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A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875


Item 2143 of 2186
Letters of Delegates to Congress:Volume 23 November 7, 1785-November 5, 1786 --James Monroe to James Madison
Letters of Delegates to Congress:Volume 23 November 7, 1785-November 5, 1786 PREVIOUS SECTION .. NEXT SECTION .. NAVIGATOR

Letters of Delegates to Congress:Volume 23 November 7, 1785-November 5, 1786
James Monroe to James Madison

Dear Sir New York Sepr. 3. 1786.
In my last I advis'd you of the point to wh. seven States had brought the business. After repealing the instruction in part, entering the repeal affirmatively, setting aside a motion requiring the sense of Congress whether the repeal was valid so as to give a new instruction by 7 States, by the previous question, & passing an order to prevent our moving it again untill they shod. have the same number of States on the floor, on their part the thing was complete. I inform'd you also of our propositions & the number of States for them---;it was on Friday last that they clos'd the business.(1) It has been propos'd by some of the gentn. on ours to notify Mr. Jay of the opinion of the 5 States but I

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think we shall not do this.(2) He is possess'd of course of our sentiments in the official way; to communicate them otherwise than thro the journals might have an intemperate & factious appearance. We have as yet done nothing but under the constitution & almost in all cases the rules of the house, nor shall we I apprehend. Some gentn. on their side hinted their determination to withdraw if the question shod. be brought on as to the validity of the repeal. Whether we shall take any other step is undecided. I doubt the propriety of so doing further than moving for permission to transmit copies of the journals to the States for their information & to obtn. instructions to their delegations.(3) I shod. suppose the Secry. wod. not proceed untill he finds himself supported by the States to whom the 7 delegations belong. Upon Jersey & Pena. then it rests. To engage their leading men is now the object.(4) Most probably he has already consulted them but his consultations & those of his party I doubt not have been founded on partial representations. To remove their impression a view of the journals may be necessary. I consider the party especially Jay & the principal advocates as having gone too far to retreat. They must either carry the measure or be disgrac'd (as the principal already hath been by the vote of 5 States), & sooner than suffer this they will labour to break the Union. I therefore suspect they have been already (and indeed have too much reason for my suspicions) intriguing with the principal men in these States to effect that end in the last resort. They have even sought a dismembermt. to the Potowmack & those of the party here have been sounding those in office thus far.(5) To defeat the measure therefore completely we must follow their mov'ments & counteract them every where, advise the leading men of their designs, the purposes they are meant to serve &c, and in event of the worst extremity prepare them for an union with the southern States. I fear some of those in Pena. will have a contrary affection---;but it must be remov'd if possible. A knowledge that she was on our side wod. blow this whole intrigue in the air. To bring this abt. therefore is an important object to the Southern interest. If a dismembermt. takes place that State must not be added to the eastern scale. It were as well to use force to prevent it as to defend ourselves afterwards.(6) I consider the convention of Annapolis as a most important æra in our affrs. The Eastern men be assur'd mean it as leading further than the object originally comprehended. If they do not obtain that things shall be arrang'd to suit them in every respect, their intrigues will extend to the objects I have suggested above. Pena. is their object. Upon succeeding or failing with her will they gain or lose confidence. I doubt not the emissaries of foreign countries will be on the ground. In short I do consider this convention as requiring your utmost exertions, in the change things will infallibly take, as well to obtain good as to prevent mischief. Mr. Randolph will I hope devote himself to the publick

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upon this occasion & not suffer himself to be taken off by his professional pursuits before the convention dissolves. I write you freely without the cover of a cypher knowing you have not yours with you. Indeed I fear nothing to the publick or myself from a publication, for I am satisfied if the publick were acquainted with the conduct of these unworthy servants their consequence wod. be of but short duration. Prevail I beg of you on Colo. Mason to attend the convention. It will give him data to act on afterwards in the State.
Very sincerely I am yr. friend & servt., Jas. Monroe

[P.S.] I have always consider'd the regulation of trade in the hands of the US as necessary to preserve the union---;without it, it will infallibly tumble to pieces---;but I earnestly wish the admission of a few additional States into the confederacy in the southern scale.


RC (DLC: Madison Papers). Endorsed by Madison: "Design of the Eastern states, in certain contingencies, to dismember the union by the line of the Potomac."
1 See Monroe to Madison, September 1.
2 For evidence that such an "opinion" had already been drafted, see the following entry.
3 For the failure of Charles Pinckney's September 28 motion to lift the injunction of secresy on the Spanish negotiations and allow the delegates to communicate with the states, see JCC, 31:697.
4 For earlier attempts to sway New Jersey's John Witherspoon and Pennsylvania's Arthur St. Clair and James Wilson toward the southern position, see Monroe to Madison, August [11], note 2.
5 Cf. Theodore Sedgwick to Caleb Strong, August 6; Monroe to Patrick Henry, August 12 ; and Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, August 19, note 11.
6 Monroe's apprehensions over the intentions of the eastern delegates had their counterpart in French chargé Louis-Guillaume Otto's summary of congressional conflict during the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations. In his September 10 dispatch to the comte de Vergennes, which is in Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères: Correspondence politique, États-Unis, 32:65--;71, Otto included the following assessment (in translation) of southern motivation in the affair:
"The negotiations relating to the treaty of commerce with Spain, of which I had the honor to give you an account in my last despatch, have since been the constant subject of the deliberations of congress. The southern states had vainly flattered themselves that they could detach Pennsylvania and New Jersey from the league of the North; they have, however, proposed the mediation of his Majesty and the plan by which New Orleans is designated as a commercial entrepôt for all the commodities of the interior. The only change which they made in it consisted in giving full instructions to Mr. Carmichael to open negotiations at Madrid instead of sending Jefferson there. This project has met serious opposition from the states of the North. As to the navigation of the Mississippi, they remarked that, far from being advantageous to the confederation, it would only serve to separate from the United States all the interior country; that the inhabitants of Kentucky, no longer feeling the necessity of maintaining commercial connections with the maritime states, and having, furthermore, a policy entirely different from that of their neighbors, would only think of rendering themselves wholly independent of congress as of a sovereign body from which they could derive no benefit; that the fertility of those countries would insensibly attract the most industrious inhabitants of the northern states, who would not hesitate an instant to exchange the arid rocks of Massachusetts and of New Hampshire for the smiling plains of the Ohio and the Mississippi; that a limited population spread over an immense surface would weaken the springs of the government, and that anarchy and discord would inevitably

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arise from this state of affairs; that the policy of congress ought to be to strengthen more and more the maritime states, and to await the time when the surplus of population would flow toward the interior; that, independently of all these motives, care should be taken to avoid exciting the jealousy of the savage hordes which still infest those lands; that a war with one of these perfidious nations, in the present exhausted state of the finances, would be one of the greatest calamities; that the possessions of the United States were already of too great extent, and that their territory ought to be reduced rather than augmented beyond all proportion; that, moreover, the court of Spain did not appear in the least disposed to give up the navigation of the Mississippi; that by insisting on this article would only irritate his Catholic Majesty and render him less disposed to yield on the most essential parts of the treaty. For these reasons it was necessary not only to reject the plan of mediation proposed by the southern states, but to recall the ultimatum which proposed the opening of the Mississippi as a condition sine qua non. Not confining themselves to simple arguments, the delegates of the North at once made a motion to repeal this clause of the ultimatum, and to authorize Mr. Jay to conclude with the Spanish minister. Seven states having given their sanction to the change in the instructions, the motion was passed in the form of a resolution. The five southern states protested against this measure, which they called illegal; they proved that, according to the articles of the confederation, the consent of nine states was necessary to give instructions concerning the conclusion of a treaty; those instructions could not be revoked by seven states only; that a proceeding so extraordinary threatened the total overthrow of the constitution, and that even if Mr. Jay should be able to sign such a treaty with Don Diego de Gardoqui, they would never consent to the ratification of such a treaty; that in regard to the western country it would be useless to insist on the necessity of restricting the territory of the United States; that the fertile plains of the interior would always attract a considerable number of the inhabitants of the different states, and it would be easier to stay a torrent than the constant flow of this population; that everybody knew the restless spirit of a people ever urged on by necessity, and eager to change home and climate; and that the colonists of the rich countries of the West, having no facilities for exporting the surplus of their produce by way of the Mississippi, would finally without fail come to an understanding with England, in order to obtain an outlet by the lakes and the river St. Lawrence.
"All these arguments made not the least impression upon the northern delegates; but the position of Mr. Jay becomes very embarrassing. The instructions given by seven states not being constitutional, he cannot conclude his treaty without encountering bitter reproaches from the five southern states, who loudly accuse him of having by all sorts of intrigues directed the actions of the northern delegates, in order not to suffer the negotiation to slip from his hand. They even threaten to displace him, or at least to give him two assistants. On the other hand, this minister cannot refuse to execute the orders of a party of which he is himself the most zealous partisan, without losing his popularity and influence. Whatever Mr. Jay's conduct may be, it is to be feared that this discussion will cause a great coolness between the two parties, and may be the germ of a future separation of the southern states.
"Mr. Gardoqui affects the greatest indifference about these negotiations. Recognising the instability of the American governments, the weakness of congress, and the continual fluctuation of political principles, he sees no necessity of concluding a treaty which his Catholic Majesty can easily do without. He has often said to me that in spite of all the precautions of the government it would be impossible to prevent contraband trade and other disorders which the Americans would not fail to cause; that it was of infinite importance to his court not to encourage establishments on the Mississippi which might one day become neighbors so much the more dangerous for the Spanish possessions, since even in their present weakness they were already conceiving vast schemes for the conquest of the western bank of the river; that the savages would always form the best barrier between the two nations; and that nothing better could be done than to leave matters on their present footing.

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"I have had the honor thus far of explaining to you merely the ostensible arguments of the two parties; but a long acquaintance with the affairs of this country authorizes me, perhaps, to divine the secret motives of the heat with which each state supports its opinion in an affair which does not appear of enough importance to disturb their harmony. The southern states are not in earnest when they assert that without the navigation of the Mississippi the inhabitants of the interior will seek an outlet by way of the lakes, and will throw themselves into the arms of England. They know too well the aversion of their compatriots for that power, and the difficulty of conveying heavy cargoes through the rivers which lead to Canada. But the true motive of this vigorous opposition is to be found in the great preponderance of the northern states, eager to incline the balance toward their side; the southern neglect no opportunity of increasing the population and importance of the western territory, and of drawing thither by degrees the inhabitants of New England, whose ungrateful soil only too much favors emigration. Rhode Island, especially, has already suffered considerably from the new establishments of Ohio, and a great number of families daily leave their homes to seek lands more fertile and a less rigorous climate. This emigration doubly enfeebles New England, since on the one hand it deprives her of industrious citizens, and on the other it adds to the population of the southern states. These new territories will gradually form themselves into separate governments; they will have their representatives in congress, and will augment greatly the mass of the southern states. All these considerations make evident to the delegates from the South the necessity of promoting by all sorts of means their establishments in the West, and from this point of view a treaty with Spain appears to them most desirable. But if this treaty contains only stipulations in favor of the northern fisheries, far from strengthening themselves against the too great preponderance of the northern states, they would furnish them with new arms, by increasing their prosperity and the extension of their commerce.
"The conduct of this thorny negotiation is in the hands of Mr. Jay." George Bancroft, History of the Formation of the Constitution of the United States, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1882), 2:389--;93.

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