




COAST ARTILLERY JOURNAL

JULY-AUGUST, 1947



CORRE

A Name, A Symbo



REGIDOR

A Tradition

By Colonel William C. Braly, CAC, Retired

(Editor's Note. The accompanying article is based on records contained in the author's Operations Office Diary which he carried from Corregidor through more than three years in Japanese prison camps, and his personal diary, found when Corregidor was re-taken, and eventually returned to his wife. The play by play account herein is therefore absolutely authentic.)

WAR COMES

A telephone in the Harbor Defense Command Post jangled noisily, jarring the early morning quiet of 8 December, 1941. As I picked up the receiver, the clock indicated 3:40 A.M. The voice I heard was that of Captain Bob Brown, Aide-de-camp to Major General George F. Moore, Commanding General of the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays.

"Rudie Fabian¹ just phoned me two messages he picked up a few minutes ago," said Bob.

"Let's have 'em," said I.

"Hostilities commenced with air raids on Pearl," and, "Air raids on Pearl Harbor. THIS IS NOT DRILL!"

Both messages were signed by the Naval Commander-in-Chief. General Moore, who had also gotten the word from Fabian, came at once to the Command Post, accompanied by Colonel Joseph F. Cottrell, the Harbor Defense Executive, and followed shortly by several other staff officers. This was IT. The war we had feared was inevitable had arrived. A few days earlier I had received a letter from my wife written in San Francisco on 18 November, 1941 in which she remarked:

"If war comes, and everyone says it will, I suppose I need

not look for you soon." Little she knew how right she was.

For several months we had been rotating one third of the command in positions of readiness each month, and for the past eight days all units on the fortified islands of Manila and Subic Bays had been at battle stations, under continuous alert. Thus the transition to actual war conditions was slight indeed.

General Moore promptly issued the necessary orders to accomplish this and transmitted the text of the above messages to General MacArthur's Headquarters in Manila, designated USAFFE. Then, at 6:02 A.M. this communication was received from the Manila Headquarters:

"A state of war exists between the United States and Japan. Govern yourself accordingly." That made it official.

Our portion of General MacArthur's U.S. Forces in the Far East consisted then of approximately 275 officers, 2,000 American enlisted men, 1,200 Philippine Scouts and 400 Philippine Army personnel. These troops were distributed among the four fortified islands stretching in an irregular line across the entrance to Manila Bay, except for two batteries of Scouts garrisoning Fort Wint on Grande Island in Subic Bay, some 30 miles up the coast northward. (See map opposite.)

The longest range cannon in the Harbor Defenses were two batteries of 12" guns on Corregidor with all around fire and a horizontal range of about 30,000 yards. There were also other 12" gun batteries, besides mortars for high angle fire, and smaller calibers. At the other three Manila Bay forts, calibers varied from 3" to 14", while at Fort Wint the heaviest guns were 10".

All heavy seacoast armament was of pre-World War I type and had been emplaced prior to the present day concept of air warfare. Thus, while formidably designed to repel any attack from sea, many batteries were wide open to aerial bombing as well as vulnerable to artillery fire from their rear, such as enemy batteries firing from the adjacent shores of Bataan or Cavite Provinces. The protection of

¹Lt. Rudolph J. Fabian, USN, in charge of Navy Radio Intercept Station on Corregidor.

these flanks was not a Harbor Defense function but depended on such mobile forces as were available in the Philippines.

Antiaircraft units were equipped with pre-war 3" AA guns, caliber .50 machine guns and Sperry 60" searchlights. Two radio direction finding sets were received in October 1941.

A brief word on the tactical organization may be worth while. The three major elements of the defense were:

1. The Seaward Defense Command, under Colonel Paul D. Bunker, CAC.
Troops: 59th CA (American) (less Battery I)
91st CA (Philippine Scouts) (less Batteries C and E)
92d CA (Philippine Scouts)
1st CA (Philippine Army)
2. The Antiaircraft Defense Command, under Colonel Theo. M. Chase, CAC.
Troops: 60th CA (American)
Batteries I-59th, C-91st and E-91st CA.
3. The Beach Defense Command, with Colonel Sam McCullough as Executive for Beach Defense.
Troops: Alternate mission for all troops.

For anyone serving in the Philippines during the years immediately preceding World War II the thought of war with Japan was ever present, including the possibility of a surprise landing attack prior to any formal declaration of war. War plans therefore provided a dual assignment for all Harbor Defense troops:

1st: An M-Day assignment to their organic armament.

2d: An assignment to emergency beach defense missions in the event of such a surprise landing attack.

These plans, or variations thereof, had been in effect for several years.

As time progressed through 1941 the wisdom of such plans became increasingly evident. Accordingly, with the availability of long delayed appropriations, intensive preparations were instituted for the provision of such means as were possible to increase the effectiveness of the Harbor Defenses. Many of the projects thus initiated contribute to the story that follows.


Among the more important of these was the laying of the mine fields across the entrance channels to Manila Bay in the summer of 1941. The Coast Artillery controlled mine field closed the north channel while the Navy contact mine field effectively blocked the south channel.

When news of the Pearl Harbor attack was flashed to shipping in Philippine waters there was a general rush for the safety of Manila Bay. Throughout the day on 8 December, vessels of all types were entering the bay through the controlled mine field, always with coordination between the Navy Inshore Patrol and our Seaward Defense Command.


Our first Air Raid Alarm came at 10:26 A.M. when a flight of 17 enemy medium bombers was reported from the direction of Neilson Airport, near Manila. The flight turned off without coming within range.

At 1:15 P.M. however, three medium bombers passed just east of Corregidor and Fort Hughes. Two antiaircraft batteries, I-59th and D-60th, opened fire, severely damaging one plane. Thus began our "shooting war" in the Harbor Defenses of Manila Bay.

That night we had a report from Major S. A. Mellnik,



Prewar review of the Corregidor garrison by Major General George Grunert following presentation of the Coast Artillery Association Trophy to the 92d CA (PS).



The V for victory chalkmark is clearly visible on the helmets of this 3" antiaircraft gun crew. This picture was taken on 5 January 1942.

CAC, a staff officer at Philippine Coast Artillery Command headquarters in Manila, of enemy air raids that morning on Baguio and at noon on Clark Field near Fort Stotsenburg. In the latter, many B-17s and P-38s had been destroyed on the ground, a loss we could ill afford as of course none of these were replaced.

We did get a momentary thrill from U.S. High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre's broadcast to the States on the morning of 9 December. Said he:

"The message I send to you in America is this: We on the front line are fighting to the death, for we have abiding confidence in our cause and in our leader. We know that you back home will send us help and that you will not permit divided counsels or capital-labor disputes or red tape or anything else to delay your getting effective help to us before it is too late. We are in the fight to stay. War enjoins upon us all action, action, ACTION! Time is of the essence. COME ON AMERICA!"

Many a weary month was to pass ere that longed-for help arrived.

The next few days saw Japanese landings at Aparri and Vigan in northern Luzon while small enemy forces appeared at Legaspi and other southern ports. From bases in Formosa, Japanese air forces were carrying out daily heavy bombings of Cavite Navy Yard, Neilson Airport, Nichols Field and the Manila Port Area. They would arrive about noon, unload their bombs, then swing out past the fortified islands on their return to base, being careful to

keep well out of range of most of our antiaircraft batteries.

At that time B-60th was the only battery equipped with mechanical fuzed ammunition reaching to the normal enemy bombing altitude of around 30,000 feet. Even so a number of medium bombers were shot down during these early raids over Corregidor, southern Bataan and Fort Wint.

Meanwhile, all organizations were busy digging in, camouflaging, and sand-bagging their positions. While a few of the shelters might have been considered bomb-proof most were of splinter-proof type construction. All seacoast batteries with an exposed flank or rear toward Bataan erected protective barricades of timber, rails, oil drums filled with earth or any other materials available.

On 14 December, the Harbor Defense Command Post was moved from Topside, Corregidor, to Lateral No. 2 in Malinta Tunnel where it functioned throughout the campaign. This was one of the numerous smaller tunnels opening off the main passageway under Malinta Hill. The Station Hospital had already occupied its Malinta Tunnel quarters as had the Navy.

By agreement with the Navy, all lighthouses in the vicinity of Manila Bay had been extinguished. General MacArthur however authorized the occasional use of Corregidor Light to facilitate the entrance of submarines. For each entry a secret schedule was agreed upon for the light. The Navy maintained a "control ship" inside the bay near the entrance to the channel through the controlled mine fields. During passage of the submarine, the mines were to be on "safe," with the channel marking buoys illuminated by seacoast searchlights on Corregidor. Action by the Naval In-

shore Patrol and the proper Harbor Defense stations were coordinated for each passage.

For exit or entry of commercial vessels the same procedure was followed. This part of the operation had been routine ever since the mines had been put down, five months earlier. Even so, a most regrettable catastrophe occurred.

A fast inter-island steamer, the SS *Corregidor*, sailed from Manila for points south some time after dark on 16 December. Hundreds of people from the southern islands, caught in Manila when war broke, rushed the gang plank at the last minute in a desperate effort to get home. How many crowded aboard will never be known but I heard estimates of from twelve to fourteen hundred. All cabins and the decks were full.

Concurrently with her arrival outbound at the Control Ship the Navy was bringing in six submarines which delayed the exit of the *Corregidor* several hours. As the last sub turned into Mariveles harbor the Control Ship was about to signal the inter-island steamer to proceed when, BOOM! She hit a mine in the outer field and sank in 3 minutes with heavy loss of life.

Navy small boats from Corregidor and Mariveles picked up 280 oil-soaked survivors most of whom were treated at our Malinta Hospital, then transferred to Manila. Naval officers stated they had been informed the previous afternoon that the vessel would be going out but never authorized her to pass the Control Ship. Neither were the Harbor Defenses informed that such an exit was anticipated. The Captain of the ship had traversed the mine fields several times previously; he knew the regulations and was familiar with the channel. It appears he proceeded on his own initiative, without permission from the Inshore Patrol or illumination of channel buoys by our searchlights. Unfortunately his course swerved from the channel just before he cleared the outer mine field with the resultant catastrophe. As he himself was lost all the facts will never be known.

The first Coast Artillery casualties occurred in the bombing of Fort Wint on 21 December when several men were wounded. The next day the Navy ordered the complete mining (Navy contact) of the entrance to Subic Bay, to be completed by dark, 23 December.

By that time the Japanese were advancing rapidly down the Central Plain of Luzon as well as northward from Tayabas Province. When it became evident that Manila must be evacuated all U. S. troops were ordered into Bataan in accordance with earlier war plans while we on Corregidor were notified of the early influx of the High Command from Manila.

They arrived on Christmas Eve, after dark, and included General MacArthur and family, with USAFFE Headquarters, U. S. High Commissioner Sayre with his family and staff and President Quezon with family and staff. Before morning other parties arrived, including Admiral Rockwell and Naval District staff, Headquarters Philippine Department, and about 900 officers and men constituting the first contingent of the 4th U. S. Marines. This regiment had recently arrived in the Philippines from duty in Shanghai. After the evacuation of Cavite and Olongapo Navy yards, it was attached to the Army for tactical employment and assigned to the Harbor Defenses.

The remainder of the outfit, under Colonel S. L. Howard, USMC, arrived on the evening of 27 December, making a total of about 125 officers and 1400 men. This regiment, supplemented by Coast Artillery troops manning 75mm and 155mm guns, took over the Beach Defenses of Corregidor.

In conformity with the general withdrawal plan, General MacArthur had ordered Fort Wint evacuated on Christmas Day. At 6:15 P.M., Colonel Napoleon Boudreau, the Fort Commander, radioed in code: "All personnel evacuated with matériel as directed." That included 34 officers, 505 enlisted men, 2 ten-ton tractors, 2-155mm guns, 43" antiaircraft guns with fire control equipment, ammunition for both calibers, and 1-60" antiaircraft searchlight. The remaining seacoast armament was rendered unserviceable prior to evacuation. All troops from Fort Wint joined the Bataan forces. Colonel Boudreau himself rejoined the Harbor Defenses and was assigned to command Fort Frank which position he held until surrender.

As December wore on, the Japanese established their own air bases on Luzon and proceeded to bomb their objectives at will. All day long their planes could be seen circling over Manila Bay, Bataan and Cavite. Three weeks of this aerial bombardment made a shambles of the Cavite Navy Yard, wrecked Neilson Airport and Nichols Field, and left the bay dotted with burning or sinking vessels. On 29 December the attack switched to Corregidor.

INITIAL AERIAL BOMBARDMENT PERIOD

After a quiet morning with fleeting clouds at about 18,000 feet, the Air Raid Alarm sounded at 11:54 A.M. and the antiaircraft guns opened fire. The attacking force, which consisted of 81 medium bombers and 10 dive bombers, approached in formations of 27, broke into smaller groups of 9 each, and passed over us in waves, raining bombs on our little island. Between runs, the dive bombers were strafing the batteries with machine-gun fire. The attack lasted until 2:15 P.M. by which time all of Corregidor had been blasted with 300 lb. bombs.

First to be hit was the Station Hospital, with its huge Red Cross clearly painted on the roof. Soon the Topside Cine, Corregidor Club, and numerous other wooden structures were burning as was the Navy gasoline storage dump at the tail of the island. The antiaircraft gun batteries came in for heavy bombing, especially B-60th. Also hit were the various barracks and quarters, water tanks, 60th CA garage, and shipping in Corregidor Bay. Two Philippine Army observation planes at Kindley Field were also destroyed.

Power, water and communication lines generally were disrupted. Casualties were 22 killed and about 80 wounded. In my rounds I discovered that one bomb had hit just outside the quarters which Colonel Louis Bowler and I shared, blowing out all doors and windows in the house and really wrecking the place. Miraculously, Colonel Bowler's two beautiful Persian cats had escaped injury. Our Filipino house boy took to the bushes but showed up later. He wanted a pass to go to Manila "to see about his brother." He got it. I didn't blame him;—I had no "brother in Manila." Everyone realized that this was only the beginning and steeled himself for what lay ahead.

Our antiaircraft meanwhile had exacted a heavy toll

from the enemy by shooting down 9 medium bombers and 4 strafing planes, for which they were officially commended by the Harbor Defense Commander. The Japs had made the mistake of coming in at around 20,000 feet. They immediately raised their bombing altitude to about 30,000. Their propaganda radio in Tokyo then proudly announced that "the raid on Corregidor by Japanese planes was so successful every battery on the island has been silenced, the 'Rock' is in flames, and Corregidor as a fortress is now as good as useless." Time would tell!

In the late afternoon of the next day, outside the east portal of Malinta Tunnel, were held the Inaugural Ceremonies of the President of the Philippine Commonwealth. The oath of office was administered to Mr. Quezon by the Honorable Jose Abad Santos, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the Philippines, after which the President made a brief inaugural address. He was followed by His Excellency, Francis S. Sayre, U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, who spoke well for the United States, then read a message from President Roosevelt. After the oath of office to the Vice-President, Mr. Osmeña, General MacArthur spoke briefly but impressively. It was evident that he was deeply moved. The National Anthems of the Philippines and the United States were to have been played by the 91st Coast Artillery Band, closing the program, but the enemy bombing of the previous day burned their barracks and instruments so a small organ, played by one of the ladies in Mr. Quezon's party, sufficed instead.

1 January was a *not* so Happy New Year. The Japs were almost in Manila. The rear echelon of USAFFE pulled out just ahead of them for Corregidor after destroying records, Port Area warehouses, and installations. During the forenoon a Jap fighter plane swooped low over Kindley Field, a

small air strip on the tail of Corregidor. Battery M-60th CA (antiaircraft machine guns) opened fire and after the first bursts, the plane crashed near a Navy small boat in Manila Bay. Many vessels from Manila, including President Quezon's yacht the *Casiana*, had taken refuge under the shelter of our Corregidor batteries. Just before the evening meal, I heard the President phoning to Mr. Jorge Vargas, his former Secretary, whom he had left as his representative in Manila. His order was: "You go to the treasury Jorge, and burn every ——— thing there, TONIGHT!"

2 January dawned cloudy with a ceiling of about 5,000 feet. We did not like it and sure enough, the Jap bombers took advantage to attack, dropping through the clouds, letting go wherever they happened to be, and disappearing into the clouds again. By 2:30 p.m., 54 enemy planes were operating in the area of the defense. The attack concentrated on Topside, pounding the barracks and quarters again. The car barn, a wooden structure, was hit and burned with several casualties. The Command Post of Battery L-60th, on South Shore Road, received a direct hit, killing the battery commander, Captain Alva L. Hamilton, and three of his men. Total casualties were 13 killed and about 30 wounded.

There ensued several consecutive days of bombing. From fragments assembled it appeared that 1,000 lb. bombs were being used, making craters 40-50 feet across. At Battery Geary (12" mortars) where the assigned personnel (from Battery H-59th) had been constructing a bomb-proof shelter, 34 men took cover in the incompleting structure when the Air Raid Alarm sounded. Unfortunately a large bomb hit adjacent to the shelter, collapsing it on the occupants. Three men were gotten out, injured and shocked,

The gallant defenders of Corregidor surrender after making the capture of the island a most bitter and costly campaign for the Japs.



but the other 31 were completely lost beneath the debris.

The Quezon yacht *Casiana* became a casualty in Corregidor Bay during this period. Only her masts remained above water with the American and Filipino flags flying. The week's bombing disrupted water, power, and telephone lines all over the island but emergency repair details soon restored service at most essential points.

When, on 5 January, our ration allowance was cut in half, most batteries adopted the two meals per day schedule. At Battery C-91st a muzzle burst from a defective anti-aircraft round killed 4 and wounded 8, including the battery commander, Captain Jack Gulick, and his executive officer, Lieutenant Morris Shoss. Meanwhile the anti-aircraft gun batteries were knocking them down daily in line with their new slogan,—“Keep 'em falling.” A recapitulation to date showed a total of 75 enemy planes downed by anti-aircraft fire of the harbor defenses and the 200th and 515th AA Regiments in Bataan. At the price they were paying, we felt we could take a lot more of their bombing. The Japs evidently decided it was rather expensive and we were given a week's respite.

On 13 January a small Japanese vessel approached Ternate on the Cavite shore but retreated promptly when Fort Drum opened fire with a 3" gun installed that morning.

The next day two flights of bombers returned to the Corregidor attack, hitting Topside mainly. The lighthouse and surrounding buildings were damaged and there was a huge crater in front of the Post Telephone Switchboard Room but sandbag protection prevented damage to that facility. 4 mules were killed at the picket line in Government Ravine. These were carved up and the mule meat distributed to the various messes. Not bad either. We made it an expensive operation for the enemy by shooting down 4 of the raiding planes.

CAVITE ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT PERIOD

The middle of January witnessed a change in enemy tactics. He was seen, by our AAAIS detail in Cavite Province, emplacing artillery in defiladed positions between the villages of Sapong and Ternate on the bay shore. His air activity over the harbor defenses was restricted to observation only (“Photo Joe” we called the daily morning observer), while on the west coast of Bataan he landed detachments in rear of our lines. This resulted in a request from our forces in Bataan for artillery fire on an enemy concentration on Longoskawayan Point which was answered at 12:13 A.M. 26 January by Battery Geary (12" mortars).

Sixteen rounds of 700 lb., point detonating, instantaneous fuze, personnel shells were used and proved most effective. According to our observers on Pucot Hill, Bataan, some fragments flew 500 yards and a large fire was started. This firing, under Captain Ben King as battery commander, was the first action by major caliber coast artillery guns against a hostile force since Fort Sumter in 1861. The next morning 24 more rounds were fired, with another 16 on the 29th.

A G-3 Information Bulletin issued by USAFFE on February 2 stated:

A wounded Japanese prisoner captured at Longoskawayan Point, during interrogation by G-2 HPD was asked: “What effect did the large artillery shell fire have on your force?” Answer: “We were terrified. We could not know where the big shells or bombs were coming from; they seemed to be falling from the sky. Before I was wounded my head was going round and round, and I did not know what to do. Some of my companions jumped off the cliff to escape the terrible fire.” It would seem that the 12" mortar fire from Corregidor did a bang-up good job.

As enemy activity in Cavite Province increased it was



As can be seen from this picture, troops of the 503d Parachute Regiment used the Corregidor parade ground as a landing field in the recapture of the island.

Corregidor

(Continued from page 9)


west coast of Bataan, within 2000 yards of the enemy lines and well in front of most of the 75s. Then there were the two New Mexico National Guard antiaircraft regiments, the 200th and the 515th CA. Brigadier General William F. Marquat, operating from the Advanced Command Post of USAFFE in Bataan, was the chief coordinator for this group. I managed to see most of the officers and positions besides a short call at General Wainwright's Corps Headquarters.

It was very dusty in Bataan, with heavy traffic and much engineer road work in progress. All headquarters were well off roads: gun positions even more so. All our batteries were well dug in and camouflaged; morale was excellent. Their only gripe was wanting "more targets." The Japs supplied that briefly on the afternoon of the 13th with a bombing raid on Cabcaban while we were at Colonel Charles G. Sage's nearby 200th CA. They used white phosphorus incendiaries, burning the town as the Filipino nipa shacks went up like tinder. It was pitiful to see the natives carrying their few little belongings up the road, looking for another place to live.

When I returned to Corregidor I found that Forts Drum and Frank had been under desultory fire from Cavite since morning. Based on the best information available the enemy fire had been returned by Battery Roberts (6") at Fort Drum, and Batteries Koehler and Frank North at Fort Frank. A muzzle burst at Battery Koehler killed one Philippine Scout soldier and wounded 7 others besides the battery commander, Captain Robert J. White. The latter died in Bilibid Prison Camp a few months later as a result of this wound.

The next day Fort Frank was included in the enemy artillery bombardment. In fact, from that time onward there was the constant threat of enemy fire from the Cavite shore as the Japs unlimbered additional batteries including 150mm and 240mm howitzers. Daily counter-battery action from the fortified islands, especially from Fort Frank, answered the enemy fire. The following quotations from my diary notes of February 15 are typical:

- 3:40 P.M.—Enemy opened fire on Corregidor from Cavite. Shells falling in vicinity of south dock.
- 3:52 P.M.—Batteries Hearn (12" gun) and Hamilton (155mm guns) on Corregidor and Frank North opened counter-battery.
- 4:10 P.M.—Enemy firing ceased.
- 4:23 P.M.—Capt. Ivey (observer on Cavite mainland) reports salvos hitting right in area of enemy gun flashes. He recommends 155s sweep the area. Battery Frank North starting to "sweep."
- 4:28 P.M.—Fort Frank under enemy fire.
- 4:35 P.M.—Corregidor under fire.
- 4:55 P.M.—Enemy ceased firing.
- 5:15 P.M.—Enemy firing on Fort Hughes: broke water pipe at Battery Leach (6").



Fort Drum was recaptured by pumping 3200 gallons of a gas and oil mixture into the fort and igniting it with the explosion of a 600-lb. charge of TNT.

- 7:00 P.M.—Battery Frank North completed 139 rounds.
- 7:11 P.M.—Fort Hughes again under harassing fire.
- 9:08 P.M.—Corregidor under harassing fire.
- 9:15 P.M.—Firing ceased.


Late that afternoon Captain Ivey and his observing detail were attacked by a Jap patrol and forced to withdraw. An American corporal was killed and Sergeant Boyd of the 60th captured but Captain Ivey and two Philippine Scouts eventually returned to Fort Frank safely.

Although sporadic, this harassing fire was none the less annoying. You never knew when or where an enemy shell might land. For instance, at 9:30 P.M. on 18 February, just after Battery Frank North ceased counter-battery fire, an enemy shell hit in the powder pit of No. 4 gun wounding 7 members of the crew who were cleaning the gun.

Another lucky shot for the enemy happened the next night. Sometime after midnight the harbor boat *Neptune*, completely blacked out of course, approached the Fort Frank dock to deliver supplies but withdrew when a shell landed nearby. Later, at about 3:35 A.M. she again came in to dock. At that instant an enemy shell hit her forward deck. Fifteen drums of gasoline went up in a flash as did 500 powder charges for 155mm guns intended for Fort Frank. The fireworks turned the ship into a blazing furnace and threw burning powder all over the post, starting numerous brush fires. Miraculously there were no casualties as the crew jumped overboard and swam ashore but the ship and all supplies aboard were a total loss.

After daylight the next morning Colonel Napoleon Boudreau, the Fort Commander at Fort Frank, sent a volunteer working party of 15 men to Calumpan barrio⁸ on the Cavite mainland to repair the fresh water pipe line which had been blown up two days previously by the Japanese. (Both Forts Frank and Drum had salt water distillation plants for emergency use.) While the men were working, they were attacked but succeeded in killing 25-30 Japs and got back to Fort Frank safely. One Philippine Scout was wounded in the arm. Colonel Boudreau covered their withdrawal with 75mm fire from Fort Frank. The working detail credited Private James L. Elkins, 60th CA, with most of the Jap casualties. He was armed with a Browning automatic rifle. His only comment was: "I got all I saw." The enemy retaliated by burning Calumpan and Patungan barrios that night.

⁸Barrio—Filipino native village.



The author inspecting Topside officers' quarters on Corregidor after liberation from Japanese prison camp.

On 20 February Battery Woodruff (14" gun) at Fort Hughes joined in the counter-battery action for the first time. That night a friendly submarine exited carrying President Quezon and Vice-President Osmeña of the Philippine Commonwealth, together with the private and official family of the President. The party was landed safely in the Visayan Islands, from which point some weeks later they proceeded by patrol-torpedo boat to Mindanao and thence by air to Australia.

Some time previously General Moore had ordered the emplacing of two 155mm guns in a new battery position at Fort Hughes, sited to fire back inside the bay. On 22 February Lieutenant Colonel Armand Hopkins, in command at Fort Hughes, reported the construction completed and the battery ready for action. This was named Battery Williams, in honor of First Lieutenant George L. Williams, CAC, killed in action at Abucay, Bataan, early in January.

For the next few days there was a period of Japanese inactivity during which all batteries took advantage of the opportunity to dig in deeper and several fired calibration problems. Meanwhile Batteries Woodruff, Koehler, and Frank North fired daily interdictions at Japanese activities in Ternate and Maragondon on the Cavite mainland. Native informers reported the enemy improving trails, using forced Filipino labor, to new gun positions high in the Pico del Oro hills overlooking Fort Frank.

In 1921 a tunnel for the Seaward Defense Command Post on Corregidor had been started but work was discontinued the next year on account of treaty agreements. After

Pearl Harbor the Engineers began again and by the end of February had it about completed.

At 2:00 P.M. February 26 Colonel Boudreau at Fort Frank scattered a Jap looting party in Calumpan barrio with 75mm shrapnel. He also transmitted to Harbor Defense Headquarters a propaganda message he had received from the Japanese through a Filipino civilian. It read:

Surrender Carabao (Fort Frank) and save lives; the whole area along the coast line of Cavite Province is now a Japanese Military Reservation; large guns in large numbers are being massed there; Carabao will be reduced by our mighty artillery fire, likewise Drum; after reduction of Carabao and Drum our invincible artillery will pound Corregidor into submission, batter it, weaken it, preparatory to a final assault by crack Japanese troops. Be wise; surrender now and receive preferential Japanese treatment.

Other similar messages were dropped in leaflet form from time to time.

Early in March an 8" railway gun, which had been brought over from Bataan, was mounted on a prepared concrete base near Road Junction 43, east of Malinta Hill on Corregidor. It had a range of 24,000 yards and all-around fire except to the west which was screened by Malinta Hill. After proof firing by the Ordnance Department it was ready for service but as no troops were available for assignment to it the gun was never in action against the enemy. It had been anticipated that troops would be available from Bataan to man this battery.

Frequently, in early March, we were receiving word of some Philippine vessel trying to reach us with supplies from the southern islands. Among the casualties were the inter-island steamers *Princessa*, *Don Esteban*, *Legaspi*, and *Florence D.*, while the *Don Isidro* had been bombed and sunk in Port Darwin harbor, Australia. This prompted some one to suggest that the theme song for "MacArthur's Magnificents" should be, "I'm Waiting for Ships that Never Come In." Others were wondering whether the chalk "V" on some of the soldiers helmets stood for "Victory" or "Victim." All of us were strong for Walter Winchell however when he remarked in a States broadcast we picked up: "To hell with this hero stuff; let's send them some HELP!"

By that time the Engineers on Corregidor had completed the construction of reinforced concrete shelters over several 75mm beach defense guns for protection from dive bombing attacks. They had also many other projects under way such as drilling of additional wells, bomb-proofing the Morrison Hill gasoline storage tanks, construction of personnel bomb-proofs at various batteries, erection of Malinta water tanks, Panama Munts (circular rails) for 155s, etc. Many tunnels were started by troops, with the Engineers supplying technical advice and supervision. Innumerable splinter-proofs were built by Beach Defense troops using such scrap or salvage materials as could be spared from the main projects. In fact, all concerned worked unceasingly to better their positions.

In the meantime we had had our 75th air raid of the war while our antiaircraft batteries competed for top honors in

enemy planes shot down. Seacoast batteries in action most frequently against Jap activities in Cavite during this period were Hearn and Hamilton on Corregidor, Woodruff and Leach on Hughes, Roberts and Hoyle on Drum, and Koehler and Frank North on Frank. Our main difficulty was lack of observation. Also, it was almost impossible to spot the enemy artillery flashes as usually he held his firing to the morning hours when we were looking directly into the sun.

About 4 March General MacArthur called the Harbor Defense Commander, General Moore, into conference and told him that he had received orders from President Roosevelt "to proceed to Australia." He had protested to the President but had nevertheless been ordered to leave. By that time the enemy had established his blockade of the entire Philippines; he had complete air supremacy, and his navy "Wild Eagles" were roaming the Philippine skies daily in search of prey. However, on the night of 11 March, General MacArthur, with his family and staff and Admiral Rockwell with his 16th Naval District staff started on the now famous "dash through the lines." Four fast navy patrol-torpedo boats were assigned the task of transporting the official party to Mindanao, from which point all flew to Australia four days later.

USAFFE was succeeded by the United States Forces in the Philippines or USFIP, with Lieutenant General Wainwright in command. He immediately moved to Corregidor from Bataan but made no change in the existent Harbor Defense Command and no change in the conduct of the defense by General Moore. The morning after he arrived General Moore was showing him around and they had just reached Battery Monja, on the South Shore Road, when an air raid came over. General Wainwright rather protested having to step into the sidehill shelter available but a moment later bombs were bursting outside, causing a big landslide and wrecking the battery kitchen. It had been a narrow escape. When they returned from the inspection tour they had just left their car to enter Headquarters when another load of bombs came down, one of which demolished the car they had vacated.

"My Gosh!" exclaimed General Wainwright. "On Bataan you can move around a little, but here on Corregidor you're right on the bull's-eye."

Before breakfast on March 15 Jap artillery shells began falling on Fort Frank. At 8:00 A.M. General Moore and I went to a station atop Malinta Hill to observe the action. By that time Forts Drum and Hughes were also under fire. Our batteries Hearn and Hamilton opened counter-battery but sun and haze combined to make observation very difficult. Soon shells were landing on Corregidor at Middle-side, South Shore Road, and the south dock. During the day however Drum and Frank received the brunt of the bombardment which was from 240mm howitzers. It was certainly painful to see those heavy shells socking the little islands and to know what must be happening.

At Battery Frank North, 2 of the 4-155mm guns were destroyed and the other 2 damaged but repairable. The same was true at the 3" anti-aircraft battery manned by E-91st. 7 out of 8 mortars at Battery Koehler were out of action temporarily. Other batteries at Fort Frank received less

punishment. Thanks to splinter-proof tunnels, casualties were comparatively few although approximately 500 shells hit the tiny island.

At Fort Drum, one 240mm shell penetrated the casemate shield at Battery Roberts (6") disabling one gun temporarily. A fire was started but was extinguished before it reached the powder. Lieutenant Sam Madison and several gunners were burned and gassed by the fumes in the casemate. There were about 100 hits on Fort Drum (the concrete battleship). At 5:00 P.M., when I phoned to the fort commander, Lieutenant Colonel L. S. Kirkpatrick, Jap shells were still falling. There was a break in our conversation, then:

"Pardon the interruption, Colonel," said Kirk, "that last one bounced the phone right off the desk."

A week later Forts Hughes, Drum, and Frank were again targets for terrific artillery bombardments with the latter receiving the heaviest concentration. Again several hundred 240mm and 105mm shells hit the island.

Intelligence sources indicated considerable enemy activity in coves on the outside coast, south of Manila Bay. As a result additional batteries, which could fire in that direction, got into action. Among these were Craighill (12" mortars) on Fort Hughes, and Wilson and Marshall, the two 14" turret batteries on Fort Drum. During all of this period nightly details of 3 officers and 150 men on Corregidor were loading out barges of supplies to Bataan.

SECOND AERIAL BOMBARDMENT PERIOD AND BATAAN REDUCTION

24 March witnessed what the Japanese press called "the largest air raid carried on so far in the Philippines." The objective was Corregidor. A Tokyo news release the night before had attributed continued resistance in the Philippines to several reasons all of which revolved around "the powerful fortress of Corregidor." It was soon evident that the enemy air forces had received replacements for earlier losses and had been reinforced by additional bomber units. This attack coincided with the general resumption of the offensive in Luzon by the Japanese in their final operations against Bataan and Corregidor.

In the next ten days we had 34 air raid alarms during daylight and 30 at night. One alarm sometimes lasted for two hours and included several actual raids by bombing planes. Frequently enemy aerial bombardment was accompanied by artillery fire from Cavite. The operations of March 24 were typical of what followed. Here is a summary:

- 7:07 A.M.—Batteries Woodruff, Marshall and Koehler opened fire on Cavite targets.
- 9:24 A.M.—Air Raid Alarm No. 77 sounded.
- 9:25 A.M.—9 heavy bombers, a new type in this area, bombed Middleside and Morrison Hill.
- 9:45 A.M.—27 heavy bombers came in over tail of Corregidor and bombed Middleside, closely followed by 17 heavies bombing Top-side.
- 9:50 A.M.—25 planes followed by 9 more made another attack. Meanwhile, artillery shells from

enemy batteries in Cavite were bursting on Corregidor. Several fires were started, communication cables and water mains cut, and an ammunition dump of 75mm shells on Morrison Hill was set off. These shells were exploding for hours. Battery Wheeler (12" guns) had a direct bomb hit on the racer of No. 1, putting it out of action temporarily.

11:00 A.M.—All Clear sounded.

2:35 P.M.—Air Raid Alarm No. 78. 9 heavy bombers approached Corregidor from SE. Bombs dropped on Kindley Field.

2:38 P.M.—7 more planes from SE with more bombs. Shelling from mainland also.

3:29 P.M.—All Clear.

3:52 P.M.—Air Raid Alarm No. 79. 9 heavy bombers hit Kindley Field again.

4:20 P.M.—All Clear.

4:40 P.M.—Air Raid Alarm No. 80. Mariveles and Cabcaban areas hit by 9 heavies.

5:03 P.M.—All Clear.

9:15 P.M.—Air Raid Alarm No. 81. 3 medium bombers dropped incendiary bombs in Cheney Ravine, Corregidor; returned later and bombed Bottomside.

10:34 P.M.—All Clear.

Bombs dropped during the day's raids were of heavier type than formerly, estimated as some 1100 lbs., 500 lbs., and none (except incendiary) less than 200 lbs. 6 enemy planes were shot down and others, severely damaged, were probably lost to the enemy. Altitudes for the heavy bombers varied from 21,000 to 30,000 feet. That day, for the second time, a car I had been driving was demolished by bombs only seconds after I had left it to enter an observing station.

The next day's seven bombings seemed to concentrate on the Bottomside area, Malinta Hill, and the tail of the island. Numerous wooden buildings were burned including the Post Bakery thus depriving us thereafter of the bread component of our rations. At the cold storage plant, the bombing burst the ammonia pipes thus putting the finale to use of that facility and necessitating the immediate issue of the remaining small stock of frozen beef for Bataan and ourselves. Always, between raids, communication details were at work repairing lines.

On the morning of 26 March I was making my daily Operations Officer rounds of the batteries when the air raid alarm sounded. I stopped at B-60th, an anti-aircraft gun battery at Topside. Flash messages were coming in continually on the AAIS phone and ran something like this:

"Six enemy dive bombers over Ternate, flying west."

"Motors heard in the south."

"Nine Jap Zero fighters over Mariveles, high, flying southeast."

"Seven heavy bombers, high, over Monja Island, coming toward Corregidor."

A Texas anti-aircrafter on the height finder drawled:

"Somethin' tells me the Japs have air superiority."

The bombers continued to approach. The sergeant in charge of the director to lateral observer:

"Get on that leading plane and keep tracking."

Reply: "I will if they'll keep the bombs out of the way so I can see it." He wasn't crazy either. The bomb bays opened and down they came, from 27,000 feet. That was more than 5 miles up and they would take over 40 seconds coming down. With the bombs halfway down the planes came within range and the battery commander, Captain Arthur Huff, gave the order:

"COMMENCE FIRING!"

Battery B fired 18 rounds, all being in the air before the first one burst. One bomber started smoking badly, dropped out of the formation, and lost altitude until she crashed in Manila Bay. One less to worry about. Most of the bombs hit on Morrison Hill that time, two straddling the height finder at C-60th. The detail ducked but the instrument was knocked out of adjustment.

It took plenty of iron nerve to stand there turning a hand-wheel or wait, projectile in hand, for the order to load, with the bombs falling faster every second. My hat is still off to those anti-aircraft batteries.

Inasmuch as the enemy heavy bomber operations were then based on Clark Field his attacks extended over a longer period of daylight hours than in December and January. There were many landslides blocking roads, besides impassable bomb craters, so that Engineer road crews were kept busy continually on repair work. On March 24 a considerable quantity of TNT stored in the north end of Topside barracks received a direct hit and blew up, demolishing that end of the barracks. No personnel had been quartered there since Pearl Harbor.

Early on the morning of 27 March it was noticed that 45 bancas⁴ had been assembled on the beach of the Cavite mainland, south of Fort Frank. The Fort Commander, Colonel Boudreau, interpreted this as a preparation to send a landing party to test his defenses. He opened fire with 75mm guns and destroyed all bancas. Every day various seacoast batteries engaged every reasonable target on the Cavite mainland with artillery fire.

At 5:00 p.m. on 30 March 2 bi-motored bombers approached Corregidor at just above 20,000 feet. Both were shot down in a brief fire action which caused much concern to the Japanese. Their excitement, evidenced in intercepted radio messages, suggested that persons of importance may have been aboard. Later, in prison camp, we read in the Japanese press, under the caption *A Year Ago Today*, this quote:

"A group of Axis officials including military attaches are now on an air tour of the southern areas."

We wondered. Anyway, the Japs kept their bombers up to 30,000 feet thereafter.

The first few days in April developed relatively less enemy activity against the fortified islands as the Japanese

⁴Bancas—native small boats.

were concentrating their efforts against the Bataan peninsula in accordance with their radio announcement of April 2 that, "we are starting an all-out offensive in Bataan." This culminated in the capitulation of the Luzon Force on 9 April.

The enemy contented himself during this period with occasional attacks on the island forts by small formations of bombers and daily shelling from Cavite which was answered by our counter-battery.

The early fall of Bataan appearing unavoidable, orders were issued on 8 April for the withdrawal of the two 3" gun batteries that were extending our antiaircraft defense into Bataan. These were G-60th and C-91st. The movement was accomplished during the night of 8-9 April amid vast congestion and confusion along all roads in the Mariveles area caused mainly by the masses of civilian refugees retreating before the Japanese. Due to forcible intervention by the Military Police, the troops were permitted to withdraw only two 3" antiaircraft guns and about 650 rounds of ammunition. All equipment left behind such as antiaircraft guns, searchlights, radio direction finder, fire control instruments and ammunition was destroyed or damaged beyond repair. This had been the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Howard Breitung, 60th CA.

From 6:10 p.m. 8 April till 5:00 a.m. 9 April upon call from the Luzon Force Commander, Battery Hearn on Corregidor put down interdiction fires on Bataan roads to delay the southward advance of the enemy.

When Bataan fell, General Wainwright directed that no troops would be brought to Corregidor except the 45th Inf. (PS), our antiaircraft gun batteries mentioned above, and the nurses; also, that no civilians would be evacuated to Corregidor. The 45th was actually assembled but never reached Mariveles for embarkation. The nurses did get over safely.

However, in spite of the General's prohibition, about 1600 miscellaneous Army, Navy, and Philippine Constabulary, plus 800 civilians rushed into Corregidor. All night 8-9 April and all the next day refugees from Bataan poured across the narrow channel to "The Rock" by boats, rafts, bancas, or any floating means. Leaflets dropped in Bataan that day stated:

"Your convoy is due in the Philippines on 15 April but you won't be alive to see it. Ha! Ha!"

At 1:10 P.M. on 9 April we could see troops in fatigue clothing marching northeast on the Cabcaban road. Thus the beginning of the infamous "Death March" out of Bataan. Meanwhile, Corregidor had been subjected to 4 bombing attacks during the morning and Topside was under artillery fire from Cavite. At 3:40 P.M. 9 planes, in waves of 3, bombed Batteries Wheeler and Geary and the Ordnance Instrument Shop. Returning at 3:49 P.M. they proceeded to bomb Malinta Hill and Kindley Field.

All vessels were moved back to the south harbor for better protection from Bataan. The Cavite shore being considerably farther away, that seemed the lesser of two evils.

The artillery personnel from Bataan was assigned to various artillery missions while all others were turned over to Colonel S. L. Howard, USMC, the Beach Defense Commander, to augment his force. Such civilians as were

physically able were drafted as laborers for the Quartermaster, the Army Transport Service, or the Engineers. Others parked themselves in Malinta Tunnel day and night.

At 4:00 P.M. 9 April, a Jap 75mm battery which had been rushed forward opened fire on Corregidor from the beach near Cabcaban, Bataan, as a foretaste of what we were to expect. As this battery was in plain sight it was quickly destroyed by 155mm fire from Battery Kysor. However, when our forces in Bataan were out of the way, the enemy lost no time in moving his artillery mass forward and into defiladed positions from which to pound Corregidor and Fort Hughes.

FINAL BOMBARDMENT AND ASSAULT PERIOD

The next morning (10 April) an enemy observation balloon was seen, for the first time, rising from the vicinity of Lamao, Bataan, concurrently with a bombing attack on Topside. A few minutes later a Japanese plane was seen landing on Cabcaban air strip just behind our own captive troops on the road. The day continued:

8:35 A.M.—2d string of bombs—landed at Middleside.

8:50 A.M.—Artillery shells from Cavite shore falling near Ordnance Point (Corregidor).

9:50 A.M.—Fort Frank under fire.

9:52 A.M.—4 flights of 3 each bombed Topside and Morrison Hill.

9:58 A.M.—2 bombers hit Topside.

10:43 A.M.—2 bombers again hit Topside.

10:56 A.M.—Enemy shelling Corregidor from south mainland.

11:15 A.M.—Bombs dropped at Bottomside and Morrison Hill.

11:21 A.M.—Jap plane landed at Cabcaban airfield, Bataan.

11:27 A.M.—2 heavy bombers hit Morrison Hill.

11:44 A.M.—4 heavies hit between Morrison Hill and Middleside.

11:47 A.M.—3 planes bombed Morrison Hill.

12:20 P.M.—Jap plane took off from Cabcaban.

12:22 P.M.—Long column of our troops seen marching north on Cabcaban road.

1:13 P.M.—9 heavy bombers, in flights of 3, dropped bombs along South Shore Road.

And so on, hour after hour. Perhaps it should be mentioned that Morrison Hill was an exposed elevation on Corregidor, facing Bataan, where were located two seacoast batteries, Grubbs and Morrison, and an antiaircraft gun battery (C-60th). All of these took terrific punishment.

All our antiaircraft batteries were the particular objectives of enemy bombers that day but shortly thereafter anything visible from Bataan was subjected to gruelling artillery fire at comparatively short ranges. With the great eleva-

tions available in Bataan for observation points, plus captive balloons and their own airplanes to spot artillery fire for them, the Japanese were able to adjust quickly and accurately on any point desired. This factor contributed more than any other to the ultimate wearing down of the defenses, this, and the realization that no help was coming.

In the late afternoon of 11 April, five landing barges appeared from around Hornos Point, the southwestern tip of Bataan, hugging the shore as they headed for the inner bay. When Batteries Rock Point (155mm), Sunset (155mm) and Hanna (3") opened fire the boats promptly retreated outside and around the Point.

On April 12 Battery Kysor destroyed a Japanese harbor vessel off the coast of Bataan but was immediately subjected to counter-battery. Geary's mortars then opened fire on the enemy but were in turn shelled and bombed. There were 9 separate bombings of Corregidor that day while artillery fire was almost continuous. Battery Craighill (12" mortars) on Fort Hughes also participated in the counter-battery action and was shelled from Bataan.

By that time all seacoast batteries and searchlights facing Bataan were under daily accurate artillery bombardment and it was with the greatest difficulty that Ordnance personnel were able to keep some batteries repaired. As time progressed some guns were put out of action permanently.

In contrast with the Cavite shelling where a warning whistle permitted you to hit the dirt if you were on your feet, we found that shells from Bataan, due to its closer proximity, arrived simultaneously with the boom of the cannon. If one caught you it was just too bad. One such shell landed in one of the gun pits of C-60th on Morrison Hill, instantly killing Lieutenant Pace.

During a heavy bombardment on the morning of 15 April part of the Philippine Army personnel manning Battery James (4-3" guns) took shelter in excavations into Morrison Hill behind the battery. The intensity of the enemy artillery fire collapsed the hillside above the entrances, suffocating the 40 Philippine Army occupants.

The Seaward Defense Command, some time previously, had organized a special spotting section with officers detailed as observers in OP's at Topside, Morrison Hill, the Mine Command OP, Malinta Hill, and on the *Don Jose*, a commercial vessel burned and beached off Hooker Point (tail of Corregidor). From 12 April on this group concentrated on locating enemy batteries in Bataan for our counter-battery action.

On 17 April three B-17's from Australia via Mindanao completely surprised the Japanese (and us) with bombing raids on the Jap occupied Clark and Nichols Fields. Our pleasure was short-lived however as we learned the next day that the raiding planes had used the small remaining stock of aviation gas on Mindanao for their return hop to Australia. Nevertheless this demonstration encouraged us to hope that more American planes might be sent our way rather than across the Atlantic.

For several days no 240mm howitzer fire had come out of Cavite and on 18 April the reason became apparent. These heavy batteries had been moved around through Manila and emplaced in southern Bataan for bombardment of Corregidor. Thereafter they were a constant threat and with their high angle fire were able to blast our 12" mortar

pits which flat trajectory weapons had been unable to reach. By that time a number of our seacoast and antiaircraft guns had been disabled. Battery Morrison (6" guns) was out completely and the personnel manning it (C-91st from Bataan) had been transferred to Battery Grubbs, 2-10" guns facing Bataan.

At Topside all height finders were out but one. A telephone circuit from that one provided altitudes for the other batteries pending repair of their own instruments. It was apparent that everything visible from Bataan was fast being put out of action thus crippling our counter-battery work. To remedy this I suggested, and General Moore approved, the selection of a number of 155mm positions defiladed from Bataan. Ten were chosen. Guns would be emplaced in some of these to fire counter-battery. That night they would be moved to other positions and the scheme repeated. The plan worked splendidly. These were called "roving guns" and were designated by the name of the officer commanding the battery. Enemy fire inflicted minor damage on the matériel each day but frequent inspections and efficient ordnance repairs kept these roving guns ready for action most of the time.

On 24 April, starting at 3:00 P.M. an exceptionally heavy concentration of 240mm fire was put down on Battery Crockett (2-12" guns), punishing the battery severely. No. 1 gun was put out of action and there were several casualties. The rear of the battery emplacement was a mass of debris. Shot hoists were ruined and a fire was started in the power passages of the emplacement but fortunately it did not reach the powder rooms.

The controlled mine channel on the north side of Corregidor being then subject to artillery fire from Bataan, two navy small boats started sweeping a channel through the contact mine field south of Corregidor in order to permit passage of our own vessels, if any.

Reports which had been received indicated that the enemy might be assembling a landing force up the east coast of Bataan, inside Manila Bay. After dark on 24 April the U.S. Engineer launch *Night Hawk*, First Lieutenant James Seater, C.E., in command, with a volunteer crew of six enlisted men from the 59th and 60th Coast Artillery regiments, made a reconnaissance up the east coast of Bataan looking for any concentration of troops or landing craft. Off Lamao they contacted a small Japanese boat with two men whom they took prisoner. Continuing, off Limay, they were hailed by a larger launch (about 120'). The *Night Hawk* opened machine-gun fire killing most of the Jap crew and setting fire to the boat.

Meanwhile the two prisoners jumped overboard and were shot. Lieutenant Seater was attaching a line to the enemy launch to tow her in when other enemy boats came rushing out from shore. As it was too dark to see anything worth while on shore anyway, he cut loose and ran for it, reaching Corregidor safely at about 5:00 A.M. of the next day.

On that day we had four separate bombing attacks with enemy dive bombers concentrating on shipping in the south harbor. The harbor boat *Miley* was burned, and sank. Craighill, Geary and two roving batteries fired counter-battery. Standing orders to the contrary, a large crowd had congregated outside the west portal of Malinta Tunnel

that night for a last smoke before going to bed. At 9:58 P.M. a heavy shell exploded in their midst, causing about 50 casualties. Several were killed instantly.

Beginning on the night of 26 April the Navy Inshore Patrol, at General Moore's direction, stationed two small vessels east of Corregidor to patrol about 600 yards offshore during hours of darkness and to give warning of the approach of any enemy by a vertical sweep of their searchlights.

The next two days were a prelude to a tremendous offensive effort by the enemy on 29 April in honor of Emperor Hirohito's birthday. We had several bombing raids each day while Kindley Field and the north dock area received the heaviest shelling. Battery Monja and roving batteries Farris, Byrne, and Rose were especially active against enemy targets, the latter setting fire to a Japanese harbor boat, the *Apo*, with four direct hits.

Battery Way (4-12" mortars) on Corregidor, which had been out of service for several years, had been taken over by Battery E-60th under Major William Massello, when they returned from Bataan. Having completed reconditioning the battery, it was proof fired shortly after noon on the 28th and reported ready for action.

As anticipated the enemy "celebration" began early on the 29th. As our Air Raid Alarm No. 260 sounded, two flights of bombers hit Fort Hughes, 3 dive bombers strafed Malinta Hill and south dock areas, enemy shells from Bataan hit Bottomside, and his observation balloon rose above Cabcaben. The record continues:

7:55 A.M.—6 dive bombers hit Malinta Hill and 92d CA garage.

8:00 A.M.—Extremely heavy shelling at both portals Malinta Tunnel and north dock.

8:21 A.M.—Enemy shelling Topside while observation plane overhead adjusts fire. Stockade level and old Spanish Fort receiving some shells.

8:40 A.M.—Counter-battery fired from Batteries Marshall, Crofton, Way, Cheney, Craighill,

10:00 A.M. Geary, Byrne, Rose and Farris.

9:23 A.M.—Bombs dropped on west end of Corregidor.

9:35 A.M.—Battery Ramsay and H-60th bombed. Fire started below Middleside incinerator.

9:57 A.M.—Middleside barracks bombed; several casualties.

9:58 A.M.—Enemy shelling North Point.

10:02 A.M.—Two ammunition dumps at Topside on fire. Shells exploding continually.

Thus it continued until dark. As a result of the enemy action, a number of our observing stations on Malinta Hill were destroyed. The power plant for No. 8 seacoast searchlight was hit and burned. The three 75mm beach defense guns atop Malinta Hill were wrecked as was a 1.1 quadruple mount, automatic weapon installed there. Several officers and enlisted men were killed and more wounded. Numerous wooden buildings that had escaped thus far

were burned. All in all it was an extremely busy day for us.

That night two naval seaplanes from Australia, via Mindanao, landed in the bay south of Corregidor at about 11:00 P.M. They brought some much needed hospital supplies and 740 mechanical fuzes for 3" antiaircraft ammunition. As soon as these were unloaded, fifty selected passengers (including about 38 American nurses) were taken aboard and the planes took off for Lake Lanao, Mindanao, without having been detected by the Japanese.

With the enemy's final preparations for assault on Corregidor, the action progressed with ever increasing tempo. Day and night we were under fire from some of the more than 400 pieces of artillery which the Japanese had emplaced in Bataan and Cavite. This was interspersed with several bombings daily of Corregidor and Fort Hughes while our antiaircraft and seacoast batteries engaged all reasonable enemy targets.

On May 2 the Coast Artillery Mine Planter *Harrison* in the south harbor was hit and burned, and the Master, Chief Warrant Officer James Murray killed. In fact, the vessels remaining were such frequent objectives for bombing and strafing that the crews came ashore. Colonel Val Foster, then Fort Commander at Fort Hughes, found useful assignment for most of the navy personnel from the three gunboats.

That was the day the Crockett-Geary area at Topside underwent a 5-hour plastering from 240mm howitzers while other calibers were sweeping the rest of the island. At 4:27 P.M., a big shell penetrated the magazines of Battery Geary, which blew up, taking out the whole center traverse and reducing the battery to rubble. The heavy mortars were scattered over the landscape while huge blocks of concrete were thrown more than half a mile. Fortunately, most of the personnel had taken shelter in a store room at the south end of the emplacement and were unharmed. Four men who were trapped in a rear passage at the north end of the battery were liberated next morning when the engineers drilled through a concrete wall. As I saw them driven away in an ambulance I had little hope for any of them but three of the four did recover.

No. 1 Harbor Defense searchlight, near Battery Point, also received a terrific concentration of 240mm fire which buried the light. Over 300 shells exploded there before Battery Marshall, firing from Fort Drum, silenced these enemy guns.

The next day was more of the same, with no respite from the incessant shelling and bombing. At about 8:00 P.M., a U.S. submarine stopped outside the south channel mine field for an hour. Navy small boats were sent out to her via the recently swept channel through the mine field, taking about a dozen army and navy officers, 13 or 14 American nurses, and many USAFFE and USFIP official records.

I think we all realized that there would be no more outgoing groups and I'll never forget that little procession of official cars leaving Malinta Tunnel for the south dock. Each fortunate passenger was happy to be escaping from that hell on earth, but sick with pity for the rest of us. Among the nurses was Lieutenant Mary Lohr who took a hurriedly scribbled note from my hand as she waved "Good-bye" and, upon her arrival in San Francisco, kindly delivered it to my wife.

On 4 May there was again the continuous drum-drum of detonations, separated by seconds only. After having pounded our batteries and observation points for weeks the enemy attack switched that day to the Corregidor beaches facing Bataan, such as James Ravine, Power Plant Ravine, and the beach between North and Cavalry Points. Beach Defense communications on that side of the island were disrupted and some machine guns and 75s were damaged. General Moore alerted our beach defenses for possible landing attack before the moon rose at 11:00 P.M. No Japs showed up however.

5 May saw all four of the fortified islands under heavy enemy fire. It seemed that as soon as one of our batteries opened up, several Jap batteries cracked down on it. When we were fortunate enough to silence one, another opened up in its stead. During the morning we had four bombing raids on Corregidor. At 12:30 P.M., under an order from General Wainwright, heavy counter-battery fire was opened *simultaneously* by Batteries Crofton, Marshall, Way, Cheney, Wheeler, Monja, and roving batteries Wright, Rose and Gulick. Three enemy ammunition dumps were set on fire and several of his batteries silenced, at least temporarily.

Air Raid Alarm No. 300 was sounded at 2:47 P.M. with Fort Hughes on the receiving end. Both mortar pits at Battery Craighill were filled with debris and there were several casualties.

By 6:30 P.M. all the fortified islands were being pounded terrifically. On Corregidor, it was especially the north shore and tail of the island. Communication lines were shot out in many places, numerous beach defense guns and searchlights were out of action, and many beach defense land mines had been blown up by enemy artillery fire.

At 9:00 P.M., Colonel Howard, the Beach Defense Commander, reported all of his stations manned. At 10:30 P.M., General Moore again alerted all control points for possible landing attack. The two small naval vessels were stationed as usual east and northeast of Corregidor, to warn of the approach of enemy landing boats by a vertical sweep of their searchlights.

At that time, the Japanese cannonading of the tail of the island was very heavy and many telephone lines were still out. Most of the beach defense installations on the north side of the island were practically non-existent, with barbed wire entanglements, machine-gun emplacements, personnel shelters, and most of the 75mm guns destroyed. The terrain was bare of trees and vegetation and the ground was powdered dust. Malinta Hospital was full and overflowing with sick and wounded.

I was on duty at the Operations Desk in Harbor Defense Headquarters until midnight when I turned over to my assistant Lieutenant Colonel Clair Conzelman. Several of us were still there, talking with General Moore when a Marine Corps runner arrived breathless from North Point and reported a landing there "of probably 600 men."⁵

Messages were immediately sent to all control stations by every means available. The Seaward Defense Commander, Colonel Bunker, was ordered to send the 59th CA personnel manning Batteries Cheney, Wheeler, Crockett, and Geary

to positions in Beach Defense Reserve. These included Batteries B, C, D, and H. Later, other Coast Artillery troops manning seacoast and anti-aircraft armament were released to the Beach Defense Commander in accordance with a prearranged plan of priorities.

An enemy barrage caught C-59th (Captain Harry Schenk) while passing through Bottomside and killed several, including the battery executive, Captain Arthur D. Thompson. This battery and B-59th (Captain Herman Hauck), moved to positions in readiness for counter-attack in the East Sector, under the Beach Defense Commander.

A Scout messenger from Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd Biggs, 92d CA, brought word he had formed a line across Kindley Field Water Tank Hill with Batteries E and F, 92d, and was cooperating with the Marines in the East Sector Defense.

Out beyond the Jap landing point was one 2-gun 75mm beach defense battery, commanded by First Lieutenant Ray G. Lawrence, 92d CA, which had never disclosed its position. Its fire apparently came as a complete surprise to the Japanese. These two guns fired a total of 193 rounds at close range, sinking many landing barges, and accounting for hundreds of casualties. Lieutenant Lawrence stated later that the continuous stream of defending tracer bullets from the shoreline gave enough illumination to permit firing at enemy barges. By 1:50 A.M. the full moon was lighting up the situation.

Information obtained subsequently from Japanese officers indicated that the first wave consisted of 2,000 of whom only 800 got ashore. Their second wave totalled 10,000; losses, over 4,000. All batteries that could bear on the landing party opened fire, including those at Fort Hughes. Meanwhile our beach defense forces engaged in hand to hand fighting with the enemy on shore.

At 4:00 A.M., Fort Drum opened fire on the Cabcaben dock. As dawn broke about 20 minutes later, a wave of landing boats was seen approaching our north dock area. Drum changed target to the boats which were also taken under fire by roving batteries Wright and Gulick with damaging effect. A-91st with Battery Stockade (1-155mm) also got into the action. This artillery fire broke up what appeared to be another landing attack destined for Bottomside and Power Plant Ravine.

The East Sector Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Curtis L. Beecher, USMC, had reported "situation well in hand," but new enemy landings behind our line near Infantry Point necessitated withdrawal toward Malinta Hill.

The Beach Defense Reserve Battalion and Batteries B and C, 59th CA, counterattacked in the East Sector soon after daylight and drove the enemy back some distance but with the sunrise, effective artillery fire from Bataan was brought to bear on our troops while dive bombers in large numbers strafed them mercilessly. Some of our men were driven back into Malinta Tunnel while all others were pinned to the ground.

At 10:20 A.M. it was learned that enemy tanks had landed on the island and were assembling in the vicinity of Kindley Field. General Wainwright sent for General Moore and informed him that, in view of the present situation and what might be expected to occur during the ensuing night,

⁵As nearly as can be determined the 1st wave of the Japanese landing attack hit the beach at 11:30 P.M., 5 May, 1942.

and in order to prevent the further useless sacrifice of lives, he had decided to surrender the fortified islands to the Japanese at noon. He was going to have a message to that effect broadcast at once. He further directed that the armament be destroyed in accordance with secret instructions already issued to regimental and fort commanders, this to be accomplished by noon; also, that the command would lay down arms at noon at which time the Corregidor flag would be lowered and burned and a white flag displayed. These instructions were relayed to all concerned as fast and insofar as disrupted communications permitted. All units received the orders in time to comply with instructions except Fort Hughes.

At noon (this was 6 May 1942) our firing ceased and the post flag, which had been shot down and replaced twice under fire during the siege, was lowered and burned by Colonel Paul D. Bunker, the Seaward Defense Commander, whose Command Post was at Topside not very far from the flagpole. He was accompanied on this sad duty by Lieutenant Colonel Dwight Edison, 59th CA.

A flag of truce was carried out by Captain Golland H. Clark, USMC, accompanied by First Lieutenant Allan S. Manning, USMC. They proceeded eastward from Malinta Hill until they contacted the enemy and were taken to the senior Japanese officer on the spot. Neither nationality could speak the other's language but the difficulty was overcome when it was found that Lieutenant Manning and a Jap officer could manage a few words of French to each other. About an hour later the Marine officers returned with the word that General Wainwright should come out to the Japanese commander if he desired to discuss terms.

Accordingly General Wainwright, accompanied by General Moore and their respective aides, Lieutenant Colonel Johnnie Pugh and Major Tom Dooley, and Major Bob Brown, proceeded by car, under a white flag, to the foot of Kindley Field Water Tank Hill where they got out and walked up the hill to meet the Jap commander. Dead and dying were on every hand, the proportion being about three Japs to one American.

At the conference with the Japanese officials arrangements were made for General Wainwright to be taken to Bataan to meet General Homma, their supreme commander in the Philippines. After some delay this was accomplished by means of a Jap boat from North Point to Cabcaben, Major Dooley accompanying the General. Meanwhile General Moore and the others returned to our headquarters, traversing en route an area being swept by artillery fire from Bataan and strafing planes. The white flag flying meant nothing to our antagonists.

Around 4:00 P.M. the Japanese moved in and took charge and we were no longer free agents. That night they landed, unopposed of course, at Fort Hughes and took over, followed by similar operations the next afternoon at Forts Drum and Frank.

The final gallant defense of the Philippines had ended.

IN RETROSPECT

In retrospect, many ideas suggest themselves as to what might have been. One wonders if a closer knit defense might not have resulted had we had a real unification of the services in 1942. How much damage could the B-17s, lost at Clark Field on the opening day of the war, have done to the invading Japanese convoy? Had hostilities been deferred until the American convoys then en route reached the Philippines how much stronger would have been our defensive effort? Idle thoughts now.

The fact remains that the fortified islands of Manila Bay, and especially the island fortress of Corregidor, with an area of less than two square miles, withstood a siege by vastly superior forces on land, sea, and air, for five months. It is doubtful if any similar area had ever before been subjected to such heavy concentrations of artillery fire and aerial bombardment.

During these operations our antiaircraft had established new records in enemy planes shot down; our beach defense forces had inflicted unprecedented losses on the enemy before yielding; and our seacoast artillery had actually accomplished its assigned mission of denying Manila Bay to the enemy navy. In that connection it should be remembered that those few outmoded seacoast batteries which remained intact after the terrific bombardment and shelling to which they were subjected, actually forced the Japanese to defeat our field army and to stage a costly landing on Corregidor in order to capture these batteries and secure Manila Bay.

When informed of the surrender General MacArthur stated:

"Corregidor needs no comment from me. It has sounded its own story at the mouth of its guns. It has scrolled its own epitaph on enemy tablets. But through the bloody haze of its last reverberating shot, I shall always seem to see a vision of grim, gaunt, ghastly men, still unafraid."

Later, in a Japanese prison camp in Manchuria, a group of Dutch officers asked me to review the Corregidor campaign for them which I did on two successive evenings. At the conclusion the senior Dutch officer, Captain G. G. Bozuwa, Royal Netherlands Navy, thanked me kindly and closed with these words:

"Before the war, Corregidor was to us just a name on the map; during the war, it became to us a symbol of the matchless courage and fortitude of the American fighting forces; now, Corregidor has become for us a TRADITION!"

May the tradition of Corregidor live on in the hearts and minds of Americans everywhere!

