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A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875
Journals of the Continental Congress --TUESDAY, MAY 14, 1782
A letter, of the 10, from the Commander in Chief, was read, enclosing a copy of a letter to him from Sir Guy Carleton, dated Headquarters, New York, 7 May, 1782; wherein he expresses a desire to receive a passport for the passage of Mr. Morgan to Philadelphia, for the purpose of carrying a letter of compliment to Congress; Whereupon,2
[Note 2: 2 This letter is in the Papers of the Continental Congress, No. 152, X, folio 525, and a copy of Carleton's letter on folio 559. Washington's letter is printed in the Writings of Washington (Ford), X, 9.]
On motion of Mr. [John] Rutledge, seconded by Mr. [Edward] Telfair,
Resolved, That the Commander in Chief be, and hereby is, directed to refuse the request of Sir Guy Carleton, of a passport for Mr. Morgan to bring despatches to Philadelphia.
The Superintendant of Finance as Agent, of Marine having pursuant to the order of the 4 of this month reported a State of the commerce of these United States and a plan for the protection thereof,
On motion of Mr. [James] Madison, seconded by Mr. [William] Ellery,
Resolved, That the Secretary for Foreign Affairs be and he is hereby directed to transmit the State of Commerce and
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plan for its protection, reported by the Superintendant of Finance, to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of Versailles, to be by him communicated to that Court with an application for its concurrence in the said plan.1
[Note 1: 1 This resolution was also entered in the manuscript Secret Journal, Foreign Affairs. The plan was entered only in the Secret Journal.]
The plan reported by the Superintendant is as follows:
In forming a state of the American commerce it will be proper rather to consider what it might be than what it is; and to confine the idea of what it might be to the state of war, rather than go into the extent which a state of peace would permit. And to render this subject as clear as possible, it will be proper to divide the trade into three different heads, as carried on from the eastern, middle, and southern states; which may, as to each district, be farther divided into the European and West India trade. To these may also be added, the circuitous or carrying trade. Which last must nevertheless be confined principally, if not altogether, to the eastern states.
The principal seaports of the southern states being at present in possession of the enemy, the following observations occur:--If the enemy continues that possession, very little if any commerce can be carried on. If the possession of those ports is recovered to the United States, the same measures which are taken for the protection of the commerce under present circumstances will apply equally to those states, and with greater security to all the states; because the enemy would have fewer ports from whence to fit out their cruisers. And if the rice and indigo of the southern states can be carried to Europe and the West Indies,
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those valuable articles will form additional inducements for protecting the American commerce.
The middle states might export to Europe, tobacco, tar, and in cases of great scarcity, wheat and flour. To the West Indies, they might export pork, beef, bread, flour, lumber, iron and tar.
The eastern states might export to Europe, masts, spars, ship timber, staves, boards, fish and oil. To the West Indies they might export lumber, pork, beef, cattle, horses, cider, and some smaller articles. In a circuitous commerce they would bring some of these articles to the Chesapeake, and take a freight of tobacco for Europe; or else take sugars from the islands to Europe, and return with European commodities of the bulkier kind, such as salt, wine, brandy, fruit, &c.
Of all this commerce there exists, at present, but little more than that of provisions to the West Indies, and tobacco to Europe. Why it is so curtailed, and why it might be extended to the objects abovementioned, will appear from considering the annexed estimates of what the tobacco trade now is without convoy, as in No. 1; and what it would be with convoy, as in No. 2. From the former it is evident, that the carriage of tobacco to Europe is a losing game, and could not be supported if the cargoes of goods brought out (and for which bills of exchange are remitted) did not, by the freight, compensate for the loss sustained on the outward bound cargoes, From the latter it appears, that goods from France might, if the ships were convoyed, be afforded much cheaper in America, and tobacco from America much cheaper in France. The consequences resulting from hence may be considered in a threefold point of view, as relating to each country separately, and to both conjointly. To America, or rather to the planters of America, would arise the
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advantage of selling this article for more money than at present; of getting the quantity of European goods necessary for their consumption for less money than at present, and consequently, of having a clear balance remaining, which, drawn forth by taxation, would yield revenue to government. The people being thus relieved from the immediate distresses of war, and finding their condition ameliorated, would be more disposed to prosecute it with vigour. Their industry being better rewarded, would be increased. The produce of the country would be greater, and by that means an addition would be made to the aggregate stock of national wealth. France would be benefited by receiving tobacco at a cheaper rate; by the revenue arising from it; by a greater consumption of her manufactures, which would follow from the increased convenience and cheapness of transporting them hither; and by securing the exclusive trade in that article at least during the war. The mutual advantage of the two countries would be, an increase of friendship, intercourse, and commerce, and a greater knowledge of each other's manners, and consequently the means of adapting the wares and produce of the one to the wants and desires of the other. To these may be added a firm establishment of their commercial principles during the war, so as take away the necessity of seeking for connexions of trade with other countries after a peace shall have been concluded; and that the enemy will be deprived of those advantages they now enjoy from making numerous captures, and thereby possessing themselves of tobacco sufficient for their purposes.
Those observations which are above confined to the tobacco trade, will apply to every other kind of commerce in greater or lesser degrees, and consequently those articles which cannot now be exported might
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then be brought to market. At present the enemy, by distressing the American commerce, derive two great benefits to themselves. They not only obtain considerable resources, but they are enabled to carry on a valuable contraband commerce. The history of human affairs demonstrates the inefficacy of penal laws to prevent such a commerce when the temptation is great; and therefore, although the dispositions of the several legislatures cannot be questioned, yet as long as the enemy can vend their goods from New York, Charlestown, and Halifax, cheaper than the fair trader can import them, that contraband will subsist.
The commerce of America consists of bulky articles. If the vessels employed in it be armed, they will require a great number of seamen; if unarmed, the number of seamen will be smaller, and the surplus might be usefully employed in ships of war.
Tobacco cannot be more important to the commerce and revenue of the United States, their friends and allies, than lumber, tar and provisions would be to the naval and military operations. Wood for masts, spars and ship building, with every other kind of naval stores, must be of consequence in Europe during such extensive and important maritime efforts. And it would also seem that the securing provisions for the islands would greatly facilitate the measures to be pursued in that quarter. The local situation of the United States renders them of more importance than almost any other circumstance. To obviate the effects of that situation is a principal object of the enemy's policy, now that they have been compelled to abandon the idea of conquest. They are fully sensible of the effects of that situation. Having found by experience in the last war, that the islands in the West Indies are much dependent on the friendship or enmity of America, they
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have considered the holding of posts in the United States as a kind of out work to their other possessions. Their avowed design at present is, to annihilate the American commerce. And, on the other hand, there can be but little doubt, that if advantage is made of those circumstances, whose effects they apprehend and guard against, the British islands must fall. But the importance of the American commerce, great as it is, will appear still greater when compared with the cheap and easy means of affording it protection. To judge of them it must be considered, that the danger of capture is always greatest near to the ports. When once a fleet are at some considerable distance from the place of their departure, and before they arrive near to the place of their destination, forty or fifty sail might safely be intrusted to four frigates. The large fleets which are kept on the European and West India seas oblige the enemy to keep their naval force collected, so that the same number of frigates would sufficiently protect a convoy in those seas, with that which would secure them in the middle of the ocean, unless under very peculiar circumstances of ill fortune. But on the coast of North America the case is different. By keeping one or two ships of the line with a number of frigates on that coast, the enemy have a decided superiority. It is nevertheless conceived, that the commerce of America would be well protected by so small a force as two ships of the line and ten frigates. For this purpose it would be proper that two very fast sailing ships of the line and two large fast sailing frigates (all sheathed with copper) should be stationed in the Chesapeake, and cruise as occasion might require. If the enemy had not a superiour force they would be obliged to keep in port, and their convoys would be exposed to misfortunes which might be even fatal to them. If they had
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a superiour force, still they would be obliged to keep that force collected, in which case they would do but little injury to the commerce. But when collected, it must either be in port, or cruising. If in port, it would answer no other purpose but to watch the arrival of their fleets. If it were cruising, it might be crushed by a seasonable detachment made from the islands for that purpose. These advantages follow necessarily from being on a friendly coast; because, to the French ships, every harbour would be a protection; but the English have only one harbour (New York) which a ship of the line can enter.
If the enemy keep a naval superiority in America, it must be done at a very great disproportion of expence, which is a clear advantage to the allies, by distressing the finances of the common enemy. If the four French ships abovementioned were very fast sailing vessels (which is a necessary part of the plan) they could always avoid danger on the one hand, and on the other might do very serious injury to the enemy. The remaining eight frigates should be divided into two small squadrons of four each. The first squadron should sail from Brest, and make a short tarry at L'Orient; from thence proceed with the American trade to Nantz; take the trade there, and proceed to the Chesapeake. Upon their arrival, they (as well as the ships stationed in the Bay) should obey the orders of the minister of France; because he would always be possessed of proper intelligence as to the enemy's situation, and be informed of the peculiar circumstances which the varying state of things might give rise to, and which must influence every plan in a greater or lesser degree. The second squadron should leave Brest about three months after the first, and pursue the same route. The trade having arrived off the Chesapeake, the convoy might, generally speaking,
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go from thence to the mouth of the Delaware, and thence to Boston. When the southern states are repossessed, the same route may be pursued, and the trade of those states detached, when near to the coast, under one or two frigates which could go with it, and from thence to the Chesapeake; the place of such frigates being supplied in the mean time, if necessary, by those in the Chesapeake. The trade bound from the middle and southern parts of America for Europe might be convoyed by the whole force to Boston Bay, and being there joined, according to arrangements previously taken for that purpose, by the trade of the eastern states, might be convoyed off the coast, and then intrusted to four frigates, as before, bound for Nantz, and thence to L'Orient; after which the frigates might return to Brest. The whole voyage would certainly be completed in five months at the furthest; and consequently the two squadrons would give a quarterly protection to the trade which would be sufficient.
It is to be hoped, that if the war continues much longer, the United States will be able to provide the necessary force for themselves, which at present they are not. Though if the above arrangements take place, they might even now provide for the trade from America to the West Indies.
It has above been mentioned, that under particular circumstances, detachments should be made from the West Indies. The situation of things at present will show the importance of that measure. If two ships of the line and two frigates should now arrive on the coast, they would clear it of all enemies, and probably take many ships, which might immediately be manned by exchanging the crews for American seamen in captivity. They would thereby become an instant reinforcement to the party by which they were taken. It has also been
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mentioned that the provisions of America would form a useful support to the military operations in the islands. An acquaintance with such operations renders the position too clear to admit the shadow of doubt. If things were placed on the footing above described, provisions could be delivered to the islands much cheaper and better than they can be drawn from Europe, saving thereby much expence and much risk. But this is not all; provisions and naval stores for the use of the king might always be prepared in season, and laden, ready to be convoyed back to the islands, by the same force sent from thence to effect the purposes of a temporary superiority on the American coast, so that the same means would apply to protecting commerce, and to promoting the success of military enterprises.
Estimates formed upon the present state of the Tobacco Trade, and what it would be, if properly convoyed and protected.
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The loss on this voyage, over and above the labour of the merchant, is therefore $13. And the commerce is only supported by the freight of goods from France. Many merchants are not concerned in ships, but buy bills of exchange, which they remit, and order goods to be purchased and laden in the ships of others, which goods pay a considerable freight.
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OBSERVATIONS ON THE ESTIMATES.
In the first estimate, the cost of the vessel, in proportion to her burden, is great, because of her being built for sailing, and encumbered with guns, ammunition, and the provisions and water for a number of men. But further, such a vessel costs more now than formerly, because many of the articles are brought from abroad, and because the number of vessels required for the commerce, and by reason of the captures, has enhanced the value of that manufacture.
In the first estimate, the port charges, as to the master and hands, are double to what they are in the second, because the risk of capture is now so great that very extraordinary encouragement must be given to prevail on them to expose themselves to it.
In the first estimate, the expences of the vessel in port are, in a very large proportion, greater than in the second, because of the greater number of men to be subsisted, ammunition to be bought, &c.
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From comparing these estimates we find,
Thus the consumer in each country gets for the same quantity of his produce, double the quantity of the produce of the other country; and yet a profit is left to the merchant.
In the first case, 30 seamen are necessary to 120 hhds. of tobacco--4 hhds. to 1 man. In the second case, 10 seamen are necessary to 300 hhds. of tobacco--30 hhds. to 1 man.1
[Note 1: 1 This plan is in the Papers of the Continental Congress, No. 137, I, folios 451--459.]
Ordered, That so much of Mr. Parsons' letters as relate to his accounts be refered to the Superintendant of finance, and so much of ditto as relates to the appointment of an agent at Martinique be referred to the Superintendant of finance as Agent of Marine.2
[Note 2: 2 This order was entered only in the journal kept by the Secretary of Congress for the Superintendent of Finance: Morris Papers, Congressional Proceedings.]
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