wartime historical archives. We have had access to some records and witnesses' testimony which has matched that obtained from witnesses no longer under Vietnamese control. This is a good sign, but it is readily apparent to me, my fellow investigators, and our intelligence analysts that the Vietnamese can do more.
Cooperation	Cheney 11/05/91	Vietnamese cooperation on these joint investigations has improved, but despite these improvements, we are still not satisfied with Vietnam's performance... Too often, our office finds that public pronouncements of increased cooperation by Hanoi do not produce satisfactory arrangements on the ground. Promises to cooperate on live sightings, improved helicopter transportation, and complete access to historical records remain only partially fulfilled... If we ever hope to achieve the fullest possible accounting in a reasonable period of time, Vietnamese unilateral efforts, as well as their participation in joint activities, will have to dramatically improve.
Cooperation	Childress 08/12/92	...when I left, our estimate was that the Vietnamese could account for hundreds of cases easily.

Cooperation	Childress 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: I think on the enemy proselytizing materials, we do not have evidence that that actually still exists. We know they had it, but we do not know it exists today. Is that not accurate? Mr. Childress: The original stories Hanoi said was that they had no records at all, they were eaten with termites, they were the rest. Now, as I said in my original testimony before this committee, Vietnamese dialogue with you is not evil, but it's certainly not in the western sense. Chairman Kerry: Oh, absolutely.
Cooperation	Childress 08/12/92	...Now, when I say resolve easily hundreds of cases, I mean either you either have a live prisoner, remains, or an explanation why neither is possible through archival research or the rest. And in those categories, there are many hundreds of cases they can resolve for us.
Cooperation	Childress 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: Let me say to you that there is no naivete on the part of the committee about this process and its past, you know. Childress: Right. And we've had many denials. Chairman Kerry: Information has been withheld. We have not always been told the truth. We understand that and we go into that with open eyes...

Cooperation	Childress 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: Imagine that when the ministry of foreign affairs in Vietnam says, oh, yes, we are going to get this stuff and we want to be helpful, but you have a lot of gnomes within the ministry of defense who only remember fighting us and are still fighting us and do not want to change, that those documents are not forthcoming. There are difficulties in that process also, I am sure you will agree. Childress: I absolutely acknowledge those and I think we're on the right track in this sense, that the Vietnamese agreed that they would pursue unilateral efforts. Most of the progress we've had in terms of resolving cases have not come from joint efforts, have come from unilateral Vietnamese decisions. And to the extent the Vietnamese mean this and we should encourage it; we should also be prepared to underwrite it if needed.

Cooperation	Christmas 06/25/92	Christmas: In the area of archival research and in the area of documents provided, there is an area where we need help, where they can, in fact, provide a great deal more. Our investigators as they go out -- Sen. McCain: What do you speculate is the reason they have not been more cooperative in that area? Christmas: Sir, I think it is a matter, as Gen. Vessey, I thought, pointed out very well; you may, at the central government level say, this is what we are going to do. But when it comes down to action at the district or province level, that may not -- it gets the slows -- whether or not that it is going to take place. The other one where we have difficulty is the trilateral agreements or trilateral talks and cross-border operations. That is at a standstill right now, Senator, and it's at a standstill for a number of reasons. both the Lao and the Cambodians have been very reluctant to trilateral talks. The Vietnamese based on the committee getting out there said, yes, you can go from Vietnam into Laos because, in some places, that is the only way you can get into where crash sites would have been. The Lao have disagreed with that and have said, no, we will not allow that. They have also disagreed with trilateral talks. So I think the point is, we are making measured progress. Can we make more? Sure we can. I think in Vietnam that progress will continue if we continue to accelerate our operations, continue to keep our folks in country face to face with the Vietnamese.

Cooperation	Christmas 06/25/92	The key element of information is missing: the current location of the person or his remains. This is why we need Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to share whatever records they possess on American prisoners and the missing, and make available for interview former members of their military units.
Cooperation	Christmas 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: So I take it, it is your judgment that we are moving down the road... Christmas: It's certainly my judgment, sir. If you remember, we talked before about the agreements that were made between Le Mai and then Assistant Secretary Solomon -- five agreements: expanded operations, live sighting mechanism, archival research, and so forth. Of at least three of those, we have had substantial movement and substantial progress from the February of this year when those agreements were made. So there has been progress, and what we need to do, as the Admiral has said, is just keep pressing.
Cooperation	Christmas 11/05/91	The Pacific Command, in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense, has moved quickly to capitalize on the favorable climate of cooperation in Vietnam. We plan to execute a comprehensive casualty resolution campaign on a scale which the Department of Defense has wanted to carry out since the signing of the Paris Accords in 1973, but could not because of Vietnam's intransigence.
Cooperation	Clapper 12/01/92	If we are to have true resolution of these cases that so consume so many Americans, it is in the hands of the Vietnamese.

Cooperation	DeStatte 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Are we on the road to resolving this?
		DeStatte: Yes, sir. I'm quite confident. As I said earlier, I think we're getting the kind of cooperation -- I think that Vietnam's top leaders have made the decision to try to solve this issue. I think they issued the instruction to their bureaucracy to do so, and I believe that at the working level, where we are, at least the people that I've been working with, I believe we're getting the kind of cooperation, we're getting good cooperation. I do, however, believe that there's some distance to go, and I think that if there's an obstacle, that obstacle is at the mid-level. And I believe that Vietnam's leaders can solve that problem. I think that's the proper solution.
Cooperation	Ford 12/04/92	...the fact is that in many cases it's clear that the Vietnamese don't always know what they have there and that they've got a lot of valuable information. We know it's valuable, but it wasn't necessarily valuable to them or they weren't quite sure what it was. Allowing us access into that is extremely important... We are just now getting into these archives and all of us are wanting to move forward as rapidly as we can.
Cooperation	Ford 12/01/92	I frankly, in looking at that period, I think that I give the most credit to the Vietnamese. I think they sought us out.

Cooperation	Ford 12/01/92	...I would argue that the reason that we have been is because we have won most of the battles of being fair and firm with the Vietnamese. And when they produce results, we have delivered, State has delivered, Defense has delivered, NSC has delivered. We have no history that if we give something to the Vietnamese for nothing, that we get reciprocal benefit from it.
Cooperation	Gadoury 11/06/91	Progress has, up to this point, however, been rather disappointing in terms of results. Despite Vietnamese claims of total freedom of travel to pursue first-hand live sightings, both captive and living free, our investigator has not yet been permitted by the Vietnamese to travel outside Hanoi to complete his investigations.
Cooperation	Grassley 11/06/91	...I think they [the Vietnamese Government] ought to know that we would all welcome and would not hold past history against them at all if there was a dramatic change of practice on the part of the Vietnamese Government for total cooperation along the lines of our people could go any place that they want to go. If the Vietnamese Government came up with an American there who they previously said was not there, that we would not look at it as an opportunity for punitive action against the Vietnamese Government, but that we would look at it as an opportunity for a further opening of relations and normalization of relations.
Cooperation	Griffiths 12/01/92	It was quite difficult in earlier years, and it evolved and got more effective and the priority began to be understood in the far reaches of the government. But it was not really an easy process, especially when you were building from zero.

Cooperation	Kerry 12/01/92	And I would lay unfortunate odds that if we were to apply that standard to ourselves at this point in time about Vietnamese MIAs, we would be sorely wanting.

Cooperation	Kerry 12/04/92	We kind of did a great, double-team effort here between General Vessey, the Committee, your efforts. But the distinction is that at that point in time the Politburo and the decisions had not been made. I sat with the General Secretary of Vietnam. I was the first United States citizen to meet with the leading official of Vietnam -- and it only happened a year and a half ago -- at which point he turns to me, and I have got to tell you I was stunned and the people with me were stunned, because he could not understand in 1991, what this issue meant, why it was real, or if we were serious. And he turned to me and he said: Senator, I do not understand this; when I was negotiating with Jimmy Carter in 1978 for normalization, nobody raised this issue with us. It was not on the table. So he had no sense that this was anything but an American trick in the 1980s and '90s to sort of find a different way to prosecute the war against Vietnam. So I went through this long explanation to him of what happened with the problems of Jimmy Carter's presidency and what happened in the desert in Iran and the sense of lack of power in the country, and along came Ronald Reagan and he made this a big issue, to his credit, and raised the consciousness, and then movies appeared and books appeared and Sly Stallone made a cult, and off we went, and it entered the American consciousness and body politic... We [sent them] a whole lot of articles and sent them information and tried to give them a sense of the reality of it.... So finally they say: Hey, you know,

Cooperation continued	Kerry 12/04/92	with it. So if they have admitted, and you say, yes, they have admitted, and this high visibility Senate delegation arrives in Hanoi and I say to them, you know what really is going to make a difference to our going back to America and being able to say good things about you? Remains. And Ted Schweitzer spends 24 hours with them privately, using the respect and friendship he's built up, and he says: You know what you have got to give these guys? Remains. And as you heard him testify today under oath, he said: You know, their faces sank, and they sat in that room and they said: If the success of this mission or failure depends on remains, then it will fail.
Cooperation	Larson 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Now I ask you, Admiral, General, and General, is the process corrupt? Are these people not cooperating broadly, or do you feel there is this genuine commitment to getting this process to work? The Committee wants to know the truth, not some preordained answer. Larson: Mr. Chairman, I think their senior leadership in their central government has made a political decision to cooperate and to try to move forward. The level of that cooperation, I think we have a system in place that will test the level of that cooperation and put pressure on them to produce and evaluate how far they are willing to go. Right or wrong for what they've done for the last 20 years, I think they've made a political decision now, we've got to change and we've got to move forward, particularly in the archival research area.

Cooperation	Needham 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: General, can you speak now to the issue of the level of cooperation that you receive? Where are we? What kind of judgment can the committee make, based on your experience now, over this year, in Vietnam? Needham: Sir, in my opinion, in the last year the cooperation in Vietnam has been steadily improving since I assumed my position in January. Recently... there have been some dramatic improvements. I think the Vietnamese could still do more, but right now we see cooperation getting better and better every day at the central level. In the field level, cooperation is mixed... in the provinces, it's mixed. Chairman Kerry: ...You have provinces in Vietnam that were very heavily bombed, and their support to the United States is less than others...
Cooperation	Needham 12/04/92	Sir, I think it is going to produce results. I think we're starting to see a little bit in Hanoi. I think it's too early to tell exactly how much we're going to get, but I believe we're off to a positive start and I'm hoping that we can -- by the information requests that Mr. DeStatte has given them, that we can lead this archival research program a little bit more to the way we want to go, which is looking at supporting the work plan and supporting cases that we want to get answers to rather than just getting information for the sake of getting information.
Cooperation	Perroots 08/12/92	Vietnam can easily account for hundreds of Americans that have not yet exercised their requisite will to do so.

Cooperation	Quinn 12/01/92	Mr. Chairman, the vastly improved level of cooperation is a clear indication that our policy of both sides taking a series of commensurate steps is working.
Cooperation	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Following years of distrust among many of the parties trying to resolve this MIA issue, there have however now been new approaches which have taken place in Hanoi over the past few weeks and cooperation has reached a new level. But there still appear to me to be three basic questions which have remained unanswered up to this point. The first question concerns just how much information we can hope to learn about the Americans still unaccounted for in Vietnam. The second remaining question involves the source of this information. The third question concerns, it has taken 19 years for the U.S. and Vietnam to come to this starting point in addressing these questions.

Cooperation	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Well, the central government has made it clear to me that the key element in getting that material brought to Hanoi is in U.S. hands, not in their hands. They had -- the leadership of Vietnam cannot simply order 70 million Vietnamese citizens to bring this mountain of material to Hanoi. It has to be something that the Vietnamese, the common Vietnamese citizen, feels in his heart he wants to do for America. If he has a souvenir, war memorabilia, something that he picked up from a crash or a war site in the highlands in '67 or from a crash up in the mountains someplace, say a piece of an airplane that he's been using as a side of his house or a little package of things he picked up somehow, maybe the man who picked it up is even dead and his children have it and have no idea what it is even. But they're not going to make -- the common person of Vietnam just isn't going to come forward with all that mountain of information unless they really have the feeling in the heart that they want to do this for America. It can't be dictated from on high that you will bring forward everything that you possess on America. It just won't happen that way.

Cooperation	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Schweitzer: ...with the steps that have been taken so far, especially the last one involving AT&T, people are coming forward with more materials than they've ever come forward with before. I brought two examples with me. Chairman Kerry: You see a significant shift now suddenly in the production of some of these documents? Schweitzer: I certainly do. And the more steps the United States takes to ease the hardships on Vietnam, the more warmth the common Vietnamese citizens will feel towards us and will come forward with materials.
Cooperation	Sheetz 06/25/92	Mr. Sheetz: I'd like to underscore. There's something that Senator Smith and Senator Kerry, you could both, I think, help us with. I recognize you'll probably be making another trip to Southeast Asia before your committee completes its work. If you do, or if another opportunity presents itself -- I wish you would underscore to both the Laos Government and the Vietnamese Government the need for unfettered access on conducting live sighting investigations. Basically, not frustrating our officers when they're out there in the field trying to facilitate the process. We're making progress, it's getting better, but it's got to get a lot better before I'm going to be happy. And if there's anything this committee could do to underscore with those two governments.
Cooperation	Sheridan 12/02/92	...To my way of thinking, the answers are in Hanoi and in Vientiane and in Cambodia, and it could be over with in a very short period of time if those governments would be forthcoming with the information that they have.

Cooperation	Vessey 12/04/92	However, when we look at the issue of Vietnamese cooperation, it would be a mistake to forget the progress in reuniting several hundred thousand separated Vietnamese family members, getting over 60,000 Amerasian children and family members out of Vietnam and getting the former South Vietnamese officers and Government officials out of the re-education camps and getting them and their families out of Vietnam if they wanted to go.

Cooperation	Vessey 06/25/92	My first instructions came from President Reagan in 1987... President Reagan started an effort in 1982 to bring more focus to this issue. Negotiations had been underway for about four years and they stalled in 1986, in late 1986, and I was asked to take on the job in early 1987. I was instructed by the President to conduct negotiations with the Vietnamese Government to attempt to get cooperation on a number of humanitarian issues, and the specifics goals were as follows: The first goal, and the number one priority, was to get the cooperation required to achieve the fullest possible accounting for all Americans missing from the war in Vietnam. Within that goal of fullest possible accounting, as the first priority, was to go after the business of whether or not live American prisoners were continuing to be held by the Vietnamese Government. And if there were live Americans either in captivity or living freely, to seek their immediate return. Then the third point was to get Vietnamese cooperation and an expanded effort in the return of remains that had already been recovered, and in searching for and recovering and return those remains which had not yet been recovered.

Cooperation	Vessey 06/25/92	It is worth remembering that those instructions were given in light of conditions which existed in 1987. Vietnam's military forces were in Cambodia. We had no relations with the Government of Vietnam other than those preliminary talks I mentioned earlier. We had consistently said that the POW/MIA issue should be settled as a humanitarian issue. We had regularly told the Vietnamese that resolution of the POW/MIA issue was not a requirement for discussing normalization, but we'd also said consistently that pace and scope of cooperation on POW/MIA matters would affect the pace and scope of our talks on normalization.
Cooperation	Vessey 06/25/92	... certainly, the one area of cooperation... is the business of archival research, is diligent. Both the prime minister and the foreign minister promised a complete and diligent search of their archives for all information about missing Americans. That's difficult to do. We need to work with them to guide them to do it. But at the same time, it can only be done with their cooperation and work. They have to do it. It's just tough work.
Cooperation	Vessey 06/25/92	Chairman Kerry: Within the last five or six months we have gotten different signals from both state and DoD regarding how cooperative the Vietnamese have been... State basically says they are being very cooperative or more cooperative and DoD says they are not being as cooperative as they should be, we need more information. Where do you see it? Vessey: The cooperation is far greater today. One of the problems with evaluating Vietnamese cooperation is we don't know how capable they are of cooperating.

Cooperation	Vessey 06/25/92	In the area of POW/MIA, a lot of work has been done but the resolution of individual cases has been slow and plodding... We've had some preliminary talks trying to get investigations underway for cases of individuals lost in the border areas of Cambodia and Laos, that were then under the control of Vietnamese forces. In 1988 we agreed to joint field investigations in Vietnam with American and Vietnamese investigators participating. We are entering now into our 18th set of joint field investigations.
Declassification	Grassley 06/24/92	Until these documents become declassified and tell the story themselves without the debunkers, without the conspirators, and the spin doctors, it is incumbent upon us, those of us on this committee and, of course, the media as well, to counter the misrepresentations that there is no evidence.
Declassification	Kerrey 09/21/92	...As said, it does not surprise me that the North Vietnamese would either lie to their people and to us, or withhold information from their people or from us. But it seems to me that it is reasonable for me to conclude that I should have a higher standard for our own government. And thus, the release of the information, redacted and carefully examined -- the decision by President Bush to release that information, pressured by this committee to do so, I think has performed a very valuable service even though we may never get, as I said, to the bottom of it...I must say that had that information been provided in 1973 -- had we just said to the American people, here are the facts, here is what we know and what we do not know, I think the outcome also would have been much different over the next 19 years.

Deserters	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Deserters are excluded from the official DoD Southeast Asia casualty files.
Deserters	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Chairman Kerry: Mr. Trowbridge, are you saying that the Defense Intelligence Agency carries only 15 people as deserters in country? Trowbridge: Based on what we have been able to obtain from the services, that is correct, sir. Chairman Kerry: Can you tell me why, then, this committee got a list from the Defense Department, the National Archives, which we were about to submit to the FBI of 1,284 deserter names last known with their units in Vietnam?
		Trowbridge: Sir, I cannot answer that. As I said, we had an analyst that went through the records ourselves in 1988. Again, if you have got a list -- you know, I do not know where these lists come and what the criteria was to make these lists. Chairman Kerry: Does that not say something to you? You are supposed to be analyzing live sighting reports. You have got a potential base of some 1,200 people who supposedly deserted in country. I am not suggesting -- this committee, incidentally, is not focusing on deserters. This committee is focused on POW's, military people who had been taken prisoner. But obviously there is a possibility that someone who is a deserter could be the source of a live sighting report. Trowbridge: That is absolutely correct.

Deserters	Vessey 11/05/91	It is my understanding that none were classified as deserters. Now, there is some evidence in some very few cases that some might have been there under their own free will. Later on there was some evidence that came up, but the evidence is pretty scanty... I would not want to accuse any of these guys of being deserters... there is just not evidence to do that.
DIA - Clusters	Brooks 12/01/92	Sen. McCain: ...General Perroots has previously testified that they did, and have used, this so-called cluster theory in part of their analysis on many occasions. Are you aware of that, Admiral? Brooks: No, I was not aware, Senator.
DIA - Critics	Brooks 12/01/92	I was disappointed with the lack of rigor in the analytic process, I was disappointed, for example, with the way in which files were kept, I was disappointed with the lack of disciplined analytic techniques which I would anticipate to be used in any analytic process...
DIA - Critics	Brooks 12/01/92	Senator, I would comment that when I first arrived there -- I was there for a period of almost four months, from June of 1985 until September of 1985, perhaps the beginning of October of 1985 -- I was surprised to see how few people were dedicated to analysis of the POW/MIA issue...
DIA - Critics	Brooks 12/01/92	There was not adequate management of the analytic process to assure that the mindset to debunk did not color potentially valid reports as well as those which were apparently invalid.

DIA - Critics	Brooks 12/01/92	...a certain degree of cynicism, I think, crept into our intelligence analysis. And it is human nature. We had been confronted with so many reports that were either deliberate fabrications or were grossly inaccurate that I think the analyst becomes cynical... there also is a category of people at work surrounding the POW/MIA issue which I will categorize as professional predators...
DIA - Critics	Brooks 12/01/92	Bureaucratic ineptitude certainly characterized the situation in 1985.
DIA - Critics	Brooks 12/01/92	...yes, indeed, there were cases that I thought should have been reopened and should have been looked into in much more depth.
DIA - Critics	Brooks 12/01/92	I think probably the desire to believe that we had accounted for the POWs perhaps accounted for some of the attitude. Also, of course, the fact that the returned POWs did in fact state that all of the POWs known to be in captivity to them, to them known to be in the official prison system, were accounted for perhaps led to the mindset that this was not as important a problem as it should have been... The case files had not been maintained properly, leads had not been followed up, the normal things that you would...do in trying to maintain continuity on a problem had not been done during that period 1973 to 1983.
DIA	Brooks 12/01/92	My own experience with the analysts is that they were a very dedicated and very frustrated lot. There were too few of them... your observation about paucity of assets is accurate.

DIA - Critics	Childress 12/01/92	...I know exactly what you're doing, you're really following it up -- by using such words you give the impression that you don't believe it's true at the outset, alleged or alleged with three other adjectives and this sort of thing. I got the impression in the period before the Reagan Administration that there was almost a fear to put in a report that wasn't hedged and guarded by enough adjectives. What we were trying to bring to them is don't fear it, say it objectively, drop the kind of adjectives, and so forth. Don't overdo it but be objective and we'll handle it, everybody will handle it when they get back.

DIA - Critics	Childress 12/01/92	By the time the Tighe Report had come out, the Vietnamese had released the largest number of remains in 1985 than at any time since the end of the war, and I think it was 26 at the time. They had also agreed that they wanted to work with us on a 2-year plan to try to resolve these major core issues of the POW/MIA issue within a 2-year plan. And we were -- had been negotiating and had several high-level trips. The Tighe Report popped in the middle of this, and they were obviously not up to date on negotiations, but that wasn't why they were there anyway, it was to look to DIA. So they were filling this document up with presumptions that I felt were years old that they had brought to the table. And I went over and briefed them on policy and, you know, our 10-point plan and the rest, on one occasion, but that was just to give them background. So I felt that they -- you know, they were good people and well committed and had their experience, but I wanted them to stay with the knitting that they were hired for.

DIA - Critics	Childress 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: What you said in your letter, and let me quote you: "There are several flat untruths in it, many distortions and inaccuracies, an abundance of speculation with no basis in fact, an obvious lack of understanding of the overall issue and judgments or perceptions of the Vietnamese mystery combined with popular mythology." Did all of those criticisms get addressed? Childress: Well, I was not in a position to -- I wasn't on the report. I was giving my impressions to General Perroots. Chairman Kerry: I understand. But when the final report came out, did you hold those same conclusions about the report? Childress: Not as strongly, but I still saw some popular mythology in it.
DIA - Critics	Childress 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: Mr. Childress, you made some criticisms of the Tighe Report which were really very strong... Childress: This was a first draft that they had done and it was full of policy things, not intelligence things. So General Perroots sent it over to me and said take a look at this, they're making policy recommendations. I was, needless to say, from reading that outraged that they were into policy things. And I also took the opportunity to make what I felt was the case that if you're going to talk about live prisoners, we're talking about last known alive, that's where I had put my focus. And a look of 16 or 18 reports, or 32 case files could not lead to those kinds of conclusions that I felt that they were heading towards.

DIA	Clapper 12/01/92	I have to say one other thing, Senator Kerry, in all due respect. We talked about who has been responsible for this over the years. The Congress, in all fairness, bears a certain amount of responsibility for this. Every year we, in intelligence, and the director of DIA as the manager of the General Defense Intelligence Program, gets very specific and very intrusive guidance from the Congress on what authorizations we will have and for what purpose.
DIA - Critics	Clapper 12/01/92	...the criticisms arise from the simple and abundant frustration at our inability to resolve the ultimate fate of the POW/MIAs. And the reason is, and again Colonel Schlatter alluded to it, is that because intelligence, given its inherent limitations, simply on its own cannot resolve these issues.
DIA	Clapper 08/04/92	...I have always been deeply concerned about accounting for the missing and will ensure that DIA's efforts to achieve the fullest possible accounting will not waiver during my tenure as director...POW/MIA intelligence investigations, collection, and analysis comprise one of DIA's highest priorities...
DIA - Critics	Gaines 12/01/92	The DIA analysts had no buffer between themselves and anybody else. In other words, they had no buffer between themselves and members of Congress. There is no buffer between themselves and outside interests... unofficial but powerful members, personnel such as Ann Mills Griffiths... had direct access, in fact, had direct access not only to files and intelligence information, but was allowed to task the analysts on her behest.

DIA - Critics	Gaines 12/01/92	They were beset by so many outside tasks and so many outside similar-dissimilar influences, that they were constantly running from one crisis to another, and they did not have time to do the kind of hard, pick and spade work such as something like this, studies on, say, the prison system...
DIA	Grassley 10/15/92	Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by stating that this issue is too important for us to rely on DIA's analysis exclusively for our judgment. This may be the only evidence that we find that possibly points to specific men. We need an independent assessment, not just a DIA assessment. Five different reports have raised the issue of DIA's mind set to debunk. The public is skeptical of DIA's continued debunking of evidence. No matter what DIA says, we need an independent evaluation of the evidence, as well. These photos may, in fact, show shadows. But I want an independent analysis to tell me that, not just DIA.
DIA - Critics	Hargis 12/01/92	The conclusion or finding. DIA did release names and addresses of witnesses under the Freedom of Information Act, but the information released was mostly a compilation of documents which originated outside DIA. Not one of the names or addresses released was of a person who had had direct contact with DIA or had requested confidentiality.

DIA - Critics	Hargis 12/01/92	The Office of the Inspector General, DIA, conducted an investigation in the Office of the Prisoners of War/Missing in Action, PW/MIA Division in the Directorate of Collection Management, between 20 November 1984 and 2 February 1985, at the direction of General Williams, who was the Director of DIA at that time... The next conclusion: these allegations of mistreatment were judged to be responses from individuals who had attempted to use the PW/MIA issue for their own purposes... There was no indication that DIA interviewers used any procedures that intentionally downgraded, humiliated, embarrassed or abused the witness. There was no evidence to suggest that any truly knowledgeable witness could be discouraged by DIA methods for making information known.
DIA - Critics	Hargis 12/01/92	Next conclusion; there can be no improvement to the worsening situation until the policy and public relations interface is inserted between the DIA and the rest of the world.
DIA - Critics	Hargis 12/01/92	We had one other finding and one other recommendation. There was evidence that DIA had been and continued to be manipulated on the PW/MIA issue by entities outside the U.S. Government.

DIA - Critics	Hrdlicka 12/03/92	...I would add that if you want to talk about fraud I would call the DIA one of the biggest perpetrators. I have spent 2 years trying to get answers out of those people on specifics. I had a meeting in July with Mr. Sheetz and Mr. Gray and they were going to get right back to me. Well I sit here today, and they have not gotten right back to me. I file a Freedom of Information; reports that I have don't even come through on the Freedom of Information. Now you want to call fraud, I call that fraud, and I feel like I've been the person that's had the fraud perpetrated on me. I can appreciate these other scams, but I have to tell you that if our Government had done their job in the first place, I wouldn't be in the situation where I could be a victim or Carol Collins be a victim.
DIA	Kerry 06/25/92	...on 4 January of 1974, in fact, significant personnel reductions were proposed to take place in the POW/MIA section of DIA. And literally, the personnel within that section had to go to bat to explain to superiors why they were important to the resolution of the accountability process.
DIA - Critics	Knecht 12/01/92	In defense of the senior management of DIA, I could not find any case where somebody had said we need to do this to fix this and they said don't do that.
DIA - Critics	Knecht 12/01/92	Mindset to debunk: everybody's discussed it. I absolutely could not find anything on it. I absolutely disagree with it.
DIA - Critics	Knecht 12/01/92	I agree with Colonel Peck where he criticized the fact that the special office was being used for tasks that were not appropriate for an intelligence activity.

DIA - Critics	Knecht 12/01/92	I am also saying that Colonel Peck basically recycled... the Gaines report to us, as if there had been no intervening change. And then when pressed for the details of those criticisms that he made, I could not find any specifics to support them. When I looked at those specific criticisms which I was then aware of in the intervening period, then I could not find those.
DIA - Clusters	Maguire 08/04/92	Senate investigators called Dak Chung a cluster because of six hearsay reports that recounted the same story...But in depth analysis showed that all the reports were similar because one of the six sources had told the same story to the other five. What we are left with is not a cluster of six, but a cluster of one. And that one source admitted lying about his original story, so now we have no cluster...So DIA has concluded that Dak Chung is not a cluster, but we could only reach that conclusion by carefully reading and investigating each report.
DIA - Clusters	Maguire 08/04/92	...there were some areas where the reporting tends to be heavier and gives a clustered appearance. Some members of the Senate Committee staff believe that the reports within some of these areas prove that a U.S. POW was held past Operation Homecoming. Our understanding is that Senate staffers used three criteria to reach that conclusion. These three criteria are shown here. However, to reach these conclusions about clusters, other types of intelligence were ignored and only a handful of the over 1,500 source reports were used.

DIA - Clusters	Nagy 12/01/92	It was not with the process or the procedure of mapping reporting. That process is underway in DIA, has been underway in DIA, and is being used today in support of General Vessey and his activities. So I certainly cannot let the comment lie that it is not being done. That is not true.
DIA - Critics	Nagy 12/01/92	I was asked to address circumstances of an early 1985 internal DIA examination of the analytic and collection tasking activities of DIA's POW/MIA office. The examination was somewhat unusual in that it was an analyst's critique of other analysts' activities.

DIA - Critics	Nagy 12/01/92	I have reviewed the study group's report. In summary, it concluded that: One, the analytic effort was of high quality; two, analyst retention was likely to be a future problem unless the division's grade structure was increased; three, access to the DIA online ADP system should be improved, and additional terminals provided; four, the POW/MIA analysts should travel to both Hawaii and Thailand to meet and interact with counterpart analysts and collectors; five, a senior executive should be appointed to speak for the organization; six, the POW/MIA analysts should receive greater recognition. The details of the report included other comments... the suspicion that the analytic activities of the division were diminished by the need to respond to numerous outside requests... the implicit view that inordinate time was spent on a somewhat legalistic approach to evidence and analysis that was probably necessary, given the importance of and outside interest in the issue... it was felt that if this were a normal intelligence activity, some of the cases that were being held open could be closed... the possibility that human intelligence in the field could be improved by adding additional collectors...
DIA	Nagy 12/01/92	In the wake of the end of the Vietnamese conflict, in 1973 the intelligence community underwent a very severe contraction, 35 to 40 percent of the personnel, and this can be easily documented, were let go, moved out of the business... The POW/MIA analytic effort was certainly caught up in that set of reductions beginning in 1973.

DIA - Critics	Nagy 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: The themes are repetitive that there was a diffusion of the mission, there was a lack of management, lack of guidance, not a direction of effort, and so forth. The politics that entered into it from outside influences, the analysis, itself. Nagy: It is my view that from 1973 until the issue from an administration's standpoint was revived in the early 1980's, that for all practical purposes you had three organizations struggling in the dark, without a great deal of policy support, that were working this issue for the Untied States Government. Those were the two that were based in Hawaii, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in CILHI, and the office in DIA... Beginning in 1983...DIA has added personnel to the effort, expanded the effort of the office, expanded the operations, as you are well aware, in Southeast Asia that were under DIA's direct control...
DIA	Perot 08/11/92	You need an organization who goes in every morning and says, here is a new shred of evidence. Let's really look at it objectively. Let's not try to debunk it. Let's not discredit the person who brought it in. Let's not spend all of our energy discrediting the person who brought it in.
DIA - Critics	Perroots 12/01/92	Another criticism that I believe invalid, at least during my tenure, was that the DIA only responded to sanitized or selected queries...I remember coming under criticism from circles that I was paying too much attention to the Rambo faction. I can tell you that I responded to any query that was deemed appropriate.

DIA - Critics	Perroots 08/12/92	No one ever approached me to take on General Tighe. It was solely and exclusively my idea for good and honorable reasons... now, as to what influence I had over [the Tighe Commission Report] conclusions and recommendations. Well, the answer is absolutely none.
DIA - Critics	Perroots 12/01/92	Another valid criticism was the lack of adequate and follow up effort within the intelligence community. The National Collection Priority for POW/MIA prior to 1985 ranged from priority 7 to priority 3. We raised it to priority 1...
DIA - Critics	Perroots 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: ...there is just ample evidence of occasions where the Government just stumbles over itself in kind of defensiveness or inefficiency or something which has -- I think you would agree -- significantly contributed to people's anger and frustration. Is that correct? Perroots: Therein lies the problem.
DIA - Critics	Perroots 08/12/92	I repeatedly asked General Tighe and the review group if they were getting the support they needed and never received anything but a positive answer.
DIA - Critics	Perroots 08/12/92	Never, never did he or any task force member mention that they had even a suspicion of any bugging of their facility...Also the statement by General Tighe that it was unanimous conclusion of all the task force members that the room was bugged is false...All of the comments implicitly accept the allegation that there was a bugging. Gentlemen, I do not believe there was. There is no evidence there was.

DIA	Perroots 08/12/92	President Reagan assumed office with a personal commitment to resolving the issue... the Administration was determined to pursue the issue as a matter of highest national priority....Frankly, a mess was inherited.
DIA - Clusters	Perroots 12/01/92	In terms of that big evidence to support the existence of Americans being held against their will, it is nonsense. You have to take each report, factor the credibility of that report, determine what other reports you have... That is a rather simplistic approach to the analytical effort required to determine whether Americans are held against their will in Southeast Asia.
DIA - Clusters	Perroots 12/01/92	Sen. McCain: General Perroots, let us get back again to the famous cluster theory. Now, this has been portrayed by the staff -- or some members of the staff of this committee -- as some kind of earth-shaking brand new idea, something that no one ever thought of before... What is your view of this cluster theory? Have you ever used it? What do you view the validity of it? Perroots: Well, let me first say that trend analyses, the clustering of reports is not only not new, but it has been done. I directly was involved as part of the preliminary for the Stony Beach operation. I said listen, I not only want to have a capability but I want to be able to move even on the basis of a lack of sufficient evidence, but if I say well, if we are going to do something, if we are going to put a team in, where would be the best place to put them in on the basis simply of where the most reports are, even if you assume that all of them are true. So we clustered and we clustered and we clustered. It was a continuing process.

DIA - Critics	Perroots 12/01/92	Another valid criticism, in my judgment, is that we not always adequately conducted timely follow-up of reports.
DIA - Critics	Perroots 12/01/92	I believe we implemented virtually all of the 30 or more recommendations of the Gaines Report and virtually all of the recommendations of the Tighe Report, save for one, as I recall, or perhaps two.
DIA - Critics	Perroots 12/01/92	Another valid criticism that we ultimately fixed was the criticism that there was insufficient coordination among the intelligence agencies to ensure an effective database and integrated collection and analysis effort.
DIA - Critics	Perroots 12/01/92	Of course, a major criticism that for the most part was invalid, from my view, was the alleged mindset to debunk. It is very easy for me to say that there was very little to debunk. There was no debunking. There was no calculated effort to debunk. I took whatever steps possible to make sure that there could be no debunking, as much as you can humanly possibly do that... We did that by establishing review boards. In retrospect, Mr. Chairman, I don't believe there was any calculated effort to debunk.
DIA - Critics	Perroots 12/01/92	Another valid criticism: DIA was too involved in activities which detracted from its primary mission...
DIA - Critics	Perroots 12/01/92	A major valid criticism was that insufficient resources were being expended to adequately do the collecting, analysis, and follow up mission...Now, this was especially true from '73 to '85...

DIA - Critics	Schlatter 12/01/92	In the case of the Tighe Report, we implemented every one of those that we could implement... There were certain of the Tighe recommendations that simply really did not apply to DIA...
DIA - Critics	Schlatter 12/01/92	...I do not believe the mindset to debunk exists... in terms of the Gaines Report, we adopted virtually every one of the recommendations.
DIA - Critics	Schlatter 12/01/92	I was to find, and it took me a year to wake up and realize this, that the answers are simply not that simple and the answers were not that available...
DIA - Critics	Schlatter 12/01/92	Another problem I found was one of confusion of management and analytic resources.
DIA - Critics	Schlatter 12/01/92	There are two criticisms that I consider particularly invalid... I came into that office feeling that, number one, what we had was essentially an intelligence analytic problem.
DIA	Sheetz 12/04/92	...we at DIA recognize that the answers to the haunting questions surrounding our unaccounted for men are to be found in Southeast Asia. We clearly understand that our duty as intelligence officers is to provide timely support to those assigned the POW/MIA operational mission in Southeast Asia.
DIA	Sheetz 12/04/92	...DIA and the entire intelligence community recently collaborated in the development of a collection posture statement and overall collection strategy for the POW/MIA issue. This effort was a major undertaking which we believe goes a long way toward ensuring that all appropriate capabilities of the U.S. intelligence system continue to be brought to bear.

DIA	Shields 06/25/92	DIA as an intelligence gathering and interpreting body should be free and unconstrained in its own internal efforts to develop information about missing and captured Americans. I believe that [standard] provided a more effective and complete intelligence effort than forcing DIA to conform to service decisions about what happened to a man.
DIA	Shields 06/25/92	Sen. Robb: In reviewing your testimony, I do not recall seeing any reference to any coordination with the CIA during the course of your testimony or analysis. I'm just curious, was there any that related to this particular matter, the whole question of POWs and MIAs? Shields: Well, there was, Senator. Most of that coordination was accomplished through the DIA and the intelligence areas. We asked that the CIA be included and they were included.
DIA - Critics	Tighe 06/24/92	Trowbridge's people were besieged with the political... the pressure to examine, the challenges to reports, and so forth. And it became an almost impossible task and... I think I probably would have given up a long time before this.
DIA - Critics	Tighe 06/24/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Did you ever have any indication that your work space was bugged during your work? Tighe: It was the conclusion, I believe unanimous conclusion, of each of our members that our room was bugged through the telephone system.
DIA	Trowbridge 06/24/92	During the war, DIA's efforts were focused almost exclusively on trying to determine who was being held prisoner and where they were likely being held.

DIA	Trowbridge 06/24/92	CIA monitored and focused the worldwide POW/MIA intelligence efforts and expedited communication with the policy makers.
DIA	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Today, the POW/MIA issue is looked at through the lens of 1992, which is a lot different than what they were in 1973. We've learned an awful lot since then.
DIA	Trowbridge 06/24/92	...intelligence analysis is not an exact science... We have to make the best judgement we can based on the information we have, and that is what we did.
DIA - Critics	Trowbridge 06/24/92	...we might find that report would correlate to several incidents. Duplicates of the source's debrief report would then be put in each man's file in the hope that subsequent information would then become available.
DIA	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Hanoi's June 1966 announcement that our captured airman would be tried for war crimes drastically focused intelligence community attention on this issue.
DIA	Trowbridge 11/06/91	Sen. Grassley: ...if you or any one of your colleagues in the organization has ever made even one mistake in analyzing live-sighting reports, it could mean that we have left someone over there against his will... Trowbridge: I think about it every day, sir.

DIA - Critics	Wiand 12/01/92	It was the general finding of the IG (Inspector General) team that the PW/MIA office was performing a unique function in the United States Government which was likely to continue for many years to come. The function was assessed as being overexposed to outside pressures and organized in a fashion that did allow for efficient operation. Intelligence analysis and morale suffered as a result. There was no evidence of illegal or improper activities.
DIA - Critics	Wiand 12/01/92	However, as documented in a report at the time of inspection, analytical work in the PW/MIA office was being conducted on the assumption that some Americans were still held captive in Southeast Asia.
DIA - Critics	Wiand 12/01/92	It is my recollection that the February '83 POW/MIA inspection was routinely scheduled as part of the overall 1983 inspection schedule.
DIA - Critics	Williams 12/01/92	...I don't choose to think that people were inept, but there was certainly a lot of bureaucratic fumbling around trying to figure out what next to do.
DIA	Williams 12/01/92	...as a former military officer having served in Vietnam and 31 year service, 28 years of those in intelligence, there was no mindset to debunk consciously and there was certainly no effort to cover up... we are darn sure going to pursue every lead as though it were a viable active lead.
DIA	Hargis 12/01/92	My charter was to investigate these allegations to determine if inappropriate procedures were being used by personnel in the DIA PW/MIA office, when dealing with individuals coming forward with information concerning POWs and missing in action.

DIA	Schlatter 12/01/92	...the answers lie in Hanoi.
DIA	Schlatter 12/01/92	We found that while the office had fairly comprehensive collection requirements, they were not really being actively managed and upgraded... the special office [for POW/MIA] was too exposed to outside influences... there were not sufficient resources in the office to accomplish its mission.
DIA	Wiand 12/01/92	The inspection findings were treated seriously and the senior management of DIA focused on the problems documented and on taking corrective actions.
DoD	Usry 11/15/91	I am confident that the Administration... really wants to do the right thing. I do not necessarily believe they want to do the right thing because that is where their heart is. I believe they want to do the right thing now because it is a public issue and there is a committee here that is going to look at them and perform oversight to ensure that they are going to do the right thing... I do not believe that everything the Defense Department did was wrong. I believe in many instances they did good work, but in those instances when they were wrong, we are dealing with human life, or the possibility of a human life... the point of departure if I were looking at this would be the day these hearings started and everything before that should be reviewed.

Families	(Carr Collins) 12/03/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Did you ever see or hear of any live-sighting reports on your husband? Collins: Never, but I know that there are some now. Vice Chairman Smith: There are some, and I don't know anything about the validity of them, so I don't mean to, you know, mislead you in that regard, but there are live-sighting reports, and you have not seen those. These are during the war. Collins: During that time, no, I did not. I saw some in 1991. I was sent them from Hawaii. Vice Chairman Smith: There is a live-sighting report, one that I know of. This is during the war, not after, in which he was allegedly captured in Laos by North Vietnamese regulars. Again, I think this -- I bring this up because it's another example of the problem and the reason why the committee's here, and the reason why sometimes information that -- if this information were put out in the public domain, the opportunity for fraud would be less, I believe, because you could simply go to the documents, but when the documents are held secret and kept in secret files for reasons other than national security, in my opinion, that -- therein, you know, lies the problem. If your husband was the subject of a live-sighting report, you should have been told that, and you were not, and yet, even today, if you bring the witnesses up here tomorrow, they'll say -- the Government witnesses, they'll say, well the families are provided all information. Here's an example right here. You have not.

Families	Bardsley 11/06/91	...I feel like in my five days in Vietnam that I found out more about my father's case than I've learned from the Government in 25 years.
Families	Carr Collins 12/03/92	...you become obsessed. You cannot sleep, eat, work, because you would waltz with the devil to bring one man home. Sen. McCain: There is no possible way that I can express the sympathy that I and the people of this country feel for what you have been subjected to. I can only tell you that we will continue to honor Donald Carr's memory and appreciate his service and sacrifice to this Nation and to the cause of freedom.
Families	Carr Collins 12/03/92	After the analysis had come out from Los Alamos and Dr. Charney I began to doubt my own view of the picture, which was there was a slight possibility there could be Don. I mean I just -- I did not know. But something that my son said to me sort of turned me around. He said mother, that picture is obviously an American. I mean he looks like an American to me. He said he's somebody's father, he's somebody's brother, husband, cousin. He said if there's a chance in a billion that it's my dad, I've got to do something. So with that, that's when I started.
Families	Collins 12/03/92	I, as an MIA wife, was frustrated by knowing little, being left out of the loop, and it seemed at times being treated as the enemy, more feared by the administration and military intelligence than the North Vietnamese whom we should have been unified against. This was typical of the attitude of the government in those years.

Families	Collins 12/03/92	Most of us have been tempted at some point to participate in some form of POW rescue based on nothing more than questionable and circumstantial information at best, such as unverified photos, live sightings, and anonymous reports. If it sounds hooky and mystic, it probably is, and it almost always plays a very cruel hoax on the families by raising false hopes... I am very pleased to know this committee will take up these issues and problems in the near future, and hope this will eliminate once and for all the con artists, and clear the way for those who are credible and knowledgeable to resolve the long standing tragedy of our MIAs. The closed-door attitude of the government, which stared and became ingrained in the early war years, has contributed greatly to making the families vulnerable and prey for the antiwar activists on the left and the con artists and mystics on the right. If the government was silent to their questions, then where were they to go for information and help? Some elements of both groups meant well, but their impact has been cruel to the families.

Families	Collins 12/03/92	Had they brought us into the loop, telling us the things that we had a right to know from the onset, we would never find ourselves in this position today. Had they trusted us, brought us in the loop, talked to us, told us these things and said, hey, we need -- we are going to tell you this, but this is for family only. See, what they did was, they said you don't need to know this. Now, you know, if you were to let this out, this could cause his death. Now, you wouldn't want to do that, would you? I love that old hang that guilt trip on them.
Families	Collins 12/03/92	...the old military cliche that wives and families should be told nothing and should know nothing was, and I presume to some degree is still the rule. This is an overreaction to legitimate military security needs, and has probably resulted in more inadvertent leaks through ignorance than if the spouses and families had been brought into the network in matters that concerned them.
Families	Collins 12/03/92	I hope that never again will families of the missing will have to literally take to the street. This is an additional burden on them in this time of grief and hardship which should not be necessary. The MIA families have had to keep up this effort even until today.
Families	Flecken-stein 11/06/91	...that isn't all of it either, because when I was looking to get fingerprints, I went to the Hall of Records in downtown Los Angeles. They had no birth certificate on my son, but they have on the other two of my sons. I went to Sacramento, they have no birth certificate on my son. DMV, the hospital records, there are no fingerprints to be had anywhere.

Families	Ford 11/15/91	Senator, the current practice, or the practice certainly in the past, has been to provide the families with information that has been correlated specifically with their loved ones -- as opposed to all the information that happened in that year, or that area in which their loved one was lost. Part of that was privacy concerns -- of giving information out about other families' cases, and partly it was [protecting] sources and methods. I think that over the years, the families have grown dissatisfied with that. They understand that there is more information that certainly is not associated directly with their loved one, but they would like to be able to look at it and see if we miss something.... Quite frankly, we've got to find a way to satisfy that requirement. We have got to find a way to give the families more confidence that they're seeing everything that we've got. If there are some things that are so highly classified and sensitive that we can't show it to them directly, that they can have the committee or someone with a security clearance check it for them... We're going to find in the very short term some sort of an answer for information for the families.

Families	Ford 12/04/92	...we didn't lose our credibility with you, with the families, with the American people overnight and we're not going to gain that credibility back overnight. And I can sit here and I can tell you about what we're going to do and I can talk about it. The only thing that is going to persuade people is our actions and our results, and to prove over time that we are serious, that we do mean what we say, and that despite occasional setbacks, despite occasional human errors, we're going to demonstrate over the next months and weeks, years, that we can do it better than we have done it in the past. And that's our only commitment, to try. And if there are problems that this committee uncovers, we'll try to fix them. I hope that also when you find good things, particularly about the people in the field who, far from the limelight, far from the excitement of Washington, are on a daily basis out there slugging it out, oftentimes in very primitive conditions. And I hope that your visits to the region, your discussion with these people, you can also say some good things about them.
Families	Griffiths 11/06/91	The vast majority of the POW/MIA families are realistic. We don't expect miracles. We expect seriousness by our own government, Executive and Legislative branches, rather than spontaneous reaction to the squeaky wheel or the latest editorial. We expect adherence to established policy and implementation with integrity, not comments from unnamed senior officials which dismiss facts and principle in the perceived interest of political or economic advantage.

Families	Hrdlicka 12/03/92	In 1977, the Air Force Casualty Office contacted me and advised me that they were going to review David's case, and unless I had any new evidence that he was alive, they were going to declare him dead. I then stated that I had no evidence since I was not allowed access to intelligence. Why is it that the burden of proof is always on the families?
Families	Hrdlicka 12/03/92	If these men are not alive today, it's because they were either starved, executed, mistreated, or simply died of broken hearts in the last 20 years it has taken to go looking for them. They know where my husband is. I know this. My family will not rest until we find the fate of David.
Families	Kerry 11/15/91	I think one of the most important things that could come out of the early days of these hearings is a new structure, and a new relationship process with the families.
Families	O'Grady 11/06/91	Hundreds of families have stories just like mine. Yet there is not enough time for each of them to come forward and speak. Even when we appear before you, we must prove our loved ones are alive by a standard not required of the United States Government to prove them dead.
Families - PFOD	Oksenberg 06/25/92	The reclassification process had no impact upon our resolve to pursue this issue.

Families - PFOD	Oksenberg 06/25/92	Equally moving was a meeting with the wife of a missing American pilot whose plane had been shot down over North Vietnam. She told me she was desperate. She explained that she had lived in suspended animation for I think six or seven years. She wanted to know whether the United States Government thought her husband was alive or dead. She could ask the Pentagon what was known about her husband's fate which might lead to his being reclassified from being missing to being dead, but she told me that she was psychologically incapable of initiating such a review. She felt that in some sense her request for a review would be an abandonment of her loved one. She wanted to remain faithful to her husband as long as there was any hope and she would do nothing to destroy that hope. But if the Government informed her that her loved one were dead, she would then reluctantly seek to rebuild her life. That is what her husband would have wanted her to do especially for the sake of their son. She felt that the Government owed her its best judgment about her husband's fate without her having to do anything to ascertain what that judgment was. She requested that the Government change its policy and implement an automatic review of all cases including that of her husband.

Families - PFOD	Oksenberg 06/25/92	The Government owed it to the New Jersey soldier and others like him, as well as to their families and friends, to persist in a search for them as long as a straw of hope of their survival existed and to recover their remains if all hope had vanished. But we also had a responsibility not to arouse false hopes and unjustified expectations.
Families	Otis 12/03/92	Sen. Reid: What more do you think we as a committee could do that we have not done? Otis: If you could even just -- what I've been wanting is for the public to really care. And I know it's been really too long, but the Government and the media didn't press this in the beginning. They just assumed everybody was dead. And we felt so abandoned because not only did our Government or the media care, but the public didn't seem to care.
Families	Otis 12/03/92	Nor are we any longer in limbo, as are the families of the missing and of those known to have been alive in captivity. Ron Dodge finally came home, and credit goes in large part to the wives and parents and siblings who founded the National League of Families and to the families and concerned citizens who are still prodding and pleading and questioning.
Families	Otis 12/03/92	Commander Dodge's status change hearing was in February 1979. The next of kin had to prove the missing serviceman alive. The Government, with all of their resources, did not have to prove him dead.

Families	Quast 11/06/91	I have been promised at a very high policy level access to my father's file, but denied access by those people who have testified before this committee when I went to see the file. I'm asking, what is the policy and who actually runs the show for the POW policy?
Families	R. Smith 12/04/92	By the late seventies, remaining MIAs under President Carter's administration were simply declared dead. One memorandum dated May 26, 1977, from the Secretary of Defense, stated that in the long run continuing to carry these personnel as missing in action would force us to make concessions to Hanoi.
Families	Reid 12/03/92	...I do hope that there can be some guidelines set that, if, in fact, something like this happens again, we do not have this on-going personal calamity in the lives of everyone connected with somebody that is shot down or is missing in some way.
Families	S. Morrissey 12/03/92	I was invited to talk about the family liaison with the POW/MIA agencies. Simply put, the agencies of our Government responsible for the MIA issue do not provide us, of their own volition and in a timely manner, all information that they had about my father's fate, despite their often-repeated promise to do just that.

Families	S. Stockdale 12/03/92	When our National League incorporated in the District of Columbia, one of our stated goals was to achieve the fullest possible accounting of our men who were missing in action, and here you are, 27 years after that briefing for Carrier Air Group 16 wives, trying to untwist that braid of lies and deceptions that have indeed emotionally involved the American people and have brought shame and disgrace on our country. And I will be quick to point out we are not alone in our history of lies and deception about prisoners of war and the missing in action. It seems to me that the one consistent thing the North Vietnamese have done for all 27 years is lie about our American prisoners and missing.
Families	S. Stockdale 12/03/92	Even though some of us wives knew we were being fed a steady diet of lies by our Government, we also knew that to publicly denounce our Government while it was engaged in war would be to play into the hands of the enemy and dishonor the very men for whom we sought humane treatment.
Families	S. Stockdale 12/03/92	In order for you to put your findings into context, it's important that you understand the extent to which we wives and families were lied to and patronized by our own Government. The Johnson Administration gave us no help whatsoever when we wanted to organize ourselves. And it was in spite of them that we were able to have 2,000 telegrams on President Nixon's desk the day after his inauguration in January 1969.

Families	S. Morrissey 12/03/92	I was 16 years old when my dad was shot down. Dad was 42. He was a big man with a good sense of humor and a big appetite for life. He liked sports cars, bagpipe music, Irish whiskey; he fished, he rode broncos in the Rodeo; he loved New Mexico and the Air Force. I remember him vividly, and miss him terribly. Nonetheless, I have long been resigned to the fact that he's almost certainly dead, and resigned to the fact that I will probably never know what happened to him, but that does not relieve me or you of the obligation to try to find out what did happen to him.
		I don't expect the impossible, only the confidence that the Government that ordered my father into combat is doing all that it can to determine his fate and that my family knows all that this Government knows.
Families	Schlesinger 09/21/92	I have spent a large part of my life and put a lot of emotion into this, Shields said. It was such an enormous issue and we were dealing with human beings. I knew their wives, I knew their sisters, I knew their brothers. Though he is years away from direct involvement, Mr. Shields said he is still invited to weddings and the other family events by relatives of the missing.

Families	Smith 12/03/92	Vice Chairman Smith: When did you know, when were you told by the Vietnamese that your husband was alive? How long was he a prisoner before you knew? Collins: Tom was missing four years, two months, and two weeks, and I received a letter from him in Christmas of '69. Now, I knew before then, but not through anything the Government did. I found on my own that Tom was seen alive in Hanoi in 1966. Vice Chairman Smith: How did you find that out? Collins: I cannot tell you that, sir. Vice Chairman Smith: All right, that is fine. Collins: I cannot testify in an open hearing as to how I found this, sir. I was more fortunate than most family members. I had friends in high places. Vice Chairman Smith: Do you have any reason to believe that anybody in the United States Government knew he was alive and did not tell you? Collins: Oh, yes, I'm certain that they did. See, here we come back to the beginning. Vice Chairman Smith: So people in the United States Government knew your husband was alive and they did not tell you. Collins: Yes.
Fraud	Brooks 12/01/92	...there also is a category of people at work surrounding the POW/MIA issue which I will categorize as professional predators...

Fraud	Kerry 12/02/92	Some people have seen fit to literally fabricate photographs and to distribute those photographs alleging that they represent the loved ones of families in this country. The hopes of families have been unfairly torn and tattered as a consequence of those actions. That is a predatory action. It is a disgrace. People who do it, I think, rank as low on the scale of measurement of human behavior as you can get. There are just no words strong enough to condemn the activities of people who will knowingly distribute a photograph alleging that they are today held when they know that photograph is a fabrication.
Fraud	McCain 12/02/92	...I and other members of this committee have urged the Justice Department to investigate allegations of POW/MIA fraud. I certainly hope such an investigation is by now well under way. The information which the committee's investigation yields should be of valuable assistance to the Justice Department in its efforts to prosecute those people that have used this issue to intentionally deceive decent people.

Fraud	McCain 12/02/92	It will also come as no surprise to my colleagues that I am somewhat disappointed by the limits of time and scope placed on this hearing in our investigation. And this is not a criticism of you, Mr. Chairman... Nor is it a criticism of committee investigators, who in my view have done an exemplary job in a short amount of time and under difficult circumstances... I understand the committee had a great many subjects to address in the span of 1 year and not all subjects could receive the attention they deserved... My disappointment is mitigated, however, by the knowledge that standing committees of Congress will again have jurisdiction over all questions concerning our POW/MIAs after the Select Committee finishes its work. And thanks to this committee, Congress' awareness of this issue and its responsibilities to continue the work of this committee has been greatly heightened.

Fraud	Sheetz 12/01/92	Sen. McCain: How much of the effort that your organization is engaged in has been -- how much of your assets have had to be diverted to tracking down the bogus pictures and the hoaxers? Sheetz: At times, Senator, I would tell you that that process has literally precluded us from doing anything else. Because the political pressure has been so intense and the high interest among the people in the Government, this committee, the American public, to know what is the truth on those cases...It's an opportunity cost argument. Essentially, what you're doing is dropping the work that would probably have more payoff to chase after things that ultimately turn out to be useless exercises.
Fraud	Sheridan 12/02/92	...I too know of a family that was defrauded of many thousands of dollars. Somehow, those people have to be recognized and they have to be dealt with. And they cannot be allowed to get back out on the street and do this the next time an issue comes along. I feel very strongly about that.

Fundraising	Albrecht 12/02/92	Sen. Reid: That is important. You say that 90 percent of the solicitations -- Albrecht: Of this group that we have evaluated, better than 90 percent probably are spending -- Sen. Reid: Meet the 60 percent standard?... Albrecht: That is significant, and I think it is important that we bear in mind that there is a lot that is right and good that is going on in this field, although we still are just as concerned, as we should always be, about misleading solicitations, about creative accounting, and about ineffective governance.
Fundraising	Albrecht 12/02/92	...I first need to emphasize that these practices are far from universal, though they are spreading at a disturbing rate. In fact, 76 percent of all the national charities reviewed and evaluated by NCIB meet all nine of our standards, including those having to do with fundraising practices and fundraising reporting.
Fundraising	Albrecht 12/02/92	There is a problem with creative accounting in the field, exactly. And there is a certain amount of it that goes on.
Fundraising	Albrecht 12/02/92	Vice Chairman Smith: On 100-percent of expenses, what is the acceptable figure for fundraising expenses, out of that 100-percent? Did any of you say? You might have said it, and I may have missed it. Mr. Albrecht: We've taken a close look at 30 percent. By that we mean we get more information. Is the percentage going up? Is it coming down? Are they in an acquisition campaign? Are they a new organization?

Fundraising	Allen 12/02/92	It's kind of like a consumer-beware kind of notion. And people being asked for the funds need to be very careful and ask a lot of questions.
Fundraising	Allen 12/02/92	...I think everyone wants to make it a level playing field, and one where the public can have the trust that it has long held in this sector.
Fundraising	Allen 12/02/92	As a matter of federalism, I think it would be unrealistic to think of a Federal role that would take care of the problem. At the same time I think, personally, there is a role for the Federal Government, and probably a larger role it could play that could include prosecutions by the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorneys more extensively than we now see based on larceny and based on fraud.
Fundraising	Canada 12/02/92	Each one of these ideas are techniques, Senator. Techniques to convey to the prospective donor what Colonel Bailey had already related to us. Techniques used in direct mail fund raising to raise money for our client so that they go ahead and continue their programs.
Fundraising	Eberle 12/02/92	Mr. Eberle: Senator, I still fail to see how that differs from when you have a speech inserted in the Congressional Record and then it is printed in the Congressional Record as if you gave the speech on the floor, how it's any different. Chairman Kerry: It is extremely different. Because all of our words we are responsible for here and everybody understands that. And the speech does not purport to be anything other than the speech. This purports to be something other than what it is.

Fundraising	Eberle 12/02/92	Chairman Kerry: You cannot say, please excuse the handwriting, but I am writing at a makeshift desk. He was not writing at a makeshift desk, was he? Mr. Eberle: No...
Fundraising	Eberle 12/02/92	Senator, I will have to be honest. I have no idea whatsoever and I have no idea why there are quotes around there. I'm sort of reminded of that comment by Elizabeth Barrett Browning when she was asked, why did she write a particular thing in a verse and she said, when I wrote that only God and I knew and now only God knows.
Fundraising	Kerry 12/02/92	...you sit here and say to us, gee, I only got $100,000, but that is really disingenuous, because the total fee produced by this which benefits you or your family or partners is significantly more than that. So you sit here and say you only got this amount of money when in fact the charity, quote, winds up with $200,000 against $1.9 million raised. I find that unconscionable and extraordinary.

Fundraising	Kerry 12/02/92	What I'm saying to you is, there is a body of evidence out there that has never been in the public domain. It should have been in the public domain, and now that it is in the public domain, I think if you read it, and those in the press take the time to read it, you will find that there is a basis of evidence, a basis of information that provides a rationale or a reason for documents like that being written, as was the league document being written... There is a body of information like this throughout this government and some of it has never been disproved. Much of it has not -- much of it is bunk. A lot of it is bunk. A lot of it is garbage and it has been proven so. But a lot of it has not been disproved... But there is a distinction between that and a letter that goes out for six years saying, P.S., some of our captive Americans are in failing health. Now I guess they knew that in 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, same letter. P.S., they are in failing health.
Fundraising	Kerry 12/02/92	...I must tell you, I mean we have just found some bold-faced, non-accurate statements. Each of you suggest this is the information you are given and you had no reason to believe otherwise. I have no way of saying otherwise, obviously, so I accept that. But it leaves us in a terrible quandary. And you know what? It leaves a lot of families and a lot of American citizens sickened, sadden, victimized as a consequence. And we should not allow that to happen in this country.

Fundraising	Kerry 12/02/92	...As part of this arrangement she elicited from InfoCision an under-the-table rebate without her clients knowledge and characterized it as 3 percent rebate to her. She entered into a management consultant agreement with VVnW, and under this agreement she was to receive $5,000 a month plus 10 percent of the net income of VVNW. And I would just read from a portion of that agreement: "expenses related to the performance of this agreement will be categorized as program expenditures on the clients financial statements and tax returns. Neither the existence nor the details of this agreement will be discussed by either party with any member of the press..." "The essential points would be that one of the letters, a solicitation letter, read as follows: Thanks to your support, Veterans of the Vietnam War have sent a delegation to Vietnam to negotiate for the release of our POWs. During these meetings in Vietnam, the Vietnamese leaders told our representatives that American POWs are still alive in Southeast Asia, exclamation point. Capital letters: THEY ADMITTED IT - FINALLY, exclamation point..." "Our representatives have been to Southeast Asia to meet with Government leaders to break the deadlock. Underlined: The Vietnamese have admitted that some of our men are still alive..."
Fundraising	Reid 12/02/92	...a lot of the money that is raised is based upon people's fears, prejudice, sympathies, and sorrows, and there is no better illustration than some of the stuff that we have gone over today.

Fundraising	Reid 12/02/92	...the point that I was making is that we have your fees plus all these subsidiary companies, of which you said you don't receive remuneration from those, but your family does. I think it pretty well speaks for itself.
Fundraising	Salta 12/02/92	To advocate a cause, to seek to disseminate information to the public, are important in a democratic, pluralistic society such as ours. That is why Congress has steadfastly provided for a relatively low-cost universal mail delivery system. Nonetheless, someone has to pay the postage, the printing, the paper, the envelopes, the copywriters, the graphic artists, the data processors, list owners, and other vendors that it takes to produce and mail a direct mail package. Plus, there needs to be some money left over for the charitable cause. Not every cause can find a sufficient number of citizens out there to foot the total bill.
Fundraising	Salta 12/02/92	Mr. LeBoutillier being, again, a credible man, the advisory board that he had some of the more distinguished military people on it -- McDaniel, Graham, Colonel Hopper, Major General John K. Singlaub, many celebrities. We had to believe that information that Mr. LeBoutillier was giving us was correct and accurate.
Fundraising	Salta 12/02/92	I don't know that it's legal, but if we got one out, it would certainly be a wonderful thing, I can assure you.
Fundraising	Salta 12/02/92	As best we can determine at this late date, my company was paid approximately $100,000 during the 6 years that we worked for Operation Rescue. This amounted to 10 percent of the total amount of funds raised.

Fundraising	Salta 12/02/92	Sen. McCain: ...Now, if I could direct your attention to number 5 there it says this guy is held out and then marked out, he survived the downing of his airplane but with a badly broken femur. He is guarded by the, the blacked out, in contact. Getting ready for some serious fun and games in this case. Now, in 1987, if my information is correct, this was sent out. Someone in your organization might have thought in the intervening years, since we have not gotten any of these claims corroborated in any way, no Americans came out, no additional corroborated information, et cetera, that maybe you ought to stop to evaluate whether you are sending out what clearly is an invalid message. On the middle one, it says remember, some of our captive Americans are in failing health. Did you ever ask them how they knew that some of our Americans were in failing health? Mr. Salta: No, I did not. Sen. McCain: ...Mr. LeBoutillier claimed that they suffered 65 casualties in their efforts, and you printed that. Did you ever ask to see or talk to any of these? Did any -- any -- of the allegations raised here, were any of them ever questioned by you and decided not to be sent out? Mr. Salta: By me personally? No.

Fundraising	Stern 12/02/92	Mr. Stern: With due respect, Senator Kerry, the highlighted statement -- what is the gross fraudulent text of it? Chairman Kerry: I read it to you, that as many as 650 of our men are still currently being held. And the inference that the Select Committee provided that information is a very clear writer's trick. You do not have to be a genius to understand what is happening there.
Garwood	Knecht 12/01/92	The final area concerns the Garwood case. He had in his initial debriefings reported that he had not seen any Americans. But then in later interviews that were in the press and in interviews of DIA, he said that he had these sightings. DIA could not find the locations that would physically map where some of these things took place.
Garwood	Shields 06/25/92	While Congressman Montgomery was in Hanoi being assured that no Americans were being held captive in Vietnam, Arlo Gay was being held at Son Tay prison and Tucker Gougelmann was being held in Chi Hoa prison in Saigon. Gay was later released but Gouglemann died in prison and only his remains returned home.
Garwood	Sieverts 06/25/92	Sen. Brown: Are there other names like Garwood where we submitted and asked and they simply would not make a response? Sieverts: A great many. Just about everybody... we provided them with the entire MIA list. And then, shortly thereafter, the entire MIA and BNR lists... the MIAs and BNRs would simply be listed alphabetically without that faintly adverse indication that one is killed, BNR, the other is MIA.

Garwood	Sieverts 06/25/92	Sen. Brown: Did this Nation, during all those years, ever specifically ask the Government of North Vietnam if they held Bobby Garwood? Mr. Sieverts: The answer to that is, yes. Sen. Brown: And what was their response? Mr. Sieverts: No response at all. Sen. Brown: They did not say that he was not there, they simply did not respond? Mr. Sieverts: That's correct.
Garwood	Vessey 06/25/92	Chairman Kerry: So a statement in 1973 that there is no indication that anyone was alive would simply be inaccurate, would it not? Vessey: I would say yes. You could say we have no firm evidence or something like that, but certainly, the discrepancy cases we have were clearly discrepancies that were unanswered at the time.
Government Policies and Actions	Burch 11/06/91	The POW/MIA Interagency Group is said to be in charge of coordinating a policy on the highest national priority. What is remarkable about this group is the list of absentees. Neither the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, nor the Drug Enforcement Agency has membership on that committee.
Government Policies and Actions	Cheney 11/05/91	I think the reaction of the Department will be set by me and by my presence here today. I think that I have indicated to everybody who works for me that we take this matter very seriously and that our mission is to cooperate with the committee, to benefit from whatever guidance and oversight you care to give us, that Congress has a very legitimate role to play in this area.

Government Policies and Actions	Cheney 11/05/91	Senator, I would be happy to see to it to the extent that I am able from the standpoint of the Department of Defense that there is no retribution against anyone who would provide information that is useful to the Committee and during the course of your inquiry.
Government Policies and Actions	Cheney 11/05/91	With respect to how the Department operated in previous administrations over the years that set a tone or a stage where families of POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia believe the Department was less than truthful, I am simply not responsible for [that]; that was not on my watch.
Government Policies and Actions	Grassley 06/24/92	...the amount of stonewalling that went on, what a contrast to have a former communist open up documents of their government to members of our Government.
Government Policies and Actions	Kerry 11/15/91	It is no fun, as a foreign officer, having your bona fides questioned. The committee is not questioning them in a way that I think some are. The Committee is trying to sort out who knows what... you are public officials and the system has come to a grinding gridlock of lack of credibility and we have got a requirement here to sweat it out. You understand that, but I just want you to know that I think there are a lot of extraordinarily dedicated people who are committed to this issue who are working day and night to try to find out if somebody is alive and to bring them home. Regrettably, we are where we are because there is a then and a now to this issue... To the degree we can sort out what happened in the past and understand it, we are going to help to understand this issue today.

Government Policies and Actions	Sheridan 12/02/92	The war in Southeast Asia was a very long war. Thousands upon hundreds of thousands were involved either fighting the battle or waiting at home. You could take each one of those individuals and you're going to get a different perspective of that war meant to them, depending on the time frame or the military service or what the person was doing at home. I would like to think that our Government has done everything that they've needed to do, but we hear from time to time that may not be the case. We do believe that the Government should be very forthcoming.
Government Policies and Actions	Smith 06/24/92	Over the past 45 years, we have seen not only zealous but jealous guarding of information by the Executive Branch... it would be one heck of a lot easier if, in fact, the Executive Branch would cooperate with the legislative branch and get the truth out to the American people totally, unequivocally... That is what we have asked for. That is what the American people want... We would not have a investigation today on any of this if the information had been put out an given to the American people. So I expect cooperation. The cooperation thus far has been good... but it has not been total and it has not been easy getting all of the information.

JFT-FA	Larson 12/04/92	Sen. Daschle: Let me just stop you. Did you say live sightings are number one. Larson: Live sightings. Sen. Daschle: Discrepancy cases, number two. Larson: Discrepancy cases. Sen. Daschle: And then surrounding cases that may be related to discrepancy, number three? Larson: Yes, sir.
JFT-FA	Larson 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: ...Are you confident that you are, in fact, making progress and that you think that if we continue down this road we can get answers, or do you feel there is a significant something missing that the committee ought to know about and articulate so that we can change it? Larson: Mr. Chairman, I'm absolutely convinced that we have the proper command structure, organization, people, priorities, and approach in place to do the fullest possible accounting. I think the key to it is what will the Vietnamese do and what will the three countries over there do, particularly, the two countries of Laos and Vietnam. I think our system that's in place will allow us to evaluate that. I think for the first time I've got the resources to continue to push and to continue to press and to make them produce in the things they promised to produce and to evaluate what they give us. So I think the system is there. But I think the key to success is on the other side and what they are willing to do for us as this system goes forward.

JFT-FA	Larson 12/04/92	Sen. Daschle: I remember General Needham saying in Vientiane that you assess the time it will take to do a case and double it, because you just never know. With that caveat and completely appreciative of the unknowns out there, do you have any kind of a time frame within which you believe this entire effort can be completed? Larson: ...My original estimate was about two years, that at the two-year point we should have a good idea as to whether we could continue or how close we were to the fullest possible accounting. At the 1-year point we will be through phase 1 and will start into the geographic investigations. I would say by next summer we'll have a pretty good idea of where we are as we look at the geographic surveys through the country.
JFT-FA	Smith 12/04/92	Some of the information that we are receiving on your work has been -- and some of the cable traffic and so forth -- has been somewhat critical about yourselves, as well as the Vietnamese. For example, in some of the things that I have looked at, there was a reference to your last field effort as one of the least successful in terms of a comparison with others. Another comment, the Vietnamese have shown no evidence of a serious effort to search records for information or to locate witnesses.

JTF-PA	Andrews 12/03/92	Chairman Kerry: What is it in the structure, that we can anticipate, that you believe is going to eliminate the problems that have existed? Didn't you say this was a new operation. Secretary Cheney came in. We are gratified for his early testimony. He said we are going to change this. A lot of changes have been implemented, to his credit. He has followed through, he has put new people in, he has committed resources. Just a night and day difference between what this administration has done in the last year and where we have been the last 20 years. But what do we look for structurally, as a consequence of those decisions, that will change this? Andrews: Well, I think you've certainly made the point of having all these documents in one place where, so even if there is a turnover, certainly someone can come and see everything in their file. I think this is something that certainly CDO is working towards achieving. I do think the more that we get into the business of JTF-PA and DIA and the other agencies not seeing families but continuing to do what their job is and ensuring that that information gets to the casualty officers, we're going to eliminate some of the problems that we've had.

JTF-FA	Christmas 06/25/92	We are employing a two-track approach toward resolving cases in Vietnam. First our detachment in Hanoi, consisting of experts skilled in interview techniques, Vietnamese wartime records, and graves registration specialists are engaged in a day in and day out effort. Second, our Hawaii-based search teams are conducting intensive 30-day periods of investigations and remains recovery operations. Between these periods of intensive field activities, our detachment staff and Vietnamese officials accomplish a number of tasks essential for the success of these field operations.
JTF-FA	Christmas 06/25/92	During the last completed period of field activities, our teams recovered or obtained from villagers fragmentary remains believed to be from seven loss incidents and involving 10 individuals... From the other last known alive individuals whose cases we investigated, we found no evidence which suggests they are alive. In some instances, we interviewed witnesses to the death and burial of Americans. Further efforts now are required to locate and to recover those remains.
JTF-FA	Gadoury 11/06/91	Sir, I think we have the mechanism to conduct the investigations on our side, and all we're waiting for is that access and the ability to get to those places where we need to go.
JTF-FA	Griffiths 11/06/91	What is being worked now, all that's missing, is greater responsiveness, not more effort.

JTF-FA	Kerry 11/15/91	...you are, in a sense, under siege here. You are going to have to come back with the Desert Storm mentality on this one in order to deal with that. I think you are beginning to see that and recognize that this is not, as I said at the outset of the hearing, something that anyone of us wished upon any one of us, or this committee, or the United States Senate. It exists because it has this tenacious life of its own, and the only way this committee can avoid becoming tarred by this process is to guarantee that we are opening it up...
JTF-FA	Kerry 11/06/91	Chairman Kerry: The public has no sense of what it's like to be out in the boonies sometimes, as you are, with a rucksack and living in pretty rough circumstances, day in and day out. I know what a pleasure it is to get back to Hanoi to be able to get a shower or something. And Hanoi is pretty rudimentary. So you are really, all of you, in Laos, in the jungle or wherever it is that you go, it is often at enormous risk and at continuous discomfort. I just want you to know that we are deeply appreciative of those efforts and very, very respectful of them. We wish you well as you continue this difficult quest. Thank you very, very much, gentlemen. Gadoury: Sir, I would submit that the risk we take is certainly not greater than the risk that the people that we're looking for took at one time. Chairman Kerry: We appreciate that, and we appreciate your recognition of that also.

JTF-FA	Kerry 11/06/91	...legitimate heroes of this effort, Kerry called Bell, Gadoury, Cole. Their story is an important part of understanding the genuine, good-faith effort that people have been making and the type of commitment that individuals have made to this issue over the years. And any inquiry into the POW/MIA effort that is lacking in their testimony is an incomplete inquiry.
JTF-FA	Kerry 11/05/91	...I happen to believe that [U.S. investigators] are heroes in the best sense of the world. I think that Americans need to know how many years people have been out there in the field in some mighty dangerous, sweaty circumstances, jumping on helicopters that most of us would hold our breath going near, and going out into the jungle...
JTF-FA	Larson 12/04/92	Our Joint Task Force has conducted five joint field activities in Vietnam in the last year, seven in Laos, and four in Cambodia, and we have ongoing operations right now out there in the field in Laos and Cambodia. We have done 294 joint field investigations. We have surveyed 149 crash sites or grave sites, and we have mounted 35 remains recovery operations.
JTF-FA	Larson 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: And how many people are on the ground in Vietnam and Laos? Larson: Our teams have varied in size from a low of about 28 to a high of about 63. It depends on how many teams we actually have. We shoot for about 70. We like to get five or six teams in the field at a time, particularly in Vietnam.

JTF-FA	Needham 12/04/92	One of my policies is that we be truly open. We do not classify any documents, and we allow our people to give us a candid assessment. We knew that we were having trouble with one of the teams in Vietnam last time. We brought it to the Vietnamese attention about half-way through the joint field activity. This was one of the ones I referred, kind of mixed cooperation, and in fact we did not accomplish all the cases in that area that we had hoped to last time.
JTF-FA	Sheetz 11/06/91	...the Defense Department plans to investigate on the ground in Vietnam each and every lost -- every missing, unaccounted-for individual.
JTF-FA	Smith 06/25/92	Vice Chairman Smith: General Christmas, on the 6th of May there was an AP report quoting both you and General Needham. General Needham said-- this is what he is attributed as having said: "There still is no reason to believe any missing Americans is alive in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos, but every live sighting has to be checked out."
JTF-FA	Vessey 06/25/92	I believe that the organizational and procedural framework is now in place to achieve our goal of fullest possible accounting.
JTF-FA	Vessey 12/04/92	To take advantage of the increases in Vietnamese cooperation, the United States made some significant organizational changes in the POW/MIA area in the past two weeks. The Secretary of Defense established that task force subordinate to the Commander in Chief Pacific... And the Secretary also established the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs. I think there's plenty for both of those outfits to do.

JTF-FA	Vessey 11/05/91	I want to tell you that I have worked very closely with these people. They are all mortal human beings like you and me. I disagree with many of them many times, and we argue and battle. But I want to tell you that they are all dedicated people. If you could see the field work that has been done with these people traveling by old Soviet helicopters, by dug-out canoe, on foot, and into areas in Vietnam where no one has been since the battles were fought, trying to find evidence of what happened to our people, you too would have the same appreciation for their dedication that I have.
Laos	Admiral Stockdale 12/03/92	Sen. McCain: Now, you have acknowledged, however, that as to Laos you cannot be so certain. Stockdale: No, I know literally nothing about Laos. Vice Chairman Smith: And I just want to be certain, when you say that you do not think that anybody was left behind, you mean Vietnam, correct? Not necessarily Laos? Stockdale: Yes.

Laos	Admiral Stockdale 12/03/92	Well, we know that, you know, it's strange that only nine military men who are now in freedom that were shot down in Laos -- and I asked Brace, what did they have in common? He said, well, there's only -- he laughed at my ignorance. He said, we were all captured by North Vietnamese soldiers and they brought us to Hanoi... I think of the Laotian people as kind of placid peasants and North Vietnamese soldiers as ferocious. But in this case, the only way you got to freedom was to get captured by the more organized army, which is North Vietnam...
Laos	Bell 12/04/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Let me ask you straight up. Anybody alive in Laos after Operation Homecoming in 1973, American POWs? Bell: We had some reports there. The reports that I think are most worthy of consideration in Laos are those in the 1972 time frame.
Laos	Brooks 12/01/92	My recollection is there were approximately a dozen, roughly a dozen names that either were put out on a Pathet Lao list at one time of people in captivity or names of people that we had reason to believe were alive when they fell into Laotian hands. I do not think it was more than a dozen, maybe 15...

Laos	Brown 12/03/92	We had very frank discussions with them and pushed them very hard on what happened to our aviators. And finally at one point with the deputy foreign minister we simply said flatly, look, we know there were a large number of American aviators shot down over your region of Laos. We know that a significant number of them were alive when they hit ground. We have reason to believe a significant number of them were alive when your forces took them into custody. We have no accounting for them; what happened to them? And after some pressure the government spokesman simply said look, we did not appreciate at the time how important this question would be and some of them were killed.

Laos - JTF-FA Operations	Gadoury 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: What have you gleaned from those 6 years of living out in jungle, you know, and putting up with the heat, and the snakes, and the insects, and the leeches, and the difficulties and so forth? What would you share with this committee about the possibility of 200 people or 50 people being held in one place in Laos? Gadoury: Well, as I said earlier, I have talked to hundreds and probably thousands of refugees, Lao refugees predominately, in the camps and they include low land refugees, Hmong, hill tribes people from all over Laos, from North to South. I have not received any credible reports of live Americans after 1973 with the exception of Emmett Kay... the focus of our field activities with our teams is to go out and conduct excavations, but at the same time use that as the starting point, the jumping point, to get out and do investigations of these discrepancy cases. And the way they break down in Laos is, and what we're working on a priority basis, are three cases. There are three cases of people who were, at one time, POW. They're at the very top of our priority list. And then there's 44 cases -- below that 41 additional cases, priority cases, where the person was last -- or the people involved in that incident were last known alive. And then there's a number of other discrepancy cases where we feel that the Lao should or could have some information. So, we're addressing those on a priority basis.

Laos - JTF-FA Operations	Gadoury 10/15/92	Since 1985, when I started making regular trips to refugee camps and villages along the Thai border in which many Lao live, I've encountered certainly thousands of Lao. And of those people, have interviewed hundreds with information related to unaccounted for Americans, mostly in Laos.
Laos - JTF-FA Operations	Gadoury 12/04/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Mr. Gadoury, you have been involved in the issue quite a while in Laos. What is your feeling, what is your assessment of the cooperation with the Lao? Are they serious? Obviously, they are not all that serious. What do we have to do to improve the situation there? What do we need to do? Gadoury: Well, Senator, as you know I work on the field level with the teams that go out in the field. And what I see in the field I think is a reflection of some of the changes or the considerations that are given at the policy level in terms of bilateral U.S.-Lao relation...

Laos - JTF-FA Operations	Gadoury 12/04/92	But when you go out there with the team, we're living out there in the tents, we've got our military rations, we've got our cots, we've got our mosquito nets, and we have our team doctor to take care of us if we get sick. Even under those conditions, it's very difficult. Sometimes, laying in my cot there at night, I wonder, if I didn't have the cot, if I didn't have the mosquito net, and the military rations and all the things that we have out there, how long I could last. I look at the villagers who live out there. The average life span in those rural areas is not much over 40 years old. You don't see a lot of old people. Sometimes it makes you stop and think what you'd be able to do if you were out there in a situation where you didn't have a lot of control over where you were living and where you're going.

Laos - JTF-FA Operations	Gadoury 12/04/92	...in February of 1986 we went on our first excavation in Savannakhet Province. And our team went into Savannakhet, the town of Savannakhet, and we had to spend overnight because the landing sight wasn't prepared. We were put up in a hotel. They put armed guards outside the door and they advised us not to go walking around. More recently on the operation I just came back from a few weeks ago, we were given pretty much unlimited access in the area of Savannakhet Province to address the cases that we had agreed upon before going out to the field. The Lao were very cooperative. In fact, there was a dramatic departure on this last trip from anything that we had experienced in the past. They were very efficient in terms of coordinating with local officials, sending their representatives with our excavation team, preparing witnesses or locating witnesses and preparing access with local officials for our teams, and then sending officials out with us to do the actual investigations and surveys.
Laos - JTF-FA Operations	Gadoury 12/04/92	...over the years that I have been involved in Laos, and starting in 1985, I personally have seen a dramatic change in the level of cooperation that we get in the field, which I think is a reflection of this higher level of cooperation.

Laos	Godley 09/24/92	After January, I think, of '73, if I remember it, I was frequently getting instructions to tell Souvannah Phouma, who was the Prime Minister of Laos -- a gallant, honest man -- tell him to do this or do that; ask him to do this or that, and give him assurances that we will resume bombing. We will do this and that if the North Vietnamese or the Pathet Lao do not agree. We knew darn well we could not resume the bombing, but I had to tell him that. It wasn't pleasant.
Laos	Godley 09/24/92	We were concerned, but there were no Americans held by the Pathet Lao, and were convinced that all Americans who fell into enemy hands in Laos were under North Vietnamese control.
Laos	Godley 09/24/92	One of the great problems that thoughtful Americans had in Vientiane -- members of the staff -- was that we were sacrificing little Lao to protect our men in South Vietnam; that sure, we would tell them darn near anything just to keep them fighting. It may not have been totally honorable, but we felt that was the role of American diplomats or military leaders at that time.

Laos	Godley 09/24/92	Godley: Really, I think the point we were making here was the bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Let's get the nine men back, and then look into it. Chairman Kerry: Let me assume that is true and not even second-guess it. The next question is you believed there were more, is that correct? Godley: Again, sir, later on, I think it was March 29 when we said we did not think there were any prisoners still in Laos. That, I think, reflects the further consideration and consultation with all elements of the American team in Laos. It's a blatant contradiction. I recognize that.
Laos	Godley 08/11/92	You recommend a specific diplomatic track to gain accounting of the men held/missing, and you point out that we should hold them accountable for all POWs being held in Indochina, and you assert the following: "This initiative should forcefully and plainly assert that the U.S. will no longer play games with the POW issue in Laos. The LPF should be told that we know they hold U.S. prisoners and we demand their immediate release, as well as an accounting and information on all those who may have died." Sir, we had proof, as much as you can, that Americans were taken prisoner. Where they were held, and by whom they were held, there was a good deal of question. I personally was convinced that there were no Americans held by the Pathet Lao, and the Americans that were prisoners were prisoners of the North Vietnamese units in Laos or had been taken back to North Vietnam.

Laos	Godley 09/24/92	Sen. Kerrey: Did you have a systematic method for debriefing the Hmong? Did you discuss some sort of development -- the development of a system that would have enabled you to debrief the Hmong about data that -- Godley: The case officers with the Hmong would do what they could. We had no system for doing that. Sen. Kerrey: Why, if it was a top priority again, if they were our best source of intelligence? Godley: Senator, if you were in my shoes, what system would you establish to question? Sen. Kerrey: I suggest to you, sir, that if it was my top priority I would at least consider the development of a system.
Laos	Godley 09/24/92	Anything that Le Duc Tho said about Laos would be law in Laos in the Pathet Lao areas. The North Vietnamese domination of everything Lao was complete.
Laos	Godley 09/24/92	The only reliable sources we had about MIAs or POWs were, of course, Air Force reports as to losses over Laos and Air America,...
Laos	Godley 09/24/92	I never accepted as iron-clad any Communist agreement... Communists in Indochina were well trained liars and their word was nothing.

Laos	Godley 09/24/92	Sen. Kerrey: What would your estimate have been of the possibility of actual victory and achieving a free Laos in 1971? Godley: They were our friends, but I never regarded the military operations in Northern Laos as victory. It was really a sideshow of the big war in Vietnam. We pursued it with all in our power because I felt -- I and my associates felt that we were holding down three first-rate North Vietnamese divisions, some artillery, even some armor. And those men were in Northern Laos, and they were not down in the Delta or South Vietnam. But I never saw a victory in that... My sense of it was I'd do my best to keep it from occurring.
Laos	Godley 09/24/92	...we did what we could vis-a-vis the Pathet Lao to obtain information concerning Americans captured or deceased in Laos. The discussions with the Pathet Lao representatives in Vientiane were fruitless and inconclusive.
Laos	Godley 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: Ambassador Godley, what priority for intelligence collection did you attach to the collection of information on POWs and MIAs in Laos? Godley: Top.

Laos	Haig 09/21/92	Vice Chairman Smith: I can understand Watergate, political pressures, protests, Congress voting to cut off the money. So, the President might say, let us sign it, let us cut, and maybe, this other agreement will be signed. We will get the prisoners back from Laos. Privately there was reference to prisoners in Laos, but publicly there was not. And, I think, families were misled by that. Maybe not deliberately, but I think they were mislead by it. And that is my point. Haig: Well, you know, I can't act as an apologist for statements that were made after January, and I won't attempt to do that, but I will make some observations. The first is, I don't believe Dr. Kissinger, or President Nixon, or anyone involved in these negotiations ever took a position that in their intellectual anguish they did not believe was going to improve the prospects of getting our prisoners out rather than impede that process.
Laos	Kerrey 09/24/92	What I have seen that is available to the committee thus far does not seem to me to represent a very systematic effort [to gather information about Laos]. Nor does it reflect the declaration that it was a top, number one priority of the embassy at the time. It just does not seem to connect.
Laos	Kerrey 09/24/92	We had to accept an assurance that really was worthless. Accepting an offer by the North Vietnamese to do all they could was hardly an iron-clad guarantee, and made it difficult for us to truly get an accounting for our missing.

Laos	Kerrey 09/21/92	Sen. Kerrey: Mr. Secretary, let me first of all deal with your assertion that we, perhaps, are not being balanced enough in our regard to the North Vietnamese -- today, the Vietnamese Government. I have never suffered the delusion that they would tell the truth. I have never suffered under the illusion that, in fact, current negotiations with the Vietnamese Government would be terribly productive in getting a full accounting of remaining POWs and MIAs. I have never suffered under the illusion. In fact, I am rather surprised, in looking at the negotiations that occurred at the time, that a representation made by the North Vietnamese -- do not worry, we will take care of Laos -- was all that was required to get the Americans to say, OK, we will accept your representation that full accounting in Laos will occur as a side agreement.
Laos	Kerry 09/24/92	If you are saying, we have an agreement that gets all of our prisoners back and we have got iron-clad guarantees, but all of a sudden in the middle of this thing you are poised with the problem of explaining, gee, we do not have them all back, you have to explain that you do not have iron-clad guarantees and you also have to explain something different to the American people, do you not?

Laos	Kerry 09/24/92	...the question was were there any surprises in the list of POWs in North Vietnam? Your response was it was pretty close to what we expected. We are hoping for 40 more on the list of those in Laos. That is your comment. I am simply trying to establish -- I know it was 20 years ago -- I am simply trying to establish, Admiral [Moorer], what the basis of that hope was. We have only six known prisoners in Laos, although we hope there may be 40 or 41. ...General Deane, had told you in a memo on March 21st that there were live prisoners in Laos in addition to those nine.
Laos	Kerry 09/24/92	Now, one final important question. On March 22nd, 1973, you sent a cable to the Secretary of State stating -- and let me read this to you because it is important: "we believe that the LPF holds throughout Laos more prisoners than found on the DRV list. But we believe that for the time being we should concentrate our efforts on getting these nine men repatriated as soon as possible...we believe we should continue to press for the release of the nine acknowledged PW's within the time frame, but deal with the questions of accounting for MIAs and determining whether there are additional PW's to be repatriated within the time frame of this cease-fire and military protocol." There is a sort of ambivalence in that I am trying to understand, and it is important to us. You said we believe they hold throughout Laos more prisoners. And in fact, we carried people as prisoners. But at the end of the memo, "we need to determine whether there are additional POWs to be repatriated." What was your thinking, then? That they may have been killed, or that you did not know?

Laos	Kerry 09/24/92	I think it is very important that in the middle of the release period when you folks had high expectations... that you thought there were hundreds, but that you had six known prisoners in Laos and that you had a hope of some 40 or 41 more.
Laos	Kissinger 09/22/92	Chairman Kerry: ... we did have information that these prisoners were held in caves near Sam Neua... When we confronted the Prime Minister point blank on this subject of non-accountability, we got the same kind of 'this was history; this was part of the past; terrible things happened in war' -- the very kind of comments that Soubhan gave us. Only he had given them to us more directly, saying [downed pilots] were killed... Kissinger: I was surprised, and shocked even, by the small number of prisoners from Laos. If that is correct,... then we never received any prisoner that was captured by the Pathet Lao and they might easily have done what the Khmer Rouge did, kill every prisoner.
Laos	Kissinger 09/22/92	...statistically, the percentage of the missing unaccounted for in Laos was far smaller than in Vietnam.
Laos	Kissinger 09/22/92	The North Vietnamese told us that all prisoners held in Laos -- they told us this in writing -- would be returned.
Laos	Kissinger 09/22/92	Our perception of the Pathet Lao was that they were stooges of Hanoi, that they had no independence whatsoever, that they were totally controlled by the communists in Hanoi... But we were confident and we had never an example to the contrary, that the Pathet Lao would not disobey anything that Hanoi wanted them to do.

Laos	Kissinger 09/22/92	I used these figures in my preparatory talks in Hanoi, and I might point out here that all of the figures in the Eagleburger and Richardson memoranda were familiar to us and had been raised with Hanoi before we received the memorandum on my February visit in Hanoi.
Laos	Kissinger 09/22/92	Chairman Kerry: So here you are in May with Le Duc Tho saying not what happened to John Sparks, or what happened to so-and-so, we need an accounting, but saying, give us a sentence that says there's nobody alive in Laos, it will be helpful to us. Why would you have been satisfied with a sentence? Kissinger: I wasn't satisfied, Mr. Chairman. I was dealing here with a man who knew reality. I had no means of pressure left.
Laos	Laird 09/21/92	Smith: When you were told or you had information either from the CIA or the DIA on your watch that there were prisoners in Laos and/or Vietnam, did you feel reasonably certain that information was accurate? Laird: I felt fairly reasonably certain as far as the North was concerned. I felt very good about the South. I had a better feeling about Cambodia. I did not have a strong feeling that the intelligence coming out of Laos was outstanding. That was run by the State Department and the CIA, and we did not have our own assets there, but I did quiz the CIA on a weekly basis about that type of information.

Laos - JTF-FA Operations	Larson 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: We haven't talked a lot about Laos. What is the level of cooperation in Laos? Larson: Mr. Chairman, I'd say the level of cooperation in Laos is mixed. It's sometimes a case of a step forward, two steps backward, two steps forward a step backwards, and in my honest assessment after being there and having some conversations and looking, I have great difficulty telling how much of it is bureaucratic ineptness and lack of cooperation in a very primitive government and how much of it is policy driven in that there's some resistance to cooperation.
Laos - JTF-FA Operations	Larson 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Some people have... asserted to us that all you need to do is put the pressure on Vietnam and that will solve Laos, they control them. Do you agree with that? Larson: That's not my assessment, from what I've seen. I think it's much more complex than that.
Laos - Perot Trip	Martin 08/11/92	The Chairman: And was there any question in your mind that these were prisoners who were alive and being held at that time that you were there, or had they been tracked earlier? Martin: No question in my mind. Chairman Kerry: They were alive at the time you were there. Martin: They were alive at that time.
Laos - Perot Trip	Meurer 08/11/92	...a lot of Americans, towards the end -- especially towards the end of the war, if they were caught, they were summarily executed and put in shallow graves...It was not Laotian policy, I recall, Senator. It was the villagers, individual villagers...

Laos - Perot Trip	Meurer 08/11/92	Chairman Kerry: Mr. Meurer remembers 27, Mr. Martin remembers 25, but the memory of both of you is specific as to mid-20's of American prisoners of war being held in the Sam Neua area in caves, is that accurate? Martin: That is correct. Meurer: Yes.
Laos	Moorer 09/24/92	During the course of this period, the numbers were always shifting back and forth as we found out that a certain individual was dead or a certain individual had been released. There were -- the lists we had and the lists that were given by the North Vietnamese didn't exactly match. And I really can't answer your question as to why I had -- where I got irrefutable evidence that there were 40 people in Laos.
Laos	Moorer 09/24/92	There is no doubt that the Pathet Lao was under the grip of the North Vietnamese army.
Laos	Moorer 09/24/92	The decisions to send the message, the decision to cancel the message, were all generated by an overall management of the plan we had to coordinate the withdrawal of the few troops we had left with the withdrawal of the prisoners we had left.
Laos	Moorer 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: Did we have any photographs or evidence that showed that there were Americans in those caves? Moorer: I don't recall ever having seen it.

Laos	Moorer 09/24/92	...a wounded Pathet Lao telephone lineman who was captured north of Vientiane. That prisoner located and described a cave complex in Sam Neua that reportedly had contained U.S. POWs at an earlier time. This was the first Pathet Lao prisoner or defector with up-to-date hard information on Sam Neua to arrive in Vientiane since 1971. He suggested that several U.S. POWs were still at Sam Neua in the late 1960's, more recently than the older reports that existed with respect to Hrdlicka and Shelton. And then the cease-fire in Laos in 1973 apparently effectively precluded any military-associated agent operations into Sam Neua due to the embassy's desire to avoid the possible compromise that such a covert operation would have on the impact of the cease-fire. So we never got in there afterwards to check.
Laos	Moorer 09/24/92	[citing Moorer deposition] Question: Why did we complete our troop withdrawal without insisting the Pathet Lao give us our prisoners back? Your answer: When this started and the POWs came back and so on, there was a very euphoric reception and the President gave a party on the White House grounds and all the wives of POWs came and so on. And press release after press release were that we were withdrawing the troops at that point. No President could have said whoops, we are not going to withdraw the troops because these people will not agree with us. They are not carrying out their part. At that point in history, we did not have the stomach for doing what you are asking me why we did not do it.

Laos	Moorer 09/24/92	And when an effort was made by General Woodard to get the General Hoa, who was a North Vietnamese rep, to do something about the Laos POWs, his reply was that Laos did not participate in the negotiations and did not sign the agreement.
Laos	Moorer 09/24/92	...when I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, not one message that involved movement of troops or aircraft attacks or anything of a military nature was originated by me. In every case, I had it initialed by the Secretary of Defense, or in many cases I had direct telephone calls from the President.
Laos	Moorer 09/24/92	Now, in answer to your specific question, of course, that was supposed to be taken up with further negotiations with North Vietnam. In my opinion, and I don't know whether the Ambassador agrees with this, the North Vietnamese had an iron grip on the Pathet Lao. And the Pathet Lao did exactly what the North Vietnamese told them to. So, the pressure had to be put on the North Vietnamese. But, as I repeat, the only way you could verify these photographs and these DIA lists and so on is to go to Laos with an armed force and find out. And then of course we just lost all of our leverage. And, consequently, what happened was that we very quickly, by 1975, we had lost not only South Vietnam, but also Cambodia.

Laos - Perot Trip	Murphy 08/11/92	Chairman Kerry: Do you recall the number of 25 or 27 prisoners being held in caves in Sam Neua as having been briefed to them by the station chief [during 1969-70 trip to laos with Perot]? Murphy: I do not recall that number. Chairman Kerry: Do you recall any number whatsoever? Murphy: ...I had in mind 18 in one report. Now, I don't know whether that was briefed to them or not...
Laos - Perot Trip	Perot 08/11/92	Vice Chairman Smith: When you were there in 1970 and you had this meeting with the station chief and others, what types of indications did they give to you specifically about the existence of POWs in Laos during the war in 1970? Perot: ...They basically indicated that they had radio intercepts. They were able to track the prisoners on the ground. They knew where the prisoners were being held. The reason they had not tried to rescue the prisoners is the risk-reward ratio was not good. I certainly agreed with that. They probably would have gotten more people killed in a rescue than they rescued. But they seemed to have a great deal of knowledge about who they were, where they were held. And they told of specific cases of Sam Neua Province, which ties in with General Walters' testimony several years later.

Laos - Perot Trip	Perot 08/11/92	...our people at the Paris Peace Conference were asked what about the people in Laos. And our people relied, oh, we'll get them back through Hanoi. Very quickly the Pathet Lao said oh, no, you will have to deal directly with us...We ransomed the people out of Hanoi. We ransomed our prisoners out of Hanoi. Senator McCain is able to sit right here today because we ransomed him out of Hanoi, but we never wrote the check. And that's what caused the people to be left in Laos.
Laos	Rodman 09/21/92	Sen. Daschle: Well, what rationale did you have amongst the negotiators with regard to the justification for signing an agreement that does not include the MIAs in Laos and Cambodia? How could we rationalize that, knowing that they were there? Rodman: Well we thought we had a commitment from the North Vietnamese in two or three different respects with respect to Laos. One was that we did expect to get a list, through their good offices, of the prisoners in Laos. They promised to try to get a -- help us get a cease-fire in Laos within a short period of time. So we were dealing with the party which clearly did call the shots to a great extent, and they were making some commitments to us which were not as formal as other commitments they made... So we thought that given that this was a Vietnam agreement, we thought we had achieved something of some value with respect to Laos and Cambodia.
Laos	Schiff 08/04/92	...there are no compelling reason to believe that a substantial number of aviators were captured and retained by the Pathet Lao. The bottom line is that Laos is not the MIA/POW black hole it has been depicted to be.

Laos	Schiff 08/04/92	Others who say that Laos is a special case cite a second reason for their belief. They say that because the Lao Government did not sign the Paris Peace Agreements, it did not return prisoners at the time of Operation Homecoming. This belief is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of who controlled the territory where most of our losses in Laos occurred. [North Vietnam]
Laos	Schiff 08/04/92	...The Ho Chi Minh Trail network is shown by the black lines. Notice that most of the Trail is well within Laos. This area was totally controlled by the Vietnamese. Almost 85 percent of U.S. personnel lost in Laos were lost in this area. Our intelligence indicates that U.S. prisoners of war captured in areas of Laos remained under Hanoi's control... When looking at Laos on a case-by-case basis, we find that very few missing men would have become prisoners of the Pathet Lao. Almost everyone lost was lost in an area under North Vietnamese control....

Laos	Schiff 08/04/92	Chairman Kerry: ...is there not a group of aviators believed to have been unaccounted for the Laos at the time of Operation Homecoming? Schiff: Yes, sir, there is. They are among the priority cases... Sheetz: There are right now still 64 discrepancy cases for Laos... Chairman Kerry: So there are 64 question marks pertaining to Laos which would have been the body of that group about whom we had legitimate questions at the end of the war. Sheetz: Yes, sir. Chairman Kerry: So when you say it is not a black hole you are saying that notions that of the 500 plus airmen lost over Laos, the notion that many more than the 64 that we have questions about is improbable, is that accurate? Sheetz: Yes, sir...

Laos	Schiff 08/04/92	...I'd like to turn to Laos to clear up some commonly held misconceptions about the POW situation in that country. To begin with, I can tell you that Laos is not the black hole some believe it to be. People who think otherwise point to the difference between the small number of prisoners who returned from Laos, and the far greater number who returned from North Vietnam. But as I will show you, this is essentially comparing apples with oranges... A comparison of air losses is relevant because 90 percent of our losses in Laos in Laos were aviators... Laos and South Vietnam are very similar. A large portion of downed airmen were rescued in both countries. The small portion captured is relatively equal... North Vietnam is different because intense air defense made it very difficult to rescue downed air crews... Since fewer men could be rescued, more of our airmen were captured, and later more were returned from North Vietnam... because search and rescue operations in Laos and South Vietnam were more effective, more downed airmen were rescued and fewer became prisoners.

Laos	Schiff 12/04/92	Another thing that I had looked at is, how many Pathet Lao prisoners can we confirm? At this point, taking confirmation very strictly, and saying that I can confirm a prisoner if I have a photograph of that individual, or I have a report from a U.S. individual who was held with that person, then if those prisoners are confirmed, I have 16 confirmed prisoners captured by the Pathet Lao... There were 16 that were captured by the Pathet Lao. One of those was turned over to the NVA, and he was released during Operation Homecoming. The others were not released during Operation Homecoming, but some of them were released. There were six that were released.
Laos	Schiff 12/04/92	Schiff: But of the 15 who were captured and held by the Pathet Lao, six of those were released, two escaped, and the rest are still unaccounted for. Chairman Kerry: So of all the information so far on the black hole of Laos, there is only information as to 16 captured by the Pathet Lao. Schiff: Only confirmation.
Laos	Schlesinger 09/21/92	It is evident, I think, that the Laotians gave no true accounting of the Americans that had been in Laos.
Laos	Schlesinger 09/21/92	When overflights ceased, of course, our ability to gather information diminished, but up until the time of the ceasing of overflights we were able to stay in touch with a number of those who had been downed in Laos and that's what led to the disappointment with regard to the brevity of the list.

Laos	Schlesinger 09/21/92	...while the CIA was running the war in Laos, it was running the war, as it were, with military assets provided from the Department of Defense. The United States government was not directly involved in Laos. it was a CIA-directed operation, but the assets that were being directed were assets of the Department of Defense. The agency itself, aside from the operations in the West, had a very limited number of personnel in the country as compared to the Department of Defense. It was the responsibility, as it were, of the Director of Central Intelligence, yet the assets and most of the knowledge came from DOD. I hope that clarifies that.
Laos	Schlesinger 09/21/92	I have a high probability assessment that people were left behind in Laos and a medium probability assessment with regard to Vietnam. I think that of the various parties, the North Vietnamese had the strongest incentive on the other side to be forthcoming, but I doubt that applied to the provisional government of Vietnam, and even the North Vietnamese were not enormously forthcoming.
Laos	Schlesinger 09/21/92	We had been in communication after flights were knocked down over Laos with the people on the ground, and those people did not appear on the lists. So one must assume, either that the other side engaged in executions, or alternatively that the list was incomplete.

Laos	Secord 09/24/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Without casting any aspersions on anyone, let me just ask the question this way. In your professional assessment as an intelligence officer in 1973, were live American POWs remaining in Laos, for whatever reason, remaining in Laos after the Paris Peace Accords were signed, and after the American POWs, the last group of American POWs came home on March 28th. General Secord: I was an operational staff officer. But the answer to that question, obviously, is affirmative. I mean, that's why we drafted the memo we've been talking about here for some time.
Laos	Secord 09/24/92	When you say POWs in Laos, a number, you are obviously referring to a larger number than the nine. And did all of those people come home that you were tracking? Secord: None of them, that I know of, have been located or even heard of since the Paris Accords. But we did know to, I think, a reasonable level of certitude, that there were more, hence the memorandum.
Laos - EC-47	Shields 06/25/92	The MIA category is specifically appropriate to cases where you do not know whether men are alive or dead. That is case of those men in the EC-47 in my own mind. I did not know.
Laos	Shields 09/24/92	I think that the small number of men which returned, and the number of men which are missing would indicate that we should receive more information concerning our men in Laos. And I think it is foolish to try and say anything more than that.

Laos	Shields 09/24/92	Shields: In the memorandum which was written in May -- which you had in your possession, which discussed the EC-47, which DIA has discussed and Emmet Kaye's capture -- I said at the bottom of that page: With your concurrence, we will continue the position that we don't know whether men are prisoner or missing. Chairman Kerry: I know what you said at the bottom of the page. But let me just say what you said at the top of the page. At the top of the page you said: In a DoD-sponsored press conference held April 12th, 1973, I made the statement that DoD had no specific knowledge indicating that any U.S. personnel were still alive and held prisoner in Southeast Asia. This statement has been the basis for all subsequent answers from DoD to questions concerning the possibility that Americans may still be held prisoner in Southeast Asia. You are saying it became Government policy.
Laos	Smith 06/24/92	Laos is a black hole. We so not have any idea, with the exception of about 13 individuals, what happened to the people in Laos.
Laos	Smith 09/24/92	We had information to conclude, even if not totally conclusive, but at least to assume, that people were alive in Laos and that we had this information. And that is my point.

Laos	Smith 09/24/92	What happened to those people? Nobody has explained that. We are talking about huge references to prisoners here. And this is intelligence data that you folks had. And nothing changed, as far as the testimony that we have received before this committee. Not a damn thing has changed that would indicate what happened to those people. Nobody said they were executed. Nobody said they were released. And nobody said they came home. So what happened to them, and do you folks have any information on that? Godley: I do not.
Laos	Smith 09/24/92	CIA has said in this memorandum, "We studied other information to access activity in Houa Phan Province in general, and the Sam Neua area in particular, and we reached the following conclusions. An historical precedent exists for suggesting the presence of American POWs in the Sam Neua area. Photographs taken by a reconnaissance aircraft in October 1969 show what may be as many as 20 non-Asians, accompanied by Pathet Lao guards, near caves at Ban Nakai Tua, 20 kilometers east of the Sam Neua markings.
Laos	Stockdale 12/03/92	Sen. Reid: But the only people that you know of that survived being shot down over Laos were people that were shot down and then captured by North Vietnamese military? Admiral Stockdale: Yes...

Laos	Trowbridge 06/25/92	...the Pathet Lao, over the years, they had a spokesman, Soth Petrasy, who made many statements relative to American POWs... As far as the intelligence reporting that we had, it wasn't supporting his statements. We have talked with him subsequent to that time and he has indicated to us that his statements about holding prisoners were for the purpose of propaganda.
Laos	Vessey 12/04/92	The second thing is that Laos is not as homogenous a Nation as is Vietnam. It's tribal ethnic groups that are split up in various places, the communication during wartime was miserable, and I doubt that it's much better today.
Laos	Vessey 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: What is your... best explanation, even if it is instinctive or intuitive, as to why there were so many not returned from Laos as opposed to Vietnam? Vessey: Well, Laos is a sparsely populated and rugged country... we lost physical things in Laos that we wanted to recover and couldn't find after they had been dropped from airplanes... just finding anything in remote regions of Laos is difficult. Additionally, Laos is a different sort of country. It is a tribal country with different ethnic groups. The central government under any regime in Laos has had very little control over many parts of Laos... We didn't have as much surveillance on what our own people did in Laos during the war. That is to say, airplanes were outside the radar coverage in Laos, where they were not necessarily in Vietnam.

Laos	Vessey 12/04/92	But secondly, there's another reason, that the accounting will not be as good from Laos as it was or as it is likely to be from Vietnam. You've flown over the area. It's very rugged terrain.
Leaks	Kerry 09/24/92	...as Chairman, I feel very, very strongly that I do not want this Committee's efforts to be sullied by personal agenda, or by people who want to be reckless with partial facts.
Leaks	Kissinger 09/22/92	Mr. Chairman, this is the record. Yet leaks from this inquiry have been suggesting: That those who had refused to abandon America's Vietnamese allies, supposedly abandoned American prisoners; that those who struggled to husband the leverage necessary to bring about the release of American prisoners were insufficiently attentive to the fates of remaining MIAs; and that those who were prepared to use force to compel Hanoi's compliance were guilty of not doing enough to enforce the agreements.
Leaks	Smith 09/24/92	After reading the column and communicating with Senator Kerry, I wondered whether I was at the same meeting.
Left Behind - Shields Statement	Kerry 09/24/92	Lieutenant Commander Vincent D. Monroe, downed in Ne On Province, North Vietnam, May 18th, 1968. Emergency radio signals were received from Lieutenant Commander Monroe and his crew member, whose status as a prisoner has been acknowledged by North Vietnam. Radio Hanoi announced the capture of two pilots at the time and the place of Lieutenant Commander Monroe's loss. Now you called him a prisoner. They acknowledged his as a prisoner. You stood up and said he was a prisoner. He did not come home, and then you say there are no indications anybody is alive.

Left Behind	Sieverts continued 06/25/92	against their will in captivity -- the lengths they would go, one way or another, to let us know of this. It bears on the photographs, for example. The idea of Americans cheerfully being photographed and not using that opportunity to somehow convey who they are and what the circumstances are is beyond my imagination.
Lists	Kerry 09/21/92	Getting the list before the agreement...the idea would be compare the lists and make some detailed man-by-man attempt to determine whether or not their list tracked with our list. That was not done...it was agreed in 1971 that it would not be done. And all of the testimony that we heard earlier from Secretary Laird saying I was at Henry all the time trying to get him to make sure it did not happen, that deal was cut in 1971. There was no effort, apparently, from the meeting in 1972, no effort to say to the North Vietnamese, this is unacceptable. It was accepted as a condition because it had been prenegotiated in 1971.

Lists	Kissinger 09/22/92	Chairman Kerry: Your response to that was, we could exchange lists of the prisoners that we hold and then start exchanging prisoners and not haggle about who is or is not a prisoner. Kissinger: So this phrase of not haggling was -- had only to do with the technical problem. Do we present our list first and wait, or do we see what they give us and then complain about it. Chairman Kerry: ...in effect, you moved the haggling. Instead of haggling name for name before the signing, you left yourself haggling name for name until 20 years later and we are haggling name for name today. Kissinger: Senator, we would have been delighted to get their lists before the signing. That was something that they were never prepared to do, and we, therefore, had to make the best arrangement possible.
Lists	Laird 09/21/92	Chairman Kerry: It was your gut feeling that the lists were not complete, is that what you are saying? Laird: It was my gut feeling that there were more. When I left, I think that we felt at that time -- I think the last figures that we had were that the list of POWs probably would contain quite a few more names than that. We were disappointed with the list because I hoped that there would be more on the list.
Lists	Laird 09/21/92	We weren't -- by the way, I wasn't being critical of the Kennedy list or the Cora Weiss list. We were glad to get that information, but it was not complete information and we knew of the existence of other POWs when those lists were delivered to us...

Lists	Laird 09/21/92	We were not getting much information from the Vietnamese at that particular time. The Vietnamese, of course, made the Kennedy list, the North Vietnamese. The source of that list was the North Vietnamese and the Cora Weiss list was also from the North Vietnamese. And they were confirmations of POWs.
Lists	Laird 09/21/92	We had several lists given to us. There was the early list that was given by Cora Weiss, which I think you are familiar with, who was a peace activist. Then the Kennedy list came, and there was a discrepancy between the Cora Weiss list and the Kennedy list. It was about five difference in those two lists. I felt that those lists were inadequate. We had firm letter confirmations of at least 26 or 27 people that we knew of confirmed by letters that were alive at that particular time.
Lists	Lord 09/21/92	Chairman Kerry: ...It appears to me... that we had agreed on the 16th of August 1971 that there was only, in regard to POW, going to be an exchange of lists at the moment that we all signed the agreements. And the question that I have got is were you aware that the Secretary of Defense and others in the defense agencies were arguing that we should get a preliminary release, and if so, why was it not more forcefully presented at this meeting? Lord: ...we did whittle down our positions, no question about it. I didn't recall the precise date and meeting until I read this document. As I say, I do not recall others pressing us to get the lists ahead of time, but it would be a natural objective that you would to have certainly be better than getting it the day of the agreement.

Lists	Mooney 01/22/92	My testimony, sir, is that I had a list of Americans who were captured alive in enemy hands with our knowledge of the specific units of those enemies down to battalion, division or regiment, or up to division or higher than division, and that the last information was that they were alive and well in enemy hands... there were approximately 305 on the list. At Homecoming I, about five percent of those were returned. That brought the list down to about 293, 294. Now, what I have recovered of the names that were on that original list is approximately 140 or maybe 120 names...
Lists	Mooney 01/22/92	...looking back on it... we should have known better, and maybe if we would have pushed a little harder when we had the power and authority, we might have been able to do something. But in '73, we should have at least insisted on getting that original list of 15 or 16 names up in print, which we had flagged kiddingly as the Kissinger list.
Lists	Mooney 01/22/92	. . . the political requirements of the Vietnamese were higher than the tactical and strategic. They wanted warm bodies to jack up the numbers to appease Kissinger.
Lists	Mooney 01/22/92	My boss... told me to my face... that if you're going to put it on a list, we want to be able to sign it, and we want to be able for the policy-makers to be able to do something with it. So keep it tight... If I hadn't kept it tight, per his instruction, my list could probably have been another 60 to 70 names.
Lists	Shields 06/25/92	Another significant list is the one passed by the DRV to representatives of the U.S. Government in Paris in January, 1973 as required by the Paris Peace Accords.

Lists	Shields 06/25/92	This list was not accepted by us as a complete accounting for those held prisoner or for those who died in captivity. First, that list did not include the names of those prisoners missing in Laos. It also omitted the names of men we knew to have been in captivity at one time.
Lists	Shields 06/25/92	We knew immediately upon receiving this list of those said to have died in captivity, that men whom we knew had, at one time, been alive and in captivity were omitted from the list altogether. After briefing those who returned, we knew also that the names of some men who may have died in captivity were also not on the lists.
Lists	Smith 09/24/92	for several weeks before the signing of the accords in January of 1973, General Eugene Tighe...was asked by the Joint Chiefs to make a list of American POWs that we could reasonably expect to be repatriated both from Laos and Vietnam. The list contained some 900 to 1,000 names yet...
Lists	Tighe 06/24/92	I certainly remember the shock and sadness at the paucity of the lists of names we received versus what we expected.
Lists	Walters 09/21/92	Sen. Grassley: General Walters, do you ever recall it being discussed that we should exchange lists prior to the signing of any agreement? Walters: Yes, I believe there was a discussion to that... But it seems to me that was discussed and they, of course, knew this is one of the principal leverages they had with us. They knew that our desire to get those prisoners of war back was inordinate compared to theirs... but what I suspected is that they wouldn't have carried out the agreement and my suspicions were not totally ill-founded.

Live Americans	Andrews 10/15/92	I acknowledge that there have been isolated reports POWs being held in some areas in Laos, including Sam Neua. But after giving these reports, most of which come from refugee sources, a full and complete evaluation, the Department has been unable to develop convincing evidence that U.S. POWs are being held in Sam Neua today, nor do we have any evidence that they were being held there in 1988.
Live Americans	Armitage 08/12/92	I think what I'd say is I believe there are Americans in Indochina.
Live Sighting	Bell 12/04/92	Bell: Sir, could I make one point on the underground facility there? Chairman Kerry: Yes, sir. Bell: The Bai Nim Conference Hall sits across from the Mausoleum as you know from being there. And they have the meetings there of the Politburo and the Central Committee. Also the Party Congress is held there. And you have high level dignitaries there. They would have to have some type of underground facility in the area to contain all of those people in the event of an emergency...
Live Americans	Brooks 12/01/92	...I found no compelling evidence of alive POWs held in the official prison system of the North Vietnamese... I was persuaded that there was, indeed, compelling evidence that in 1973... to cause me to believe that there probably were people alive in 1973 in Laos.
Live Americans	Cawthorne 11/07/91	I think if one looks at the evidence, piece by piece, one doesn't get anywhere. You don't see the wood for the trees... it's a seamless, carpet of evidence that comes from during the war and beyond.

Live Americans	Chagnon 10/15/92	Chairman Kerry: At any rate, in your years, no one has ever come to you with a secret key and offered or whispered to you that up here there are some Americans. You have never hear that. Nobody has ever -- Chagnon: Only the incidents that Roger [Rumpf] mentioned in Vientiane, which were very much second-hand stories and which we turned over all information to the U.S. Embassy. And those did not prove to be valid.
Live Americans	Childress 08/12/92	...I believe there's a possibility of Americans in Southeast Asia in some category that is not defined.

Live Americans	Christmas 06/25/92	Sen. Reid: Do any of you know of any American servicemen in Southeast Asia, like Garwood, who are still there? Sheetz: I do not. And when I met with Vietnamese officials last summer I asked the same question, as does Vessey, as does Christmas, and I'll let him speak for himself. Christmas: I have no personal knowledge, sir, that we have any there. Sen. Reid: You have no personal knowledge. Do you have any reports, any hearsay information that they are there?
		Christmas: Sir, we have live-sighting reports that we continue to pursue. But we have, at this time, no sufficient information to say that we have a live American in Vietnam or anyplace. However, and I would be the first to tell you this, we don't have sufficient information yet to say that there isn't, and that's why we will pursue any continue to pursue these live-sighting investigations, the last known discrepancy cases, and through our efforts expand throughout those three countries.

Live Americans	Christmas 06/25/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ... with the job that you have to do and the importance of the job that you have to do, it seems to me to be somewhat like going to a baseball player and saying now, Smith, you are going out and you are going to play first base -- which I used to do -- and you will be batting third. Now Smith goes out and plays first base. He does not bring his glove because he is not going to get any ground balls and he does not take his bat up to the plate because he is not going to get a pitch... I think the fact that there are live-sighting reports out there, whether you believe them or not, but the fact that they are there indicates that they have to be pursued... Christmas: It does not mean that I don't believe that live-sighting report, and we pursue each and every one of those live-sighting reports. Unfortunately, all of them to this point in time have shown that -- at this time, we have not been able to determine that there have been live Americans.
Live Americans	Christmas 11/05/91	If we find out the location of Captain Carr or anybody else, there is no doubt in my mind ...we'll go get him. If he can't get out, we'll go get him.
Live Americans	Christmas 12/04/92	I would echo that, sir. I would also state, however, that as you've indicated, Senator, we pursue every lead. We do not leave any stone unturned, and we have in position the operational plans to recover Americans if, in fact, we should find one.

Live Americans	DeStatte, Deeter, Bell 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Mr. Gadoury, as to Laos. Do you currently operate with any intelligence or evaluation that suggests to you that someone is alive? Is there any credible evidence that says so? Gadoury: Not that I have seen, sir. Chairman Kerry: As to Indochina? DeStatte: That's correct, sir. Chairman Kerry: And you say no. DeStatte: No. Chairman Kerry: Mr. Deeter, Sergeant Deeter? Deeter: No, sir. Chairman Kerry: Mr. Bell? Bell: No, sir.
Live Americans	DeStatte 08/05/92	We shouldn't forget that those 300-plus sources who accurately described Robert Garwood, encounters with Robert Garwood there, also said that they had no knowledge, personal or hearsay, of any other Americans living or being detained in that area, and if these folks were acknowledged reporting accurate on that, why should we question their accuracy on the other?
Live Americans	Gadoury 10/15/92	After eight years of searching neither I, nor... personnel from various other military units... have found proof that any of our missing survived after the prisoner release from Hanoi in 1973. Yet, as long as the possibility exists that there could have been or could still be, we must continue the search.

Live Americans	Grassley 06/24/92	Evidence exists, and the next time that someone in the Administration says that there in no evidence that we left people behind, it is clear that he or she is not reading the same documents that the members of this Committee and our respective staffs are reading.
Live Americans	Jensen-Stevenson 11/07/91	There is an amazing amount of credible evidence, [that Americans are alive in Southeast Asia].
Live Americans	Kerry 06/25/92	The evidence, to me, is still as likely that there might be fraud as that there is evidence of a prisoner.
Live Americans	Kingston 06/25/92	The JCRC work did not include investigating the possibility that live Americans remaining in captivity against their will in Southeast Asia after Operation Homecoming.
Live Americans	Kissinger 09/22/92	. . . why they would hold prisoners that they don't acknowledge, for that I have great difficulty understanding it.
Live Americans	Kissinger 09/22/92	I think it's improbable that any are alive today. I honestly did not think there were any alive in Vietnam when the war ended. I have always kept open the possibility in my mind that there were some -- that there were some in Laos.
Live Americans	Larson 12/04/92	Mr. Chairman, I have seen no piece of evidence at this point that would indicate anyone is alive from any of our researches, investigations, surveys, or any of the data that we have available.

Live Americans	Larson 12/04/92	Admiral Larson: ...in this last year, we have resolved 143 live-sighting cases. Chairman Kerry: Has any one of those live sighting cases given an indication of either a live American, or that there was a live American there? Larson: No, sir...
Live Americans	Maguire 08/04/92	We conclude with the following assessment. After years of post-war searching, thousands of reports evaluated, and every available means of intelligence collection employed, no single report or combination of reports has ever been able to confirm that American prisoners of war remained in captivity after Operation Homecoming in 1973.
Live Americans	Needham 12/04/92	Sir, I agree. I would add, it is our number 1 mission, looking for live sightings in support of the DIA effort. We react to every single one of them.
Live Americans	Rumpf/ Chagnon 10/15/92	Chairman Kerry: ...what do you believe is the possibility that somebody is being held? Mr. Rumpf: ...if they were living as local people were living, life would be very difficult...A 10-year period would be very difficult. Chairman Kerry: Do you agree with that, Ms. Chagnon? Ms. Chagnon: Yes...

Live Americans	Rumpf 10/15/92	Mr. Rumpf: I talked to a very few people about the issue of live POWs being held by the Government. And in each occasion people said there were no Americans being held in Laos. But it was not an issue that came up regularly. People did not raise the issue until late in our stay there in 1989 and '90 when people started coming to our house in Vientiane claiming they had tapes, fingerprints, bringing us sometimes those kinds of materials, expecting some money in return. And that's the only time people really came up to us. Chairman Kerry: Did they ask you for money, specifically?
		Mr. Rumpf: Yeah, it was implied in the discussion that they expected something from it. We only said we'd take it and give it to the U.S. Embassy.
Live Americans	Schiff 08/04/92	...the U.S. Government position is, while there is no information to confirm that Americans are still detained in Southeast Asia, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Because the U.S. Government cannot rule out the possibility, the Department of Defense continues to aggressively investigate this issue...
Live Americans	Schlatter 12/01/92	Sir, the evidence that I saw over, again, the period of time I worked in the office leads me to two conclusions. I think the evidence supports the contention that if you were an American prisoner of war and you were alive in the spring of 1973, the time of Operation Homecoming, you came home. The second conclusion I have to reach is that only the Vietnamese know for sure.

Live Americans	Schlesinger 09/21/92	I believe those prospects would be very slim, Mr. Chairman, as of now. But it's conceivable that one or two may have survived. One or two, or a handful.
Live Americans	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: But we do have people come to people. I mean, we have the reports. We have got them laid out. These guys spend hours analyzing them. They go through them. You are aware of that, correct? Schweitzer: Yes, and that has to be done. That is a valuable process, and for the American people that must be done. And it is the work of the analysts and the investigators, and it is a valuable process that must be gone through. And I do not in any way want to detract from the dedication and the hard work all of these men do. Chairman Kerry: Well, what makes you come to that judgment? What is sort of the basis of your judgment nobody is alive? Schweitzer: Well, I have never seen any evidence or heard any evidence that anyone is alive in Vietnam.

Live Americans	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: ...you are speaking from archival experience, and a reality base that a lot of people do not have. ... you have drawn a conclusion here that is pretty solid in your mind, and you have laid it out to the committee that you think this concept of focus on live people is a waste of time, in your estimation. What gives you this basis that you draw this notion that nobody is alive? Is that a fair statement of your notion? You think this concept of anybody being alive is wrong, is that correct? Schweitzer: Sir, I've seen no evidence that there are live Americans in Vietnam.
Live Americans	Sheetz 08/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Do you interpret any of the live-sighting reports that you have in front of you today as evidence that an American is alive inside Southeast Asia today? Mr. Sheetz: That kind of clear-cut statement I cannot make, and I don't think there's a Member on this committee who can make such a statement. We have 110 reports. It was 109 when I last briefed you and there's been a new one come in. We have 110 reports right now that are in active inventory, and as we go into the areas where those 110 reports are located, we take a look at other reporting that's in that same geographic area. Until we run those to ground, I can't tell you. That's not a cop-out. I cannot tell you...

Live Americans	Smith	I might say in some respectful disagreement with the Chairman, there is information and evidence before the Committee on specific individuals. The question is, is that information valid, and that is what we are trying to determine.
Live Americans	Smith 10/15/92	In view of the information put forward at our September hearings that we had expected more POWs/MIAs to come home in 1973, it is incumbent upon the Committee to treat the information before us today, I believe, with the assumption that American pilots from the war could still be alive and held against their will somewhere in communist hands in Laos and Vietnam.
Live Americans	Sydow 08/05/92	Chairman Kerry: ...Out of those several thousand, apart from Bob Garwood and apart from the Caucasians who were not American POWs, are there reports in which you place credibility of American POWs being held? Mr. Sydow: No sir. There is no evidence of POWs being held in this system.

Live Americans	Sydow, Sheetz, Cole 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Now, let me ask each of you the relevant question as to your countries or areas. Mr. Sydow, Laos. Sydow: No, sir, Vietnam. Chairman Kerry: Just Vietnam. Do you have any credible evidence today, which you are operating on or working with, that someone is alive in Vietnam, a prisoner? Sydow: No, sir. Chairman Kerry: Mr. Sheetz? Sheetz: No, sir. Chairman Kerry: Colonel Cole? Cole: No, sir.
Live Americans	Tin 11/07/91	About this issue, I can say that I know as well as any top leader in Vietnam and, in my opinion, I state categorically that there is not any American prisoner alive in Vietnam.
Live Americans	Vessey 12/04/92	It is almost beyond the realm of comprehension for me to figure out how the Vietnamese leadership can say after X number of years that they have no one and then say now we do and we'll do it for X million or billion or whatever it happens to be.
Live Americans	Vessey 12/04/92	Now, I will tell you that based on what we've learned over the five years I've been involved, I think the probability of anyone being alive is far lower than I would have given that probability five years ago. But I'm not going to say I don't believe there's not anyone alive. I think the probability is very, very low, but certainly it exists. The probability exists.

Live Americans -Offers	Vessey 06/25/92	Sen. McCain: You have never heard of any offer on the part of anyone in authority in Vietnam to return Americans in return for money or assistance? Vessey: Absolutely not. In fact, just the contrary. The Vietnamese officials with whom I've dealt have said we cannot so it, whatever you were to offer. We cannot do it because we do not have any [Americans].
Live-Sighting Reports	Bell 12/04/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Are you not talking about the area around the Mausoleum, Mr. Bell? Bell: I'm talking about the Bai Nim Conference Hall, right across the street from the Mausoleum, sir. Chairman Kerry: It is actually about 500 yards away, is it not? It is not right across the street. There is a huge expanse.

Live-Sighting Reports	Bell 12/04/92	The two morticians or technical specialists that the ambassador referred to, I believe in early last year was reduced down to one person. He resided in the house across from the Mausoleum on the corner of Chuma Ho Street next to the compound of the Soviet GRU. In May of 1991, this gentleman was soaked with gasoline on the streets of Hanoi and burned to death. And the only facility or information about that facility that I have heard was that it was built on the same order of Lenin's Tomb and there is an elevator that goes down one floor beneath the mausoleum. And the advisors that came there, they used the same plan to construct Ho Chi Minh's mausoleum. Concerning any tunnels in the citadel area or the military compound, previous reporting indicates that there was or probably still is a tunnel which went from Cua Dum Street under Ly Nam De and inside of the Ly Nam De compound. And this tunnel was constructed back during the French era.

Live-Sighting Reports	Chambers 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: OK. How many of these are firsthand up here? How many of those flags are first-hand [reports]?... what you have is 920 -- 928 minus about 200 that you say are fabrications. That leaves you 728. You have 225 that are first-hand, leaving you with about 500 that are hearsay. 225 firsthand. Chambers: And the hearsay is probably where the heart of this issue is at. And the reason that there is what we find is a problem with this is that in addition to the use of -- Chairman Kerry: 700 hearsay total. OK, go ahead. Chambers: -- Some basic geographic flaws in the map where some of the reports were plotted in the wrong area, and I think we went through this in closed session and again in open session earlier. There's a misunderstanding about the nature and the use of hearsay reporting. Hearsay reporting goes from accurate renditions of what actually happened that someone told their brother or their sister and they repeated and it's very accurate to something that you heard, someone else said it to someone, and by the time it is repeated to one of the investigators you can't figure out what it is that they were really talking about. And it's marketplace trivia that people pass back and forth amongst themselves.

Live-Sighting Reports	DeStatte 12/04/92	There's one other point that I'd like to bring out. In the statement released here on the 1st December, there was a quote of the Russian ambassador, and I quote from that one December statement: "We have also heard from the Russian ambassador that there is a restricted underground area beneath the Ho Chi Minh Mausoleum." This quotation is taken out of its original context. The original context was a partial transcript of a briefing by Russian ambassador Rashid Camadolin to two journalists in Hanoi on 15 August, 1992. The following is an accurate text of the ambassador's statement in context: "There is an underground area beneath the mausoleum. It is restricted. There is a lot of equipment, a cooling device. When we built that, we put in a triple generator system in case of an electricity black-out." Now, the ambassador also stated that Russian experts helped build the Mausoleum, and that two Russian experts are at the Mausoleum at the request of the Vietnamese Government to preserve the body of Ho Chi Minh. He said these Russian experts would have known if any U.S. POWs were detained at the Mausoleum. The ambassador said he's never heard of any prisoners at the Mausoleum. In fact, he scoffed at the idea that anyone could imagine Vietnam could hold prisoners here. He said he has spoken with many Americans about this subject, and he noted, and I quote, "those who are serious, who are not playing politics, who are not playing on the emotions of the families, they know these stories are not true..."

Live-Sighting Reports	DeStatte 12/04/92	...a BBC radio interview with Ambassador Camadolin in which the ambassador stated he was, quote, sure there is no so-called underground prison here in the center of the city, and above all, beneath the Mausoleum, close quote.
Live-Sighting Reports	Gadoury 10/15/92	Chairman Kerry: And have any of them given you a lead that you have been able to follow that you have considered real or found to be real with respect to an American being alive? Mr. Gadoury: In my recollection, in all the people that I talked to, there were three people who provided information, first-hand live sighting information, of what they said were American prisoners or people being held against their will. In two of those cases, I participated in follow up interviews and even polygraph exams, and neither of the first two individuals were determined to be presenting truthful information. In fact, there was indications of -- ...Deception in each case. In the third case, the Stony Beach office followed up, and I understand that in that case it was determined that there was no substance to the individual's report.

Live-Sighting Reports	Haig 09/21/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ...we get into these definitions of hard evidence, and iron-clad evidence, and evidence... we have got hundreds of live-sighting reports that have not been all debunked. We have got some other types of intelligence which we will be getting into in a couple of weeks... ...where is the proof that the men we did know were alive are dead? Where is that proof? Why do you not put the same burden on that?... where are they? Haig: Well, the same suspicion I have put on another foot. And that is that the enemy that we fought cared nothing about the lives of human beings, including their own. And I saw it on the battlefield, as you did.
Live-Sighting Reports	Maguire 08/04/92	...So far, the largest body of post-war intelligence about missing Americans is refugee source reporting...Over 15,000 source reports have been received since 1975, and that number grows every day...To date, we have received almost 1,600 first-hand reports. DIA evaluates these reports and our results are reviewed by an independent channel made up of representatives from other U.S. intelligence agencies.
Live-Sighting Reports	Maguire 08/04/92	...As of today, over 100 reports are still under active investigation, as we've just discussed...In Vietnam, hearsay reports account for about half of all live-sighting reports, and they tend to echo the details and descriptions of actual firsthand reports. However, in Laos, hearsay reports account for almost 80 percent of the live-sighting reports, and in many instances they are vague in detail.

Live-Sighting Reports	Mooney 01/22/92	Sighting reports, stand-alone sighting reports are essentially worthless unless they are cumulative. They beggar more questions and you can argue about them all day long.
Live-Sighting Reports	Schiff 08/04/92	...In 1979, we received information from a source who said he saw 50 U.S. prisoners of war between 1973 and '78, while he was held in Quyet Tien re-education camp near the Chinese border. Reports like this one, where sources describe seeing POWs with their own eyes, are categorized as first-hand live sightings. They receive our highest priority for investigation. We used all-source analysis to investigate this report. We looked at photography to locate the camp in the area the source described, and we found it. However, the photography showed that during the time the source said he saw U.S. POWs in this camp, the gates were wide open... However, to be certain that no POWs had ever been held in this camp, we located some former inmates to ask if they knew of any Americans held there. These people all denied that any Americans had ever been held in this camp...

Live-Sighting Reports	Schiff 08/04/92	Each of the former inmates that we had located from the camp provided accurate sketches, one of which you see here. In fact, the only person whose sketch of the camp was not accurate was the original source who claimed that he saw 50 U.S. prisoners of war in the camp. The moral of the story is this. Relying only one source of information would have led us to believe that there were U.S. prisoners of war in the camp. Taking a multiple source approach convinced us that this was obviously not the case...
Live-Sighting Reports	Schiff 08/04/92	...the U.S. Government's intelligence collection capability on the POW/MIA issue is continually being improved.
Live-Sighting Reports	Schiff 08/04/92	...as the U.S. Government's expert on Indochinese prison systems, we routinely study the handling of all foreign prisoners in order to gain insight on how U.S. prisoners of war might be handled... The point here is that within a few weeks of the time a Westerner showed up in a maximum security prison in Indochina, we knew he was there.
Live-Sighting Reports	Schlatter 12/01/92	...judgments of a source are a fundamental part of intelligence analysis. And the fact that some sources are weighed and found wanting is not an indictment of the analytic process or of the analyst; it is a fact of life.
Live-Sighting Reports	Schlatter 12/01/92	It's a fact of life that you encounter people who either make up a story or who really are telling you the truth, but they don't have a clear view of what they're saying and they embellish a little bit, or you have people who simply come forward with a very straightforward story.

Live-Sighting Reports	Schlatter 12/01/92	The charge is made that we believe everybody is lying. We do not. Demonstrably, seven out of 10 or more of the people who talk to us are telling us the truth. I found a lot of frustration. I was frustrated every day I went into that office and every day I left, and I am still frustrated 2 1/2 years out of it. But to then take the leap from frustration to saying you knowingly and willingly turned your back on a valid report of a man that you could have rescued is absurd. And that is why I am so hard over on denying or declaring the invalidity of the mindset to debunk. Because that is where I found that argument to lead.
Live-Sighting Reports	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: Well, what do you say to the live-sighting report process? Here we are. We get live-sighting reports. People come in and say, I saw an American. What do we do? Schweitzer: I've never heard one, sir. Chairman Kerry: You have never had somebody come to you? Schweitzer: No, sir.

Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 08/04/92	...because the initial contact with that source -- our field collector was not privy to all the information have about a particular geographic area in Vietnam, may not be aware of all the subtleties surrounding that report, we've got to go back to the source in some circumstances to sharpen up the original reporting. We do that through what we call a source-directed requirement, or SDR. It takes a couple of months for that process to work. I guess we balance off the need for thoroughness and completeness and accuracy against the risk that we would take in going off half-cocked with half-developed or poorly developed information in a live-sighting report.

Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: But as a ready pool of sort of information, here you have boat people. These are people who hated the government. They risked their lives, they got into boats, they went out into the South China Sea, they were escaping communism, escaping the country, they had a reason to hate it and foul it up. And yet thousands upon thousands of them said they had never seen anything, is that correct? Sheetz: Yes, sir. Chairman Kerry: Now, is that as relevant as a counterbalance in terms of proving a negative, if we are working with statistics, as people who say they did see something as a hearsay? Sheetz: In fact... one of the techniques we use when we deal with this bogus reporting coming out of reeducation camps. When we've got 200 and 300 inmates who were there who said that they never saw any Americans and then suddenly somebody appears who was there at the same time that says, you know, there were 50 Americans in this facility. So you have to -- it's not enough just to take individual reports and throw them up on the map. You've got to look at them in the context of all that you know. This is another way of talking about doing all-source analysis. You know, evaluating each report in terms of what you know about the area and how that report fits in.
Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 12/01/92	Things are on track, things are moving ahead with regard to those investigations. But the results are not all in yet.

Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 08/04/92	Chairman Kerry: ...given the nature of prioritization and the increased access in Vietnam, that a live-sighting report rendered in the year 1991 or 1992 would be the highest order of priority and the fastest resolved. Can you help me understand why the bulk of those remain unresolved? Sheetz: ...before we send those cases out there, we want to get a very quick, thorough analysis of the case, match it up with whatever data we hold in our files, present the live sighting investigator with a complete package to go our into the field with not only information on the particular sighting, but now we're also sending out, along with that sighting package, all other previously closed live-sighting reports and hearsay reports that are in that same immediate geographic area. We're continually refining the process, I, too, am desirous of having it sped up, but we can only work it as fast as we can get the reports in here, analyze them, and get them back out.
Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 11/15/91	DIA has held all along that the report of the mortician that he saw three Caucasians who were identified to him by another person as probably being Americans -- that report stands, there is validity to that report. . . . I am unaware of any firm, credible evidence that Americans were held against their will after Operation Homecoming.

Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 12/04/92	What I think we were really referring to is the notion that yes, there is a foundation for that rather large structure. And embedded in that foundation, it now turns out there's a couple of generators and some other equipment that's related to the facility. Is that a prison? I think not...
Live-Sighting Reports	Sheetz 06/25/92	Sen. Reid: Gentlemen, what is the latest live-sighting report that any of you know of? Mr. Sheetz: We receive them all the time. The inventory of -- Sen. Reid: When you say all of the time, it would not be unusual to receive a couple a week? Mr. Sheetz: Many weeks we could receive two or three or four or more. We have generally an aggressive inventory that we are investigating. Between 80 to 125, and about every 3 months, we hold a review board where representatives of the entire intelligence community plus the State Department and the Joint Staff and OSD come in and listen to our analysts describe what we have been able to do to resolve or otherwise investigate the case. And cases get closed out at that point, and the inventory drops down to maybe 75 or 80, and then over the next couple of months it will build back up. And we will hold another review board. So it's a very fluid figure.

Live-Sighting Reports	Sieverts 06/25/92	[Investigating live-sighting reports] remained an active, if not primary then secondary, mission of all the American intelligence agencies to my knowledge right into the mid-Seventies and even to this day. The problem is that the kinds of information that began arriving after '73 were qualitatively different from what was coming in before '73. It's not a question of attitude by analysts, but rather simply the information itself, and it's for that reason that I drew attention to what is, to me, a significant difference. The absence of that kind of verifying information in which the name or some other detail that... would let you know that this was real. I have sometimes said that the very large number of sightings themselves raised incredulity. There could not have been as many American prisoners as the live-sighting reports suggest were there.

Live-Sighting Reports	Sieverts 06/25/92	The very large number of these reports should have triggered caution, since it was clearly improbable that there were ever enough prisoners to correlate with all the alleged sightings. It is noteworthy that in most of these reports no information was provided on the name or names of the people reportedly seen. While the war was underway, we received reports on captured Americans which often had names associated with them. This was so even if the reports came from indigenous, illiterate people who would render an American name phonetically.... it was the way of validating that information. Among American prisoners we learned so clearly over the years that the exchange of names was the highest priority.
Live-Sighting Reports	Sieverts 06/25/92	My work with refugees has made me deeply aware of the desperation that these people face and feel.
Live-Sighting Reports	Tighe 06/24/92	...the only way you're going to prove all of these things is to go over there at the point that is under discussion, so you can query the local people even or examine the sight of a crash.
Live-Sighting Reports	Tighe 06/24/92	[In] 70 percent of those reports, analysis that was done in our office said that those individuals told us the truth.

Remains	Bell 12/04/92	Mr. Bell: Rather than concentrate on numbers of cases, prioritized a list where you have leads that can be followed now, regardless of where the case is in the country, and do the cases that have the greatest probability of success first, based on those leads. And, at the same time, have someone working on the development of leads for those cases for which you have no leads. Chairman Kerry: That seems to make sense. Mr. Bell: To move the thing forward. Chairman Kerry: Well, are we not doing that in the context of having put the toughest discrepancy cases in front of them? I mean, General Vessey sat there and put them there. Mr. Bell: Yes, sir, we have, but we're at a dead end on some of the cases, and unless we come up with some new information, it's pointless to go back and investigate them again. Chairman Kerry: Are there a number of cases on which we really know the fate of people, but we just do not have the remains? Mr. Bell: Yes, sir. Chairman Kerry: So, in effect, we have really resolved some cases, but we do not take them off the list simply because we do not have remains. Mr. Bell: But there are also some cases where we do not know the fate of the individual and also do not have remains or any possibility of further leads in the case.

Remains	Childress 08/12/92	...Vietnam could solve the live prisoner issue by returning their remains. So the key question is, if they're not alive, why is Vietnam not solving it?
Remains	Christmas 11/05/91	I think that it's unfair to our people in the field to suggest that their primary focus is on remains recovery. We go where the facts lead us as we identify each case and try to follow it through for the fullest possible accounting. If, in fact, the facts lead us to the notion that we can either recover the remains or that we think the Vietnamese or Laotians have those remains, we think it's important as our accounting to the families that we can give them information.... They want them to walk out of the jungle and come home, but they will tell you very quickly that if that can't be the case, please end the uncertainty for me. Give me something that I can put this to rest, I've been with it so long.

Remains	DeStatte 12/04/92	Mr. DeStatte: First, I doubt that more than a few remains, if any, are in the hands of private citizens in Vietnam. It would be culturally antithetical, as well as illegal. Chairman Kerry: Well, let me just ask you something. You know, there is intelligence that -- I mean, some people within your own house assert that there are remains being held. Mr. DeStatte: Yes, sir, I understand that. Chairman Kerry: You disagree with that completely? Mr. DeStatte: That's correct. I acknowledge that there may be some instances where private citizens may have remains, but I think that that's rare. I think that we should avoid setting up a mechanism that ultimately is simply a disguised means of paying incentive rewards to private citizens. I think what we should be doing is providing Vietnam's official organs, such as we are doing with the museums, means by which they can help us find the answers we're looking for and the return of the remains, and rely on -- and also articulate, for Vietnamese leaders, problems as we understand those problems, and rely on Vietnam and Vietnam's leaders to resolve the internal problems of recovering remains; to resolve the internal problems of recovering information and sharing that with us. And I think that's the appropriate approach, myself.

Remains	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Mr. Schweitzer: Well, after our meeting I had meetings with the Vietnamese all that day, and into the night... the importance of this historic trip of yours to Vietnam [was stressed], and what could be achieved during this trip. And I was told to me that they simply have no remains. That if the success or failure of this trip and of establishing relations with the U.S. is dependent upon their turning over the remains they have in their possession, or that is believed they have in their possession, then it's going to fail. They have no remains. Now, I don't mean to indicate to you that there are not remains out there. There are, and the investigators that are there, the analysts are going to get them as the people of Vietnam -- Chairman Kerry: But you are suggesting those are the ones in private hands? Mr. Schweitzer: Private hands. Chairman Kerry: Or in provincial hands. Mr. Schweitzer: Or, possibly, that haven't been excavated yet. The location of the grave sites is known by -- you were given the example by Colonel Dai, a very vivid example. He knows the location of four graves.
Remains	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Sen. McCain: You do not disagree with that, Mr. Schweitzer, that there are remains in different parts of the country. Mr. Schweitzer: I wouldn't disagree with anything Bill Bell says. He's the real expert on this.

Remains	Larson 12/04/92	...There are remains somewhere, because we have photographs of bodies that they had at one time that we do not have remains for. So there are some that once were available that we do not have, and we don't know where they are.
Remains	Needham 12/04/92	Sir, the one area that I don't know what to tell you is the answer to the remains. I can give you a scenario that Morrissey was buried in an area and maybe they lost the records. However, we are working with them and we have presented those cases to them. We're going to talk to them more about it next week. I believe, as Admiral Larson said, they are trying to find a way to get themselves out of this situation, because they are concerned about the laws. They're also concerned about taking remains from individuals and convincing them that they have no chance of getting any money somewhere down the road.

Remains	Schweitzer 12/04/92	Sen. McCain: Mr. Schweitzer, I asked General Vessey this morning on the issue of the allegation of the warehousing of remains. One, have you seen any evidence of warehousing of remains? And, two, what is your opinion about that theory that there may be several hundred American remains kept somewhere in Hanoi, or somewhere in Vietnam? Mr. Schweitzer: There is no such warehouse, sir. If, at one point in the '70's or early '80's, if there were some remains somewhere in Hanoi, those remains have by now, as the officials retired who were in the program, as they went back to their provinces, various memorabilia, maybe even remains, have gone back with them. And while there may have been some remains at some point -- I don't know that, but if there were, they are now in private hands. Sen. McCain: You are absolutely convinced there is no warehouse for the large number of U.S. remains somewhere in Hanoi? Mr. Schweitzer: Yes, sir. There is no such warehouse.

Remains	Ford 12/04/92	...I am struck by the fact that the cases that bother me, that gnaw away at me on this issue, is the cases that they should know the most about: the ones where we have the photographs of people on the ground dead in Vietnamese control, the last known alive cases that we've investigated that they had custody of them, based on our joint investigations. Those are the ones that are not showing up. Now, I can understand, as some have said, that they've lost the coordinates, a bomb went off and when they went back to get them they didn't find them, somebody took them home when they retired as a gold bar, they were going to sell them back to somebody at some time in the future. I can understand that for, give me a number; 25 percent, 40 percent, but not all of the most likely cases where we know they had control over an American that was dead on the ground. They don't lose them all.
Remains	Ford 12/04/92	Mr. Ford: ...I remember being told two years ago in Hanoi: There are no archives; we have no archives; why would we not give them to you if we had them? They have been eaten up. Chairman Kerry: I remember that. Vessey spoke to that, though. Mr. Ford: But why is that different than the remains?

Remains	Ford 12/04/92	This is one that I have a nightmare about, and that's that something Carl Ford will say or do to his superiors will give the Vietnamese the impression that they don't have to give us those remains and they destroy them, they get rid of them. I shuddered when all of the people told the truth as they saw it today, because if the message ever gets to the Vietnamese that the U.S. Government believes they don't have remains we aren't going to get any. And I just can't for the life of me -- I will err on the side of trying to provide the answers for the families as long as I can. That's my bias.
Remains	Ford 12/01/92	The fact is that every piece of evidence that we have gotten in the breakthrough suggests that they do have far more information than they have provided thus far, that they, in fact, have to explain to us if they do not have the remains, why not.

Remains - Excavations	Gadoury 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: What did you pull out of this crash site?
		Gadoury: The aircraft involved was an AV/OV-2, which crashed into the side of a mountain. It's scattered over a large area. The exact dimensions were -- I don't recall the exact dimensions, but it was over 100 meters wide, and probably about the same distance going from the bottom of the slope up a 60 degree slope to the top. And there was a wide distribution of wreckage. As we started going, meticulously following the Identification Laboratory's excavation procedures from the bottom to the top --
		Chairman Kerry: So, you literally began to sift through soil, right? Gadoury: Right.
		Chairman Kerry: You would sift through soil, and you would clean it out, and you would find fragments of bone; you would find fragments of teeth. Gadoury: On this last situation, we were not able to finish the site, but we found over 300 bone fragments, and a number of teeth, and quite a few personal effects and personal equipment.
Remains	Larson 12/04/92	General Needham said that -- and I do not want to misquote him, but the impression I had is that he believes that there are remains that are known to exist being held by individuals, as well as perhaps local government officials. There is some expectation, of course, that some bounty would be paid for remains. We have made it clear that that is not the policy of the United States.

Remains	Schweitzer 12/04/92	However, this does not mean that remains, or even partial remains may be found for most of these cases. The majority of the remaining MIA cases in Vietnam may eventually be resolved by means of other factors. These will include photos, documents, aircraft wreckage, memorabilia, and personal stories told by a farmer, a People's Army Vietnam soldiers, and civilians.
Remains	Vessey 11/05/91	. . . U.S. analysts have combined these facts to build a case which suggests that the Vietnamese government could be holding as many as several hundred sets of remains.
Remains	Vessey 12/04/92	...for example, if there were an air crash they were to find -- the local people were to find the crash, find the pilot if he were alive, capture him; if he wasn't alive, find the remains then bury them on the stop and then report the location of those -- of the grave to the central authorities. And then the central authorities clearly had a system for recovering those remains at a later date, one, two, or five years later, and then sending those remains to central storage.

Remains	Vessey 06/25/92	In the past five years we've received 332 sets of remains... Of those, 125 have been identified and returned to their families. Another 107 might be those of Americans, but have not yet been identified, and the remaining 100 sets are not remains of missing Americans. In the 119 discrepancy cases which have been the focus of our joint field investigations, 22 have been resolved through recovery, return and identification of remains. In 39 other sets we and the Vietnamese have agreed that the individuals involved are dead which confirms an earlier presumptive finding of death. in four of those cases we agree that we will not be bale to recover remains. For the other 35 of those cases we believe that there still may be an opportunity to recover the remains... The other 58 cases continue to be investigated. They all have been investigated at least once and most several times... none of the new evidence gathered... points toward any of the individuals being alive.
Remains	Vessey 11/05/91	...U.S. analysts have combined these facts to build a case which suggests that the Vietnamese government could be holding as many as several hundred sets of remains.
Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	...we did not want to create the impression of ransom and reparations.

Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	The North Vietnamese, in what turned into a constant pattern, immediately began to violate the agreement, especially with respect to a full accounting of MIAs. They did not hand over the POW list for Laos as required on January 27th. In response, we delayed deliveries to them of the confidential Presidential letter on recommending to Congress reconstruction assistance after peace had been established. The letter was kept confidential only to prevent a linkage between the agreement and what we presented as a unilateral American act. A Presidential report to the Congress in February 1972 had affirmed this undertaking, and have a figure of $2.5 billion. It was again repeated in the Presidential speech of May 8, 1972. Mr. Chairman, some suggestions have been made, including this morning, that the North Vietnamese may have withheld some American prisoners in an effort to get this economic aid. I find this reasoning difficult to understand.
Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	I don't believe that reparations were their primary objective. Their primary objective was to take over Indochina, and if all they had wanted from us was economic aid, all they would have had to do was observe the agreement...
Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	I certainly told them innumerable times that we were not paying ransom, we were not paying reparations, and they have never used it. They never said, you owe us economic aid, and therefore we are holding prisoners. If they had done it, I wouldn't have been astonished.

Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	To encourage compliance with these commitments we held out the inducement first offered by President Johnson in 1965, and frequently reiterated since, at least three times by President Nixon in 1972, of economic aid to North Vietnam.
Reparations	Kissinger 09/22/92	Finally, it is curious that Americans would make such an argument when the North Vietnamese did not. As the bipartisan House Select Committee reported in 1976, not once in all their discussions with the North Vietnamese, did they cite the American failure to provide economic aid as an excuse for their failure to provide a complete accounting. They have never denied their obligations. They have only denied that they have prisoners. Why should Americans now put forward an alibi for Hanoi which even Hanoi has never asserted?
Reparations	Robson 09/24/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ...Dr. Kissinger was very clear about that -- no linkage. Now, why would they bail out if they did not feel there was linkage? Colonel Robson: I know there was not supposed to be any linkage, Senator, but in fact there was. They were constantly trying to link things... Vice Chairman Smith: Is Dr. Kissinger wrong in that perception? Colonel Robson: I know that he had the agreement, the understanding that there would be no linkage. But what happens in Washington and what happens in that little dusty room in Saigon is two different things, Senator.

Reparations	Smith 09/22/92	[Habib] said in one of the first lists of negotiating points put forward by the North Vietnamese, "The communist side bracketed the release of prisoners with what they described as U.S. responsibility for war damage in Vietnam in a single numbered point. I know of no instance in which an adversary so openly treated this humanitarian problem in this way. We recognized from an early date what we were up against."
Reparations	Walters 09/21/92	...My understanding was this is what they really wanted from us, the postwar reconstruction aid and obviously they knew what we really wanted from them short of surrender was the prisoners.

Returned POWs	Ford 12/01/92	Vice Chairman Smith: I think one area that could be very helpful and, frankly, it has been a real problem, is the POW debriefs. Not regarding anything in there other than the names of individuals that they saw. I have only -- we are restricted to the Chairman and myself. There are 590 of them, and it is impossible to get through those with the two of us doing it... Ford: Is there any possibility that as a compromise, Senator Smith, that you might allow us to go through that and do this work ourselves? I mean part of this is a contract that we have. It's not a legal contract, but it's certainly a contract in principle, not only to the past POWs but any future POWs. That when we talk to them after they come back, we know that they've been through hell. We don't expect them to be anything other than human but we want to know, we need to know what happened to them. And we've always made it clear in that process that these would be guarded as sort of nuclear weapons secrets or something, and that's the reason that we've done that.
Returned POWs	Trowbridge 06/24/92	I know of no prisoners that came home that said, I saw an individual that was alive that we left behind, without other information that may have supported the fact that he died.
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	... in 1990... I broke with the KGB and went public and denounced the organization as cruel, repressive and inhuman... What I am doing now is simply a continuation of my old story, for which I was sued... and deprived of my rank and pension and everything else. So I am not doing anything new...

Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	Chairman Kerry: ...can you help us to understand why Mr. Nechiporenko allegedly said one thing to you at one moment and straight-out denies that he talked to anybody subsequently? Do you have an explanation for that? General Kalugin: ...my explanation is that he had consulted his former superiors and they would tell him, just say one... I think that's a premeditated lie on the part of the former intelligence organization, and I know the reason... Vietnam remains to be probably one of the last listening posts in the Far East, and to lose a relationship with them... would probably be a major setback for the Soviet intelligence, so why not keep a story which was coordinated with the Vietnamese?
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	... I do care about people at home. I'm not a defector. I'm a citizen of my country. I love my country. I want to stay in that country. I want to change that country and transform it into something far better than we have today or we had in the last 70 years. And the United States, as I know it, is a country which I always felt friendly for and I will do my best to get both countries closer together and get Russia out of this mess and standing on its feet as a proud nation, a prosperous nation. That's my only desire.
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	...to take any American against his will to the USSR would require a major political decision by the Politburo and Brezhnev personally... They would never risk [the damage to Soviet/American relations... It makes no practical sense, no political or military sense. They could have been interviewed on the spot and that made sense indeed.

Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	I do have a lot of obligations [regarding confidentiality], according to the old rules, but I think it's time to set new rules.
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	The GRU is an autonomous organization and the KGB's role in regard to the military intelligence is to protect this agency from foreign intelligence agencies' penetration, and second, to control their political health, so to speak. That was the major role of the KGB. Otherwise, they would act autonomously, do their things without the KGB's knowledge.
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	At least for us, for [American POWs] to go would be the best thing, because we would have probably some potential sources. To keep them in Vietnam, it's a loss of everything, it's a complete failure as an intelligence operation.
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	Two years ago, or about that time, I said publicly that the KGB was a state within a state which would do everything to disrupt the process of democratization in my country. I was denounced as a liar, as a mental jerk or something, and I was stripped of my honors and everything, but one-and-a-half years later, Mr. Gorbachev, after his return from the Crimea, said the same -- the KGB was a state within a state -- and he confirmed what I has said previously. . . . everything that I have said so far found at a later time confirmation.
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	I am sure that [Soviet military interrogation of U.S. POWs] happened, because they did have a major interest in American know-how, in weaponry, details, instructions. This would be a natural thing to expect, but this is my assumption. I do not say that this really happened.

Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	I would reject the idea of American POWs taken to the Soviet Union. We don't have to take them to the Soviet Union. They could have been interrogated in Vietnam. The Vietnamese wanted us to interrogate them... to take any American against his will to the USSR would require a major political decision by the Politburo and Brezhnev personally... They would never risk, because of one or a handful of Americans, to be taken inside to damage the Soviet/American relations... It makes no practical sense, no political or military sense. They could have been interviewed on the spot and that made sense indeed.
Soviet Union	Kalugin 01/21/92	Sen. Reid: Why couldn't your story be a continuation of the intrigue, deceit and lies and destroying records that you were involved in for some 32 years? General Kalugin: Well, it makes no sense. I am 57 and I've lived a very interesting life. Today I want to live a different life, just an honest and simple [one]. You may believe it -- as I say, take it or leave it.

Soviet Union	Kerry 01/21/92	General Kalugin's startling account has been disputed by the Government of Vietnam, discounted by the CIA and denied outright by the KGB agent who allegedly carried out the interviews. This conflict between statement and denial is precisely the type of situation the Committee expects to run into time and time again. Our intent is to build as complete a record as we can, to take neither allegations nor denials at face value, to contact original sources whenever possible, and to locate contemporaneous documentation wherever it exists. We cannot, in this way, be sure of arriving at the truth, but we can be certain that we have left no avenue unexplored in our pursuit of the truth.
Soviet Union	Kohl 11/15/91	What happens in 41 years that we do not go back and re-inquire and ask whether or not there is some information that would be useful?.. We inquired about many, many people in the Soviet Union about whom we were concerned -- Soviet Jewry, rightfully so, Raoul Wallenberg and many others. Why were we not at the same time asking consistently about POWs and missing POWs in the Soviet Union that we did not have any information on, or inadequate information on?
Soviet Union	Mooney 01/22/92	The interest in Moscow Bound is totally surprising to me... It's an intelligence given... The Soviets do take our people... Unlike World War II and Korea, the Soviets did not need a bunch of people for labor. They were after the minds... They were not stealing them by the hundreds. They were few and rare.
Soviet Union	Shields 06/25/92	Some early releases came home from Vietnam via Moscow, but we never had any indication that prisoners were transferred to the Soviet Union and detained there.

Soviet Union	Smith 01/21/92	General Kalugin's comments have produced admissions from the CIA, the KGB, and even Vietnam, that at least one American POW was interrogated by the Soviets. For seven years, I was told just the opposite.
Soviet Union	Vessey 06/25/92	Vessey: And Colonel Nechiporenko who was Kalugin's source, said that isn't what I told Kalugin. I told him I interviewed one person in 1973... The Vietnamese say yes, that's what happened... Now, surely the Soviets gave questions to the Vietnamese. There are al sorts of information that the Soviets desperately wanted from our people, and surely they had worked out some sort of arrangement to try to get that information from our people. As far as we know, from debriefing the prisoners returned, none of them reported having been interrogated by the Soviets. There were some Cubans involved, but none were interrogated by Soviets. Senator Kassebaum: Any Chinese? Vessey: And so far as I know, none by the Chinese.

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Sen. Grassley: Mr. Andrews, I want to ask about Morse code K. DIA determined that the Dong Manh facility was a re-education center, yet the CIA analysis shows it to be one of the most security facilities that they have seen, and we have had reference to that in the CIA memo. Can you back up your assessment and indicate to us why the CIA's analysis is wrong? Mr. Andrews: Senator, as I said in my statement and in subsequent questions already, that initial analysis was their best estimate at the time. This was mad prior to the extensive interviews we have had of inmates of the facility where we got a lot more information on the security and the nature of the facility. That's our best judgment.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	The USA and possible K remain unexplained despite extensive tasking of information collection activities of the intelligence community. No correlation to a know, unaccounted for individual -- to a known, unaccounted for individual -- has been made. And unless an unexpected lead develops, there is little more that can be done other than continuing to monitor the situation.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Now that, to say the least, is pretty outrageous, based on this Senator's opinion. You teach people to communicate, you teach them how to communicate, you teach them what to communicate with, and then you do not keep the number so that you can identify them when they communicate. You are going to have a hell of a job identifying them, are you not? Mr. Andrews: Absolutely.

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Every image that I am aware of that we have taken, we've analyzed and the committee has been made aware of, and we've talked about today...
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	...of all the millions of square kilometers of territory in Southeast Asia that we've examined over the years, we really only have two unexplained sets of symbols which were clearly intended to communicate something to an observer from above. And that's the 19 or 1573 TH and the USA with the possible K.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ...let us assume that a number appears on a photograph. Let us assume that you cannot make any determination any way, shape, or form, that thing was created by a natural object. Your analysts say there is nothing that we can find anywhere in any of the imagery in any way we analyze this, that in any way that this number that we see was made by natural objects. You then see that number. What is going to be your recommendation if you cannot determine for sure that it was a man-made object? What is going to be your recommendation? What are you going to do?... Mr. Andrews: Sir, I will offer you a personal opinion. We always, when we have reason to believe that something may be an indicator, we follow up, as Mr. Erickson says or as Mr. Dussault said. The first thing you do is go collect more information. So that's exactly what we would do. Until we could resolve it, we would follow up. And that's what we've done with these others.

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	I think that it's -- it's very hard when you're trying to go back a number of years to try to put yourself in the place of an imagery analyst or an analyst in that time frame tho know why he concluded what he concluded. We've done the best we could, at the committee's request, to reexamine all this imagery and bring in multiple people to look at it. And what we looked at, we saw a possible 52 that we believed we could explain.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Mr. Andrews: If there was a number on the ground that an escaped prisoner made and we detected it, we would not dismiss it until we had done everything we could to resolve what the case was. Vice Chairman Smith: Well, you may not be able to. Mr. Andrews: Well -- and that's our problem. So we keep it unexplained. It would immediately go on my unexplained list, Senator Smith. Vice Chairman Smith: Well, it sits on the unexplained list, what happens to the poor guy down there that is making the number? Mr. Andrews: Senator, we do everything we can with the resources available to us to follow up on these various numbers.

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Viewing a poor-quality print with a magnifying glass is just not how imagery exploitation should be done...When the JSSA personnel viewed the original quality imagery of the printed photography on a light table using high resolution optics the nature of all the supposed evader symbols became clear. They were simply vegetation, shadows, or artifacts of the photography production process. Some possible symbols were even in the tops of 200 foot tall tress, an unlikely place for an evading POW to leave a signal. When shown photographs of other locations -- and I think this is very significant -- other locations in Africa and one in Utah, the JSSA personnel also saw the same kinds of symbols, symbols which again disappeared on the light table.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	No one -- not DIA, not CIA, and not the JSSA -- can correlate the USA and possible K symbols to an unaccounted-for individual.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ...in spite of all that information, in spite of the fact that they were taught to provide identifying information to imagery from above, we do not have the list of those identifier numbers to find them if they signal. Is that correct?... Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir. As far as I know right now, yes, sir.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: I think the laws of probability would indicate to you that if there are a series of numbers that identify with an individual or individuals who are missing in action in Southeast Asia and those numbers correlate with individuals, the laws of probability would tell you that it is a very high probability that those people are, in fact, identified with those numbers.

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Is it your position that these symbols are -- well, to use the term, is it your position that what you say on the imagery is valid until proven otherwise? Mr. Andrews: Yes, sir. Vice Chairman Smith: Is it your position, as well? Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.
Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	...the other point that Senator Smith made that I would like to respond to regarding circling the wagons and directed that everybody get in line... None of the players, and you have deposed them on this particular subject, none of the players were asked or directed or forced in anyway to change their minds... We simply brought them together so that we could better serve the committee. We're not circling the wagons. We want to get the information to you. We believe there's a good story to tell if we get the accurate information and not the incomplete information on the table.

Symbols	Andrews 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ...nobody said to this Committee when we showed you this [information on symbols], thank you... We will take a look at that. Maybe we missed something. That is not what we heard. What we heard was immediately circling the wagons, pulling everybody together, saying we will have one position on this. No one is to talk to the committee. We will have one position to the committee, and we are telling you now that position is that those are not symbols and those people are not missing. And I find it outrageous that is the way this issue is being treated... Andrews: Senator, if I could, first of all, we do take them very seriously. When the USA came to our attention, we had an analyst on an airplane within a couple of days to Southeast Asia to try to follow-up on actions that we could take to determine what was there. We collected additional intelligence information and continued that process.
Symbols	Chagnon 10/15/92	Ms. Chagnon: The gentleman here before us said that here was one possibility of these being written by POWs, one being that it was a ruse by resistance people. Those letters could be Lao letters. Vice Chairman Smith: What would it say in Lao? Does it say anything? Ms. Chagnon: ...it could be ba ra hoi, which means don't wait. It could be the abbreviation for those three words...I have a Lao friend staying with us...I said what would these letters stand for if you saw them anywhere, and she immediately picked out ba ra hoi...

Symbols	CHECK QUOTE	He also stated under oath, that although Committee investigators suggested he contact JSSA to become educated in the distress symbol program, he did not arrange for such a briefing until June; page 21.
Symbols	Clapper 12/01/92	The joint investigation team travelled to Sam Nuea Province on 29 November '92, located the rice field where the USA symbol was made, interviewed it's owner, and discovered that the owner's eldest son made the USA symbol by copying it from an envelope because he liked the shape of the letters.
Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	Sen. Grassley: Mr. Dussault, did you also think that you saw a name faintly scratched in the field? Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir. Sen. Grassley: Without telling us the name, did you try to match it with the names on the missing list? Mr. Dussault: About three days later, yes, sir. At first I didn't realize it was a name. Sen. Grassley: Did it match any names? Mr. Dussault: To my recollection, it did.
Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	And in this case, in my mind, it's a possibility that the individual may have tried over the last 15 years various signals. None of those got any attention, so he's going to go with a blatant USA.

Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	Chairman Kerry: And it has the walking appearance, whatever that extra -- I don't want to get into any classified area. Do you believe it's distinctly a K? Mr. Dussault: It to me looks like a K, and that's how I think we ought to consider it. And I've said that in writing, I think, and I've really done that for a reason. My position is...Give the benefit of the doubt to the operator. That's always been my concern.
Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	Sen. Grassley: Did you see, 72 TA 88? Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir. To my recollection that's what I saw. Sen. Grassley: How did you interpret that? Mr. Dussault: At first, my first interpretation of that is -- 72 was the year the guy went down. TZ was his E&E code letters. And 88 could have been the year he arrived there or the year he left. And that was my interpretation. I don't know if that's even close. That's just speculation.
Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	Sen. Grassley: When you saw 72 TA 88, did it match a person that was missing? Mr. Dussault: Sir, again, we are talking a year, two letters, TA -- and those are E&E code letters that applied during 1972. Sen. Grassley: when you found the name, though, did it match when that person went down? Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir.

Symbols	Dussault 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ...we cannot assume that is made while the person is in captivity, can we? The person could have escaped, is that not correct? Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir, that is correct. Vice Chairman Smith: And made it while he was escaping? Mr. Dussault: Yes, that's one of the possibilities. He could be an escapee hiding out in that area, made a K, went back into hiding, for a couple of weeks, stayed close by, within a kilometer, which is his training, and then goes back and does the USA. Again, maybe even at night, under a moonlit night, or something like that, he gets out there and works for three hours.
Symbols	Dussault/ Erickson 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ...we have an agency that teaches pilots escape and evasion procedures and identifying or authenticating numbers in order to locate them. Those people who taught that were not sent any imagery until at least, at the minimal, 1985; most of it was seen after this committee showed it to them in 1992. Is that correct? Mr. Dussault: Yes, sir. Mr. Erickson: Yes.
Symbols	Elder 10/15/92	Vice Chairman Smith: ...If you could remove yourself from what you heard here this morning, did you ever hear any information from anybody regarding that, any indigenous person in Laos or anybody else who was in Laos regarding the USA? Mr. Elder: I did not.

Symbols	Erickson 10/15/92	Chairman Kerry: Now, we have discussed this previously, and this is not classified. But how long would it take a person to dig out a USA of that size? Mr. Erickson: At least and hour per letter for one individual. Chairman Kerry: So, three hours of work? Mr. Erickson: At least.
Symbols	Erickson 10/15/92	Chairman Kerry: Now, with respect to the K up there, it has been referred to occasionally as a walking K. Without getting into great details about walking, does that appear to be a walking K? Mr. Erickson: To me, it does.
Symbols	Godley 09/24/92	We had one very peculiar incident. Some random aerial photography happened to take a picture of a rice paddy or some cultivated area, and we thought we saw USAF spelled out in this field, even with an arrow. We got very excited about it, and we sent an intelligence team of local American irregulars -- these were Hmong. They went there and they said there was absolutely no evidence of any American or any other prisoners in that area.
Symbols	Grassley 10/15/92	On October 2 and 5, the Committee received a full court debunking from DoD on the pilot code numbers in two closed sessions. They said that numerous sets of numbers seen in a photo and which match code numbers of know MIAs were shadows and vegetation. They made the numbers disappear, presto, just like that, by some sort of high-technology equipment.

Symbols	Gray 12/04/92	Mr. Gray: Yes, sir, exactly. The owner was brought out. We talked to him about the symbol being seen in his field several years before. At first he didn't understand what we were talking about. As the conversation went on, he laughed when they showed him the line drawing of the USA. He said I know now what you're talking about. My sons did that 3 or 4 years ago and they did that based on letters that we got from our relatives in the United States. We said we'd like to see those letters. They brought them out and written under the sender's address on these envelopes in big letters was USA. The owner of the rice field said my sons saw this. They went down, one of them wrote it in a hut. The other said I can do better than that, and he went out into the middle of the field, stacked up rice straw, and burned it in the shape of a USA. We asked if we could speak to his sons and he said absolutely. They were brought out. They were 20 and 17-years-old. They admitted that they had made the symbol. The older son that he had done it by stacking up the rice straw. He was asked if he had written anything else and he said, yes, I made a stick airplane and he drew that for us. And he said he also did a dragon's head in the same area either days before or day after he burned the USA into the rice field. We have pictures of the letters that came from the United States. It turns out most of the villages in Ban Hui Hindon have letters from the United States and all of them have on them in big letters USA. So he says -- the long man said that's where he got the idea for the USA.

Symbols	Gray 12/04/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Mr. Gray, I have no reason to doubt what the individual told you. On the other hand, I do not have any reason to believe him either. So let me just ask you a tough question. Was he [given a polygraph test]? Gray: He was not [given a polygraph test].
Symbols	Gray 12/04/92	Vice Chairman Smith: Now do you have proof that he made this? Mr. Gray: Do we have proof that he went out and burned a symbol into the field? We have his word. Vice Chairman Smith: Well see the point I am making -- I am not doubting what you say, I am really not. I am just trying to make a point here that we make these quantum leaps when it relates that is not live Americans. We draw the conclusion the man is telling the truth. He may be, I do not know. But I guess what frustrates me in trying to get to the bottom of the issue...is that when we get live-sighting reports, which are [given polygraph tests] and pass some, we do not believe them. And we do not have any evidence to contradict it in some cases. In many cases we do, but in some cases we do not, and we do not believe those reports. So I mean I guess I get concerned about -- DIA and intelligence people are supposed to be strict and tough on methodology.
Symbols	Santora 10/15/92	...when you're not looking at the original imagery and you're trying to detect something on anything else, any other form or copy of that imagery, then all bets are off on what you might see or might not see.

Symbols	Sheetz 12/04/92	I share the Senator's concern about the need to be as careful as you can given the situation that you are in, to make sure you are collecting accurate information. And I would point out that I was a bit skeptical when I first heard about this and the first thing I asked Warren when he came back was there any indication at all that these kids had been coached or that someone had sort of prepared the war for Warren's entry and had pushed these people out. Because I will admit, we have had experiences in the past in Southeast Asia in investigating cases where witnesses appear to have their story coached. But in this case we did not even know who we were looking for and it was only through happenstance that they were able to track these kids down. And basically they dug the kids out on the their own. They weren't pushed out there by a local Lao official saying ha, we found the person who made these symbols.

Symbols	Shields 06/25/92	Sen. Robb: Let me just go back to the question that I think has troubled the panel... it has to do with the whole question of compartmentalization of information during a critical period and what appeared to be the lack of sharing of information and/or critical questions being directed to those who might have been able to help in that reconciliation process. General Tighe observed during his testimony yesterday that when policy makers in the early 1970's made statements about no Americans being left behind, that the intelligence analysts tended to believe them, despite contradictions with most current intelligence, simply because they felt that the policy makers had access to compartmentalized information not available to them. Shields: Senator, to my knowledge, all of the intelligence agencies, including the NSA, were part of our process. That information was fed in... into the DIA.
Symbols	Smith 10/15/92	...it would be my position... that if information like this was provided to me, I would want to take the position that these symbols should be treated as valid until proven as otherwise. But that is not the position that has been taken here. The position that has been taken here is that these symbols are not valid.
Symbols	Smith 10/15/92	...what do we need this agency for? If we have signals and we are training people to do is, and then when we get the signals but we do not have the capability to determine whether it is a signal, it does not make any sense to me.

Symbols	Smith 10/15/92	[to Andrews] ...But basically, what you are saying here is that the analysis on 52, by your early analysis, is incorrect, or may have been incorrect. Therefore your analysis today very well may also be incorrect. And yet you are taking the emphatic position that you are correct.
Symbols	Smith 09/24/92	if we are talking about negotiating an end to a war and accounting fully for all of our prisoners of war, and we have photographs like that -- if somebody has presented you an analysis of those photographs and they say they are not true, they are not accurate, they are not Caucasian, they are something else or somebody else, fine. But your testimony is not that you got that testimony. Your testimony is that you never saw the photographs, and that very well may be the case. But the point is, it shows there is a communication breakdown somewhere, in terms of information that we had on POWs.
Symbols	Smith 10/15/92	Second, if a pilot were to attempt to communicate by ground signal, letter or whatever means, by using his authenticator number, the U.S. government will be unable to identify the individual if his number happened to be among those numbers DIA can't account for. This could be potentially tragic.
Vessey Cases	Ford 11/15/91	The way we define a discrepancy case is, a case about which the United States Government has convincing evidence that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia should have specific knowledge. The term 'discrepancy case' includes not only individuals who were last known alive, but also individuals who we are not certain of their fate, or who were known dead but for whom the Indochinese Government should be able to provide information or remains.

Vessey Cases	Trowbridge 06/24/92	...the 97 who were listed as prisoner that have not subsequently been accounted for. They have made their way into the General Vessey list as priority cases. And those are the cases that are the core of the search efforts that are ongoing right now.
Vessey Cases	Vessey 06/25/92	It was not to mean that we weren't going to investigate the other cases. We were going to investigate all the cases, but these were the priority cases because they appeared to be the cases of those people had the best chance of being alive.
Vessey Cases	Vessey 11/05/91	. . . my approach with the Vietnamese is that we are not trying to reconstruct the past or come up with war crimes trials or any such thing as that. We want to know what happened to our people. First, we want to know, are there any live Americans there? We are not going to ask the question about what you said in the past, that you said there were not any, and now there are. Fine, if there are some, let us have them and we are just going to ignore the past statements. If people have been killed under circumstances that are embarrassing, we are not going to make an issue out of that. What we want to know is where are our people, what happened to them?

Vessey Cases	Vessey 06/25/92	So in early 1989 I asked DIA and JCRC to work together to refine the list and include all cases where the evidence showed that the person involved was alive when he last knew of him and we had evidence that he likely came under Vietnamese control or was captured and for whom we had not yet had an accounting. I also asked that the border areas be searched for the same sort of cases. And as a result of that effort we added 39 people lost in Vietnam and came up with 49 so-called discrepancy cases in the border area.
Vessey Cases	Vessey 06/25/92	I wanted to be able to confront that assertion that they had held no live prisoners with the sort of glaring examples that led Americans to believe that there may well have live American prisoners held. So at that time, the Defense Intelligence Agency officials gave me a list of about 70 cases... they were the cases for those individuals for whom the Vietnamese should have been able to account readily, some of them were not cases of people we thought had been reported to have died in captivity, but the remains had not been returned and we believed that the Vietnamese government should be able to account for them. Most of them were in fact people who the U.S. believed we had the evidence to show that they were alive when we last saw them, they were captured or about to become captured.
Vessey Cases	Vessey 11/05/91	The people who are missing are my comrades, as they were comrades of many of the people on this committee.

Watergate	Kerrey 09/22/92	The question today for this committee is how could this have happened? Several witnesses who were appointed policymakers in 1973 have identified Watergate as the culprit. They believe the United States would have forced North Vietnam to abide by the terms of the peace treaty had President Nixon not been weakened and distracted by the scandal of Watergate. Perhaps this is true. It also seems likely to me their attitude towards informing the public, coupled with their obsessive desire and need for secrecy, led to information about our missing being withheld from the American people. While they were trying to keep information about Watergate secret, they were also trying to keep information about our missing in action secret. The faulty judgment which resulted in one tragedy also produced a second.
Watergate	Kerry 09/22/92	It is clear also that paramount among the pressures of that time, when the agreement was signed and implementation began, was the energy and attention- sapping saga of Watergate.
Watergate	Kissinger 09/22/92	Now on the impact of Watergate, I think it is only fair to point out that the opposition to using any kind of military force strongly antedated Watergate. If you read the media of February and March when the Administration was repeatedly saying that it preserved the right to enforce the agreement, we were constantly told that we had no right to enforce a cease-fire. And it was something we always objected to on the ground that under those conditions any time America ends a war and makes a cease-fire, it has, in effect, surrendered because it cannot enforce what it has fought for.

Watergate	Kissinger 09/22/92	...it is quite possible that President Nixon did not have the same strength to resist that pressure as he might have had without Watergate. He never said that to me. I think the position he took, which was that he wanted one more negotiation before considering military operations, was a perfectly reasonable position. I had a somewhat different view, but I had always a somewhat more professorial view and he had a somewhat more understanding of the political situation; that's why he was President.
Watergate	Rodman 09/21/92	I think knowing all the risks that we were heading into as 1973 began, none of us anticipated Watergate and how it would explode and totally wipe out Nixon's political leverage, and I think our analysis was that some of the crucial votes in the Congress that we used to defeat were lost this time and it was probably because of the demoralization of the President's supporters, so this was an unanticipated factor. But I agree with what Winston said earlier, and it's very important. We signed this agreement believing that if we did the right thing we had a good chance to maintain it, and that there was a chance that the South Vietnamese -- that the struggle within Vietnam would turn into some kind of political competition. There was a chance for this agreement to survive, and a lot depended on what we did. Chairman Kerry: Well, I accept that, and I said earlier, and I'm convinced from all the reading that I have been doing, that Watergate looms far larger in this than I had ever imagined...

Watergate	Secord 09/24/92	What I think happened was we evolved through the Watergate era on this issue, and it just dragged on and on, and it was just kind of pushed off to one side, and it became less important in people's minds. And to our discredit, I think, it kind of left the consciousness of nearly everyone. But I think those of us who knew the truth, or what we thought to be truth, were always bothered by this. I don't know what else I can say.

Live-Sighting Reports	Trowbridge 06/25/92	Sen. Brown: My understanding is that we have hundreds of statements that are sworn statements, where people have passed a polygraph test, indicating there are Americans being held as POWs... That indicates Americans are being held. Now, how do we reconcile that? Trowbridge: There is information that individuals have indicated that there are prisoners being held. Of that information, we don't have convincing information, or we have none that we have confirmed.
Live-Sighting Reports	Trowbridge 06/24/92	Right now we have, I believe, 40 unresolved reports that talk about Americans living freely in Vietnam. We do not know who they are.
Normalization	Ford 12/01/92	...I happen to believe that it's very much in U.S. interests to normalize our relationship with Vietnam. I spent two years in Vietnam. I have every reason to know that country and the horror of that war, but I think it's something we need to put behind us, both in a political sense and in an emotional sense, and I think economic and whatever. I think it makes a lot of sense to move forward.
Normalization	Griffiths 12/01/92	Once we do that, I think that the United States should move forward just as rapidly as Vietnam acts in the context of the roadmap.

Normalization	Kerry 12/04/92	...if you read what is in Phase Two, let us say you were to do the business piece that involved permitting U.S. firms to sign a contract, but they cannot execute on it, they cannot execute...you are whetting the Vietnamese appetite. But Phase Two specifically says continue the rapid repatriation. Vietnam in phase two is not alleviated of any responsibility. Vietnam specifically is required to continue the rapid repatriation of American remains readily available to Vietnam. Vice Chairman Smith: If they become available after Phase One, true.
		Chairman Kerry: So they must continue the process. We have an expectation of the continuation of remains in Phase Two. The roadmap clearly contemplated it, and it leverages it. Now, let us say a couple of companies move in. Let us say you chose to only let it be certain kinds of companies, whatever. They go in. The Vietnamese start to get excited: Hey, this is working. But you do not get more of those remains. They cannot execute on the contracts. Everybody is going to get angry: Hey, how come you are not able to move forward? Gee, we thought we would be able to make this a real business thing, but where are those remains? All of a sudden you have increased your capacity to get them. You lose no leverage. You increase the leverage. Phase Two contemplates it.

Normalization	Kerry 12/03/92	Now some of us may feel, just as policy people all over the agencies may feel, that one step or another may serve better to get some of those answers. But none of us feels that we should give up leverage. None of us feels that we should move to an actual commercial product-moving relationship. Every comment that we have suggested in terms of the roadmap suggests that those who have advocated some step are simply saying, we think we can get more information and still maintain leverage.
Normalization	Quinn 12/04/92	...I think it's important to emphasize that we do have a policy in place to deal with Vietnam, the roadmap policy. And it's premised on two underlying pillars. One, that we should speak clearly and authoritatively to the Vietnamese, and so we gave them our policy in writing and we told them that it was approved by the President, by all of the relevant secretaries. Secondly, the roadmap was premised on both parties taking steps, concomitant steps, to address the concerns of the others. That policy, plus the work of General Vessey, General Needham, all of the people from DOD who have been up here, has produced results and I outlined those in my testimony the other day in terms of offices and prisons access, live-sighting investigation, remains that have been returned.

Normalization	Quinn 11/15/91	There was also a charge, a criticism, of our overall policy, particularly the State Department's role in the POW/MIA effort, that we are acting at the behest of commercial interests, that we are rushing to normalize relations with Vietnam. I doubt that those who would charge this have heard from the American businessmen and businesswomen who see me almost every day, and who leave, for the most part, disappointed. I tell them that we will not have the domestic support system necessary for Government or a business to move ahead with Vietnam until we resolve the POW/MIA issue. I add that there is hope for the future, because our policy appears to be working; but the embargo will remain in place until the proof is in. American economic interests have high standing in our foreign policy, but in the case of Vietnam, these interests are weighed against even higher priorities. It is true we are in a rush, a rush to obtain the fullest possible accounting for the 2,271 American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. The uncertainty has gone on far too long. We are doing our best to energize the process and elicit the cooperation we need from the governments in the region. We have had some notable success in the past year, but more must be done. As we get results, we will take the commensurate steps that will help put the past behind us. The response from Vietnam is slow and begrudging. So, too, will be the pace and scope of normalization. At every opportunity, we remind Vietnam of this fundamental reality.

Normalization	Quinn 12/04/92	...the question now is how to keep it going. I believe the record demonstrates [Vietnamese cooperation] that the philosophy underlying our roadmap -- that when each side is taking steps that we're able to move ahead, but that whenever we stop taking those steps that we run the risk of bringing the whole process to a halt. I think it should be that philosophy which continues to guide us in the future.
Normalization	Quinn 12/04/92	...If I could just say, I think the explanation you gave of how these steps were supposed to work is exactly right and exactly what was in our minds when we laid them out. It was intended that as you took them to increase your leverage and too, as you draw nearer to what in our view is what the Vietnamese want from us, that that would impel them to do all the more that they could to respond to what we want from them.

Normalization	Smith 12/04/92	...I think we lose all of the leverage that we have by moving to Phase Two at this point, and let me explain very simply why. We got the information that we received from Mr. Schweitzer when we indicated to the Vietnamese that we knew that they had it. So they provided it to us. Understandable. Now, if we were to go at this point and accept the premise that they have no more remains and move on to Phase Two or accept the premise that all live-sighting reports are resolved and move to Phase Two, not only is there not an incentive for them to provide them to us; there is a disincentive, because if we move into Phase Two and there is a cache of remains somewhere or a group of Americans somewhere still alive, to bring that information forth would immediately stop the process of the roadmap.
Offers	McCain 09/24/92	Sen. McCain: Let me ask, at any time, did you receive or know whether the Vice President or the President of the United States received information of an offer of Americans for money? Murphy: I doubt very much that could have happened. It's something that he would probably have discussed with me if he had gotten it separate from me. He never did. I can only assume that it never happened.

Offers	Perroots 12/01/92	Perroots: ...let me tell you, they turned into being inquisitions. And when I found that out I took steps to alter it. But I was probably to blame. This was part of the whole atmosphere that we generated to make sure that we were responding to virtually every critic, to make sure that nobody could make the suggestion that we were hiding anything. We trailed that film. It was in Billy Hendon's office that he said he had the names of the people on that film that refused -- it is a two-way street. You have got to have cooperation with the agency responsible for the identification of those people. And there were other inconsistencies in the way the Congressman operated that resulted in our terminating that kind of activity. Sen. McCain: It is worthy of note, Mr. Chairman, and I was going to wait until the hearing tomorrow, that former Congressman Hendon has also refused to cooperate with a committee request concerning our investigation of fraud and fundraising, and I think that is interesting, particularly coming from people who are demanding full disclosure of all other information...

Offers	Schlatter 12/01/92	Schlatter: ...the episodes that we underwent was that we would be called to come to this member's office, and in support of his legislation he would have some of his colleagues there. And he would say all right, I want you to read this report. Well, we would take the report out and we would read the report. Well, stop right there. Read that again. So we would read this one sentence again. Now, Colonel or mister or whomever he was talking to, what do you make of that report? Well, we would lay out our investigation and our analytic findings. We would then be subjected to considerable degree of criticism for our investigations or our findings. The end result was that we chased ourselves round in circles. The same reports were reviewed time and time again, the same questions asked and the same answers given. At one point, the member ordered an analyst to go stand in the corner after... Sen. McCain: He told an analyst to go stand in the corner? Schlatter: Yes, sir...

Offers	Vessey 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: You have had the opportunity to raise this issue in the most personal way on behalf of the President of the United States? Vessey: I have. Chairman Kerry: Have you, in the course of those meetings, confronted the Vietnamese repeatedly with the question of live Americans in their country? Vessey: I have. Chairman Kerry: And what have they responded to you each time? Vessey: We hold no live Americans.
		Chairman Kerry: Has money been offered to them, deals been offered to them? Vessey: No. I have not offered money, but I've made it clear that it is the fundamental basis on which we can move forward in any fashion.
Offers	Vessey 12/04/92	Sen. McCain: Do you believe that would be a good idea to say to the Vietnamese that we will give you a couple of billion dollars if you will give us any live Americans? Vessey: I think it's a bad idea. Sen. McCain: Why do you think that would be a bad idea? Vessey: Well, there are -- there are rules of international warfare. There's the Geneva Accords. And I believe that we should promote civilized behavior among nations and that we all ought to respect the dead, the captured in warfare according to those rules, and that we should expect nations to abide by those rules.

Oral Histories	Bell 12/04/92	Chairman Kerry: ...I want to ask you, in your judgment, on the oral histories, do you think that is sort of a gold mine, so to speak, and something we ought to pursue significantly? Mr. Bell: I think the oral-history program is not only important from the standpoint of the interviews with the individuals for verbal testimony, I think it's also important in that they can identify areas where records are stored or areas where records were stored at one time. And also, a lot of the personnel -- in fact, most of the personnel who participated in the war kept personal diaries, and they retained those as much as possible and they still have those around today.
Oral Histories	DeStatte 12/04/92	I agree that what we have referred to as the oral history program is very important. As a matter of fact, this is something I've been discussing with my counterpart and the people at the museum. Having a record that documents the fate of the missing person is really only one step in the accounting process. The final step should be, wherever possible, to return the prisoner's remains. And to do that, in many cases, it's going to require the help of witnesses, eyewitnesses.
Oral Histories	Schweitzer 12/04/92	220 million Americans and 70 million Vietnamese couldn't do this. And yet Colonel Dai and I got together and these things just started coming out. And it was just so natural and so easy for us. There was nothing to it. But, when you look at it is seems mysterious, and I don't think it is. I just think it was the time and it just happened, and it's going to continue happening. It's just the beginning, and I think all the rest is coming.

Peace Talks	Daschle 09/21/92	Mr. Aldrich, on the 24th of January of 1973 Dr. Kissinger stated at his press conference that there were no secret understandings in the sense of secret commitments. He said that there were statements by each side of its intentions or interpretations of the agreement on which the other side might or might not choose to rely...That is very important public pronouncement, probably equal in consequence, in many respects, to the pronouncement of the President a couple of months later....Dr. Kissinger announced on the 24th that there were no secret agreements, and that was left unchallenged. No one came forth on his staff, in the administration, by the President, to clarify a fundamental mistruth.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Godley 09/24/92	The Symington Amendment was the final blow. That amendment, as I recall it, limited the dollar value of our military expenses in Laos to $300 million a year. This was to cover ammunition, aircraft sorties, bombs, food, and to pay indigenous personnel. I don't believe that in the history of warfare there has ever been a military commander operating under such budgetary restrictions. We were beaten, not by the men in the field, but by public opinion at home, and were negotiating from a position of abject weakness...
Peace Talks - Implementation	Godley 09/24/92	Any efforts to obtain a full accounting of POW/MIAs were doomed to failure unless the North Vietnamese could see some advantage in acceding to our request.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Grassley 09/22/92	[quoting General Walter's Testimony] "Something like half the prisoners that were known to have been captured alive never came back to France after they reached a deal with the North Vietnamese."

Peace Talks	Haig 09/21/92	...the bombing halted and the negotiations began at a time when Hanoi could see clearly that the Congress, the American people and the American psyche no longer had the stomach to do what it had to do.
Peace Talks	Haig 09/21/92	What I'm saying is be sure you know the constraints that existed, because it's my personal judgment, maybe wrong, maybe naive, that Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon never made a decision that they didn't think (with some probably minor exception) was not dedicated to the proposition that we want to get our prisoners out, all of them, as quickly as possible. And I believe that. So that's my contribution to your deliberation.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kerry 09/24/92	I enlisted in 1965, was commissioned in 1966, went over in 1968 twice, came back in 1969, and volunteered, volunteered to go over, volunteered to go down to the southern part where we were fighting in the Navy, and went over to win. But I came back in 1969 convinced that what was going to happen in 1975 was going to happen. And the notion of trying to fight a war with these crazy restrictions that we were trying to fight it with just convinced me that you cannot fight a war that way.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kerry 09/22/92	There is nothing in the record that suggests you asked the Congress of the United States for the right to bomb because they were holding prisoners that they would not give back. Nothing.
Peace Talks	Kerry 09/21/92	I do not want this to be confrontational. It is not meant to be; no member wants it to be. But 20 years later, folks, you know as well as I do that we are here because, for better or worse, the intentions we sought in 1973 have yet to be fulfilled. We do not have a full accounting.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Kerry 09/21/92	...The debate is about what happened in this country in our attempts to get our prisoners back and were families dealt with honestly, were the American people dealt with honestly...We are not here..to rehash the war, to renegotiate the agreement. We want to know what decisions were available to us and how we might have made choices to get them back. Now, you said we did not get a full accounting. All we are trying to do is understand why we were not able to get that full accounting. Was there anything disingenuous in that process of not getting it? Were we lied to? Were families not told the truth? Was it inadvertent, was it simply impossible as a consequence of the circumstances you have described? Now, I have taken up more than my time here, but I would ask you what it was that prevented us, once we knew that did not have a full accounting, from going to the American people and raising their consciousness around that reality? Would people not have coalesced around the notion that they were not getting back Americans who were supposed to come home?
Peace Talks	Kerry 09/22/92	A lot has been said and written about the man the committee will hear from today, but the one thing that has never been said about him is that he was out of the loop.

Peace Talks	Kerry 09/22/92	The pressures on our negotiators during those critical years were real and unavoidable. We had a President elected in 1968 who took office in 1969 on a pledge to end U.S. participation in the war. We had a public hungry for that moment, anxious for the goal to be achieved. And we had a complex set of political and military objectives throughout Indochina that were at risk. We had a very determined and skillful adversary, and we had tantalizing but imperfect information about the number and status of prisoners in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kerry 09/22/92	[citing Kissinger's memoirs] But what is very clear, we were willing to move heaven and earth to support President Thieu, we were willing to move heaven and earth to enforce the bombing on the violations for infiltration, but we never talked about moving heaven and earth to have that full accounting and never did the American people learn, never did this come to the Congress. And I think it would have been one of the great levers that you had, but it was not there.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger	It did not matter whether we could have added one or another clause to the agreement. The provisions with respect to the missing in action were perfectly plain. They just didn't carry them out.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Most commentators -- I would say all commentators, Congressional or media -- opposed any effort to stand up to Hanoi, arguing that the United States had no right to retaliate at all against the North's blatant violations. ...By the middle of April, Hanoi's violations were overwhelming.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Unfortunately, it was also no secret that these efforts to pin Hanoi down amounted to firing empty cannons. In theory we had three sources of leverage available: bombing the North, offering economic aid to Hanoi and giving military and economic aid to Saigon to deprive Hanoi of the hope of military victory. The Congress took all three levers away, denying us both the carrot and the stick. When the Congress eliminated our leverage, we were trapped in the classic nightmare of every statesman. We had nothing to back up our tough words, but more tough words.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	...Hanoi sensed our leverage was rapidly eroding. A host of congressional resolutions made it clear that we would have no support for military action.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	It is totally inappropriate for those who prevented any sort of military action to blame those of us who wanted to enforce the agreement because they can find this or that document that gave one or other reason.

Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	Monday-morning quarterbacks can argue that the Paris Peace Accords were not perfect. I agree. To me, the ideal outcome would have been an American victory. But, Mr. Chairman, we had to deal with the war in the specific circumstances we faced. Even with the perspective of 20 years, I am convinced that in those circumstances, no better agreement was obtainable. For example, just as I was leaving for the final negotiations in January 1973, the House and Senate Democratic caucuses each passed, by very large margins, resolutions calling for legislation to cut off all funds for the war. ...since Congress removed both incentives and penalties for Hanoi's compliance, how exactly would any achievable amendment have changed Hanoi's behavior?
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	The problem with the Paris Accords was not with the words, but with their implementation by North Vietnam. ...the U.S. Congress even more vigorously, and successfully, undercut our ability to enforce those accords.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	We have had many disagreements on policy, and honorable people will differ about this. But on the fate of our prisoners, Mr. Chairman, there can be no division. We had all an equal concern.

Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	There were also numerous Congressional resolutions. Most were Congress resolutions which were not binding. But whether they passed or not, they were all known to the Vietnamese and weakened our negotiating position. 35 of these resolutions were introduced in 1972 alone. ...During this period many political leaders, including Senator McGovern and 30 other U.S. Senators, were calling for unconditional, unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam without any formal North Vietnamese commitment or the concurrent or even subsequent return of our MIAs and POWs, or accounting for the missing in action. . . . At the same time, members of the American peace movement were spreading the word that they had been told by the North Vietnamese that setting a deadline for our withdrawal would create favorable conditions for the subsequent release of American prisoners of war.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	Privately, you see, the problem was they were counting a great deal on our domestic opposition, so they were going extremely slowly in the negotiations.
Peace Talks · Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Oh, it's a fair question, Mr. Chairman, and the answer to it is that this body prevented the enforcement of the agreement. When we spoke of iron-clad guarantees we never thought we were dealing with a bunch of Lord Fauntleroys whom we could hand a document to. We thought we had the right to enforce the agreement, which was then taken away from us.

Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	From the day we entered office, we had no more consistent goal than the release of the brave Americans held prisoner throughout Indochina and a full accounting of their missing colleagues. The negotiating record makes clear that this matter was insistently raised with the North Vietnamese. There was no issue on which American officials, from the President on down, were more adamant. Yet here we are 20 years later being pilloried in leaks without a shred of evidence, with the unforgivable libel that we knowingly abandoned the very group whose suffering was the biggest single incentive for our exertions.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	The problem with the Paris accords was not with the words, but with their implementation by Vietnam. From the very start, Hanoi began violating the accords. The record shows clearly that while the executive branch tried strenuously to bring pressure on Hanoi, in particular those relating to POWs and MIAs, the U.S. Congress even more vigorously, and successfully, undercut our ability to enforce those accords.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	If the Vietnamese violated these provisions it was not because of any omission by the responsible U.S. officials but because we had been stripped of the weapons we might have used to enforce that commitment.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	We had, in meetings with many groups, said forever that if we got the terms we asked for we would end the war. That we were not pursuing the war and that we were not making these proposals as gimmicks; we meant it.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Despite all these obstacles, strenuous negotiations resulted in a joint communique on June 13th, reaffirming and strengthening all the POW provisions, ...We made no secret of our outrage with Hanoi's violation.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	I therefore cannot accept, Senator Kerry, that information was knowingly kept from the American public. Nobody had a monopoly of anguish in that period. Nobody had any conceivable interest in deceiving the American people.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	In response to my presentations, Le Duc Tho disdainfully read me editorials from the American press and speeches from the Congressional Record.
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	[quoting from his 1973 statement] "...as for us at home it should be clear by now that no one in this war has had a monopoly of anguish and that no one in these debates has had a monopoly of moral insight. And now that at last we have achieved an agreement in which the United States did not prescribe the political future to its allies, an agreement which would preserve the dignity and self-respect of all parties, together with healing the wounds in Indochina we can begin to heal the wounds in America."
Peace Talks	Kissinger 09/22/92	If Saigon collapsed, the residual American force would become hostage. The number of our prisoners would increase exponentially. In the end, we achieved the terms we set out to obtain, and which our critics had repeatedly told us were unattainable. In the process, we dramatically improved the conditions for the return of American forces. We demanded and obtained release of all prisoners.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Only when our leverage was in the process of being dismantled, while the Saigon Government was disintegrating, in the absence of a cease-fire, would we be permitted to talk about our prisoners under conditions of unspeakable chaos.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	Nobody ever questioned that the accounting for the missing was unsatisfactory. We raised it at least 60 times during 1973. The only difference is that we did not know of confirmed prisoners. And had we known it, we would have taken the most drastic steps. As I will say in my statement, but it is better clearly understood now, I advocated the resumption of military operations to enforce the agreement starting in the middle of March, 1973.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Kissinger 09/22/92	...we never accepted that They're all dead, and continued to express our dissatisfaction with Hanoi's failure to account for the MIAs.
Peace Talks	Laird 09/21/92	I knew about the secret negotiations probably as soon as Ambassador Harriman went over there. I was a member of the -- we had, at that time, a smaller committee in the House of Representatives that handled highly classified operations. As a member of the Defense Appropriations Committee, I was informed of those negotiations as they went forward in Paris. And I was kept informed regularly, of course, as Secretary of Defense.

Peace Talks	Lord 09/21/92	I believe the final agreement was the best possible one at the time, given the mood in America and the pressures on the U.S. side. It was a far better deal than almost anyone on the American scene thought possible, and that almost all of Congress and the media and certainly the demonstrators were calling for. It is unfair, retrospectively, to forget the atmosphere of the times in evaluating the agreement today. It is unfair to examine our maximum positions during the course of the negotiations and complain that they were not all realized in the end. By definition, any agreement had to be a compromise and reflect the realities of both the battlefield and American domestic support.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Moorer 09/24/92	The country was in a state of near anarchy,...
Peace Talks - Implementation	Moorer 09/24/92	...I don't think that any nation has ever fought a war with 500,00 troops and let the capital of the opposing nation have a sanctuary.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Richardson 09/24/92	The question is one of what the public will support, what Congress would support in the circumstances, what the international political costs are of a new use of force. And, indeed, I don't know exactly when the vote taken by Congress was, but it was not long after that Congress specifically prohibited the use of force for this or any other purpose having to do with Vietnam.

Peace Talks	Schlesinger 09/21/92	...but one must assume that we had concluded that the bargaining position of the United States in dealing with Vietnam, North Vietnam, was quite weak, we were anxious to get our troops out, and that we were not going to roil the waters if that could be avoided. That would be my judgement.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Secord 09/24/92	Sen. Brown: But faced with the cutoff of funds, what would you have recommended? What should we have done? What should the Administration have done faced with the cutoff of funds for military alternatives? Secord: If the Congress totally tied our hands with respect to ability to wage another offense, another bombing campaign, then what I alluded to earlier seems to be the only option. That would be to mount an intensive intelligence operation using all of our intelligence community and really putting some dollars behind it.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Richardson 09/24/92	those of us here in Washington and in the Government -- when you and your fellow prisoners of war returned, it was a tremendously, to me, moving and exciting moment. I had the opportunity then to talk with many of you, and it was an indelible experience. And I think that this feeling, very broadly shared, may have had something to do with the whole feeling that peace had been achieved, the prisoners were home, it was over. It had been truly a nightmare. All I can say is that it would have been a very tough call, when the North Vietnamese in effect abrogated the whole agreement by re-invading or invading South Vietnam. Then surely had the political -- had it been politically feasible, bombing and, I think, other military responses should have been initiated.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Robson 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: After that initial 60-day period beginning with 29 January to the end of March, what happened in terms of your effort to gain accounting for those people? Can you describe that for us? Mr. Robson: Yes, sir. We had that series of folders, as I said, approximately 80. I don't remember the exact number. But we also developed some more information. I say we, the services, JCRC, and the intelligence agencies developed more information which was fed to JCRC in Thailand, which in turn was passed back to us, and we ended up with a total of 104 folders with information on people that the enemy should be able to tell us about with any great amount of difficulty. And I personally passed that list and stuff to them, I believe, on the 17th of April. Chairman Kerry: What kind of response did you get? Mr. Robson: Nothing.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Robson 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: ...When we deposed Colonel Bernie Russell, who is -- Vice Chairman Smith: The U.S. head of the Four-Party Joint Military Team, he said otherwise. He stated that in early May the Vietnamese were linking U.S. aid commitments to cooperation with the MIAs. And when the vote came, or when the word was passed down to the Vietnamese, or passed to the Vietnamese that there was no aid forthcoming, or at least not in the immediate future, that they stopped cooperating. Colonel Robson: There is no contradiction there, sir. That's exactly what happened. Vice Chairman Smith: What? Colonel Robson: When they got the word that the aid was cut off, they just -- Vice Chairman Smith: Bailed out. Colonel Robson: Just started bailing out. I mean, they'd sit and talk to you.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Robson 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: When you say nothing, they just -- Mr. Robson: They took it and they said we will study it. The same thing they told Dr. Kissinger in Hanoi. Chairman Kerry: So in effect, the process that was put in place to get the accounting was truly not working almost from the beginning.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Shields 09/24/92	Chairman Kerry: But you did choose 14 that you did know were prisoner. Dr. Shields: No, we did not -- Senator, we did not know they were prisoner. We knew that they could have been prisoners. We never had any intelligence that they actually entered the prison. Chairman Kerry: That's not what you said on that day. Dr. Shields: I don't know the press conference transcript. Chairman Kerry: I will show you. "These 14 individuals were at one time identified by the DRV as having been captured, but were not listed on the so-called complete list provided on 22 December." We carried them as POW. We believed they were POW. We held a press conference saying they are POW.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Shields 06/25/92	Shields: I believe we failed to get as complete an accounting as we could have gotten at that time, yes, I do. There is no question about it. In mind, had Article 8B been implemented, we would have had the accounting that we desired. Chairman Kerry: And your interpretation of why it was not implemented is? Shields: We never had access to the areas where we needed to go. We needed to go into the areas where our men were lost. We needed to begin with the incident of loss and track down what happened to them from that point... in the area of Laos, we did not have access. We were not allowed to go. The government was hostile. The same was true of North Vietnam.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Shields 06/25/92	The record of our efforts to implement Article 8(b) have been well documented. Without cooperation from the other side, the JCRC sent teams into the field to investigate crash and suspected grave sites. An extensive and sophisticated underwater search effort was made off the cost of South Vietnam at suspected crash site locations. The last U.S. military man to die from hostile fire in Vietnam in a U.S. initiated action was killed in December, 1973. He was a member of a JCRC field team, and with the ambush of that team and his death, our field efforts ceased.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Shields 06/25/92	Shields: Now, the families had all of the information which we had available. The family of Richard Van Dyke, now living I think in Salt Lake City, knew about his case. They knew about what the men in the prison camp had to say about him. They knew about Commander Ford. So this information was passed onto families. It was not information that anyone tried to hide. Chairman Kerry: But the point is, obviously, that here we are 20 years later with a list called, discrepancy cases. And General John Vessey who will testify later, who is an extraordinary public servant, who has devoted his time going over there, has a list of people that 20 years later we are saying to the Vietnamese, hey, wait a minute, we thought these folks were alive. Now, if 20 years later we are doing that, it just occurs to me that 20 years ago the presumption, the information, the probability, the expectation,... were a hell of a lot higher, and the moment was riper. Shields: Certainly, Senator. We had at the time of the Paris Peace Accords an Article 8B which, as Mr. Sieverts has pointed out, contained all of the authorities we needed for an accounting. Chairman Kerry: So there was a real failure to pull off the Accord itself and get the accounting? Shields: Absolutely.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Shields 06/25/92	Even though we were not having the cooperation that we needed, we made overtures to the Vietnamese time and time again. A Presidential commission went to Hanoi and to Vientiane, Laos, in 1977 appointed by the President, manned by distinguished Americans, specifically for this purpose of accounting for the missing. We had a complete set of hearings, and numerous hearings within the Congress on this issue, and the Department of Defense spoke out and maintained contact with families, and let the families know exactly where this issue was. So if there was not a hue and cry in the country, it was not for want of effort on our part.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Shields 06/25/92	We pinned our hopes on article 8(b). We negotiated. We staffed the FPJMT in the field. We had the JCRC in the field... We did not have access to Laos. We did not have access to North Vietnam. We did not have access to most of the areas in South Vietnam where we thought we could go. The man who was killed, Captain Reese, was killed in an area which we felt was under friendly control. As it turned out, of course, it was not. So we could not go into the field, we were limited to negotiations, a part of a treaty which was never observed, and never implemented. We faced extraordinary difficulties in those days.
Peace Talks - Implementation	Sieverts 06/25/92	...our overriding objective during this entire period was to assure that all our prisoners were returned, and to assure that we were pursuing all available means to secure the fullest possible accounting for our men.
Peace Talks	Sieverts 06/25/92	...the January, 1973 Paris Agreement was the first agreement ending an armed conflict that contained such extensive provisions for accounting for the missing and dead.

Peace Talks - Implementation	Smith 09/22/92	...we did have iron-clad agreements with the Vietnamese but what happened is they did not comply with those iron-clad agreements.
Peace Talks	Smith	I think it is important to understand the politics of the times, people in the streets protesting the war, 300 men dying every week. And those were the times that you entered onto the political scene with the President, and there was a great amount of political pressure to end the war, trying to end the war in an honorable way. And you proceeded into negotiations to try to do that, since there did not seem to be the political will to win it militarily. So these were difficult times, and you insisted on many matters concerning POWs and MIAs in those negotiations. The issue, as far as I am concerned, is did the Vietnamese and the Lao respond to what you insisted on?
Peace Talks - Implementation	Vessey 06/25/92	Chairman Kerry: Do you share a feeling that climate of 1973 may have contributed to... and attitudinal approach that accepted a sort of willingness to, perhaps, ask some tough questions and deal with some realities? Vessey: ... there were many people interested in this issue at the time. There were unanswered questions at the time. At the same time, the country seemed to be desperate to get out of Vietnam and be separated from that issue. And I think that people made the decisions that they thought were the best decisions at the time, based on the information that they had.

Peace Talks	Walters 09/21/92	I think it was Ambassador Lord who said, you know, we cannot second guess every aspect of it...I am here to talk about POW/MIA, and what we knew about that and how that issue figured into these negotiations, and perhaps some larger issues about the negotiations and how they may have impacted our ability to get the full accounting that we sought.
Perot	Childress 08/12/92	It is my opinion...that Mr. Perot's trip was counterproductive to U.S. efforts.
Perot	Kerry 08/11/92	We may leave some questions out there because we are not capable, as humans, of resolving all of this 20 years later. But the record will be more complete. And the evidence will be greater and I think the effort more significant -- thanks, in part, to your participation and contribution.
Perot	Perot 08/11/92	Mr. Perot: ...The POW project had to be a completely private project, otherwise it would have had no credibility with the Vietnamese, and these were the people we were trying to impact. Chairman Kerry: But that was your suggestion that it be kept private? Mr. Perot: ...No, I think that was actually Dr. Kissinger and/or Colonel Haig said this has to be done privately....
Perot	Perroots 08/12/92	Mr. Perot's activities during my tenure had no adverse affect on my mission. I considered his efforts to be a reflection of his patriotism and sincere concern over the issue and that still applies. He made no mention of any enumeration nor any offer by the Government for any payback.

Perot	Perroots 08/12/92	Soliciting Mr. Perot's support as a member of my advisory board and authorizing him access was my idea.
Perot	Perroots 08/12/92	The White House had acknowledged Mr. Perot's efforts in support of the POW/MIA issue and commended him for his efforts. In view of his past activities, I made a decision to provide him access and to keep him personally involved for our mutual benefit.

Photos	Gray 12/04/92	Mr. Gray: We talked to the sources who sent these photos out. The individual that sent them out said he was never told that these were American prisoners. He was told simply by the source of the photo to find out who these Americans are. But en route to the American embassy in Bangkok the story became that these are American prisoners. Sen. McCain: You do not know who put the names on them. Mr. Gray: Well, we asked the source who said -- the ceramic merchant in Khompong Chang, Cambodia, why did they -- the photos that came forward as those of American prisoners. He said, well, if the Vietnamese who gave him the photos were looking into these photos, then they had to be American prisoners, but he was never told they were prisoners. Now, the names were not associated when he sent those photos forward. None of the names were associated. The only names associated with the photos were actually the ones written on the photos, Chester Wimmer and others, names which were not of Americans who were missing. So not until later in the year of 1990 were names associated with the photo. We determined that the names Robertson and Stevens actually came from a handbill that had been out in Southeast Asia since 1987. And it said across the top $1 million dollar reward being offered for American prisoners and the two photos across the bottom were Robertson and Stevens.

Photos	Kerry 12/04/92	[to Chambers] I think an interesting example of that was your own explanation of what happened on the Lundy-Robertson-Stevens photo where it went from one person as a photo of Americans and by the time it got out of the car it was a photo of prisoners, and by the time it got somewhere else it had names of people, and by the time it got to America it was on the front page of Newsweek with three people, startling new evidence, and so forth.
Photos	Sheetz 12/04/92	The photographic experts who used the computer-enhanced techniques at the U.S. National Labs to determine if the alleged Robertson-Stevens-Lundy photograph was accurate, they noted that the handwritten sign that the Senator is referencing was not on the original photograph, that was a paste-on, and then the photograph was re-shot. There was no question about that.
Priority	Apodaca 11/06/91	Earlier this year, I was actively involved in a highest national priority, Operation Desert Storm... I don't know if this is a good comparison, but if the POW/MIA issue has the highest national priority, why are hundreds of remains still in Vietnam today? Why are agencies allowed to not follow through on reports? Why can't we find the fingerprint records for almost 25 percent of those still missing? I would not be so upset if the Government had called this a high national priority, but they didn't. For years it has been the highest national priority, and for years I've wondered.
Priority	Childress 12/01/92	...in January of '82 ...In the intelligence area, manpower and priorities were at an all-time low and I believe the POW branch had only nine personnel assigned.

Priority	Childress 12/01/92	Let me put it in a perspective. When we talked at the national level about a matter of highest national priority, we were referring to not just resources that the director of DIA or someone in the Pentagon could put to the problem based upon the priorities we were giving them in the national documents. There's a difference between implementation of the priority which allows them to move forward or tells them how are you doing, moving forward, and saying that, well, we didn't have enough people.
Priority	Gaines 12/01/92	Sen. Daschle: ...give me your sense of which of these criteria...had the most to do with our failures over the last 10 or 15 years? Colonel Gaines? Colonel Gaines: I would like to offer that lack of priority as the one.

Priority	Kerry 12/01/92	It is hard for me to believe. I mean, if you have got 70 people responding to this committee's requests. We have got a staff of 15 or 20 people working on it. We have got 58 people in Vietnam. This is 1992. Here you are with files that, by your own admission, were not organized. Are you saying to me you could not find people to organize the files? You could not put people to the task of collecting the lists? You could not bring all the documents into one house? I have to tell you, as I sit here, it just strikes me that this is one of those Government euphemisms that -- and I do not blame you guys. I do not think any of you made this policy...you were not the policymakers, you were carrying it out. But I think a lot of you folks were left dangling in the dark. Some people paid lip service to the notion this was the highest priority, but in fact, as you just said, it was not resourced, and that is the way you get things done, is resources. It does not do you any good to have a policy up here, and then you do not have the resources...
Priority	Kerry 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: In all of your reviews, did you find that this was indeed treated as and resourced as a nation's highest priority? Mr. Wiand: No, Senator, I did not. Colonel Hargis: ...no, I do not... Mr. Nagy: No... Admiral Brooks: Most assuredly not... Colonel Gaines: No...

Priority	Kerry 06/25/92	I want to, obviously, point out that the committee feels very strongly that the effort of the last year, two years, has increasingly been augmented, that the Bush Administration and the Department of Defense and Secretary Cheney have put money and personnel where they have put their stated priorities. And today we can boast greater attention to this issue and greater effort to put it to rest than at any time, I think, in the history of this issue. So it is not something that, I think, we are achieving and we are doing it on a good schedule.
Priority	Nagy 11/06/91	...The kind of assets that we have now applied against the problem would have been best applied then [20 years ago]. I can't recover from that, and I can't apologize enough to the families personally.
Priority	Perot 08/11/92	Chairman Kerry: Mr. Perot, does all this not really stem from the fact that in reality, despite all the rhetoric about highest national priority, this issue has been bouncing around with no real general -- you know what I am saying, no person really having seized the cudgel and managing it. Is that not accurate? Perot: Yes sir, it's like a ship without a rudder. Every now and then a group will get interested and then let several years go by and then, another group will get interested, but there's no consistent logical program to resolve it.
Priority	Perroots 12/01/92	There was no question within the agency that the POW/MIA issue was the top priority. We gave it not only top budgetary priority, but top disclosure in terms of exposure.

Priority	Williams 12/01/92	Chairman Kerry: And the fact is I just have a sense that there was a kind of disregard, is a polite way to put it, for the real relevance of this, for what some of that evidence might really have meant. And it was kind of a convenient political highest priority but not really the highest priority. The highest priority was figuring out what the Russians were doing with missiles; the highest priority was responding to Grenada, Panama, a lot of other priorities. But this just was not there. That is my sense. Much more there today in 1992 than it ever has been at any proceeding time in history since 1973.
		General Williams: I think that is a fair statement. I wold also say, though, that it was not until probably 1982 that the Reagan administration had a chance to reverse the long decline in intelligence manpower. The agency, DIA, had gone from -- had about a 35 or a 40 percent reduction, and you do not just reverse that in the program and budget cycle immediately. But you are absolutely right.
		Chairman Kerry: And also, with the demise of our position in Southeast Asia we lost our on-the-ground assets. We were basically shut out for the 4 years after Saigon fell in 1975. There are clear things that ad into this that we need to take into account. And I acknowledge all of those.
		General Williams: And you are correct about your impression.

Private Groups	Duker 12/02/92	Well more times than not it can't be verified, so we have to pass it on as that. This is an article that came through to us and we could not verify it with Government agencies as to whether it was authentic or not. That's how we pass it on. We don't -- we won't say it's authentic if we cannot prove that it is authentic.
Private Groups	Duker 12/02/92	So it puts us in a position of what is the truth and what isn't. Where else do we have to go to get information but the Government. I mean that's where the answers are, it lies within your committee, it lies within the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency. That is the sources that we have. That's where we have to go to try to verify the information that we get, the rumors, the speculation, and so forth.
Private Groups	Duker 12/02/92	...there are just absolutely thousands of pieces of information out there that cannot be verified, and so it does make our position difficult in terms of our membership because at times I think they may think we are not pursuing it as actively as we should, but we are. But again, we will not pass on information that we can't verify.

Private Groups	Eddy 12/02/92	...the Prisoner of War Committee of Michigan operates as a nonprofit, nonpartisan POW/MIA public awareness organization. The committee's primary source of income comes from the sale of public awareness merchandise. For example, bracelets, pins, t-shirts, and flags, mostly through mail order. The most expensive item we have available for sale are a lined Windbreaker jacket and a 3 by 5 POW/MIA flag, each priced at $30. The least expensive is a small bumper sticker priced at 25 cents apiece... In addition to the sale of public awareness merchandise, the committee occasionally receives donations from veterans' organizations, concerned citizens, and others who support the work and the objectives of the group.
Private Groups	Ford 11/15/91	...the people that really get hurt by this are the families who have these people coming around preying on their uncertainties and their concerns about their loved ones, and it ought to stop. That's one reason we think that this committee is one of the best ideas going, because hopefully we will get to the bottom of this.
Private Groups	Ford 11/15/91	If I have ever seen a cover-up, this is it. The fact is that what is being covered up, for whatever reason, is that Jack Bailey went to Southeast Asia with our assistance, with our hopes, with our prayers, and came up empty.
Private Groups	Gadoury 10/15/92	...in addition to our own governments efforts to search for information about potential American POWs and unaccounted for Americans, there were a number of private American individuals and organizations who were engaged in similar activities, some more extensively and in a more organized fashion than others.

Private Groups	Gadoury 10/15/92	While we work for a full accounting of our missing and unaccounted for, we should also demand a full accounting from those who have engaged in fabricating information to further their personal or organizational financial goals, and at the same time falsely raising hopes of the American people, especially the families of our missing and unaccounted for.
Private Groups	Quinn 12/01/92	...I think the need for some sort of better mechanism to reach out to other organizations, be they veteran's organizations, other POW/MIA, other family organizations, who have often expressed to me and raised the question about why they are so far on the outside when others are on the inside.
Private Groups	Sampley 11/07/91	The pattern has continued. Rather than focus all available resources on resolving the problem of our missing Vietnam veterans, much of the effort has been directed toward destroying the credibility and/or reputation of the critics.

Private Groups	Sheridan 12/02/92	The scholarship program that was established in 1970 has become one of the most important activities of the organization. It provides scholarship assistance to the dependents of those uniformed servicemen listed as missing in action or killed in action who were associated with the war in Southeast Asia, as well as those uniformed servicemen missing or killed in action associated with armed conflict through Operation Desert Storm. Since 1971, when the first three $1,000 grants were given, 613 scholarships totalling over $760,000 have been awarded. This year, 26 students alone were awarded scholarships totalling $100,000... The Red River Valley Fighter Pilots Association has tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. We are eligible for contributions from the Combined Federal Campaign under the umbrella of the Independent Charities of America. Other funds are derived through annual membership dues, contributions from the private sector, local chapter fundraising activities, and the generosity of the American public. We have never used the services of a professional fundraiser.

Private Groups	Steadman 12/02/92	I provided this committee with a chronological summary of our public efforts at influencing the Government on this issue, but I'd like to just highlight a few of our major efforts. First, VFW has consistently urged accelerating government-to-government contact with Southeast Asian countries in pursuit of the fullest possible accounting. Second, we have consistently held that it was a legitimate function of our Government and its duty to the families to provide this accounting. Third, the VFW has consistently maintained that maximum economic and diplomatic pressure should be exerted on the Southeast Asian governments to obtain their full cooperation in resolving the fate of our missing men. Since 1987 the VFW consistently supported public release of more information about our POW/MIAs and since then we have consistently called on the Government to increase its efforts to recover our missing men from the Korean War as well. Finally, with the revelations of Senator Helms and Senator Grassley over a year ago and Colonel Peck's allegations, we have supported a public investigation of the Government's handling of this issue... Concerning finances, we do not solicit any funds for ourselves or any other organization on the basis of the POW/MIA issue, nor do we use professional consultants as fundraising organizations to do it for us. The VFW supply department sells POW/MIA flags and emblem devices, but the monies derived are quite small in comparison to our overall sales.

Private Groups	Turner 11/07/91	It was apparent to me that there existed the strong possibility that actions by an agent of the U.S. Government had deliberately killed a viable operation to rescue American prisoners of war, and I wanted to find out what I could about it.
Remains	Bell 12/04/92	Sen. McCain: Mr. Schweitzer said that there was no American left, there are no warehoused remains...What is your view? Mr. Bell: My view, sir, is that there certainly was a warehouse in the Hanoi area at one time. The mortician, I think, after he defected in 1979, he testified here in Congress that he processed some 452 remains. The Vietnamese were confronted with that information. They denied it. They indicated that they thought the mortician was fabricating. He actually provided about seven different items of information. I think six of those have been verified... The Vietnamese, I believe, came to the conclusion that we were confident that the man was telling the truth. Since the mortician gave his testimony, they have returned to us approximately 450 remains. Approximately 260 to 269 remains have now been identified, and what that indicates to me is...that we did have a warehouse but we don't have one now, and what that indicates to me is that they have admitted that the mortician was telling the truth. They're telling us that we have given you those remains back, and the warehouse here in Hanoi is now empty.

Remains	Bell 12/04/92	Sen. McCain: I think what you said is a very important point here, and if any of the other witnesses disagree with that, that there is no longer, in the view of the witnesses, a warehouse of remains, but there is in the view of the witnesses remains that still need to be recovered, and that's the job of the previous witnesses, CINCPAC and you, Mr. Bell. Is that accurate? Mr. Bell: Yes, sir.