


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


SIXTH
UNITED STATES
ARMY

R E P O R T O F T H E

OCCUPATION
OF JAPAN

22 SEPTEMBER 1945 ★ 30 NOVEMBER 1945



R E S T R I C T E D

U.S. Army. Sixth army.

REPORT OF
THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

SIXTH UNITED STATES ARMY

22 September 1945 - 30 November 1945

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REPORT OF THE OCCUPATION
SIXTH ARMY

I. INTRODUCTION

Headquarters Sixth Army was activated on 25 January 1943 at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. General (then Lieutenant General) Walter Krueger, USA, at that time Commanding General of the Third Army, was designated to command the new army, of which he assumed command on 16 February 1943. Initially from Australia and later from Milne Bay, Good-enough Island, Finschhafen, Hollandia, Leyte, and Luzon, Headquarters Sixth Army planned and directed operations which had advanced by the summer of 1945 4000 miles from the point of their original inception. Using reoccupied Luzon as a springboard, the Sixth Army was preparing to achieve its ultimate goal---an amphibious assault against the home islands of Japan itself---when Japanese capitulation turned the planned invasion into peaceful occupation. The part played in this occupation by the Sixth Army is to be recounted in the succeeding pages.

Students of military history who are primarily interested in the planning and actual conduct of large-scale amphibious operations would be better served by studying earlier Sixth Army campaigns, such as Leyte and Luzon, instead of this operation, where no problems relative to the overwater movement of large bodies of troops were involved which had not already been encountered and solved elsewhere.

For this reason, particular stress has not been placed upon the amphibious phase of the operation. Emphasis has been placed instead on those aspects of the occupation and control of a conquered nation that presented new and different situations and problems---often non-military in nature---the solution of which consumed the major portion of the Sixth Army's time and effort.

II. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

In the period immediately following the termination of the Luzon Campaign on 30 June 1945, Sixth Army has been engaged solely in planning and preparing for the invasion of Kyushu (originally designated as the Olympic Operation but later redesignated as the Majestic Operation). This operation contemplated an assault by three army corps and one amphibious corps (Marine), totaling eleven army and three Marine divisions, all under the direct command of General Walter Krueger, the Commanding General, Sixth US Army.

For more than three years American armed forces in the Central and Southwest Pacific had been steadily and inexorably compressing the orbit of Japanese conquest from the Marshalls, the Marianas, and Ryukyus on the east, and from New Guinea and the Philippines on the south. Now for the first time the major land, sea, and air components of these two forces were to merge in the initial ground assault against the home bastion of the Empire itself---invasion along the east, south, and west coasts of Kyushu, the southernmost Japanese home island.

Preparations for the invasion had reached an advanced stage when on 2 August the Sixth Army received from GHQ, Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC) the "Basic Outline Plan for Blacklist Operation to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea after Surrender or Collapse." Although planning for the invasion was to continue, the Commander in Chief, AFPAC, directed the Commanding General, Sixth Army, to plan and prepare concurrently for the occupation of Kyushu and Western Honshu, the area of Japan assigned to the Sixth Army in the occupation plan.

On 8 August Headquarters Sixth Army received GHQ Operations Instructions Number 4, which confirmed the missions previously assigned to the Sixth Army. Subsequently Field Order 75, Headquarters Sixth Army, dated 21 August 1945, assigned zones and missions to its major subordinate commands as follows: I Corps, Nagoya-Osaka-Kyoto area of Central Honshu; X Corps, Kure-Okayama area of Southern Honshu and the island of Shikoku; and V Amphibious Corps (Marine), Kyushu and the Shimonoseki area of Western Honshu. After the unconditional surrender of the Japanese, GHQ, AFPAC, announced 15 August as B-Day, the date Operations Instructions Number 4 designated for initiation of the occupation. Following a month of continued intensive planning and preparation, the Commanding General, Sixth Army, on 14 September opened the Army Command Post Afloat aboard the USS Auburn. Thus was initiated the amphibious phase of the operation, which, despite unforeseeable delays and difficulties, was carried out smoothly and efficiently by the Fifth Amphibious Force of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral H. W. Hill, who was charged with the overwater movement and landing of the Sixth Army troops.

The V Amphibious Corps inaugurated occupation of the Sixth Army area by landing the 5th Marine Division at Sasebo on 22 September and the 2d Marine Division at Nagasaki on the following day. Later landing of the 32d Division at Sasebo on 15 October enabled the Corps to

extend its control over all key areas in its assigned zone, which included Kyushu and the southwestern tip of Honshu. Successive landings on Honshu of the 33d Division at Wakayama on 25 September, the 98th Division at Wakayama on 27 September, and the 25th Division at Nagoya on 25 October effected occupation of the I Corps area. The X Corps completed the seizure of the major Sixth Army objective by occupying Kure with the 41st Division on 6 October, and occupying Matsuyama (Shikoku) and Okayama with the 24th Division on 22 October. Having completed the movement to Japan of all Sixth Army units and having occupied all the principal objectives designated in Operations Instructions Number 4, General Krueger, as Commanding General, Sixth United States Army, directed the closure of the operations journals for the Occupation on 30 November.*

* Although the period covered by this report terminated on 30 November (the date the operations journals were closed to permit preparatory of this report), the Commanding General, Sixth Army, continued to exercise command of the occupation troops in the Army zone until 31 December 1945, at which time control passed to the Commanding General, Eighth Army. Activities during December were merely a continuation of the duties covered in this report.

III. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SIXTH ARMY AREA OF OCCUPATION

A. CLIMATE AND TERRAIN

The zone of occupation assigned to the Sixth Army extends over 46,000 square miles, encompassing the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, and the western half of Honshu. Like the remainder of Japan, this area consists of generally rugged, mountainous terrain interspersed with occasional coastal lowlands and a few broad upland valleys. Since Japan is situated in a temperate zone, the weather in the southern half of the home islands is generally not extreme, ranging from 80-90 degrees mean in summer to a 30-40 degree mean in winter, with a minimum extreme temperature of 15 degrees. Rainfall is heaviest between April and October, the highest mean monthly precipitation (10-15 inches) occurring in September.

B. ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The havoc wrought by aerial bombing has altered considerably the man-made economic structure of Japan. Cities have been wholly or partially obliterated and their former industrial importance has been destroyed. However, since the degree of permanent destruction is difficult to gauge and the former relative importance of different areas forms a definite link with the occupational mission assigned to the Sixth Army, the following paragraphs depict the economic structure of the area without regard to the alterations caused by the aerial offensive of our armed forces.

Largest and most important of the three areas is Western Honshu, which includes all of that island west of the Nagano, Yamanashi, and Kanagawa Prefectures. Here, in and around the cities of Nagoya (population 1,328,084) and Osaka (population 3,252,340), are centered the largest manufacturing districts in Japan where much of the machine tool, aircraft, electrical, chemical, and textile industries are located. Also situated in this area is the great port of Kobe (population 967,234), which lies at the focal point of the densest rail network in Japan. Forming the apex of this vital Nagoya-Osaka area is Kyoto (population 1,089,726), the former ancient capital of Japan, now a resort city in and around which is produced a great proportion of Japan's fine art and handicraft. Further to the west along the Inland Sea at Kure (population 276,085) is the most important Japanese naval base, which includes the largest combined dockyard, ship-building yard, and naval industrial plant in Japan. Other important cities in this area are Okayama (population 1,329,358) on the Inland Sea, Shimonoseki (population 196,022) at the extreme western tip of Honshu, and Tsuruga (population 31,346) on the northwestern coast of the island.

Next in importance to Western Honshu is the island of Kyushu, with a population approximating 10,000,000 spread amongst its 15,000 square miles of precipitous, granitic hills and mountains. The

southern and eastern parts of the island are chiefly agricultural, producing exportable quantities of rice and sweet potatoes, while the northwestern half of Kyushu contains almost all Southwestern Japan's coal field, Japan's greatest pig iron and steel district, and important shipyards. On this one island there are twelve cities which have population exceeding 75,000 and into which were compressed prior to the war much of the industrial sinew of Japan's empire. Chief of these cities is Nagasaki (population 252,630). Possessing one of Japan's finest natural harbors, Nagasaki is chiefly noted as one of the nation's most important shipbuilding centers and also as an air, road, ship, and rail terminal. Slightly north of Nagasaki is Sasebo (population 205,989), a major repair base for the Japanese Fleet. Other cities of importance are: Yawata (population 260,000), site of the great Imperial Iron and Steel Works, by far the largest producer of pig iron and steel in the Japanese Empire; Fukuoka (population 320,000), the administrative center of the surrounding mining and industrial area; and, to the south, Kagoshima (population 190,257), the principal port in Southern Kyushu.

Least important of the three islands is Shikoku, which is characterized by rugged, sharp-sided mountains and narrow, deep, winding valleys, and which has a population of about 3,300,000 people. Self-sustaining agriculturally, Shikoku possesses many small industries and minor ports but cannot be considered as vital to the life of Japan. Kochi (population 106,644) on the southern coast, Matsuyama (population 117,534), and Takamatsu (population 111,207) on the north coast are the chief cities of importance on the island.

C. MILITARY ASPECTS

Of the 1,600,000 Japanese ground force troops stationed in Japan at the termination of hostilities, 850,000 (comprising the Second General Army) were located in the Sixth Army area of occupation. Under the Second General Army were the 15th Area Army of two corps occupying Western Honshu and Shikoku, and the 16th Area Army of three corps occupying Kyushu. In all, this area could muster 24 infantry divisions, 6 depot divisions, and 10 independent mixed brigades. In addition, there were 120,000 army air personnel under the command of the Sixth Air Army with headquarters at Fukuoka, 110,000 personnel of the Shipping Command, and 30,000 railway troops, giving a grand total of approximately 1,000,000 military personnel in all the area which was to be occupied by Sixth Army troops.

D. SUMMARY

In brief, the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, and Western Honshu contained 55 per cent of the total Japanese population, among which were numbered 50 percent of the Japanese Army garrisoning the homeland. Also concentrated here were three of Japan's four major naval bases, all but two of its principal ports, three of its four main transportation centers, four of its six largest cities, and two-thirds of all

its cities exceeding 100,000 in population. From Shimonoseki to Nagoya extended Japan's most vital transportation channels, both by rail and through the many ports located along the Inland Sea. Such then was the nature of the area scheduled for occupation by Sixth Army troops.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF DALLAS, this 1st day of August, 1908, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State and County, personally appeared _____, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the same for the purposes and consideration therein expressed.

IV. PLANNING AND PREPARATION

A. BRIEF OF PLAN FOR INVASION OF KYUSHU

To facilitate a thorough understanding of the complications and problems which arose because of the sudden change from the Kyushu invasion plan to the occupation plan, the progress of preparations for the invasion of Kyushu will be briefly summarized.

Sixth Army was to land three corps in assault on 1 November and one corps on 4 November as follows:

- a. I Corps (25th, 33d, and 41st Divisions), staging principally on Luzon, was to land in the vicinity of Miyazaki on the southeastern coast of Kyushu on 1 November.
- b. XI Corps (43d, Americal, and 1st Cavalry Divisions), staging principally on Luzon, was to land in the vicinity of Shibushi in the Ariake Wan on the southeastern coast of Kyushu on 1 November.
- c. V Amphibious Corps (2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions), staging principally in Hawaii and the Marianas, was to land in the vicinity of Kushikino on the southwestern coast of Kyushu on 1 November.
- d. IX Corps (77th, 81st, and 98th Inf Divisions), staging principally on Leyte and Cebu and in Hawaii, was to land on the south coast of Kyushu, west of Kaiman-Dake, on 4 November.
- e. The 40th Division, staging on Panay, and the 158th RCT, staging on Luzon, were to land on outlying islands south and southwest of Kyushu on 27 October in order to destroy hostile forces encountered there and provide air warning facilities thereon.

Evolution of this invasion plan had posed many difficult problems. The 650,000 troops comprising the ground force units, scattered throughout the Central and Southwest Pacific, the European theatre, and the United States, had to be organized into well-balanced corps and advanced base groups, reequipped for warfare in a cold-wet climate and re-staged to a minimum number of mounting areas in order to insure the absolute maximum use of the available shipping. Jungle-worn equipment had to be largely replaced. Units received issues of equipment not previously needed or available and accordingly required indoctrination in the use of that equipment. Assault units had to conduct amphibious training, and the various planning headquarters had to resolve the many problems of supply and tactics attendant on the integration of air, land, and sea forces in a large scale amphibious operation.

By 1 August much of this preparatory work had been done through the medium of intensive planning and almost continuous conferences between representatives of the major ground, air, and naval units on matters of supply, base development, shipping, communications, naval gunfire support, air support, and other related matters. Units were either at or en route to final staging areas, assault units were undergoing amphibious training, supplies were beginning to accumulate, and shipping schedules for troops and cargo had been largely determined. On 28 July appeared Sixth Army's Field Order 74, for the invasion of Kyushu, and the Commanding General, Sixth Army, prepared to review at an early date the plans of his subordinate commands.

B. AFPAC STAFF STUDY FOR OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

Preparation for the Kyushu Operation were thus rapidly developing when on 2 August Headquarters Sixth Army received AFPAC's staff study for the Blacklist Operation, the plan for the occupation of Japan in the event of that nation's surrender or collapse.

Basically this plan called for the occupation of Korea by the Tenth Army, of Hokkaido and Northern Honshu by the Eighth Army, and of Western Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu by the Sixth Army. Major forces assigned to the Sixth Army for the occupation were the I Corps, X Corps, and V Amphibious Corps which, together with supporting units, totaled 240,000 troops. The general missions assigned to the army commanders directed the rapid occupation of strategic centers in order to isolate Japan from Asia, seize control of the higher echelons of government, immobilize the enemy armed forces, and initiate operations against any recalcitrant elements in Japan or Korea. Dividing the occupation chronologically into three phases, the basic plan designated strategic centers for occupation in each phase.* In accordance with the strategic importance of the respective areas, the plan further stated specific dates for the occupation of each center based on B-Day, the day to be designated for the initiation of the operation. Once initial control had been firmly established, each commander was to assume responsibility for:

- a. The demobilization of the Japanese Army.
- b. Institution of military government.
- c. Recovery of Allied prisoners of war.
- d. Extension of such control over the Japanese as was required to implement the post-war government and aid the

* Phase I included the occupation of the Sasebo-Nagasaki and the Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe areas; Phase II included the occupation of the Shimonoseki-Fukuoka and the Nagoya areas; and Phase III included the occupation of the Hiroshima-Kure area, Kochi, Okayama, and Tsuruga.

armies of occupation.

- e. Insurance that the terms of surrender were carried out.

In general, swift occupation of the selected strategic centers at the earliest possible date after surrender, decentralization of planning and operations within major commands, and instant readiness to meet armed resistance at the time of or subsequent to the initial landings were to characterize the operation.

C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

Since there was no indication that Japan would surrender prior to actual initiation of the Kyushu invasion, preparatory activities incident to that operation continued without interruption. Concurrently, however, work was initiated to prepare troop lists, determine supply requirements, gather intelligence, and determine more specifically the role the various staff sections of the headquarters were to assume in execution of special tasks such as demilitarization and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, military government, etc.

The destruction of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 by a single atomic bomb and the entry of Russia into the war increased the possibility of early surrender to such an extent that planning for the occupation was still further intensified, although planning for the Kyushu invasion did not cease. After the initial report of the Japanese offer to surrender on 10 August, however, further action on the Kyushu Operation was deferred, and preparations for the occupation were accelerated accordingly.

During this period GHQ, AFPAC, approved the Sixth Army's recommendations to alter the original plan by redesignating the objectives assigned to each corps. This regroupment provided for a better distribution of objectives among the three corps, and also provided for the seizure of all Phase I and Phase II objectives by the I Corps and V Amphibious Corps. This left all Phase III objectives to X Corps, which was least prepared to move quickly since it had not been slated for the Kyushu Operation and was at that time still in active contact with the Japanese forces on Mindanao.

On 13 August Headquarters Sixth Army received information from GHQ, AFPAC, that the Tenth Army had been deleted from the operation, whereupon the XXIV Corps assumed the missions in Korea.

On 14 August the V Amphibious Corps passed to the operational control of the Commanding General, Sixth Army.

D. ISSUANCE OF AFPAC OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 4

Following the official announcement of the Japanese offer to surrender on 15 August, GHQ, AFPAC, officially suspended the Kyushu

Operation and issued a warning order to initiate the occupation of Japan, designating 15 August as B-Day, the base day from which all landing dates as designated in the Operations Instructions were calculated. On this same date Headquarters Sixth Army received Operations Instructions Number 4, which confirmed and implemented the missions previously assigned to the Sixth Army in the staff study. On succeeding days Headquarters Sixth Army received annexes to Operations Instructions Number 4 which delineated more specifically the logistic requirements and also the measures to be taken with respect to military government, counterintelligence, enforcement of the terms of surrender, control, disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, and the care and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees. Since at this time the internal situation within Japan was unknown and the degree of cooperation of the nation as a whole with the occupation forces could not properly be gauged, these annexes directed a much greater degree of operational control in the execution of these tasks than was later found necessary.

Preparations which had been developing slowly over a period of two weeks were now intensified. Upon AFPAC direction, units formerly assigned the Sixth Army for the Kyushu invasion but not intended for the occupation immediately passed to the control of AFWESPAC (Army Forces, Western Pacific). Headquarters Sixth Army prepared revised troop lists for the three corps and for Army troops, maintaining as nearly as possible the integrity of I Corps as constituted for the Kyushu Operation, because the equipping and staging of this corps' units were well advanced. As the Eighth Army was required to make landings prior to the Sixth Army, it required an equitable number of these prepared and alerted units, which necessitated the substitution on the Sixth Army troop list of units not previously scheduled for the operation. These changes naturally created many problems involving establishment of administrative control, quick resupply and re-equipment of these new units; and movement of them to staging areas.

E. ISSUANCE OF SIXTH ARMY FIELD ORDER 75

Despite these difficulties, Sixth Army plans were sufficiently definite by 21 August to warrant issuance of Field Order 75, which outlined the missions assigned to subordinate commanders. (See map opposite page 14.)

The V Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions and commanded by Major General Harry Schmidt, USMC, was to land on A-Day in the Nagasaki-Sasebo area of Kyushu with one reinforced division and was quickly to establish control over the Sasebo area, extending occupation and control to include the Nagasaki area as additional troops became available. Following the initial landing, the V Amphibious Corps, conducting overland and overwater operations, was to occupy the Shimonoseki-Fukuoka area of Western Honshu and Northern Kyushu on C-Day with a minimum of one division, reinforced.

The I Corps, consisting of the 25th, 33d, 98th, and 6th Divisions, commanded by Major General Innis P. Swift, was to land on K-Day in the Wakayama area of Western Honshu and establish control over the Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe area, employing one reinforced division at Osaka, a reinforced division (less one RCT) at Kobe, and one RCT at Kyoto. On M-Day the corps was to land a reinforced division in the Nagoya area and establish control over this area to include Yokkaichi. As its final objective, the I Corps was to occupy Tsuruga on N-Day, employing not to exceed one RCT.

The X Corps, composed of the 41st and 24th Divisions, and commanded by Major General Franklin C. Sibert, on F-Day was to land in the Kure-Hiroshima area of Western Honshu with one reinforced division. One division (less one RCT) of the corps was to occupy the Kochi area of Southern Shikoku on G-Day, and finally on I-Day one RCT was to occupy the Okayama area of Western Honshu. As will later be shown, unforeseen developments caused numerous changes in the dates and landing points which have been indicated above.

F. AFPAC CHANGES IN BASIC OCCUPATION POLICY

On 30 August, GHQ, AFPAC, issued Amendment Number 12 to Operations Instructions Number 4, which materially altered the mission assigned to the Sixth Army. Instead of actually instituting military government, the Army Commander was to supervise the execution of the policies relative to military government which GHQ, AFPAC, was to issue directly to the Japanese Government; likewise, the functions of the Sixth Army with respect to the disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces was changed from active operational control and direction to supervision of the execution of orders as transmitted to the Japanese Armed Forces by GHQ, AFPAC. Accordingly the Commanding General, Sixth Army, directed that all annexes to Field Order 75 be reviewed and amended to conform to the revised policy of requiring the Japanese Government and its armed forces to shoulder the chief administrative and operational burden of disarmament and demobilization.

G. CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN

As the use of troops of other Allied Powers as occupation forces had by this time been contemplated, the Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC, was also designated the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Under the authority thus vested in his command, SCAP began issuance of a series of directives to the Japanese Imperial Government designed to implement further the changed concept of occupation. Thus on 3 September was issued SCAP Directive Number 2, which imposed on the Japanese Government the basic requirements for the prompt execution of the terms of surrender. This directive also required realignment of the boundaries of the Second Japanese General Army to conform to that of the Sixth US Army and further directed that

the Commanding General, Second Japanese General Army, report by radio to the Commanding General, Sixth Army, for instructions relative to the entry of the occupation forces. After being established on 8 September, liaison between the two forces was maintained through the medium of radio until arrival of the Sixth Army's Advance Detachment at Wakayama on 19 September.

On 31 August Headquarters Sixth Army received information from AFPAC that the 3d Marine Division was to be withdrawn from the operation and to be replaced probably by the 32d Infantry Division, which was at that time located on Luzon in theatre reserve. On 6 September AFPAC confirmed this change.

While the Sixth Army's planning thus continued, SCAP accepted the formal surrender of the Japanese on 2 September, and the entry of Allied Forces into Japan commenced. Thereafter, the amount of information concerning conditions to be expected in Japan increased immeasurably. Headquarters Sixth Army dispatched representatives of the Engineer Section to Japan to study the engineering aspects of the occupation; other members of the headquarters were sent ahead in connection with the early evacuation of prisoners of war and civilian internees. Information from these sources and from the troops already landed indicated that serious resistance was no longer a strong probability and that housing facilities for troops in most cases would be adequate. This data consequently permitted substantial reductions in the number of supporting combat units and in service units required to sustain the occupation forces. In addition, further adjustments in the troop list were required by the stoppage of the redeployment of all European Theatre units which, on 19 August, had not cleared the Panama Canal. In all, for various reasons, 145 changes had to be made in the troop list originally published.

H. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHIPPING PLAN

Since Operations Instructions Number 4 designated the Fifth Amphibious Force as the naval unit responsible for the movement of Sixth Army troops, representatives of that command reported to Headquarters Sixth Army on 14 August to initiate coordinated planning. The following day AFPAC published its initial allotment of shipping, which assigned to the Sixth Army 5 transport squadrons, 90 LST's, and 45 LSM's, which numbers were later increased to 175 LST's and 138 LSM's. As the shipping originally allotted to the Kyushu Operation was not to be in the mounting areas until 20 September, the Japanese collapse occurred at a time when these ships were scattered throughout the Pacific or in west coast United States ports.


Furthermore, the Eighth Army's initial target dates for the occupation were earlier than the Sixth Army's, and therefore priority in shipping was given to the Eighth Army. Under these circumstances, only three of the five transport squadrons assigned to the Fifth Amphibious Force for the lift of the Sixth Army could be made available


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in the foreseeable future---one in Hawaii on 21 August, one in Hawaii on 1 September, and one in the Philippines on 1 September. This situation automatically eliminated any chance of landing units as early as specified by AFPAC in Operations Instructions Number 4 and resulted in the issuance by AFPAC of instructions on 20 August authorizing changes in target dates to conform with shipping availability dates, requiring only that the relative priority for the occupation of Phase I objectives be retained as nearly as possible.

During this period appeared another factor that also affected the original landing plans. Prior to the Japanese surrender, Allied aircraft, through widespread aerial mining operations, had successfully closed many Japanese ports. In some cases these aircraft had used pressure mines, and, as there was no method yet devised for sweeping these mines, their presence in certain areas created an undue hazard to sweeping other types of mines. Studies by the Fifth Fleet, which was charged with sweeping the mines, indicated that no difficulties would be encountered at Sasebo, Nagasaki, and Kochi. The harbor of Nagoya could be swept with difficulty, but the harbors of Kobe, Osaka, Shimonoseki, Fukuoka, Hiroshima, and Kure would be inaccessible for an indefinite period.*

Accordingly the occupation forces for the Kobe-Osaka area were directed to land at Wakayama, an accessible beach approximately 50 miles south of Osaka, and the Kure occupation force was directed to land at Hiro, likewise clear of mines, located approximately five miles east of Kure.


On 6 September the Fifth Amphibious Force reported that a sixth transport squadron would be available for the initial lift. This squadron was assigned to the X Corps for the movement of the 41st Division to Kure, thereby advancing the date for that landing approximately two weeks. Thus, because of numerous unforeseen changes, the schedule for landings in the Sixth Army area had been considerably altered from that which was originally planned.

* The initial Sixth Army scheme of landings included the landing of the 3d Marine Division at Fukuoka and the landing of both the 5th and the 2d Marine Divisions at Sasebo, from which area control was to be extended southward to Nagasaki. Just prior to movement of the advance command post of Headquarters Sixth Army to Japan, the scheme of landings underwent changes that resulted in the plan shown opposite page 18. The presence of mines in the harbor of Fukuoka and the satisfactory situation at Nagasaki (condition of the harbor, cooperative attitude of the Japanese, and the virtual assurance of a safe Allied entry into the city) required these revisions.

On 13 September, the eve of departure of the advance echelon of the Headquarters Sixth Army from Luzon, the schedule was as follows:

<u>Day</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Staging</u>	<u>Land at</u>
A	22 Sept	5th Mar Div & VAC Hq	Hawaii	Sasebo
K	25 Sept	33d Div, I Corps and Sixth Army Hq	Luzon	Wakayama
K / 2	27 Sept	98th Div	Hawaii	Wakayama
M	2 Oct	25th Div	Luzon	Nagoya
F	3 Oct	41st Div	Mindanao	Hiro
A / 4	26 Sept	2d Mar Div	Marianas	Sasebo
C	15 Oct	32d Div	Luzon	Sasebo
G	25 Oct	24th Div (less one RCT)	Mindanao	Kochi
I	26 Oct	1 RCT, 24th Div	Mindanao	Okayama
A / 32	24 Oct	6th Div*	Luzon	Nagoya

* On 26 September GHQ, AFPAC, deleted the 6th Division from the Sixth Army troop list and substituted therefor the 96th Infantry Division, which was on Mindoro. After the cooperative attitude of the Japanese had been proven, the Commanding General, Sixth Army, decided that the employment of the 96th Division would be unnecessary, and he accordingly recommended to GHQ that the division be deleted from the Sixth Army troop list. GHQ approved the deletion on 6 October.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

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V. OPERATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

The original plan for the occupation of Japan contemplated the accomplishment of the Sixth Army mission in three phases: Phase I involved landings by VAC (V Amphibious Corps) and I Corps in the Sasebo-Nagasaki area and the Kobe-Osaka area respectively; Phase II called for landings at a later date by I Corps at Nagoya and the overland movement of a VAC unit to Fukuoka; and Phase III envisioned an overland movement by I Corps to Tsuruga, and landings by X Corps at Kure, Kochi, and Okayama. Basically this plan provided for the establishment of control of Japanese Armed Forces and civil population; the imposition of prescribed terms of surrender by occupying key areas such as Nagasaki, Sasebo, and Osaka; and the extension therefrom of occupation and control as troops became available during Phase II and Phase III.

During the early days of the occupation a number of reasons induced the abandonment of the phase concept just described. For instance, the attitude of the Japanese people, the complete capitulation of the armed forces, and the cooperation of Japanese authorities facilitated initial control and disarmament so that the operations eventually became a movement of troops into areas that were awaiting occupation and that were prepared for our surrender policies. Furthermore, the uncertain condition of mined harbors, the effect of typhoons in landing areas, and the availability dates of shipping disrupted the original timing of landings to such an extent that there were no distinguishable phases in the operation: in one case Phase III landings in the X Corps area preceded Phase II landings at Nagoya contrary to original plans.

In order to present a clearer picture of the operations involved in the occupation of Japan, this report will cover the entire period of activities of each corps in turn.

B. SIXTH ARMY ADVANCE DETACHMENTS

At the time of surrender approximately 20,000 Allied prisoners were in Kyushu and Western Honshu. Planning for the Kyushu Operation had contemplated that liaison and recovery teams composed of Dutch, Australian, and American representatives were to accompany the invasion forces and immediately effect evacuation in their respective zones. After the surrender, however, the Japanese virtually freed all Allied prisoners by turning over to them the prison camps and allowing them freedom of movement. This action immediately created a difficult problem in that, taking full advantage of the situation, the former prisoners roamed the countryside at will. These factors, in addition to the fact that the policy was to get the prisoners home as fast as humanly possible, caused a complete change of plan.

As the result of a radio message from SCAP on 4 September regarding conferences on evacuation of Allied POW's, five representatives of Headquarters Sixth Army were flown to Atsugi airdrome, Yokohama, arriving there 6 September. The conferences* on 7 and 8 September resulted in the selection of two ports for evacuation purposes in the Sixth Army area, Nagasaki (Kyushu) and Wakayama (Honshu), the only available ones with harbors sufficiently clear of mines and obstructions to permit entrance. The Fifth Fleet agreed to dispatch to each of these ports one task force from Okinawa, each force being composed of at least one hospital ship, two CVE's and such other shipping as could be assembled for use in shuttling recovered personnel to Okinawa for air evacuation to Manila. The Eighth Army, evacuating personnel through Yokohama, agreed to extend its evacuation activity into Southern Honshu until such time as the Sixth Army was prepared to take over and evacuate personnel through Wakayama. AFPAC Advance was to furnish sufficient clothing, rations, and transportation, which were to be lifted from Okinawa and transported by the naval task forces. The Sixth Army was to provide sufficient shipping from its allotment for the occupation to lift two replacement battalions from Luzon and two engineer dump truck companies from Okinawa. In addition, 13 recovery teams totaling approximately 70 personnel flew from Manila to Okinawa to join the naval task forces.

On 9 September members of the Sixth Army evacuation group departed from Yokohama. The Transportation Section representative went to Okinawa to arrange for the reception of recovered personnel and subsequent air shipment to Manila, one G-1 representative traveled to Wakayama to coordinate with Eighth Army evacuation units and to arrange for Wakayama evacuation, and one G-1 and one G-3 representative went to Nagasaki to set up facilities for evacuation from Kyushu. To serve as liaison, the Military Government representative remained at AFPAC Advance. Naval task units arrived in the ports of Nagasaki and Wakayama on the evening of 11 September, and the Sixth Army evacuation work commenced the morning of the 12th. At this time there were approximately 10,000 awaiting evacuation in Kyushu and 6,000 remaining in Honshu. By 22 September evacuation of recovered personnel in the Sixth Army areas was complete. Approximately 10,000 were processed through Nagasaki, and, of the 6,000 in Western Honshu, 3,000 were evacuated through Wakayama and 3,000 were evacuated through Yokohama under the Eighth Army's recovery teams.

In the meantime radio communications had been established between Headquarters Sixth Army on Luzon and the Second Japanese General Army, which controlled that area of Japan to be occupied by the Sixth Army. In order to assure the smooth and orderly entry of Sixth Army forces into Japan, an advance echelon was organized to precede the troops and obtain information of the situation in the area to be

* These conferences were attended by representatives of the Sixth Army, the Eighth Army, AFPAC Advance, the Fifth Fleet, and Japanese military and naval personnel.

occupied. The advance party consisted of 19 officers and 2 enlisted men under the command of Brigadier General H. W. Kiefer, representing each of the General Staff Sections as well as Medical, Engineer, Finance, Military Police, Military Government, Signal, Procurement, Transportation, Quartermaster, and Headquarters Commandant Sections. Similar advance parties were organized for I Corps, X Corps, and VAC.

The Sixth Army's advance party departed from Luzon on 14 September 1945, arriving on Okinawa on the same date. Because of a severe typhoon, departure from Okinawa and arrival at Wakayama were delayed until 19 September instead of 18 September as originally planned. During the stay of the Sixth Army Advance Party on Okinawa, the advance party of VAC joined it, and a general orientation was effected.

In accordance with instructions, the Chief of Staff of the Second Japanese General Army* and some 20 staff officers and interpreters reported for instructions on the morning of 20 September 1945. At this initial meeting a Sixth Army representative read, explained, and delivered to the Japanese a letter of instructions. This letter required the clearing of Japanese armed forces, except for unarmed caretaking personnel, from those locations where our troops were scheduled to land; prohibited the movement of Japanese armed forces on certain main highways; restricted the movement of civilian traffic on the dates and in the areas of the several landings; directed the establishment of contact by the appropriate senior subordinate Japanese commander with the I and X Corps and VAC in their respective areas, including initial contact with respective advance parties; and directed the immediate establishment of liaison with the Sixth Army Advance Party at Wakayama and later with Headquarters Sixth Army at Kyoto. This meeting with the Second Japanese General Army, although not a surrender formation, was nevertheless quite formal and impressive. The meeting started many processes necessary to accomplish the occupation and also had the effect of serving notice on the Japanese Army that the Allied Forces knew exactly what they wanted and had organized their plans well.

The Advance Party issued subsequent directives having to do with reports from the Japanese on the location and amounts of their ordnance materiel; reports on amounts and places of storage of chemical warfare materiel; amounts and locations of certain engineer supplies; and the establishment of direct liaison with Japanese civilian government officials, the Japanese Imperial Railways, the Japanese banking system, medical organizations, communication facilities, and other Japanese activities of special interest. The Japanese, on the other hand, established in each prefecture a liaison office, which was in effect a branch office of the Foreign Office in Tokyo. Considered direct representatives of the Emperor with

* The Commanding General, Second Japanese General Army, was unable to arrive from Hiro in time for the meeting because of transportation difficulties.

commensurate authority, these officers demonstrated their ability to execute directives and to achieve results.

Each member of the Advance Party investigated, formulated plans, and submitted recommendations within his particular field to assist the expeditious entry of Sixth Army into the area as well as the entry and establishment of Headquarters Sixth Army at Kyoto. The advance parties of the I and X Corps joined the advance party of the Sixth Army while it was at Wakayama. They were oriented, given the information already secured, and told of the arrangements which had been made with the appropriate Japanese officials.

C. V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS

Prior to making the first Sixth Army landings in Japan, VAC staged its component divisions over a wide area of the Pacific. During the embarkation period, when the advance command post of VAC was afloat at Saipan, the 2d Marine Division was loading at Saipan, the 5th Marine Division was loading at Hawaii, and the 32d Division (which had replaced the 3d Marine Division on the corps troop list) was preparing to load from Luzon.

The 5th Marine Division completed its loading at Pearl Harbor on 30 August and departed for Saipan, where it joined VAC Headquarters and the 2d Marine Division. On 18 September, VAC, less the 32d Division, departed from Saipan for the objective area. Naval Task Group 54.1 (Amphibious Group 4), Rear Admiral Reifsnider commanding, transported and conducted the landing of VAC troops.

The Sixth Army plan visualized landings by the 5th Marine Division at Sasebo on 22 September and by the 2d Marine Division at Nagasaki on 26 September. The 32d Division was scheduled for follow-up landings in mid-October in the Nagasaki area. Because Sasebo proved to have better harbor facilities than had Nagasaki, and since the distance from Sasebo to Fukuoka was less than the distance separating Nagasaki and Fukuoka, the Sixth Army plan later was changed to permit the 32d Division to make its landing at Sasebo.

On 21 September representatives of the Fifth Fleet closely inspected the Sasebo coastal area for possible Japanese reaction against VAC landings, particular attention being paid to localities suitable for suicide craft. After a thorough survey of the entire coastal area surrounding Sasebo in which no craft of offensive potentialities were seen, the Navy deemed the harbor safe for entry of the 5th Marine Division. Furthermore, advance parties entering the area discovered that the Japanese port authorities had followed exactly the directions given them.

At 0900I on 22 September the first elements of the 5th Marine

Division landed at Sasebo.* The division unloaded rapidly and occupied progressively the Sasebo Naval Air Station, the Sasebo Aircraft Factory, and the Sasebo Harbor area.

On the following day, the 2d Marine Division went ashore at Nagasaki, landing both the 2d and 6th Marine RCT's by 1800I.

Once the key objectives, Sasebo and Nagasaki, had been occupied, the VAC mission called for seizure and occupation of Omura and Isahaya and instant readiness for further overland or short-range amphibious operations.

In compliance with this mission, a reinforced company from the 27th Marine Regiment (5th Marine Division) seized Omura on 23 September.** The 8th Marine RCT, the last 2d Marine Division element to land, passed through Nagasaki on the following day, moved to Isahaya, and there seized control of the area. On 25 September the 2d Marine Division Artillery displaced to Isahaya, while the 2d Marine Division Command Post closed aboard the USS Cambria and opened simultaneously at Nagasaki.

The VAC zone of occupation comprised the entire island of Kyushu and the Yamaguchi Prefecture on the western tip of Honshu. After the 2d and the 5th Marine Divisions had landed, VAC's general plan was for the 2d Marine Division to expand south of Nagasaki to assume control of the Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima Prefectures. The 5th Marine Division in the meantime was to expand east to the prefectures of Saga, Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi. The latter division was to be relieved in the Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi areas upon the arrival of sufficient elements of the 32d Division.

Once it had completed movement into Nagasaki and Isahaya, the 2d Marine Division dispatched reconnaissance elements to the eastern coast line of Kyushu and south to Kagoshima.*** The 8th Marine RCT moved to Kumamoto on 5 October, and on 13 October division reconnaissance elements initiated patrolling in the Miyazaki, Kanoya, and Kagoshima areas.

* The Commanding General, 5th Marine Division, assumed command of his division ashore at 1337I, 23 September.

** The Commanding General, VAC, assumed command of his forces ashore on 23 September at 1600I, when the VAC Command Post opened at Sasebo Fortress.

*** The general plan of the division on 23 September had been to move the 8th Marine RCT to Kumamoto and to hold the remainder of the division in Nagasaki and Isahaya until the key areas of Southern Kyushu had been reconnoitered.

Meanwhile, on 27 September, the 5th Marine Division Command Post moved from Sasebo to the Ainoura Naval Training Station. Up to this time the division had been engaged chiefly in unloading vessels at Sasebo and Nagasaki and in reorganizing elements for the expansion eastward. In the following days, units of the division started their movements to other key areas in the division zone of occupation.

An advance group from the 28th Marine RCT (5th Marine Division) arrived at Fukuoka on 30 September after having completed a reconnaissance of the area. The 28th Marine RCT, which had been designated as the Fukuoka Occupation Force by the Commanding General, VAC, completed the rail movement of its main body into Fukuoka from Sasebo on 1 October and shortly thereafter moved a reinforced company from Sasebo to Shimonoseki by rail. By 5 October the 28th Marine RCT had completed movement into the Fukuoka-Shimonoseki area.

The 27th Marine RCT (5th Marine Division) moved eastward, one battalion of the 27th Marine RCT occupying Saga on 9 October and moving patrols to Kurume without incident.

After accomplishing the occupation of Moji and Yawata, the Fukuoka Occupation Force sent elements of the 28th Marine Regiment into Yamaguchi Prefecture to occupy the city of Yamaguchi on 11 October. Marine Corps penetration south into Oita Prefecture commenced on 12 October, when advance parties reached the city of Oita, and the Oita Detachment (from the Fukuoka Occupation Force) arrived at Oita on 13 October.

The dispositions of the 5th Marine Division on 14 October permitted almost complete control of the key areas in the northern portion of the VAC zone. The 27th Marine RCT controlled the cities of Saga and Kurume, the 26th Marine RCT occupied Sasebo, and the 28th Marine RCT controlled the eastern prefectures of Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi.

The 32d Infantry Division commenced debarkation at Sasebo on 14 October. The 128th Infantry, the first regiment ashore, initiated rail movement immediately for Shimonoseki. The leading elements of the regiment arrived at Shimonoseki on 15 October, and on the following day the regimental command post opened at Shimonoseki. The 127th Infantry, less the 1st Battalion,* debarked at Sasebo on 18 October, passed to the control of the 5th Marine Division, and on 19 October relieved the 26th Marine Regiment from occupation duties in Sasebo.

* The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, had landed at Kanoya airfield on 3 September under the control of the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, to establish an intermediate airstrip for staging and refueling of aircraft. The battalion passed to the control of the Commanding General, VAC, on 1 October.

The 126th Infantry departed from Sasebo for Kokura on 21 October, completing movement three days later. On 24 October the 32d Division, its command post established at Fukuoka, assumed operational control of the zone of responsibility of the Fukuoka Occupation Force, which included the prefectures of Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, and Oita.*

Alerted on 15 October for movement to the Palau Islands, the 26th Marine Regiment (5th Marine Division) completed embarkation immediately following its relief in the Sasebo area by the 127th Infantry on 19 October.

Throughout the remaining days of October the 2d Marine Division maintained air, motor, and overwater patrols to the Miyazaki, Kanoya, and Kagoshima areas, reconnoitering in addition the areas surrounding Wakinisaki, Nomo, Shimabara, Arie, and the islands south and west of Kyushu.

On 29 October the 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (2d Marine Division), moved to Kagoshima, thus becoming the first major element of the division to move to southernmost Kyushu. On 10 November the 3d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, moved by motor to the inland city of Hitoyoshi. The 8th Marine RCT, less these two battalions, remained in Kumamoto.

The 2d Marine RCT (2d Marine Division) initiated its movement south when its 2d Battalion sailed from Nagasaki on 1 November to relieve the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, which had maintained a refueling and resupply point at Kanoya airfield since 3 September. The regimental headquarters and the 3d Battalion of the 2d Marine RCT arrived at Kanoya on 4 November and moved to Miyakonojo, where the RCT command post was established on 7 November. The 1st Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, departed from Nagasaki and moved to Miyazaki, on the eastern coast of Kyushu, arriving there on 9 November.

The remainder of the 2d Marine Division, which included the 6th Marine RCT, remained in Nagasaki until 26 November. On that date the 2d Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, moved to Saga and there relieved the 27th Marine RCT of the 5th Marine Division. The latter RCT initiated movement to Sasebo in preparation for return to the

* The Commanding General, VAC, dissolved the Fukuoka Occupation Force on the date that the Commanding General, 32d Division, assumed operational control of the area. Simultaneously the Commanding General, VAC, formed the Fukuoka Base Command. This command, which controlled the service troops in the area and operated under the control of the Commanding General, 32d Division, was disbanded on 25 November 1945.

United States with the 5th Marine Division (less the 26th Marine Regiment).*

Following the arrival at Fukuoka of the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, on 2 November (after its relief at Kanoya) and the remainder of the regiment on 4 and 6 November, the 32d Division made no major revisions of its troop dispositions or plan for the control of the division zone of occupation during the remaining days of November. During this period the division headquarters and the 127th Infantry occupied Fukuoka; the 126th Infantry from Kokura patrolled east and south to the coast; and the 128th Infantry, with the 1st Battalion at Shimonoseki, the 2d Battalion at Bofu, and the remainder of the regiment at Yamaguchi, controlled the Yamaguchi Prefecture.

D. I CORPS

Headquarters I Corps and the 33d Infantry Division departed from Lingayen Gulf for Wakayama on 19 September.** Meanwhile, on 18 September, the 25th Division had reported an epidemic resulting from a pulmonary disease of unknown character in the 27th Infantry and had requested permission to leave that regiment in the staging area until the epidemic subsided. This request was granted; however, the danger disappeared several days later, and the regiment loaded out on schedule.

The Commanding General, Sixth Army, assigned to the I Corps the important Osaka-Kyoto-Kobe area embracing a total of 13 prefectures. Originally the Nagano Prefecture lay in the Sixth Army and I Corps zones, but AFFAC changed the boundaries between the Sixth and Eighth Armies so that Nagano Prefecture lay in the Eighth Army zone.

Field Order 75 directed I Corps to accomplish occupation and control of its zone in three phases: a landing on K-Day in the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto area, another on M-Day at Nagoya, and the occupation on N-Day of Tsuruga. The tentative target dates for I Corps operations were: K-Day, 25 September; M-Day, 2 October; and N-Day, to be selected as the situation developed. The largest centers of population and

* The 28th Marine RCT (5th Marine Division) had concentrated in the Sasebo area immediately upon the relief of that regiment in the Fukuoka area by the 32d Division. The presence of the 28th Marine Regiment in Sasebo in turn permitted the release there of the 127th Infantry, less the 1st Battalion; upon arrival of its two echelons at Fukuoka on 4 November and 6 November respectively, this latter unit passed to the control of the Commanding General, 32d Division.

** Naval Task Group 54.6 (Amphibious Group 8), Rear Admiral Noble commanding, transported and conducted the landings of I Corps troops.

and the major portion of the industrial facilities in the Sixth Army zone were to come under the control of I Corps as it carried out its mission. As the necessary troops were released from key areas, the occupation force then was to extend its activities northward.

On 25 September Headquarters I Corps and the 33d Division arrived in Wakayama harbor and commenced debarkation. The 136th Infantry landed at 0830I and moved immediately by rail and motor to Kyoto, the selected site of the Sixth Army Command Post. Landing also at 0830I, the 130th Infantry moved by echelon to Kobe. On 26 September the Commanding General, I Corps, landed and assumed command of his forces ashore. Later on that day the 123d Infantry of the 33d Division landed. The regiment, less the 2d and 3d Battalions, bivouacked at Takarazuka, the 2d Battalion moved to Kobayashi, and the 3d Battalion moved to Kobe.

Arriving at Wakayama on 27 September, the 98th Division initiated movement by echelon to Taisho Airdrome.

The Commanding General, Sixth Army,* debarked at Wakayama on 28 September and moved directly to Kyoto. On the same day at 1200I the Sixth Army Command Post closed aboard the USS Auburn and opened in the Daiken Building in Kyoto.

The I Corps zone of occupation was divided as follows: the prefectures of Hyogo, Kyoto, Shiga, Fukui, Ishikawa, and Toyama were assigned to the 33d Division; the prefectures of Wakayama, Nara, Osaka, and Miya to the 98th Division; and the prefectures of Gifu, Aichi, and Shizuoka were assigned to the 25th Division. The divisions in turn assigned prefectural responsibilities to regiments. This alignment was compatible with the SCAP policy of permitting the prefectural instruments of police and administration to remain integrated and effective.

After 27 September the 98th and 33d Division moved their regiments forward into assigned zones as rapidly as transportation became available. By 1 November the divisions had completed movements to and establishment of controls in assigned areas. The 98th Division assigned Osaka to the 391st Infantry, Wakayama to the 389th Infantry, Nara to the 390th Infantry, and Miye to the division artillery. The 33d Division assigned Hyogo to the division artillery, Kyoto to the 130th Infantry, Shiga to the 123d Infantry, and Fukui, Ishikawa, and Toyama to the 136th Infantry. On 25 October the 1st Battalion of the latter

* The Commanding General, Sixth Army, assumed command of ground forces ashore in the zone of responsibility of VAC at 1000I 24 September and in the zone of responsibility of I Corps at 1000I on 27 September.

regiment moved from Otsu and occupied Tsuruga, one of the original Sixth Army objectives.*

The 25th Infantry Division, after a month on the water, finally debarked at Nagoya on 25 October. Scheduled originally for 2 October landings, this division fell victim to delays caused by typhoons and the difficulty of sweeping the harbor at Nagoya. The 27th Infantry, the 161st Infantry,** and the 35th Infantry landed in that order. The division had a total of three prefectures in its zone: Gifu, assigned to the 27th Infantry; Aichi, assigned to the 161st Infantry; and Shizuoka, assigned to the 35th Infantry. These units assumed control of their respective areas by 10 November and as of 30 November had made no major changes in troop dispositions.

E. X CORPS

The original Sixth Army plan for the occupation contemplated the landing of X Corps in three echelons: the 41st Division was to land in the Kure-Hiroshima area of Western Honshu on F-Day; the 24th Division, less the 21st RCT, was to land in the Kochi area of Southern Shikoku on G-Day; and the 21st RCT was to land in the Okayama area of Western Honshu. These dispositions permitted control of the heavily populated Hiroshima and Shimane Prefectures by the 41st Division, control of Tottori and Okayama Prefectures by the 21st RCT, and control of the island of Shikoku by the 24th Division less the 21st RCT.

The Sixth Army plan underwent minor changes to meet unforeseen obstacles that appeared in the X Corps zone after the issuance of Field Order 75. The Kure area proved inaccessible because of the presence of pressure mines and the fact that a typhoon raged through the area, damaging the port installations and thus making the area unsuitable for debarkation. In addition, a landing at Kochi would necessitate the establishment of a supply base there. As an alternative, the selection of a landing area in Northwestern Shikoku would simplify the logistics problems because that area could be directly supplied from Kure and a supplementary supply base therefore would be unnecessary.

Accordingly, the Commanding General, Sixth Army, on 21 September directed the X Corps to send the 41st Division into Hiro Wan***

* Amendment Number 2 to Field Order 75, dated 11 October, altered the N-Day mission of I Corps by directing that one reinforced battalion, instead of one reinforced RCT, occupy Tsuruga.

** This regiment was later redesignated the 4th Infantry.

*** Wan is a Japanese word meaning bay.

rather than into Kure itself, and to have the 24th Division, less the 21st RCT, debark at Matsuyama in Northwestern Shikoku.*

On 19 September the X Corps Headquarters and the 41st Division departed from Mindanao, which served as the staging area for all of the major tactical units comprising the corps. While en route to Japan this echelon received naval reports stating that mine conditions in Hiro Wan were still uncertain. As a result of this situation, COMFIFTHPHIBFORCE directed the Naval Task Group Commander** to divert the initial X Corps echelon to Okinawa and to hold it there for several days.

The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, of the 41st Division debarked at Hiro Wan on 6 October*** and immediately secured the huge Kure Naval Yard. On 7 October the remainder of the 162d Infantry moved into Kure Submarine Base, while the 186th Infantry debarked and bivouacked at Kaidaichi.

On 8 October the Commanding General, X Corps, landed at Kure and assumed command of his forces ashore. During the day the 163d Infantry and 41st Division established their command posts in Kure. Reconnaissance parties from X Corps moved overland to reconnoiter Okayama for the 24th Division landings which were scheduled for 22 October.

The 41st Division remained concentrated in the Kure and Kaidaichi areas until 1 November, sending patrols to the rest of Hiroshima Prefecture and the northern Shimane Prefecture. On 2 November the 162d Infantry moved one battalion to Matsue, one battalion to Fukuyama, and one battalion and the regimental command post to Onomichi.

The 41st Infantry Division continued its occupation mission throughout the remainder of November with the 186th Infantry at Kaidaichi, the 163d Infantry at Kure, and the 162d Infantry disposed in the Matsue, Onomichi, and Fukuyama areas.

In the meantime, on 22 October, the 24th Division (less the

* Confirming revision of the X Corps landings, Amendment Number 2 of Field Order 75, Headquarters Sixth Army, dated 11 October 1945, directed the X Corps to land on G-Day in the Matsuyama area instead of in the Kochi area as had been previously directed.

** Naval Task Group 54.11 (Amphibious Group 5), Rear Admiral Rodgers commanding, transported and conducted the landings of the X Corps.

*** The improved availability of shipping permitted the target date for the landing of the 41st Division to be changed from 22 October to 6 October.

On 12 September the 1st Group Headquarters and the 1st Division reported from Khabarovsk, which served as the meeting point for all of the units involved in the campaign. This was done in order to coordinate the various units and to ensure that they were all working towards the same objectives. As a result of this meeting, the 1st Group Headquarters issued orders to the 1st Division to move to the area around Khabarovsk and to hold it for several days.

The 1st Division, 1st Infantry, of the 1st Division departed for Khabarovsk on 8 September and immediately moved to the area around Khabarovsk. On 9 October the remainder of the 1st Infantry moved into the Khabarovsk area, with the 1st Infantry Battalion and the 1st Battalion at Khabarovsk.

On 5 October the 1st Group Headquarters, 1st Group, issued orders and general command of the 1st Group. During the day the 1st Infantry and the 1st Division established their command posts in the area around Khabarovsk. The 1st Group Headquarters issued orders to the 1st Division to move to the area around Khabarovsk and to hold it for several days.


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The 1st Group Headquarters, 1st Group, issued orders to the 1st Division to move to the area around Khabarovsk and to hold it for several days.

The 1st Group Headquarters, 1st Group, issued orders to the 1st Division to move to the area around Khabarovsk and to hold it for several days.



UNIT DISPOSITION
12 November 1954

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21st RCT) debarked near Matsuyama in Northern Shikoku. The division headquarters and the 34th Infantry moved to the city by rail, while the 19th Infantry moved south to Kochi. The 21st RCT initiated its first landings at Hiro and closed in the Naval Air Station at Hiro.

In the succeeding days the 24th Division, less the 21st RCT, quickly established control of Shikoku. The 19th Infantry remained in Kochi with a detachment at Zentsuji. The 11th Field Artillery Battalion moved east to Komosujuna. Control of the zone of occupation continued from these points through 30 November.

After landing at Hiro, the 21st RCT dispatched reconnaissance parties to Yonago in western Tottori Prefecture, and to the city of Tottori at the northeastern corner of the prefecture. Small detachments of company strength moved to these areas on 2 November. Occupation of the Okayama and Tottori Prefectures continued throughout the month of November with the 21st RCT, less these detachments, at Okayama and patrols operating between this point and Yonago and Tottori.

F. OPERATIONS OF A TYPICAL REGIMENT IN THE OCCUPATION

The infantry regiment was, in the occupation of Japan, the chief instrument of demilitarization and control. The entire plan for the imposition of the terms of surrender was based upon the presence of infantry regiments in all of the prefectures within the Japanese homeland and in Southern Korea. The foregoing account of operations during the occupation does not include a comprehensive description of the regimental functioning other than the steps incident to the movement of the regiments from staging areas to zones of responsibility. The following is an analysis of the actions of a regiment accomplishing its occupation mission in practically any Japanese prefecture.

The outline of occupation duties was fairly well standardized throughout the Sixth Army zone. The division of responsibility was based upon the lines of Japanese prefectures so as to utilize the governmental structure that lay within the area. Sixth Army assigned a number of prefectures to each corps proportionate to the number of troops available. The corps in turn assigned a specific number of prefectures to a division. Regimental zones of responsibility were usually a single prefecture except where more than three prefectures lay within the division zone, in which case a regiment was to assume responsibility for more than one prefecture. This exception occurred in lightly populated prefectures which contained limited industrial or military potentialities.

An infantry regiment moved into a prefecture with the mission of supervising the execution of the Japanese surrender terms within its zone of responsibility. The regimental commander was particularly responsible for seizing all Japanese Armed Forces installations and disposition of all materiel therein, security of all enemy stores not

Two of the more important factors in the successful occupation of Japan were improvisation and opportunism. At the time of Japan's capitulation, when the Sixth Army was planning the assault upon Japan for 1 November 1945, shipping was dispersed widely over the Pacific. When finally concentrated, the bulk of available shipping had to be allotted to the Eighth Army, which was scheduled to make the initial landings in Japan. The Sixth Army plan was contingent therefore upon the ability of the Navy to supply extra shipping as speedily as possible. This the Navy did. Responding to this challenge in a manner worthy of the highest commendation, the Fifth Fleet released shipping to Sixth Army units so that in some cases the occupation forces reached Japanese shores many days before the target date originally planned.

VI. SPECIAL ASPECTS OF THE OCCUPATION

A. INTRODUCTION

Many of the problems met by the occupation forces in Japan were of a nature not ordinarily encountered in the course of military operations. Contributing to the unusual conditions was the Allied policy that permitted the continued functioning of the established Japanese Government after the surrender articles had been signed. This policy required the Japanese to effect their own demobilization and demilitarization under directives issued by SCAP. Because of these activities of the vanquished, some tasks of the Sixth Army troops became subordinated while other missions took on new importance.

Out of the many unusual aspects of the occupation a few special ones have been selected as subjects of this chapter principally because of their unconventional nature or their value as an aid to insight into conditions during the early months of the occupation.

B. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE CORPS OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

To judge and evaluate the accomplishments of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) in the occupation of Japan, one must have a full understanding of the nature of the operation. The decision to permit the Emperor to retain his throne and to maintain the Japanese Government in being as the principal agency to carry out the surrender terms served to place upon our forces a mission of supervision in addition to other tasks requiring more positive action. This applied particularly to CIC. CIC's normal mission is the detection of espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities affecting the security of our forces. Complete compliance by the Japanese with the surrender terms and with subsequent SCAP directives would have obviated the need for CIC in this operation. However, complete compliance with both the letter and the spirit of the surrender agreement was beyond reasonable expectation. CIC had a mission in Japan---that of exercising close surveillance throughout the entire occupation zone for evidence of evasion or avoidance of the surrender terms.

CIC detachments were not organizations to enforce SCAP directives. Their task was more the prevention of hostile acts and the detection and suppression of movements detrimental to the interests of the Allied Forces before such movements could accomplish their purpose. CIC's powers of arrest were closely limited by SCAP directives to those persons suspected of war crime guilt or those who committed overt acts affecting the security of our forces. CIC was powerless, therefore, to apprehend or detain persons known to be associated before the armistice with secret organizations and

movements whose aims came to be regarded as inimical to the Allied Forces. The apprehension of war criminals or United Nations personnel suspected of treason or war crimes was a command function of all occupation troops and was not the exclusive concern of CIC.

CIC's chief accomplishment in the Sixth Army zone of occupation included the following: investigation to determine the degree of compliance with certain far-reaching SCAP directives; the investigation and screening of foreign nationals in the occupation zone, including the Chinese and Korean minority groups; investigation of Japanese police organizations, including the Kempei Tai (Military Police) and Tokko Ka (Thought Control Police); investigation of political and quasi-military organizations, both nationalistic and liberal; and the establishment of informant networks to enable CIC to keep close check on the attitude of the Japanese people and their reaction to the occupation as it proceeded.

2. SCAP Directives

Among the SCAP directives that gave CIC its biggest problem was the order of 4 October 1945, Subject: "Removal of Restrictions on Political, Civil, and Religious Liberties," which was further clarified on 10 October 1945 by the SCAP reply to the Japanese Fro Memoria on the subject. CIC was charged with determining the extent of compliance with these specific points of the directive:

- a. Suspension of laws restricting freedom.
- b. Release of political and religious prisoners, either from imprisonment or surveillance.
- c. Dissolution of agencies created to carry out freedom-restricting laws, including secret police organizations, Special Higher Police (Tokko Ka), and the Protection and Surveillance Commission.
- d. Removal from office of the Japanese Minister of Home Affairs, the chiefs of each prefectural police department, the chiefs of metropolitan police, and the entire personnel of the Tokko Ka and the Protection and Surveillance Commission.
- e. Safeguarding the records of the abolished organizations.
- f. Prohibition of physical punishment and mistreatment of all persons imprisoned.

CIC agents immediately examined police records to ascertain if all political prisoners had been released. Only scattered cases of failure to comply with the order were found and these were quickly rectified. CIC then undertook the task of locating and interrogating

released political prisoners. By 30 November 1945, 75 of the 300 prisoners released in the Sixth Army zone had been interviewed. Three of those found had been jailed for religious beliefs, the remainder for political offenses ranging from Communist activity to the passing of idle remarks of a faintly liberal tint. The alleged offenses did not follow a strict pattern. Although the majority were carried on the books as Communists, this was a term that included almost all degrees of liberal thought. In many instances the interrogation of these people proved of value to CIC. Prisoners who were mistreated or tortured gave information concerning responsible prison officials. Many who were liberals gave data on organizations which could be expected to aid in the democratization of Japan or which operated secretly during the war to retain the former system of government. Some had valuable information on the attitude of the Japanese Government toward the occupation and became CIC informants.

Although the dismissal of members of the Tokka Ka was faithfully carried out, CIC was able to uncover instances of these men being re-employed in other branches of the government in violation of the SCAP order. Civil police organizations were also investigated by CIC to determine the reason for the frequent increases in personnel after the surrender and to determine if former Tokko Ka or Kempei Tai personnel were being added to the rosters. Twenty-three major prisons in the Sixth Army zone were inspected and their records examined.

Also of concern to CIC was the SCAP directive relating to the surrender of arms by civilians. CIC agents examined civil police systems, Kempei Tai headquarters, and schools and universities in all prefectures to determine the amount of arms, munitions, and ordnance materiel still in the hands of the Japanese. Several large caches were found and reported.

In connection with two SCAP directives concerning the administration of the educational system in Japan and the screening and certification of educational officials, CIC conducted a number of surveys of prefectural school systems to determine the extent to which democratic and liberal ideas were included in the curricula. CIC agents attended meetings of school officials and determined that certain local officials were under considerable restraint in altering their curricula because of the rigid control over the schools maintained by the Ministry of Education in Tokyo. CIC uncovered and reported a few cases in which school principals failed to discontinue the teaching of judo and other military subjects.

3. Precious Metals

CIC found evidence of the failure of certain officials to comply with the directive to report to the Allies the location of all gold, silver, and other precious metals. In Osaka, CIC uncovered an apparent attempt by the Japanese Navy to secrete stocks of silver bullion with private firms, and approximately 13½ tons of silver bullion and

pertinent records were seized. In Munazu, Shizuoka, approximately a half ton of silver plate, rods, wire, and ingots, plus a half ton of silver, gold, copper, and platinum alloys were found. Investigating illegal possession by two former employees of the Bureau of Communications, Korean Government, the CIC at Shimonoseki recovered 7,500,000 yen. In Kobe, the CIC found \$500,000 worth of radium in the German Consulate. From the Horita Warehouse at the Nagoya Naval Base, the CIC seized 1500 tons of copper coins (Chinese); four tons of nickel coins (Hong Kong, French Indo-China, Singapore); and 800 tons of assorted copper coins, intended for the manufacture of war materials.

4. Foreign Nationals

CIC undertook the extensive task of interrogating all foreign nationals residing in Japan at the time of entrance of the occupation forces. In general, all except the Chinese and Koreans, whose numbers run into the thousands, had been thoroughly screened by 30 November 1945; by this date more than 3000 interrogations had been completed. The group included subjects of the following countries: United States, Spain, Portugal, Mongolia, Russia, France, Italy, Great Britain, Turkey, Canada, Germany, French Indo-China, Netherlands East Indies, Federated Malay States, Sweden, Ireland, Poland, Switzerland, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Belgium, The Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, India, Manchuria, and Hungary. These people furnished considerable information regarding Japanese espionage organizations, the identity of war criminals, the Japanese attitude toward Americans and the occupation, Japan's war effort, potentially subversive individuals and organizations, and treatment accorded foreign nationals during the war. Many of CIC's best informants were selected from among these foreigners.

Of especial interest to CIC in this connection was the activity of the Nazi Party in Japan during the war, particularly in the large German colony in Kobe. CIC agents, acting on orders from SCAP, confiscated all photographic film, other pictorial records, documents, and monetary and other negotiable assets known or suspected to belong to the Nazi Party which were in the possession of German nationals. Careful inventories of all seized material were prepared.

The Chinese and Korean situation in Japan demanded special attention from CIC, which was called upon to investigate numerous clashes and disorders involving large groups of these people. The troubles stemmed from demands for increased pay and better conditions at labor camps; charges that Chinese PW's were being used as coolie laborers; the alleged torture of Chinese PW's; demands by Koreans for a food issue in excess of the Japanese ration and for immediate repatriation; and disorders at several Japanese ports. CIC conducted investigation of the Tokko Gakari (a Japanese police agency aimed at preventing clashes between Koreans and Japs) and the Dai Niki Section of the Osaka Prefectural Police, which was concerned with Chinese and

Korean affairs.

5. The Kempei Tai

CIC was particularly interested in gathering information about the domestic set-up of the Kempei Tai, closest counterpart of CIC in the Japanese military organization. Working directly with Kempei Tai headquarters and through confidential informants, CIC made detailed studies of the Kempei Tai structure in the Tokai, Chubu, Chugoku, and Seibi regions, which represented four of the five main military districts in the Sixth Army zone. These surveys revealed the duties, personnel, and key figures in each district before the date of demobilization, 1 November 1945. Investigation was continued as to the reserve status of former Kempei Tai members; the attempts, if any, of the organization to go underground; and the efforts that had been made to infiltrate Kempei Tai personnel into the civil police organization. An organization of discharged Kempei Tai members, the Keisatsukan, came under CIC scrutiny.

6. Other Japanese Organizations

To insure the security of Allied troops and to determine the subversive potentialities of Japanese political, civil, and military organizations known to have been ultra-nationalistic, imperialistic, or militaristic, CIC took immediate steps to investigate past, present, and intended activities of such groups as the Kokumin Giyujai (People's Volunteer Corps); Tokumu Kikan (Special Service Organizations, a civilian espionage agency employed by the Japanese Army and Navy overseas); Kokuyu Kai (Black Dragon Society); Rikkenyosei Kai (Junior Black Dragon Society); Teikoku Zaigo Gunjin Kai (Imperial Reservist Association); Sei Shonen Dan (Youth Organizations); Dai Nippon Seiji Kai (Greater Japan Political Society); Tonari Gumi (Neighborhood Association); Suisen Kokoku Kai (Marine Patriotic Society); Yokusan Kai (Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society); and Kino Doshi Kai (Terrorist and anti-Communist group). Most of these organizations claimed to have disbanded and to have destroyed their records immediately after the surrender. CIC obtained the names of the leaders of these groups and watched for signs of additional activity on their part. CIC studied certain liberal movements and political parties in Japan that in spirit were in keeping with the democratic movement in the country. Interrogations of released political prisoners afforded much useful information about such groups as the Zenkoku Suiheisha, an organization of 5,000,000 Eta (lower caste) banned during the war; the Republican Party; the Social Democratic Party; the Nippon Rodo Kumiyuan Shonikai, advocating a universal form of government and greater voice for the people; the Zenkoku Rono Taishuto Nipponi Shibu, Socialist Party; and the People's Emancipation League, which eventually it was planned to name the Communist Party of Japan. Leaders of these liberal movements were hampered by fear of reprisals by the government or by secret

nationalistic groups, and in one case CIC was called upon to investigate a death threat received by members of the Republican Party in Kyoto from an anonymous group which called itself the Tokko, or Special Assault Squad.

7. War Criminals

CIC apprehended only one war criminal in the Sixth Army zone. He was Gerhard Kahner, self-confessed German Gestapo agent. Kahner is alleged to have mistreated foreign nationals in Kobe who had been arrested by the Japanese. However, CIC gathered much useful information on war crimes which was forwarded to the proper authorities. Testimony on several incidents such as the beheading or mistreatment of American fliers was obtained by CIC agents.

Throughout the Sixth Army zone, CIC detachments made careful studies of towns and cities, examined newspapers, motion pictures, and the theater, and in other ways made an effort to keep fully informed on what the Japanese people were doing, saying, and thinking.

C. DISARMAMENT AND DEMOBILIZATION OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES

SCAP's first two directives to the Japanese government (dated 2 and 3 September 1945 respectively) ordered the disarming and demobilizing of all Japanese armed forces and placed the responsibility for accomplishing these tasks squarely on the Japanese themselves. Annex 11 to Operations Instructions Number 4 from GHQ, AFPAC, dated 31 August, charged the Commanding General, Sixth Army, with the duty of supervising the Japanese as they disarmed and demobilized.

The Japanese did not wait for the Allied forces to appear before starting to disband their army and navy. By the time the Sixth Army Command Post was established at Kyoto on 28 September, 776,491 Japanese troops, or about 80 per cent of their armed forces in the Sixth Army's zone, had been discharged and sent home, according to the reports submitted. By 3 November approximately 97 per cent of the 1,029,210 troops reported as being in the zone had been demobilized. Nearly all of the remainder were performing duties as headquarters troops and processing center personnel, the latter being needed to carry on the discharge of troops returned from overseas. The majority of Japanese forces coming home from Korea and the Southern Pacific bases were landed at ports under Sixth Army's control.

D. SURRENDERED MATERIEL

One of the greatest and most difficult tasks of the occupation forces was the locating, seizing, guarding, and disposing of surrendered Japanese and German equipment and materiel.

Prior to the occupation it was anticipated that the quantities of Japanese Army weapons, ammunition, and other materials of war would be enormous. Accordingly, prior to its arrival in Japan, Headquarters Sixth Army made plans regarding surrendered materiel and published directives to implement these plans. Based on available directives from higher headquarters, the plan included an assumption that large numbers of Japanese service troops and adequate numbers of Japanese military vehicles would be available for the concentration and disposition of surrendered materiel. When the occupation forces arrived in Japan, they found that the Japanese vehicles were lacking both in quality and in quantity and that the Japanese service troops had been demobilized.

In brief, the plan for collection and disposition of surrendered materiel was as follows. The Japanese Army was directed to disarm all Japanese Forces, to hold intact and deliver all weapons and equipment at such times and places as were prescribed by occupation force commanders, and to submit detailed inventories of all such equipment. United States Army corps and division commanders were directed to seize all reported installations, verify the Japanese inventories, and dispose of the equipment in the following manner: enemy equipment essentially or exclusively for use in war and not suitable for peacetime civilian uses was to be destroyed or scrapped. Destruction was to be at the location of receipt from the Japanese whenever practicable. Enemy equipment suitable for peacetime civilian uses and not essentially or exclusively for use in war was to be disposed of, at the discretion of the local commander, for (1) maintenance of occupation forces, prisoners of war and displaced persons of the United Nations, or (2) relief of local civil population to the extent necessary to prevent or alleviate epidemics or disease and serious unrest or disorder which would endanger the occupying forces and the objectives of the occupation, or (3) return to the Imperial Japanese Government through its designated agency, the Home Ministry, for conversion into civilian uses. The Home Ministry was directed to maintain records of all materials and supplies returned to them, showing receipt, distribution, and final disposition of all items. Such records as these were to be subject to inspection as required by occupation force commanders.

The plan proved to be sound and served as the basis of operations throughout the occupation. The execution of the plan, however, was delayed by many local conditions such as those indicated below and accordingly was not in full operation until nearly a month after Sixth Army units landed in Japan. In accordance with agreements between the Commanders of the Sixth Army and the Fifth Fleet, Sixth Army assumed responsibility for disposition of naval equipment and installations ashore in Southern Japan. Some of Japan's largest naval installations were located in this area, and the quantity of naval equipment increased the disposition problem by approximately 80 per cent. The creation of United States Naval and Air Force liaison groups to furnish technical advice to ground force personnel in the disposition of naval and air technical equipment required

considerable time. In addition, the freezing of large quantities of materiel pending decisions as to requirements for technical intelligence study, for war museum and memorial pieces, for operational needs, and for distribution as war trophies delayed disposition operations. The prevalence of mines in practically every exit to the open sea made dumping of materiel at sea a slow and hazardous process. The fact that Japanese service troops had been demobilized prior to the arrival of Sixth Army troops necessitated the widespread use of civilian labor, most of which was slow and unskilled, requiring complete reorganization of labor in each new target area. Japanese cargo vehicles were extremely limited in number and were in poor condition. Furthermore, the Japanese inventories proved to be highly inaccurate and incomplete. Unreported installations were discovered and taken over by occupation forces almost daily, and language difficulties made the problem of identification of items extremely laborious. Finally, the inactivation of Sixth Army units, as well as the accelerated readjustment of personnel without a corresponding flow of replacements, served to disrupt the continuity and retard the disposition program.

Despite these delaying factors, disposition of surrendered materiel was carried out at a steadily increasing rate. The G-4 Section, Headquarters Sixth Army, prepared consolidated disposition reports and submitted them weekly to AFFAC beginning on 20 October 1945. As of 1 December 1945, these reports showed that disposition had been made of 209,321,005 rounds of small arms ammunition, 393,211 rifles, 9,293 pistols, 66,759 machine guns, 2,348 field artillery pieces, 63,840 mortars and grenade dischargers, 1,131,331 tons of individual and organizational equipment, and 3,911,519 pounds of fish and meat. These reports brought out one point that may be significant in showing the lack of reserves the Japanese had in weapons and equipment: although approximately 1,000,000 Japanese soldiers were demobilized in the Sixth Army zone of occupation, only 652,261 rifles, 18,128 pistols, 118,671 machine guns, and 77,000 mortars and grenade dischargers had been secured as of 1 December 1945. If the fact is considered that Japan was the arsenal for its armies of aggression, these figures indicate either a lack of reserve ordnance equipment or the possibility that some equipment still remains unsurrendered.

E. CONVERSION OF JAPANESE INDUSTRY

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Directive Number 3, dated 22 September 1945, ordered the Japanese Imperial Government "to stimulate and encourage the immediate maximum production of all essential consumers' commodities, including industrial, agricultural, and fisheries products and commodities essential to the production of such essential consumers' goods."

In furtherance of the demilitarization and disarmament program, the directive specifically prohibited the production of arms, ammunition, implements of war, and parts, components or ingredients

thereof. It forbade the construction of combat vessels and all types of aircraft. This directive was the authority for a far-reaching change in Japanese manufacturing activities. The great effort which Japan had been channeling into the making of munitions was thereby diverted into production for peace.

Before any war plant could be converted to production of peacetime commodities, however, permission had to be obtained from the occupation forces. The Military Government Section of the Sixth Army was charged with the establishment of procedures for handling conversion applications. Provision was made for the inspection of productive operations to insure compliance with SCAP regulations.

Applications were accepted at the headquarters of divisions and corps as well as that of the Army. Review of the applications, their final approval or rejection, and notification of all interested parties of the action taken were other functions of the Sixth Army Military Government Section.

In addition to the firms which were required to obtain permission for conversion, a number of other concerns whose production had been interrupted by the war saw fit to make application to resume operation. Although this procedure was unnecessary, they were given written permits as a matter of routine, partly as an incentive to get them into operation, and partly as an aid to their prestige in dealing with the Japanese Home Ministry, which controlled raw materials.

In granting permits, primary consideration was given to the nature of the proposed product, but the ownership of equipment and materials, and whether or not the movement of machinery was involved, were also factors which determined final action on the application.

It was not feasible for the Sixth Army to consider such factors as financial solvency or credit facilities of the individual applicant, nor could the availability of raw materials and proposed selling prices be taken into account as they were under the control of the Japanese Government. In several instances, however, United States military personnel made helpful recommendations as to factory layout and arrangement of machinery to increase production efficiency. On other occasions, pre-operation visits by inspecting officers served to calm the doubts of hesitant management and cause the factories to commence operation promptly.

To insure that production was kept within the authorized lines, Headquarters Sixth Army instituted a system of monthly inspections and reports and utilized the services of a representative of the division in the area in which the plant was located. These representatives reported any violation of the terms of the permit to Headquarters Sixth Army for appropriate action.

F. REPATRIATION OF ORIENTALS

The repatriation of a million and more orientals to their native countries posed a difficult problem during the early stages of occupation. In addition to nearly 200,000 Koreans who had been conscripted for labor, a huge number of Koreans, Chinese, and Formosans had voluntarily immigrated to Japan in search of better wages and a higher standard of living. After the surrender, the majority of these foreign nationals joined in the clamor for return to their homeland. Exclusive of conscripted laborers, about 1,000,000 Koreans, 30,000 Chinese, and 15,000 Formosans sought repatriation in the Sixth Army zone.

SCAF directives placed the burden of repatriation of these orientals upon the shoulders of the Japanese Government. The directives designated Sasebo, Kagoshima, Senzaki, Kure, and Hakata as embarkation points and instructed the Japanese Government to establish adequate processing centers there. Further directives ordered the erection of similar establishments at Maizuru, Shimonoseki, and Moji as soon as these harbors were clear of mines.

The repatriation program set up by the Japanese encountered difficulties immediately. As soon as the Koreans and Chinese learned of the program, they commenced swarming into embarkation ports in numbers far greater than those which could be adequately handled. In a futile attempt to stem this tide, the Japanese Government halted the sale to Koreans of railway tickets for embarkation points. The foreign nationals evaded this restriction by purchasing tickets to local points successively along the line and finally by proceeding on foot from the next-to-last stop. Despite press and radio warnings to the contrary, many prospective repatriates sold their property and independently moved their entire families to the ports. The resultant congestion was further complicated by the unsanitary habits of the orientals which shortly menaced the health of the areas in which they congregated. Surplus energy resulting from long idleness coupled with the new feeling of freedom led the people awaiting repatriation repeatedly to disturb the peace and endanger the lives of the nearby Japanese residents. Also, the ineffective performance of the Japanese Government in handling what was to them a distasteful project, and the difficulties of organizing adequate shipping facilities, served further to complicate the problem.

SCAF finally directed the Japanese to enlist the aid of Korean societies and adopt a certificate control to stem the flow of oriental repatriates. In compliance, the Japanese established commissions with representatives in various communities whose duty was to issue certificates at a controlled rate to local Koreans. Possession of this certificate was necessary for the admission of any repatriates into an embarkation center. Later, conferences between the Japanese Government and the Sixth Army were held with a view to obtaining maximum use of available shipping. By the end of November the controlled flow of repatriates and the improved shipping situation had considerably

reduced the problem of repatriation of orientals.

G. REPATRIATION OF EUROPEAN NATIONALS

An approximate 2000 European nationals (700 of which were German) and stateless* individuals resided within the Sixth Army zone when United States Forces entered the area. The majority of the nationals were eligible to return to Europe since consuls or representatives of their homeland were able to insure their acceptance by the state. The stateless persons were unfortunately ineligible because their nations either had disappeared as a result of the war or, if these states existed, had refused to recognize the individual's claim to citizenship.

Recovery teams working under the supervision of the Sixth Army arranged for the repatriation of those who expressed a desire to return to their homeland and who were eligible for return. With the assistance of the Swiss and Swedish consuls, the teams were able to approve the 100 formal applications of those eligibles seeking repatriation. Of the 100, however, less than 60 actually departed from Japan; the remainder changed their minds and decided to remain in Japan.

From time to time, stateless individuals (German Jews, Austrians, and White Russians) approached Headquarters Sixth Army to seek transportation to their former homeland and elsewhere, but the recovery teams were unable to assist them since repatriation arrangements required the approval of an existing bona fide state.

German nationals in the Sixth Army zone were not interned. In fact, the many foreign nationals and stateless individuals were treated the same as any other inhabitant of the area, and no special provision for the care, housing, feeding, or surveillance of the many diverse nationalities found in the area of occupation was made or was found necessary.

H. CLOSING OF COLONIAL AND FOREIGN BANKS

In a directive dated 30 September 1945, SCAP ordered the Japanese Imperial Government to close all colonial and foreign banks and special wartime financial institutions including their head offices, branches,

* European nationals are those individuals who are citizens of a country which still maintains an established government in Europe. Stateless individuals are citizens of countries which have lost the right to established government since the war's end (Germans, Austrians) or who were forcibly separated from an existing government (White Russians).

and agencies. All transactions were prohibited; all key personnel were discharged but were told to remain available for future questioning.

Sixth Army troops closed eleven banks. By direction of SCAF the Sixth Army took charge of the premises and, with the assistance of bank employees and a representative of the Japanese Ministry of Finance, located, identified, and inspected books, records, safes, vaults, cash, securities, and other valuable property. The Sixth Army issued passes to military government personnel permitting them to enter the bank premises. Sixth Army tactical units seized currency, coin, and bullion totaling about \$1,500,000 in value and deposited it to the account of the closed institutions in the nearest branch of the Bank of Japan.

On 20 October 1945 SCAF appointed the Bank of Japan as liquidator of the following-named institutions which had been closed as a result of the earlier directive: Bank of Chosen, Bank of Taiwan, Banque Franco-Japonaise, Chosen Colonization (Shokusan) Bank, and Deutsche Bank fur Ostasien. In a letter of instruction SCAF directed the Bank of Japan to prepare a comprehensive report on the assets and liabilities of each bank as of 29 September 1945 and to provide detailed information on its officers and directors as of 31 July 1945.

SCAF directed the Sixth Army to exercise close supervision over the banks to prevent removal, defacement, or destruction of books, records, or other property. The Sixth Army assigned military government representatives to each bank and required them to submit written reports on the progress of the liquidation and on matters of special financial interest including any actual or suspected irregularity of failure of personnel to carry out the policies and procedures directed by SCAF.

I. EDUCATIONAL WORK

Although there were no specific directives defining the duties of the Sixth Army with regard to control or supervision of the Japanese educational system in the Army's zone of occupation, personnel of the Military Government Section of the Sixth Army initiated a program to orient Japanese educators in the ideals of democracy. Working in coordination with the authorities of the Doshisha University, Kyoto, officers of this headquarters presented a series of lectures to a group of Japanese teachers, business men, and school officials dealing with such subjects as the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution, Democracy at Work, American Education, Chivalry versus Bushido, and Abraham Lincoln. "American Women's Part in Government" was the title of an address delivered to the women's branch of the Kyoto Section of the Japanese Liberal Party. Each lecture was followed by a question and answer period which indicated intense interest in the topics under discussion. Several of the talks were published in full in both Japanese and English language editions

of the Kyoto Shinbun and the Osaka Mainichi, the latter of which has a circulation of more than 4,000,000.

Representatives of the Military Government Section of the Sixth Army inspected and reported on the conditions found in a number of schools in the vicinity of Kyoto.

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VII. ACTIVITIES OF STAFF SECTIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

In the preceding chapters an effort has been made to cover only the most significant aspects of the Sixth Army's role in the occupation of Japan. The omission of many details regarding problems and solutions of the various staff sections of Headquarters Sixth Army was deemed appropriate in the interest of emphasis and concise narration. A realization of the probably value of these omitted activities to the military student, however, has resulted in the addition of a concluding chapter, which contains for the most part those matters upon which the various staff sections acted without having precedent or experience to guide them. An account of the actions taken upon these matters should be of some assistance in meeting similar problems in the future.

In the interests of avoiding repetition and conserving space in this chapter, certain features of the planning phase of this operation either have been eliminated or have been given only slight reference. Every staff section was confronted with the problems of adapting its nearly-completed plans for the Kyushu invasion to new plans for the occupation of a greater area where the amount of resistance to be encountered was a matter of conjecture. In addition to doubts concerning the attitude of the Japanese individually and collectively, other factors which added to the planning difficulties and were more or less common to all sections were: the shortness of time available before the work of occupation commenced, the effects of the readjustment and redeployment programs, the wide dispersion of the required shipping which was scheduled to be loaded and ready at a much later date, and the insufficiency of adequate data on the physical and economic conditions to be met in Japan.

B. G-1

Accounts of the Sixth Army's activities in supervising the recovery of prisoners of war and the demobilization of the Japanese Army and Air Forces have been treated earlier in this report. The largest remaining task which came within the scope of the G-1 Section was that of supervising the readjustment program and insuring the efficient handling of United States military personnel who were qualified for return home by reason of their adjusted service rating scores.

During the months of August and September 1945, when the Sixth Army units were being prepared for shipment to the forward area, difficulty was encountered in clearing such units of personnel eligible for readjustment because of inadequate space at replacement depots, many last-minute transfers of units between commands, and absence of reports of eligibles from many units newly assigned to the Sixth Army. As a result, many units arrived in Japan before such personnel could be released.

Release of this personnel was further complicated in Japan because Nagoya harbor, the replacement depot's port, had to be cleared of mines before it could be entered by shipping. The 11th Replacement Depot, which was among the first units to arrive in Japan and which had been established at Okazaki, was able to begin processing personnel on 19 October and to clear its first shipment to the United States on 29 October 1945. For several weeks after that date faulty shipping schedules caused some delays and changes of orders. As a result of personal representations by the Commanding General, Sixth Army, the Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC, made available additional shipping which eased the situation. By the end of the second month of occupation readjustment was proceeding in an orderly and effective manner. More than 30,000 officers and men, or an estimated 60 per cent of the personnel eligible for readjustment from Sixth Army units in Japan, had been shipped home by 30 November, the close of the period covered by this report. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, estimated that by the end of December the Sixth Army's back-log of eligible personnel would be eliminated and the readjustment program would be on a current basis. This was actually accomplished by 24 December 1945.

The readjustment program inevitably added to the difficulties of the occupation. The release of a large number of experienced key men, many of them technical experts, during the early days of a new and unusual type of military operation retarded in some measure the setting up of installations such as troop billets and offices. The seizing of occupation objectives and the destroying of captured material was consequently delayed. Ordnance, quartermaster, signal and medical units lost highly-trained specialists at a time when they were most needed. In addition, among the personnel not immediately eligible for readjustment there were instances of a decline in morale and efficiency brought about by a shortage of experienced leadership or distracting thoughts of home and civilian life.

C. G-2

1. Accuracy of G-2 Estimate

Information secured from the Japanese and from reconnaissance of the terrain after occupation revealed that the G-2 estimate of the situation on Kyushu published 1 August was gratifyingly accurate. In that estimate, it was reasoned that the Japanese had 421,000 troops on Kyushu comprising nine divisions or division equivalents, plus a large number of base and service troops, and naval defense personnel. Additional information received after publication of the estimate and prior to the end of the war revealed that large-scale reinforcement of Kyushu was under way. Consequently, G-2 had prepared an estimate to be published on 15 August 1945 showing a total of 680,000 troops on Kyushu, including fourteen divisions or division equivalents. These figures were obtained just as the war ended.

The Japanese reported their actual strength in Kyushu when the war ended as 735,000, comprising fourteen divisions and six independent mixed brigades plus additional base and service units. However, this total included units on the islands off-lying Kyushu, totaling 25,000, which were not considered in the proposed G-2 estimate. Therefore, the G-2 estimate scheduled for publication would have been 96 per cent accurate as to enemy strength on Kyushu. The difference between the strength estimate published 1 August and the estimate prepared for 15 August is largely accounted for by the reinforcements the Japanese pushed to Kyushu in July and August, organization of new units, and the augmentation of naval defense forces by the crews of immobilized ships.

As to tactics, the G-2 estimate fared even better. Based upon two years of combat experience, research from other theaters, and information obtained by analysis of aerial photos and from prisoners of war with intimate detailed knowledge, the Sixth Army G-2 estimate of favored Japanese defensive action was strikingly similar to a report submitted by the Japanese command. For example the G-2 estimate published 1 August 1945 contained the following capability: "Due, however, to the numerical strength and terrain advantages the enemy will possess in Southern Kyushu, it is believed highly probable that he will revert to his long-favored doctrine of 'annihilating the enemy at the water's edge' and that a very strong and ferocious defense will be interposed at the beaches."

The 2d Japanese Demobilization Headquarters reported on 1 December 1945 concerning the defensive plan for Kyushu: "Powerful defense was established directly near coastal areas. Therefore, the strength stationed along the beaches differed according to natural terrain features but were generally on a basis extending from one fifth to one third of the whole coastal defense strength. The principal fighting method and object of coastal stationed units was to persistently destroy the establishment of bridgeheads, and to enforce continuous counter-attacks in wave formation to attain the same. For this purpose fighting units would take their stand even to utter annihilation."

2. Order of Battle and Language Activities

Upon arrival in Japan, the Order of Battle Subsection assumed responsibility for the collation of information concerning all Japanese units in the Sixth Army zone of occupation, their strength and locations as of 15 August, and, in general terms, their status of demobilization. The sources of this information were largely the documents prepared by various Japanese headquarters at the request of the Sixth Army. Since most enemy documents were burned in mid-August by order of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, nearly all this information had to be reconstructed. None of the documents received was actually a captured document, and this lack of original records led to several discrepancies between the reports submitted by various Japanese headquarters.

The greatest problem the Order of Battle Subsection encountered was the lack of a single Japanese headquarters that controlled all of the army or all of the navy troops in the Sixth Army zone of occupation. Various supply and equipment depots and the railway troops were not under the control of the Second General Army, but rather were under the control of several headquarters in Tokyo. The vast majority of the shipping troops were under the Shipping Command at Ujina, which was directly responsible to authorities in Tokyo. The problem of control was solved by directing the Japanese Second General Army to secure from the responsible headquarters information on all units in its area through Japanese Army channels and communications. In many cases the Second General Army sent staff officers of its command to these headquarters to gather and compile the required information. This system proved very effective, and the data obtained, when checked with other reports, was found to be usually reliable. In general, there was no indication of non-cooperation shown by the various Japanese headquarters concerning order of battle information. Certain discrepancies and errors occurred, but most of them resulted from misinterpretation of terminology or a lack of original documents and were noted, rechecked, and corrected.

The 162d Language Detachment, operating within the G-2 Section, made very few translations of military documents since the responsibility for seizure of documents rested with corps and division. The Japanese were directed to translate all documents required of them into English, and the Language Detachment verified the accuracy of these translations. The detachment translated editorials and other pertinent articles in Kyoto newspapers in order to keep abreast of the Japanese public attitude.

The attachment of language personnel to authorized intelligence teams that came into the area in search of specialized information proved to be the most effective way to locate documents.

D. G-4

1. Planning

The greatest problem of the G-4 Section while planning for the occupation was the modification and adaptation of the plans for the Kyushu Operation to enable them to fit the new project. To do this, the G-4 Section had to make many swift changes in the logistic plans, for the occupation began several weeks prior to the target date for the Kyushu invasion. The Sixth Army could not utilize fully the preparations for the Kyushu Operation because many of the supplies and materials for its logistic support were unavailable in the theater prior to the occupation. The necessity of establishing priorities for scarce supplies between units of the Sixth and Eighth Armies and the XXIV Corps further complicated the supply situation. As a result of these adverse conditions, some units of the Sixth Army experienced difficulty in obtaining necessary supplies and equipment to accompany them on their movements to Japan.

Plans for the resupply of troops proved to be more readily solved than had the plans for initial supply. Headquarters Sixth Army averted a resupply problem by utilizing all available theater maintenance shipping at critical ports and by using subsequently the operational shipping originally intended for the Kyushu Operation when this shipping arrived from the United States. After conferences with AFWESPAC, G-4 representatives were able to provide a resupply schedule which allocated quantities of all classes of supplies for movement to the various ports serving the Sixth Army. Under the provisions of these schedules, AFPAC Petroleum Office furnished all petroleum to the occupied zone except that carried forward by troops, while CINCPAC furnished all class II and class IV supplies for the Marine units under Sixth Army control.

Army Service Command O, (ASCOMO), originally intended for use in the Kyushu Operation, was to provide logistic support for the Sixth Army during the occupation. This organization, made available by AFPAC to Headquarters Sixth Army and staffed by personnel furnished by AFWESPAC, was divided into Headquarters ASCOMO and three base headquarters: Headquarters Kobe Base, Headquarters Nagoya Base, and Headquarters Kure Base. Headquarters ASCOMO remained under the control of Sixth Army; Headquarters Kobe Base (at Wakayama) and Headquarters Nagoya Base initially were re-attached to I Corps, while Headquarters Kure Base was re-attached to the X Corps. VAC retained responsibility for the logistic support in its area and did not utilize any part of the Army Service Command until mid-December, when Headquarters Kyushu Base was formed by ASCOMO and attached to VAC. The several base headquarters functioned to supervise logistic operations at the ports as directed by corps, utilizing service troops attached for that purpose, until the bases were established by Headquarters Sixth Army. After establishment, the appropriate base headquarters operated the base under the direction and supervision of ASCOMO.

To meet the problem of procurement, Sixth Army directed each corps and division within its command to form a procurement agency to procure for all units within its area needed Japanese supplies, real estate, equipment, and facilities. Each procurement agency was directed to operate under the policies and procedure announced by the Sixth Army Procurement Section, which was initially organized for this operation as a subsection of G-4 and later as a separate staff section of Headquarters Sixth Army.

2. Operations

The presence of pressure mines in the entrance of Kobe harbor and sweeping difficulties in Nagoya harbor denied the use of these harbors initially, and as a result all supplies for the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto area were routed through Wakayama. The absence of docks, the limited useable beaching areas, and the required use of an unprotected roadstead from which cargo had to be unloaded by lighterage made Wakayama an unsatisfactory port of discharge. On 15 October 1945, when the Kobe Base was established under ASCOMO, Headquarters Kobe Base

took over all port operations in the Wakayama area and assumed logistic responsibility for all troops in the Wakayama-Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto area, relieving I Corps of this responsibility. On 15 November the Nagoya Base was established and the Headquarters Nagoya Base, under ASCOMO, assumed responsibility for the port operations in the Nagoya area and logistic responsibility for all troops in the Nagoya area. On 20 November port operations in the Wakayama area were drastically reduced and the Nagoya Base assumed logistic responsibility for all troops in the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto-Nagoya area. Elements from the Headquarters Kobe Base took over the operation of supply and service installation in the Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto area from I Corps and subsequently formed the nucleus of Headquarters Kyushu Base.

The X Corps relinquished logistic responsibilities in its area on 3 November 1945, and the Headquarters Kure Base, under ASCOMO, took over port operations in Kure and assumed the logistic responsibility for the X Corps area.

VAC was responsible for logistics and port operation in Kyushu and in Yamaguchi Prefecture on Honshu. Pressure mines, which prevented the use of all ports north of Sasebo until after 20 December, seriously hampered supply and troop movements in this area. Headquarters Kyushu Base was established under ASCOMO on 30 December 1945 just prior to the release of Headquarters VAC from the theater on 31 December 1945.

3. Comments

Because the occupation troops made maximum use of the existing Japanese facilities and supplies and the undamaged railroad system, construction supplies and replacement vehicles were provided in quantities greatly in excess of actual needs. The Sixth Army avoided discharge and storage bottlenecks by selective discharge of essential items in the above categories and by the turnaround of partially loaded resupply ships. Principal shortages experienced by the occupation troops in the early stages were limited to the following: fresh meats and frozen foods, winter clothing, and stoves. Strenuous efforts to provide special shipments and to effect speedy and equitable distribution resulted in progressive alleviation of these deficiencies.

Of the favorable factors affecting the logistic situation, the first-class railroad system was one of the most important. The railroads adequately met all demands and more than offset the lack of good highways. The use of the railroads to carry troops, supplies, equipment, and in the disposition of surrendered munitions and explosives made possible the rapid extension of the scope of operations without the construction or reconstruction of an extensive highway system.

Existing Japanese facilities fulfilled the majority of the needs

of the occupation troops, although Kyoto was the only large city within the Sixth Army zone of responsibility which had escaped bomb damage. By widely dispersing major commands, the Sixth Army made possible the utilization of existing Japanese Army and Navy barracks and cantonments to the maximum extent. Facilities for base operating troops proved to be more difficult to find. By conversion and modification, however, satisfactory housing, supply, administration, and service installations were obtained. Dock facilities in most cases had suffered only minor damage from aerial bombing. Adequate usable berths for deep-draft vessels were therefore available to all main supply points upon the completion of mine clearances in the approach channels.

Most of the areas had abundant supplies of Japanese laborers to fulfill the needs of the occupation forces. Skilled laborers, particularly plumbers and electricians, were critically limited in some areas, but these shortages were alleviated by careful allocation according to designated construction priorities.

E. ENGINEER

1. Introduction

In planning for the occupation of Japan, the Engineer Section, Headquarters Sixth Army, encountered many unfamiliar problems, the enumeration of which will clarify the difficult situation that existed during the planning period. As a primary factor, maps, photographs, and intelligence studies of the proposed areas of occupation were exceedingly limited and provided but a fraction of the information required for an accurate analysis. Furthermore, the reaction of the Japanese to the entry of occupation forces was an intangible which required engineer elements to be prepared for support of combat operations. Engineer troops for the operation were widely scattered throughout the Pacific and these units had to be equipped and prepared in a brief time. Also, engineer supplies had to be obtained by diverting theater resupply ships, ships loaded originally for the invasion of Japan, and by local procurement. Diversion of shipping meant that supplies would not arrive in the priority needed and that much excess tonnage would have to be unloaded in order to obtain the desired materials. Insufficient knowledge of the internal supply situation and the absence of a definite procurement policy, attributable to insufficient information on local Japanese administrative offices, prevented an accurate analysis of the amount of supplies which could be obtained through local procurement. Finally, planning of port and base development, roadnets, and airdrome locations was contingent upon the availability of engineer supplies, and, since the Navy at that time was unable to predict the speed of mine-sweeping operations, the Engineer Section encountered great difficulty in scheduling early operations and in selecting sites for vital installations.

2. Preparation

Upon receipt of the warning order for the occupation, the Engineer Section started immediately the compilation and dissemination of the limited available information concerning cities, installations, and facilities in the area to be occupied by Sixth Army troops. Despite the scarcity and unreliability of available information, some positive conclusion regarding these elements could be reached. It was apparent that Japan had an excellent railroad net and that piers and wharves could be in serviceable condition after minor repairs. Aerial photographs indicated that buildings and utilities in the port areas and bombed cities had been severely damaged. The usability of harbors remained unknown because of insufficient information concerning the depth of water and presence of mines. However, early choice of Sasebo, Nagasaki, Kure, and Wakayama as the initial landing points did partially relieve the uncertainty by permitting a concentrated and detailed study of these port areas.

Engineer representatives who accompanied advance parties into Japan sent back additional information that proved helpful in further engineer planning. Early in September an officer from the Engineer Section and an officer from the newly created Procurement Section flew to Japan to secure definite information on procurement procedure and the organization of the Japanese administrative agencies. These officers proceeded to Tokyo, where this information was not available, and thence to the Kyoto-Osaka area on 9 September to interview the senior representative of the Japanese Central Liaison Agency in that area. Proving beneficial in preparing for the entry of troops, the visit demonstrated the advisability of sending advance parties into all proposed landing areas and also supported the previous surmise that Japanese airdromes were not generally usable for our troops. In the vicinity of large cities the existing roadnet was adequate while the railroad net was generally excellent throughout the Sixth Army zone. The engineer representative also reported that Japanese construction equipment and ability were limited and that many critical construction supplies could not be procured in Japan.

The engineer representatives of the Sixth Army Advance Party which arrived in Japan in mid-September assisted in preparing detailed plans for the landing of occupation troops and for the development of roads, housing facilities, and hospitals. The engineer personnel initiated reconnaissance and planning for airdrome and bulk fuel storage development.

The Engineer Section worked closely with the Procurement Section while developing plans for the occupation of Japan. The solutions to problems of procurement procedure were more important to the engineers than to any other service because of the contemplated use of Japanese real estate, utilities, materials, and contractors. Utilizing information on the Japanese liaison agencies submitted by engineer and procurement representatives with the advance detachments, the Sixth Army Engineer incorporated into the Engineer Annex a pro-

cedure which enabled army and corps engineers and engineer construction brigade commanders to obtain from local sources necessary real estate, construction, and supplies that did not exceed 10,000 yen per transaction. Under this plan utilities were procured directly from operating agencies. Divisions were the lowest echelons delegated this procurement authority.

The Engineer Annex to Operations Instructions Number 4 reached Sixth Army in late August. The annex stressed maximum use of local facilities and included instructions to procure locally or construct certain facilities that were required for the support of the occupation forces. After the Army Engineer had analyzed these instructions and the known facilities in the Sixth Army area, a breakdown listed below of construction requirements was determined and included in the Engineer Annex to Field Order 75, dated 11 September 1945:

	<u>I Corps</u>	<u>VAC</u>	<u>X Corps</u>
Runways	1 - 7000' x 100' 1 - 5000' x 100'	1 - 6000' x 100' 1 - 7000' x 100'	1 - 5000' x 100'
Transport Apron, Sq Ft	150,000	150,000	
Parking Facilities for			
HB Group	1	2	
MB Group		1	
LB Group		1	
Fighter Group	1	2	
Troop Carrier Group		1	
Misc Squadrons	1	4	
Bulk Petroleum Storage (bbls)	137,000	172,000	
Camp Facilities (troops)	142,000	116,000	65,000
Hospitalization (beds)	6,000	4,500	2,500
Supply Point Facilities:			
Storage, covered (Sq Ft)	823,000	673,000	374,000
Liberty Ship Berths	4	3	2

AFPAC later revised these instructions to include fixed-bed hospitalization for four per cent of the garrison strength, camps for garrison troops, and three 6000' x 150' airstrips with operations buildings and housing facilities--one in the Kanoya area of Southern Kyushu, one in Northern Kyushu, and one in the Osaka-Kobe area.

AFPAC assigned engineer units by prorating all troops available to that headquarters to major commands, leaving a minimum in rear areas for base requirements. Assuming considerable reconstruction, the possibility of combat operations, and no early reduction in the size of the occupation force, the Sixth Army Engineer found the allotment of engineer troops barely sufficient to meet operational needs. In addition, an analysis of the road construction problems determined after the landings of initial engineer parties indicated that reconstruction of roads would be beyond the capabilities of the originally allotted engineer troops. This resulted in the abandonment of plans of road reconstruction and in the decision to use railroads for troop and supply movement.

Because of the widespread operations and distribution of troops, the Sixth Army attached most of the engineer troops to the three corps and held each corps responsible for construction operations within its area. The single exception to this was in the I Corps area, where the 5220th Engineer Construction Brigade, operating directly under Sixth Army, was responsible for the construction of all major airdrome installations, all docks and petroleum storage installations, and other facilities directed by Headquarters Sixth Army. Headquarters ASCOMO was to be given engineer construction and supply responsibility at the bases in the various areas passed to its control.*

Where practicable, each corps was responsible for the preparation of its attached and assigned engineer units for loading out and movement on vessels made available by the Sixth Army. Because of communication difficulties and the inability of the corps to supervise the staging of some attached engineer units, Sixth Army had to supervise the equipping and loading out of those VAC and X Corps engineer units which were based on Luzon. Other engineer units scattered throughout the Pacific received radio instructions, or sent representatives to army or corps headquarters for instructions.

3. Operations

Engineer construction operations in Japan were very limited in the first month of occupation, but they gained impetus after 1 No-

* Kure Base passed to control of ASCOMO on 1 November 1945 and Nagoya Base passed to control of ASCOMO on 15 November 1945.

ember 1945. Due generally to poor road conditions, congested rail-road transportation, and blocked harbors, the initial arrival of engineer troops in the occupation area was considerably delayed. The effect of this delay was particularly noticeable in the Nagoya and Fukuoka areas where high priority construction missions were set back from three to six weeks.

Road construction in the Sixth Army zone of occupation was initially limited to maintenance with minor improvements. Road maintenance was relatively simple in the major city areas since the roads were well constructed and deteriorated only slightly under military traffic. Outside the city areas, however, the problems were quite different, for here the existing roads were narrow gravel roads with bridges incapable of carrying the heavy vehicles of our armed forces. The complicated drainage system, the numerous rice fields, and the buildings adjacent to the roads made widening of these roads impracticable. Since the burden of supply and troop traffic was passed to the railroads, maintenance and improvement of roads outside of the major cities were restricted to the main connecting highways: the Wakayama-Osaka road in the I Corps area, the Hiro-Kure-Hiroshima road in the X Corps area, and the Sasebo-Saga-Fukuoka road in the VAC area. The greatest amount of work was concentrated upon the Sasebo-Saga-Fukuoka road inasmuch as the railroad capacity was low in this area and delay in removal of mines from the Fukuoka harbor enhanced the importance of this route. Ninety per cent of this highway required grading to make it suitable for even light military traffic, and practically all the bridges along the route needed extensive repair. Other than the work done on the Sasebo-Fukuoka highway, very limited bridge construction or repair was required because of the limited use of roads. In the entire Sixth Army zone, the engineers installed but two Bailey bridges--one at Kobe after the existing bridge had been destroyed by a washout, and one temporarily between Hiro and Kure to repair a break resulting from a Typhoon.

Railroad construction and maintenance were negligible. Typhoons caused minor damage in the Kure area which the Japanese satisfactorily repaired by the utilization of large numbers of laborers and with practically no construction equipment. In two instances only did the engineers require heavy construction equipment for railroad maintenance, and in both cases this equipment was used to speed movement of earth in repairing typhoon damage.

Airdrome construction was limited to the repair and improvement of existing Japanese fields. Utilized for the staging of troop carrier and transport planes, Kanoya airdrome, in southern Kyushu, required only minor repairs that were accomplished by one company of the 873d Engineer Aviation Battalion assisted by Japanese labor. Only minor repairs were required at Omura airdrome, near Sasebo, which was developed as a Navy field by naval construction forces. Work was started on the complete resurfacing of a 6000' x 150' runway on the Itazuke (Mushiroda) airdrome near Fukuoka, but only 14 per cent of the work had been accomplished on this drome prior to

1 December. The slow rate of construction on this drome resulted from the delay in moving construction troops and heavy equipment to this area, which in turn had been caused by road and railroad limitations, harbor congestion at Sasebo, and inability to use Fukuoka harbor because of mines. The considerable drainage and rebuilding that was necessary on this field was rendered difficult because of absence of gravel and the necessity for using crushed rock for aggregate and sub-grade. Hiroshima airfield was prepared for use of transport planes for liaison purposes by minor filling and rolling. The improvement of Itami airfield, near Osaka, to make it suitable for an airbase for a light bomber group, a fighter group, and a troop carrier group required the extension of one runway for about 800 feet and the construction of an almost completely circumferential taxiway around the field. Although gravel was available locally, only 30 per cent of the work was done on Itami airfield prior to 1 December because of unfavorable weather and delayed arrival of a heavy construction unit on the site. Renovation of buildings at Itami to meet Air Force operational needs was well advanced by 1 December and housing construction was getting underway.

In general, existing petroleum storage and distribution facilities were adequate in the Sixth Army zone, with only cleaning and minor modifications being necessary in order to prepare these facilities for handling the petroleum requirements of our forces. Construction units, however, had to erect additional tankage (40,000 barrels) and distribution facilities at Nagoya, and new aviation gasoline storage tanks at Itami, Itazuke, and Kanoya airfields. In addition, the Japanese under the direction of United States engineers rehabilitated at Shimotsu, south of Wakayama, an overseas tanker terminal with storage for 680,000 barrels.

Hospital requirements on 11 September 1945 were estimated at 13,000 beds. This estimate, however, was scaled downward after the arrival of occupation forces in Japan, the requirements dropping to 7500 beds by 30 November. Existing military and Red Cross hospitals and suitable commercial-type buildings provided space for the latter requirement. While considerable improvement of the utilities in these buildings was necessary, the construction problems were relatively minor and Japanese labor under Sixth Army supervision accomplished most of this work.

Sixth Army solved the housing and administrative installation problems in the same manner as described above. Some troops lived in floored tents, but the majority of the occupation forces occupied barracks, factories, hotels, and government or privately owned buildings. With the assistance of Japanese labor, the engineers quickly repaired and renovated the buildings and related facilities. Despite the fact that installation of heating systems was a major task, by 30 November all buildings which housed troops were adequately heated.

One of the highest priority construction missions in the Sixth Army area was the provision of a 20,000-man replacement depot at

Okazaki, near Nagoya. The 5220th Engineer Construction Brigade operating directly under Sixth Army, and later the 931st Engineer Construction Group under ASCOMC, supervised this work. The urgency of this labor was dictated by the necessity for handling replacements arriving from the United States and large numbers of high-point personnel leaving for the States under the readjustment program. One reinforced construction battalion and several hundred Japanese laborers were assigned to this work. The work consisted of the repair and improvement of the facilities formerly utilized by the Japanese in connection with airfield operations at Okazaki drome. This included construction of bathhouses, latrines, and lavatories, the insulation of most of the buildings, the installation of 715,000 square feet of low ceilings in high-ceiling buildings to simplify heating, the improvement of 15 miles of roads, extensive repairs to the water distribution systems, and the installation of 1800 heaters to complete the heating facilities. Work was considerably delayed initially because of the late opening of the port of Nagoya, which had resulted in delayed arrival of heavy construction equipment and construction supplies.

Repair, rather than construction, sufficed to make all port and wharf facilities usable in the Sixth Army area. In the Nagoya area, wharves and buildings were ready for use shortly after the harbor was cleared of mines. In Wakayama, Matsuyama, and Shikoku, no wharves were available, and all unloading was handled directly over the beaches. The first estimates indicated that the Fukuoka harbor would be open by 22 October, but the minesweeping difficulties actually delayed use of the port by LST's until 6 December and by deep-draft vessels until 26 December. Port operations were not possible in the Osaka-Kobe area because of the presence of pressure mines. At Kure, sufficient storage facilities were obtained ashore after the removal of considerable debris, and Japanese naval port facilities sufficient for three Liberty ship wharves were adequate after minor improvements. However, the presence of mines prevented the use of this port for other than small landing craft until late November. Limited covered and open storage facilities in Sasebo and Nagasaki decreased the port capacities and required the construction of roads, clearing of areas, and the extensive construction of buildings.

The redeployment program seriously hampered the effectiveness of engineer operations throughout the Sixth Army zone. Faced with important construction missions, units were rapidly depleted of practically all skilled and technical personnel. Essential organizations were kept up to authorized total strength by the transfer of personnel from units scheduled to be inactivated. But too few of the personnel transferred were skilled men or qualified technicians. The result was that insufficient technically skilled men remained in essential engineer units to train adequately replacements--not to speak of carrying on a construction task.

Japanese labor was used extensively for engineer work in the Sixth Army area. The labor was obtained through the United States

military government agencies and was generally of good quality, although there was a shortage of skilled labor, which became particularly noticeable after units had been depleted by release of high-point personnel. Procurement of labor became more and more difficult as the occupation progressed, presumably because of the improvement of civilian enterprises and the low wages paid by the Japanese government in accordance with military government regulations. It was necessary to bring increasing pressure to bear on the Japanese agencies through military government as the filling of labor requisitions became less and less efficient. Construction progress was materially handicapped by the lack of specific means of locally punishing Japanese liaison authorities who failed to procure labor, and of punishing laborers themselves for desertion or failure to report. Further, our own troop commanders frequently did not assign labor to projects in order of prescribed priority.

The Sixth Army effectively used Japanese construction contractors on the renovation of buildings including heating installation, carpentry, painting, and insulating for winter use. Language and technical problems caused some difficulties in these operations, but the results obtained were very satisfactory. The contractors obtained both skilled and unskilled laborers more readily than they could be obtained through military government channels. In most instances better progress was obtained when materials and equipment were furnished by the U. S. units supervising the work. Contracts were arranged through Japanese liaison agencies or through prefectural headquarters. Prefectural headquarters and city governments were held responsible for the continued operation of utilities and maintenance of roads, where this work could be accomplished with the means available to them.

4. Supply

The majority of the engineer supplies used in the Sixth Army zone up to 1 December came from Japanese military supply dumps. Each corps was provided with engineer depot, maintenance, and equipment companies for handling the storage and issue of these supplies. Initially, engineer supplies were not shipped from one corps zone to another, but after 1 November numerous shortages of critical items that developed in corps zones were relieved by shipments from other corps zones. ASCOMO assumed supply responsibility in the X Corps area on 3 November and in the I Corps area on 15 November. Small supply problems were established in Osaka and Kyoto to decentralize supply problems initially in the I Corps area and were stocked from Japanese military and civilian sources. These supply points passed to ASCOMO control on 10 November.

To obtain critical supplies not available in Japan, Sixth Army obtained from AFWESPAC ships loaded in whole or in part with engineer supplies. These ships were not loaded in accordance with requirements, but were loaded with all types of supplies and equipment, much of which was not needed by the occupation forces. Therefore

much excess tonnage had to be unloaded in order to obtain the desired supplies. Sixth Army later arranged for special loading of some POL storage and distribution materials on small ships, but otherwise no special loading was possible in the time and with the means available.

Large quantities of construction supplies were obtained in the Japanese military dumps in I and X Corps areas, and limited quantities in the VAC area. These included lumber, electrical supplies, nails, pipe and fittings, cement, and steel plate and shapes in large quantities. The Japanese were required to submit complete inventories of these dumps, which were placed under control of U. S. troops as rapidly as practicable. Civilian engineer supplies were generally quite limited and, in many cases, were badly needed by the Japanese for critical civilian shortages. However, when necessary, these supplies were obtained for our use through the procurement boards in the various areas.

About 2500 tons of tankage, pumps, pipe, and fittings were loaded on small ships in Manila for delivery to I Corps and VAC ports soon after the arrival of occupation troops in Japan. Encountering a typhoon in the vicinity of Okinawa, these ships were so severely damaged that only one was able to continue on to Japan while the other four returned to Manila. The delay caused a critical shortage in the above materials for nearly a month. Sufficient chlorine for civilian water systems, engineer space heaters, quartermaster stoves, plywood, and insulation kits to convert tropical type prefabricated huts remained critical items throughout November.

5. Surveying and Mapping

Bulk shipments of map reproduction materials and equipment for the occupation did not arrive at Luzon in time for initial distribution. AFPAC furnished reproduction materials for black and white emergency editions of Japanese 1/500,000 topographic maps covering the occupation areas. Sixth Army also compiled and reproduced a 1/5,000,000 road map covering the zone of occupation. Theater stocks provided additional maps at scales of 1/250,000 and 1/1,000,000. Sixth Army was able to distribute these maps to I and X Corps from Luzon, and AFMIDPAC made initial distribution to VAC. Upon arrival in Japan, army and corps topographic units were able to reproduce a number of 1/50,000 sheets covering restricted areas for which reproduction material was not previously available. Surveying operations in Japan were confined generally to construction surveying.

6. Comments

Insufficient time and the scarcity of accurate intelligence information for planning prevented the Sixth Army Engineer from making a proper analysis of the engineering problems likely to be encountered in the occupation of Japan. The time element furthermore required

improvisation of a supply plan that proved unsatisfactory since diversion of shipping resulted in unnecessary handling of excess supplies and an accumulation of stocks.

The readjustment program seriously impaired the efficiency of engineer units. With the shortage of replacements, the only solution to this problem was the inactivation of many units in order to keep other units at maximum working strength.

Japanese airdromes were generally poorly constructed. None of the airdromes were suitable for heavy bomber operations without almost complete reconstruction. Preparation of the best fields for medium bomber operations required the lengthening of runways, improvement of drainage, and the addition of taxiways. Considerable maintenance of even the best paved runways was necessary if these were to be used extensively by medium and light bombers.

Damage to buildings in Japanese cities by U. S. bombing was great, but the effect on streets, water supply, and electric power was not extensive.

Construction capabilities of the Japanese were extremely limited because they lacked organization, skill, knowledge, experience, and materials. Existing facilities were poorly maintained during the latter part of the war. However, active governmental organizations greatly facilitated any Japanese engineer operations by providing centralized means for locating existing supplies, reaching contractors, and making full use of available facilities.

The roadnet in Japan was entirely unsatisfactory for military operations, except in the vicinity of major cities, and could not be improved to carry two-way military traffic without the expenditure of excessive engineer effort in most instances. Heavy reliance on the good railway net was mandatory.

For virtually 45 days after initial landings, the Sixth Army had no operating port either in Central or Western Honshu. Delays caused by difficult minesweeping operations and the uncertainty of the date when ports would be open made planning construction operations very difficult and frequently delayed initiation of work. The harbor situation therefore was the greatest single obstacle to supply, construction, and efficient occupation of Japan in the Sixth Army zone.

F. MILITARY GOVERNMENT

Previous concepts of the functions of the Military Government Section, Headquarters Sixth Army, underwent drastic changes as a result of SCAP's decision to transmit orders to the Japanese concerning the occupation policy through civilian channels of the Imperial Japanese Government. Military government as practiced in other areas

may have been what the name implied, for the actual governing was done by the military forces of occupation. However, the situation in this regard in Japan was entirely unique and without precedent since the governing of the Japanese people remained in their own hands, subject, of course, to SCAP directives. Under such conditions as these, the chief role of military government officers became one of observing and reporting on the compliance of the Japanese with SCAP directives.

Although relegated to a subordinated status in the actual governing of the Japanese in the Sixth Army zone, the Military Government Section of Headquarters Sixth Army nevertheless performed a number of duties that facilitated the occupation. Previously in this report have appeared the activities of the section in supervising and closing foreign and colonial banks, reconverting war industries, repatriating orientals, and carrying out educational work. In addition to these duties, the section controlled labor procurement for the headquarters and for Sixth Army Troops in the Kyoto area.

The procurement of labor did produce some problems and resulting interesting solutions. For instance, the procuring of skilled labor early in the occupation became difficult. The Labor Subsection of the Military Government Section advertised in the local newspapers for all types of skilled labor in order to remedy this unsatisfactory condition. Thinking that they were to be employed directly by the Sixth Army rather than by the Japanese Government, the Japanese applied in large numbers, and accordingly 5,000 applications were received. The Military Government Section then forwarded these applications together with requisitions for labor to the Japanese authorities and exerted pressure to insure that the applicants reported for work. Thus in the space of two weeks the difficulty of procuring most types of skilled labor was alleviated.

The almost complete absence of certain categories of skilled laborers was one important obstacle to the fulfillment of labor requirements. Because the Japanese did not have many plumbers, requisitions for them could never be completely filled. Requisitions for glaziers usually met with the same results, for the Japanese did not have workmen who devoted their labors solely to that skill; in Japan the carpenter or the cabinet maker does whatever glass work is necessary on the object that he has made.

By carefully coordinating the requisitions for labor, the Military Government Section was able to fill most requirements for both skilled and unskilled labor expeditiously. The demands for labor in the Kyoto area were not small, for the average daily requirements were 6,000 and the maximum daily requirements reached 7,800. In addition to coordinating the labor requisitions, the Labor Officer of the section also coordinated the reports on labor originating in lower echelons throughout the Sixth Army area.

G. ORDNANCE

In addition to the normal responsibility of providing troops with ordnance supplies and maintenance, the Ordnance Section assumed a new and somewhat different function than heretofore experienced: that of disposing of large quantities of Japanese Army ordnance supplies, equipment, and ammunition. Before leaving Luzon, P. I., for Kyoto, Japan, the Ordnance Officer drafted a tentative standing operating procedure and plan prescribing the methods of disposing of these items. Shortly after Sixth Army's arrival in Japan, AFPAC issued specific instructions governing the disposal of Japanese ordnance material. The Ordnance Section revised the tentative plan to conform with the AFPAC order and issued the final forms to all corps. The Ordnance Section also prepared and distributed to corps and divisions a technical bulletin which contained suggestions on organizations and procedure for carrying out the directives concerning the disposition of Japanese Army ordnance material. To lend assistance further in this work, the Ordnance Officer attached to corps several officers of the Ordnance Section who had participated in the preparation of the directives.

H. PROCUREMENT

SCAP directives ordered Japan to provide supplies, facilities, and services to meet adequately the needs of the occupation forces to that extent which would not cause starvation, disease, or acute physical distress. Inasmuch as a large proportion of the requirements was known to be controlled by the civilian population and not the military authorities, it was readily apparent that some method of contact with civilians should be initiated. In order to accomplish this efficiently, Headquarters Sixth Army by Staff Memorandum, 7 September 1945, formed the Procurement Section, Inclosure 5 to Administrative Order 19, dated 7 September 1945, promulgated the duties and responsibilities of the section.

On 8 September 1945 the Procurement Section opened in Luzon, P. I. Basically its functions were to:

- a. Formulate and initiate all policies and procedures in connection with procurement from the Japanese for all Sixth Army units.
- b. Instruct, regulate, and coordinate all subordinate procurement agencies organized by these various units.
- c. Procure all necessary requirements as submitted by units within the Kyoto area.

Within this framework of responsibility the Procurement Section found necessary the following tasks:

- a. Compiling certain standard forms and procedures to be used in contacting the Japanese.
- b. Maintaining accurate and complete records of all transactions accomplished, including an accurate appraisal value of all supplies, services, and facilities received.
- c. Insuring compliance with all policies forwarded by the General Procurement Agent, AFPAC.

Procurement officers with the advance party assisted and advised on all matters pertaining to procurement of Japanese facilities and supplies required for the initial entry of troops into the Kyoto area. One of the most difficult problems faced by these officers was the acute shortage of trained linguists, which made communication of requirements to the Japanese particularly difficult and necessitated that they be given detailed and explicit written instructions regarding requirements.

In all cases the Japanese apparently were most cooperative and willing to do anything possible to fulfill any and all requirements. Liaison offices with responsible men at the head of each had been opened in most of the large cities. Over-all planning and coordination of effort, however, were made difficult because of inefficient aides, the cumbersome bureaucratic governmental procedures, and the antiquated business methods inherent in Japan, all of which resulted in the heads of agencies being bogged down with details and petty decisions.

The traditional slowness and methods of business of the Orient contributed to considerable delay in the processing of requests by the Japanese. To increase the tempo of action on the part of the Liaison Office and its officials, the Procurement Section had to be constantly on the alert, maintaining a vigorous policy of personally following up all matters.

The over-all organization of the Japanese Liaison Office was extremely weak and inefficient, resulting in additional work for the Procurement Section. For instance, the Liaison Office lost, mislaid, and generally handled in a haphazard manner the requests sent to it. Subordinates of the office were not assigned specific duties and responsibilities with the authority for making decisions. In order to alleviate this situation, the Procurement Section required the Central Liaison Office to organize in a manner similar to the organization of the Sixth Army Procurement Section, and this change resulted in smoother and quicker action in accomplishing procurement.

Because critical shortages of Japanese supplies were encountered, a careful scrutiny of all requests was necessary in order to prevent undue hardships on the people. This procedure likewise was applied to real estate requests, and therefore only those properties and

space absolutely required were obtained.

Significantly and quite understandably, the Japanese quickly took advantage of the GHQ policy that stated no educational and religious institutions would be appropriated except with prior approval of GHQ. As a consequence, buildings which had not been used for many months suddenly became "schools". Seven-story buildings with grounds in run-down condition indicating a long period of disuse were found to contain one student. In extreme cases like this, the Procurement Section acted vigorously.

Appraisal of the items procured and the services furnished undoubtedly constituted one of the most difficult tasks faced by the Procurement Section. The accomplishment of this job required the preparation of detailed and complicated tables converting Japanese systems of weights, measures, etc., into the American system. All of this material, including price lists based on prices of 15 August 1945, had to be catalogued, and from this data a manual was prepared for dissemination to subordinate units.

I. QUARTERMASTER

The movement of the Sixth Army from the Philippines to Japan presented three principal problems to the Supply Division of the Quartermaster Section. The first was that of supplying troops with items of winter clothing and equipment either prior to embarkation or shortly after arrival in the objective area. The second problem was one of providing sufficient tent stoves to meet the needs in the objective area. The last problem of the three was that of assuring equitable distribution of perishable ration items received in the early phases of occupation.

The first problem, supplying troops with winter clothing and equipment, was complicated by the change from the mission of invading Japan to that of occupying Japan. Under the first plan it would have been necessary to equip all troops before embarkation. Toward this end, the first shipments of winter items to reach the Philippines were shipped to the several bases in an attempt to supply all troops at about the same time. The changed situation, brought about by the surrender, however, dictated that many of the troops could not be provided with winter clothing until after their arrival in Japan. While it was planned that all troops would be supplied by 1 November, this date could not be met in some instances because of the following difficulties:

- a. Shipping diverted from the United States was not balanced. Sizes were loaded without regard to tariffs. Some items were absent from the first ships to arrive in the objective area, and manifests were not available for all shipments in time to divert vessels to ports where the best could be made of cargoes.

- b. Port conditions were such that only limited tonnage could be brought ashore. This prevented concentration on unloading of winter items.
- c. Ships carrying clothing for the 98th Division were delayed en route to the objective area.
- d. Shipments could not be made from Philippine bases except in small increments because of the wide dispersion of the limited supplies and the absence of sufficient shipping to lift all loads expeditiously.
- e. Some shipments expected to be diverted directly to Japan were sent to Korea and transshipments had to be made.
- f. The 41st Division moved from the Philippines before receiving any winter clothing except underwear. Because of the shipping delays, the items that were expected to be supplied in the Philippines did not arrive in the objective area in time to be issued prior to 15 October 1945.
- g. The 32d Division, which was to be fully equipped before arrival in the objective area, arrived only 40 per cent equipped.

In order to expedite the equipping of I Corps, the Quartermaster gave priority to the unloading of winter clothing from small diverted shipments, from small shipments from Philippine bases, and from shipments made from Hawaiian bases for the 98th Division. All shipments were then collected at the I Corps Supply Point at Osaka and issues were made from this one installation. Under the circumstances, this method was without doubt the most logical. The necessity for supplying 11,000 sets of clothing to the 11th Replacement Depot for issue to departing troops, however, made impossible the supplying of all I Corps troops before 15 November 1945.

Transshipments made from Korea supplied X Corps troops. These transshipments reached Kure 26 October 1945, and practically all troops were equipped by 10 November 1945.

Prior to 15 November 1945, all Army and Army Air Force troops in the VAC area received winter clothing, which arrived on two ships diverted directly from the United States. The combined quantities of items carried by these vessels were approximately double the requirements for the troops in the area. However, because of unbalanced loading, both vessels had to be completely unloaded and rail transshipments had to be made in order to relieve shortages in I Corps.

As a result of its experience, the Quartermaster Section recommends that clothing and equipment should be loaded in balanced lots in order to keep transshipment to a minimum and avoid the

necessity of overstocking in some areas to insure balanced distribution. Such overstocking inevitably causes undersupply in other areas.

The second problem, that of providing sufficient stoves to meet heating needs, was complicated by several unforeseen contingencies. These were:

- a. Lack of space heaters for heating billets and offices, and the decision to use tent stoves for this purpose.
- b. The arrival piecemeal and in separate shipping of both heaters and oil burners.
- c. Shipments to bases without regard to needs in the particular areas.
- d. Delays in unloading because of poor port facilities.
- e. Slow transshipment from the Philippines, Hawaii, and Korea.

Sixth Army requirements for these items were based on one stove and one burner per five men. Sixth Army strength as of 1 November 1945 was 230,000, making total requirements of 46,000 of each of these items. On 10 November 1945 the status of supply of these items was:

- a. Arrived in the I Corps area for distribution through I Corps Supply Point: 11,488 stoves and 2,900 burners.
- b. Afloat for delivery to Nagoya: 17,560 stoves and 21,605 burners.
- c. Afloat for delivery to Sasebo: 1,000 stoves and 1,560 burners.
- d. Due from Korea: 2,000 stoves.
- e. Due from Philippine Bases: 15,575 stoves and 3,177 burners.
- f. The totals of all received and due in were 47,623 stoves and 29,242 burners.

Since no stoves or burners had been received by the X Corps or VAC by 10 November 1945, shipments to these units were scheduled from those due at Nagoya so as to make equitable distribution of all available stoves and burners.

To assure the equitable distribution of perishable items of food, the Sixth Army Quartermaster made arrangements to have these rations reach Nagoya, Kobe, Kure, and Nagasaki soon after the arrival of the troops in these areas. Part of the supply was scheduled for delivery

by reefer barge. For this purpose the Quartermaster arranged with AFWESPAC to have one 50,000 cubic foot barge in the VAC area by 1 October 1945 and another in the I Corps area about 10 October 1945. The barges were delayed because of storms and upon arrival in the objective area were found to be empty. Later investigation disclosed that orders to load the barges had been misunderstood by AFWESPAC subordinate units. As a result, perishable foods did not reach VAC in sustained quantities until 5 November 1945. Perishable foods became available at Wakayama on 21 October 1945, being distributed for the first time to I Corps and Sixth Army units on 22 October. Transshipments from Osaka first reached X Corps on 25 October. After these dates the supply of perishables was continuous.

For the purpose of determining the availability of laundry, dry cleaning, and refrigeration facilities in Western Honshu, one officer of the Quartermaster Section landed with the Sixth Army's Advance Party at Wakayama on 19 September 1945. In regard to these facilities, this officer secured reports from representatives of the Japanese industries concerned in the principal cities of the area to be occupied by troops of I Corps and afterwards made spot checks to determine the accuracy of these reports.

An officer of the Quartermaster Section verbally contracted with the Kyoto Japanese Laundry Association through the Japanese Liaison Office for the use of civilian facilities and personnel to take care of laundry for all troops quartered in the Kyoto area. A laundry price list prepared by the Quartermaster Section in conjunction with the Liaison Office was passed on and modified by the G-4, Procurement, and Military Government Sections. Individual unit commanders made payment to the Laundry Association. The Laundry Association collected all laundry for processing at a central point where it was distributed by the association to a maximum of 20 laundry plants with capacities ranging from 25 pounds per day to 1,500 pounds per day. Facilities and personnel were inadequate for the load, and hence the quartermaster took steps to increase capacities by utilizing one section of a laundry platoon in conjunction with a civilian laundry reconverted from an ammunition factory. A section of the 1st Platoon, 580th Quartermaster Laundry Company, began operations on 4 November 1945, supplemented by the personnel and plant of the reconverted civilian laundry.

As a means to offset the late arrival of 18 dry cleaning plants that had been made available by the Chief Quartermaster, AEFAC, representatives of the Sixth Army Quartermaster Section contacted the Kyoto Dry Cleaning Association and drew up tentative plans to begin dry cleaning operations about 8 November. On that date 12,000 wool shirts, 12,000 wool trousers, and 6,000 wool field jackets were submitted as the first items for processing. Four-day service was the maximum time requested.

Through the Japanese Liaison Office in Kyoto the Sixth Army procured a refrigeration and storage plant using 100 per cent Japanese

personnel and equipment. On 1 October 1945 the section also procured for I Corps for immediate operation 30,000 cubic feet of cold storage space located in the central market of Kyoto. In addition, a QM representative and a Sanitary Corps representative checked the ice-making facilities of this plant for capacity and purity and found that with the addition of chlorine (two parts per million) the water was fit for making ice for all uses of the armed forces. A maximum daily ice capacity of 12,000 pounds was contracted for, and the plant was put in operation on 10 October. The Quartermaster Section on 31 October completed a survey of civilian refrigeration facilities in the Sixth Army occupation area, visiting and spot-checking facilities in Western Honshu and Kyushu. A resume of the survey was submitted on 5 November to AFPAC for planning and operational purposes.

It is highly recommended that in future planning a considerably greater number of small ships (500 - 1,000 tons capacity) be made available than has been provided in the past. Individual ships of that size should be allocated to the various services, (QM, Signal, Engineers, etc.) to be solid-loaded with supplies and equipment as required by the service to which assigned and should be sent to the objective area at a very early date. Such a procedure as this would materially reduce the delay and confusion that has been experienced in discharging critical supplies. Furthermore, the speed of discharge would be increased and there would be a flexibility of shipping that is not possible with larger ships.

J. SIGNAL

1. Planning

The plans for signal communication and signal supply that had been almost completed for the Kyushu Operation were readily modifiable and applicable to the occupation plan. Of the unknown factors affecting the signal plans for the occupation, the greatest single one was the adequacy and serviceability of the Japanese wire communication system. Based upon the initial assumption that most of the wire facilities needed by the occupation troops would have to be constructed, the Signal Officer, Sixth Army, had placed on the troop list the following signal construction troops in addition to the construction companies organic to corps signal battalions:

436th Signal Heavy Construction Battalion
34th Signal Light Construction Battalion
33d Signal Light Construction Battalion
Companies A and C, 60th Signal Battalion
Companies A and C, 62d Signal Battalion
Companies A and C, 66th Signal Battalion
291st Signal Heavy Construction Company

* Approximately 700 circuit miles of open wire material was ordered.

Based upon the initial assumption that a strict control of all phases of Japanese civil communication would be necessary, a considerable number of signal operating troops were set up for the occupation. Stating that Japanese civil communications were to be permitted to function as normally as possible, a change in the GHQ directive arrived at Headquarters Sixth Army too late to permit a reduction in the list of operating units.

Prior to the movement to Japan, the Signal Officer, Headquarters Sixth Army, submitted to AFFAC a list of circuit requirements together with a request that they be made available from civil communications facilities by the Japanese Government. Field Order 75, Headquarters Sixth Army, empowered corps commanders to make arrangements for local circuits with the local representatives of the Japanese Telephone Company, but requests for long lines were to be submitted to Headquarters Sixth Army.

2. Operations

The Sixth Army Advance Party selected the Daiken Building in Kyoto, Japan, as the location of Headquarters Sixth Army and made arrangements with the local representatives of the telephone company for two circuits from Wakayama to Kyoto.

Elements of the 16th Signal Operations Battalion unloaded at Wakayama on 26 September. They established a small signal center on the beach, VHF communications to the USS Auburn and the LSV-1 (Sixth Army command ships), wire communications to Beach Control, I Corps, the Railway Transportation Officer in the railroad station at Wakayama, and a circuit to the Daiken Building. In the meantime, the message center, radio receivers and teletype and code rooms were installed on the fifth floor of the Daiken Building. VHF equipment and antennae and CW antennae were installed on the roof of that building.

One TC-4 was installed on the ground floor of the Daiken Building for the initial telephone switching facilities of the Sixth Army Command Post. The cable terminations in the Daiken Building were rearranged, and arrangements were made with the local representative of the telephone company for the securing of long distance and local circuits. Two trunk lines to Tokyo and two trunk lines to Osaka were installed. Headquarters Sixth Army opened in Kyoto at 1200I, 28 September 1945, and work was immediately started on the installation of a six-position TC-10 switchboard, 14 CF-1 and 15 CF-2 carrier terminals, and a teletype switchboard in the basement of the Daiken Building. Installation was completed and the cut-over was made at 2400I, 3 October 1945.

By 10 October the following circuits had been obtained from the Japanese:

4 Kyoto - Tokyo
 6 Kyoto - Osaka
 2 Kyoto - Okazaki
 2 Kyoto - Nara

In addition the following VHF circuits were installed:

Headquarters	Location	Relays	Channels
I Corps Rear	Wakayama	NW of Wakayama and Sano	2 voice
II Corps Rear	Wakayama	NW of Wakayama and Sano	2 voice, 1 teletype
Radio City	Kyoto		Keying lines
I Corps	Osaka	NE of Kyoto	2 voice, 1 teletype

By the time Headquarters ASCOMO had completed movement from Nara to Kobe on 25 October, six trunk lines had been provided from Kyoto to Kobe. The two existing trunk lines from Kyoto to Nara had been discontinued on 16 October.

On 15 October, GHQ made the following allocation of Japanese circuits to Sixth Army:

Circuit	Allocated	Installed by 28 October
Tokyo to Kaijo (Korea)	2 circuits	0
Tokyo to Fukuoka	2 circuits	0
Tokyo to Kyoto	5 circuits	5
Tokyo to Osaka (Kobe)	3 circuits	2
Nagoya to Kyoto	4 circuits	4
Nagoya to Osaka (Kobe)	6 circuits	4
Kyoto to Osaka	6 circuits	6
Kyoto to Kobe	6 circuits	6
Kyoto to Kure	5 circuits	3
Kyoto to Sasebo	4 circuits	0
Osaka (Kobe) to Sasebo	2 circuits	0
Osaka (Kobe) to Kure	6 circuits	0
Matsuyama to Kure	2 circuits	0
Osaka (Kobe) to Fukuoka	3 circuits	0
Fukuoka to Sasebo	4 circuits	3
Kure to Sasebo	4 circuits	0
Shimonoseki to Sasebo	4 circuits	0
Sasebo to Nagasaki	5 circuits	3
Sasebo to Kanoya	2 circuits	2

In addition, two circuits to Otsu, two to Tsuruga, and two to Kanazawa were obtained to serve the 136th Infantry and its battalions.

In the Kyoto area 42 long local lines were obtained from the Japanese Telephone Company to serve the units located in the area and the hotels in which the officers were quartered. The Japanese furnished 10 dial telephone lines terminating in the Kyoto commercial exchange to serve other units in the area. Five trunk lines were ob-

tained between the Sixth Army switchboard in the Daiken Building and the Kyoto commercial exchange. Twenty civilian circuits were used to provide keying lines from the Daiken Building to Radio City.

Off the army switchboard were installed 143 common battery lines with 106 extensions.

Telegraph terminals CF-2B were installed on circuits furnished by Japanese to provide teletype service to GHQ, AFPAC Advance (Tokyo), Kobe (ASCOMO), Osaka (I Corps), and Kure (X Corps).

By the end of October the following VHF circuits had been established:

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Relays</u>	<u>Channels</u>
Radio Transmitter Area	Kyoto		standby keying lines
I Corps Rear	Wakayama	Ikomayama	2 voice, 1 teletype
I Corps	Osaka		2 voice, 1 teletype
11th Repl. Depot	Okazaki	Ikomayama	2 voice, 1 teletype
310th Bomb Wing	Itami Airdrome		2 voice, 1 teletype
X Corps	Kure	Ikomayama & Okayama	2 voice, 2 teletype

Because the distances between some relay points were far greater than normal, unusual results were obtained in some of the VHF circuits listed above. The distance between Ikomayama and Okayama is 65 miles and between Okayama and Kure is approximately 100 miles.

Radio circuits were initially established to Eighth Army (1), V Amphibious Corps (2), GHQ Manila (2), XXIV Corps (1), I Corps (1), X Corps (2), Navy (1), Sixth Army Rear Echelon (2), and GHQ Tokyo (2). As teletype facilities became available, the number of circuits was reduced to 8 by 28 October.

Shortly after the arrival of the Sixth Army in Japan, it became evident that the number of signal units set up for the occupation exceeded the need. Accordingly, the 33d Signal Light Construction Battalion, 986th Signal Service Company, and Companies A and D, 3119th Signal Service Battalion, were deleted from the troop list and were not moved to Japan. In addition, the following units were recommended for inactivation during November and December 1945:

- 34th Signal Light Construction Battalion
- 67th Signal Repair Company
- 56th Signal Repair Company
- 99th Signal Battalion
- 66th Signal Battalion

K. SURGEON

The change from the Kyushu Operation to the occupation required that the combat medical supplies already afloat be supplemented. To accomplish this and to provide a more efficient medical service early in the occupation, Headquarters Sixth Army directed each medical supply unit to carry a balanced stock for 50,000 men for 30 days. Arrangements that were made with AFWESPAC insured a balanced stock on all resupply ships not previously loaded.

The only serious shortage existed in prophylactic materials. The shortage resulted from the failure of some units to bring a 30-day supply and from the inability of combat maintenance units to provide these items in sufficient quantities.

Unusual or epidemic disease in either the civilian population or army troops did not effect the occupation. The patient load was unusually low, with no battle casualties and very few accidental injuries. Of the patients, 90 per cent were admitted for disease, of which hepatitis and the common respiratory diseases were the primary causes for admission. The diarrheal rate was unexpectedly low, and malaria, with continued suppression, presented no problem.

After occupation, venereal disease rates increased rapidly and reached a rate of 171 cases per thousand per annum by 1 November 1945 despite adequate prophylactic stations and facilities for prophylaxis. Although the Japanese civil authorities controlled prostitution and made regular physical examinations, their measures were nominal and of little value.

L. TRANSPORTATION

The Sixth Army utilized amphibious (Navy-operated) vessels, including LST's, LSM's, LSV's, AKA's, APA's, Liberties, and some AP's, for the movement of first echelon lifts and as turnaround shipping. AFWESPAC provided resupply and maintenance shipping from merchant vessels operated by the War Shipping Administration. Ports of Okinawa were utilized as a holding area for heavy shipping.


The G-3 and the Transportation Sections jointly prepared requirements for turnaround shipping and submitted the requirements to COMFIFTHPHIBFORCE, who designated shipping and availability dates at specific ports.

Military organizational vehicles had to be relied on entirely in the operation because of the scarcity and poor operating conditions of Japanese vehicles. Road networks in the Wakayama-Osaka-Kyoto area were inadequate to handle heavy military traffic. Motor and truck pools in key areas provided transportation for the quick and efficient handling of troops and supplies.

The efficiency of the railroads greatly helped ease transportation problems. Experienced American military railway officers in each rail office controlled the operation of railways through Japanese railway authorities. During the initial period of the occupation all railroad traffic was committed to military requirements, with railway transportation units being utilized to supervise movement of personnel and supplies. By 29 September the Sixth Army had allowed the Japanese to return to the operation of civilian passenger and freight trains on established schedules.

The inability of Japanese air strips to handle heavy military plane service greatly hampered air transportation. After emergency repairs and improvements by Japanese labor under United States Army Engineer supervision, Headquarters Sixth Army established air carrier service on a schedule coordinated with Eighth Army and XXIV Corps. The delay in the arrival of air-ground communication, weather forecasting, refueling, and maintenance personnel and equipment hindered the expansion and operation of American air facilities. By 15 October, however, scheduled intra-theater transportation was in operation.

The small craft and slow-tow barges for the operation were not able to move on the planned schedule because of adverse weather conditions which included a typhoon. As a result, only two tows arrived at Okinawa from Manila. Over half the vessels in these two tows were lost, and the tows which remained were delayed.


WALTER KRUEGER,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding

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ANNEX

SIXTH ARMY TROOP LIST

1. Sixth Army Troops:

a. Combat Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
Hq & Hq Co, Sixth Army	1,457	Luzon
6th Ranger Bn	516	Luzon
241st Engr C Bn	637	Luzon
841st Engr C Bn	637	Luzon
650th Engr Topo Bn (Army)	426	Luzon
207th MP Co	163	Luzon
16th Sig Opns Bn	552	Luzon
Totals, Sixth Army Troops, Combat	4,388	

b. Service Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
Hq & Hq Co, 5220th Engr Cons Brig	109	Luzon
3234th Engr Tech Int Tm (R)	9	Luzon
1603d Engr Map Dep Det	12	Luzon
1623d Engr Model Making Det	19	Luzon
414th Engr Dp Trk Co	110	Luzon
451st Engr Dp Trk Co	110	Luzon
1679th Engr Surv Ln Det	15	Luzon
1729th Engr Util Det (EA)	36	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 135th Med Gp	34	Luzon
9th Med Dep Co	145	Luzon
26th Med Lab (Army)	53	Luzon
1st Gen Disp (Type 2)	39	Luzon
6th Mal Surv Det	13	Luzon
7th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
10th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
22d MP CI Sec (Type 3)	11	Luzon
23d MP CI Sec (Type 3)	11	Luzon
800th MP Bn (ZI)(less Co B)	500	Luzon
Co B, 800th MP Bn (ZI)	149	Luzon
28th QM Car Plat	40	Luzon
21st QM Car Co (less 2 Plats)	36	Luzon
383d QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	134	Luzon
3349th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	134	Luzon
3794th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	134	Luzon
Co Hq, 580th QM Ldry Co	22	Leyte
580th QM Ldry Co (less Co Hq)	202	Luzon
2d Sec, 1st Plat, 580th QM Ldry Co	27	Luzon
Co A, 60th Sig Bn	193	Luzon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
436th Sig Hq Cons Bn	437	Luzon
3153d Sig Sv Co (RCM)	179	Luzon
126th Sig Rad Int Co	263	Luzon
Det 6, 4025th Sig Sv Gp	308	Luzon
Det, 4026th Sig Photo Bn	21	Luzon
11th Air Cargo Resupply Sq	186	Luzon
Det, 30th Traffic Reg Gp	44	Luzon
Det, 737th Ry Operating Bn	130	Luzon
155th Fin Disb Sec	20	Luzon
189th Fin Disb Sec	7	Luzon
200th Fin Disb Sec	20	Luzon
8th I & E Sec	27	Luzon
1st Censorship Adv Det	93	Luzon
113th AGF Band	29	Luzon
147th AGF Band	29	Luzon
237th AGF Band	29	Luzon
434th ASF Band	29	Luzon
94th AAF Wea Sta (Mbl)	22	Luzon
4th Base Post Office (G)	121	Luzon
Machine Records Det "A"	9	Luzon
12th MRU (Type Y)	48	Luzon
34th MRU (Type Z)	68	Luzon
51st MRU (Type Z)	68	Luzon
5th Sp Sv Co (less 1st, 2d, & 4th Plats)	39	Luzon
306th CIC Det	20	Luzon
2212th TQM Team	27	Luzon
2213th TQM Team	27	Luzon
4th CIC Region	20	Luzon
Field Unit No. 1 (Type A), 5250th Tech Int Comp Co (Sep)(Prov)	18	Luzon
Field Unit No. 71 (Field Dep Unit), 5250th Tech Int Comp Co (Sep)(Prov)	9	Luzon
14th V-Mail Detachment	28	Okinawa
Totals, Sixth Army Troops, Service	4,676	
Grand Totals, Sixth Army Troops	9,064	

2. I Corps Troops:

a. Combat Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
Hq & Hq Co, I Corps	580	Luzon
25th Inf Div	14,035	Luzon
33d Inf Div	14,035	Luzon
98th Inf Div	14,035	Oahu
209th AAA AW Bn	702	Luzon
767th Tk Bn	741	Hawaii

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
Hq & Hq Btry, I Corps Arty	116	Luzon
26th Inf Plat (Scout Det)	21	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 1136th Engr Cons Gp	81	Luzon
259th Engr C Bn	637	Oahu
380th Engr C Bn	637	Luzon
186th Engr C Bn	637	Luzon
1292d Engr C Bn	637	Luzon
671st Engr Tonn Co (Corps)	112	Luzon
4th Engr Spec Brig (less 2 EBSRs and Det)	655	Luzon
534th EBSR (4th ESB)	2,025	Luzon
544th EBSR (4th ESB)	2,025	Luzon
533d EBSR (less Boat Bn)(3d ESB)	991	Oahu
3015th Engr Boat Maint Co (4th ESB)	157	Luzon
3017th Engr Boat Maint Co (4th ESB)	157	Luzon
Det, 164th Ord Co (4th ESB)	48	Luzon
Det, 163d Ord Co (3d ESB)	16	Oahu
36th MP Co	163	Luzon
530th MP Bn	543	Luzon
58th Sig Bn	793	Luzon
Totals, I Corps, Combat	53,877	

b. Service Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
99th Oml Sv Co	210	Luzon
217th Oml Sv Co	210	Luzon
240th Oml Sv Plat	55	Luzon
245th Oml Sv Plat	55	Luzon
274th Oml Sv Plat	55	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 931st Engr Cons Gp	94	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 1523d Engr Cons Gp	94	Luzon
27th Engr Cons Bn	901	Luzon
1636th Engr Cons Bn	901	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 1191st Engr Base Dep Gp	72	Luzon
3193d Engr Base Dep Co	173	Luzon
439th Engr Dep Co	209	Luzon
464th Engr Dep Co	209	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 1059th Engr PC & R Gp	272	Luzon
361st Engr Sp Sv Regt	1,324	Luzon
1897th Engr Avn Bn	777	Okinawa
695th Engr Base Equip Co	173	Luzon
421st Engr Dp Trk Co	110	Luzon
3073d Engr Dp Trk Co	110	Okinawa
3074th Engr Dp Trk Co	110	Okinawa
972d Engr Maint Co	191	Luzon
3014th Engr Maint Co	191	Luzon
1504th Engr Water Sup Co	136	Luzon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Stations</u>
782d Engr Pet Dist Co	216	Luzon
1734th Engr Util Det (EE)	53	Luzon
3161st Engr Fire Ftr Plat	27	Luzon
1042d Engr Gas Gen Det	22	Luzon
3153d Engr Ref Maint Det (DG)	3	Luzon
3154th Engr Ref Maint Det (DG)	3	Luzon
3226th Engr Tech Int Tm (C)	4	Luzon
760th Engr Parts Sup Co	174	Luzon
1st Plat, 1541st Engr Base Surv Co	35	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 153d Med Bn	29	Okinawa
Hq & Hq Det, 264th Med Bn (4th ESB)	29	Luzon
Co A, 264th Med Bn (4th ESB)	117	Luzon
72d Med Base Dep Co	44	Luzon
398th Med Coll Co	105	Luzon
424th Med Coll Co	105	Luzon
412th Med Coll Co	105	Luzon
893d Med Clr Co	112	Luzon
895th Med Clr Co	112	Luzon
981st Med Amb Co	90	Luzon
697th Med Amb Co	90	Luzon
6th Port Surg Hosp	37	Luzon
7th Port Surg Hosp	37	Luzon
24th Port Surg Hosp	37	Luzon
25th Port Surg Hosp	37	Luzon
61st Port Surg Hosp	37	Luzon
63d Port Surg Hosp	37	Luzon
36th Evac Hosp (400)	286	Luzon
92d Evac Hosp (400)	286	Luzon
86th Evac Hosp (400)	286	Oahu
54th Evac Hosp (400)	286	Luzon
32d Field Hosp (400)	222	Luzon
23d Field Hosp (400)	222	Luzon
98th Field Hosp (400)	222	Oahu
15th Med Sup Plat	21	Luzon
704th Med San Co	112	Luzon
716th Med San Co	112	Luzon
726th Med San Co	112	Luzon
718th Med San Co	112	Luzon
364th Sta Hosp (750)	496	Luzon
35th Sta Hosp (500)	353	Okinawa
229th Gen Hosp (1000)	589	Luzon
231st Gen Hosp (1000)	589	Luzon
307th Gen Hosp (1000)	501	Luzon
318th Gen Hosp (1000)	594	Okinawa
95th Vet Food Inspection Tm	5	Luzon
102d Vet Food Inspection Tm	5	Luzon
465th Dent Pros Tm (Mbl)	4	Luzon
554th Opt Rep Det (BF)	7	Luzon
26th Mal Surv Det	13	Luzon
37th Mal Surv Det	13	Luzon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
213th Mal Surv Det	131	Luzon
604th Mal Surv Det	131	Oahu
421st Mal Surv Det	131	Luzon
3d Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
12th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
25th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
26th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
40th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
53d Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
59th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
67th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
527th Mal Contl Det	12	Oahu
30th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co	72	Luzon
31st Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co	72	Luzon
221st Mp Co	156	Luzon
183d MP POW Proc Co (less 1st & 2d Plats)	56	Luzon
3-3d MP Co (EG)	135	Luzon
21st MP CI Sec (Type 3)	11	Luzon
44th MP CI Sec (Type 3)	11	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 72d Ord Gp	51	Okinawa
Hq & Hq Det, 9th Ord Bn	33	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 169th Ord Bn	33	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 243d Ord Bn	33	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 259th Ord Bn	33	Luzon
614th Ord Am Co	179	Luzon
622d Ord Am Co	179	Luzon
630th Ord Am Co	179	Luzon
636th Ord Am Co	179	Luzon
643d Ord Am Co (less Det)	92	Luzon
Det, 643d Ord Am Co	87	Mindoro
21st Ord MM Co	162	Luzon
48th Ord MM Co	162	Luzon
109th Ord MM Co	162	Luzon
110th Ord MM Co	162	Luzon
288th Ord MM Co	162	Luzon
3142d Ord MAM Co	116	Luzon
3143d Ord MAM Co	116	Luzon
3535th Ord MAM Co	116	Luzon
3608th Ord Hv Maint Co (Tk)	210	Luzon
AA Maint Tm No. 8, 3073d Ord Maint Co	28	Luzon
84th Ord Dep Co	186	Luzon
341st Ord Dep Co	186	Luzon
318th Ord Dep Co	186	Luzon
359th Ord HM Co (FA)	198	Luzon
99th Ord HM Co (FA)	198	Luzon
179th Ord HAM Co	202	Luzon
494th Ord HAM Co	202	Luzon
959th Ord HAM Co	202	Luzon
3085th Ord Sup Co (less 2 Sup Tms)	56	Luzon
101st Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	Leyte

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
107th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	Luzon
108th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	Luzon
172d Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	Luzon
173d Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	Luzon
210th Ord Bomb Disp Sqd	7	Luzon
278th Ord Tire Rep Det (Mbl)	16	Luzon
480th Ord Tire Rep Co	145	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 524th QM Gp	31	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 556th QM Gp	31	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 161st QM Bn (Mbl)	27	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 473d QM Bn (Mbl)	27	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 330th QM Bn	25	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 570th QM Bn	25	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 334th QM Bn	25	Luzon
323d QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
466th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
3539th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
3553d QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
3554th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
3557th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
4037th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
3714th QM Trk Co (Hv)(w/Dr Det)	141	Luzon
3716th QM Trk Co (Hv)(w/Dr Det)	141	Luzon
4169th QM Dep Co	192	Luzon
4167th QM Dep Sup Co	154	Luzon
3244th QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
3257th QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
4060th QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
4074th QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
4138th QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
4139th QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
4491st QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
190th QM Gas Sup Co	125	Luzon
325th QM Gas Sup Co	125	Luzon
3839th QM Gas Sup Co	125	Luzon
4295th QM Gas Sup Co	125	Luzon
260th QM Rhd Co	177	Luzon
566th QM Rhd Co	177	Luzon
569th QM Rhd Co (less 1 Plat)	102	Luzon
1st Plat, 569th QM Rhd Co	75	Luzon
3073d QM Ref Co (Mbl)(less 1 Plat)	75	Luzon
3064th QM CR Co (less 1 Plat)	126	Luzon
127th QM Bkry Co	160	Luzon
262d QM Bkry Co	160	Luzon
370th QM Bkry Co (less 1 Plat)	120	Luzon
217th QM Salv Rep Co (SM)	201	Luzon
860th QM Fun & Bath Co (Mbl)	86	Okinawa
236th QM Salv Coll Co (less 3d Plat)	120	Luzon
950th QM Pet Prod Lab (Mbl)	6	Luzon
1st Plat, 21st QM Car Co	38	Luzon

Unit	Approximate Personnel	Staging
632d QM Ldry Co	270	Luzon
369th QM Ldry Co (SM)(less 1 Plat)	205	Luzon
1st Plat, 335th QM Ldry Co (SM)	30	Luzon
180th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
181st QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
190th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
191st QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
247th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
437th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
278th QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Okinawa
249th QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Okinawa
335th QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Luzon
349th QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Luzon
356th QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Luzon
357th QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Luzon
431st QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Luzon
3129th Sig Co (Port)	150	Luzon
66th Sig Bn	793	Luzon
34th Sig L Cons Bn	436	Luzon
586th Sig Dep Co	143	Luzon
Det, 4026th Sig Photo Bn	20	Luzon
Dets 9 & 10, 3925th Sig Sv Co (Photo)	10	Oahu
3d Sp Plat, 3119th Sig Sv Bn	76	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 7th Major Port Comd	520	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 117th Port Bn	33	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 366th Port Bn	35	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 387th Port Bn	33	Luzon
218th Port Co	219	Luzon
276th Port Co	219	Luzon
277th Port Co	219	Luzon
403d Port Co	219	Luzon
404th Port Co	219	Luzon
406th Port Co	219	Luzon
874th Port Co	219	Luzon
875th Port Co	219	Luzon
876th Port Co	219	Luzon
896th Port Co	219	Luzon
897th Port Co	219	Luzon
898th Port Co	219	Luzon
492d Amph Trk Co	180	Oahu
811th Amph Trk Co	180	Luzon
812th Amph Trk Co	180	Luzon
813th Amph Trk Co	180	Luzon
376th Har Cft Co	291	Luzon
377th Har Cft Co (less 1 Plat)	236	Luzon
1113th Port Mar Maint Co	197	Luzon
804th Army Mar Ship Rep Co	117	Luzon
849th Base Dep Co (TC)	121	Luzon
Kobe Base Hqs, ASCOMO	905	Luzon
Nagoya Base Hqs, ASCOMO	301	Luzon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
160th Fin Disb Sec	10	Luzon
12th Postal Reg Sec	31	Luzon
67th APU (Type M)	29	Luzon
352d APU (Type J)	18	Luzon
713th APU (Type F)	10	Luzon
15th MRU (Type Y)	48	Luzon
1st & 2d Flats, 5th Sp Sv Co	50	Luzon
3d Plat, 22d Sp Sv Co	25	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 11th Repl Dep	196	Luzon
65th Repl Bn	421	Luzon
68th Repl Bn	421	Luzon
70th Repl Bn	421	Luzon
Armd Forces Rad Sta (WVTQ)	7	Luzon
Hq, Met CIC Unit No. 90	42	Luzon
Hq, Met CIC Unit No. 92	20	Luzon
Hq, Met CIC Unit No. 97	42	Luzon
Hq, 42d CIC Area Det	12	Luzon
Hq, 43d CIC Area Det	12	Luzon
Hq, 47th CIC Area Det	12	Luzon
Hq, 57th CIC Area Det	12	Hawaii
Hq, 58th CIC Area Det	12	Luzon
25th CIC Det	12	Luzon
33d CIC Det	12	Luzon
98th CIC Det	12	Hawaii
201st CIC Det	12	Luzon
Field Unit No. 3 (Type A), 5250th Tech Int Comp Co (Sep)(Prov)	18	Luzon
Field Unit No. 51 (Type B), 5250th Tech Int Comp Co (Sep)(Prov)	15	Luzon
Field Unit No. 52 (Type B), 5250th Tech Int Comp Co (Sep)(Prov)	9	Luzon
Totals, I Corps, Service	36,791	
Grand Total, I Corps	90,668	

3. V Amphibious Corps Troops:

a. Combat Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
H&S Bn VAC	1,071	Maui
1st Plat, Bomb Disp Co, H&S Bn VAC	22	Maui
2d Plat, Bomb Disp Co, H&S Bn VAC	22	Maui
2d Air Del Sec Serv Comd FMF Pac	83	Maui
2d Mar Div	18,161	Saipan
5th Mar Div	18,161	Hawaii
32d Inf Div	14,035	Luzon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
VMO-2	48	Saipan
VMO-3	48	Hawaii
Helron MOG #1 (Air FMF Pac)	63	Maui
21 Sep Enar Bn	876	Guam
43d NC Bn	1,115	Saipan
98th NC Bn	1,115	Maui
116th NC Bn	1,115	Hawaii
3d MF Bn (Prov)(Less Cos A & B)	251	Hawaii
Co A, 3d MF Bn (Prov)	99	Hawaii
Co B, 3d MF Bn (Prov)	99	Maui
2d Mar War Dog Plat	64	Saipan
6th Mar War Dog Plat	64	Guam
Landing Force Air Support Control Unit #4	98	Maui
Totals, Marine Units, Combat	56,610	

b. Service Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
Sig Bn VAC (less Co C)	713	Maui
Co C, Sig Bn, VAC	183	Guam
Med Bn, VAC	340	Maui
1st Sep Radio Int Plat	48	Maui
5th Sep Radio Int Plat	48	Maui
Hq Co Shore Brigade	18	Maui
CUE 18	6,587	Designated by CINCPAC
Hq 7th Naval Cons Regt	46	Maui
12th MT Bn (Prov)(less Co A)	597	Hawaii
Co A, 12th MT Bn (Prov)	84	Maui
20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)(less Cos A, B & C)	189	Guam
Co A, 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)	153	Guam & Hawaii
Co C, 20th Amph Trk Bn (Prov)	153	Hawaii
2d Amph Trk Co	178	Saipan
5th Amph Trk Co (Prov)	178	Hawaii
JICPOA Int Team	160	Oahu
Corps Evac Hosp #I	232	Hawaii
Corps Evac Hosp #III	232	Guam
8th Service Regt	1,893	Hawaii
4th Sep Ldry Plat	62	Saipan
6th Sep Ldry Plat	62	Hawaii
8th Sep Ldry Plat	62	Maui
24th Mar Dep Co	165	Kauai
33d Mar Dep Co	165	Hawaii
34th Mar Dep Co	165	Hawaii
36th Mar Dep Co	165	Hawaii
42d Mar Dep Co	165	Oahu
43d Mar Dep Co	165	Oahu

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
3d Plat, 4th Salv Rep Co	62	Saipan
1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)(less 3 Plats)	26	Hawaii
1st Plat, 1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)	48	Hawaii
2d Plat, 1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)	48	Hawaii
3d Plat, 1st Salv Coll Co (Prov)	48	Hawaii
1st Furn & Bath Co (Prov)	81	Oahu
1st Bakery Plat (Prov)	42	Hawaii
2d Bakery Plat (Prov)	42	Maui
1st Salv Rep Co (Prov)	208	Hawaii
6th Mar Ammo Co	258	Oahu
8th Mar Ammo Co	258	Hawaii
10th Mar Ammo Co	258	Maui
Totals, Marine Units, Service	14,587	

c. Army Augmentation, Combat

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
Hq & Hq Co, 1161st Engr C Gp	81	Leyte
1298th Engr C Bn	637	Oahu
1688th Engr C Bn	637	Oahu
546th Engr Rigid Boat Co	213	Oahu
Totals, Army Augmentation, Combat	1,568	

d. Army Augmentation, Service

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
275th Oml Sv Plat	55	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 5201st Engr Cons Brig	109	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 1112th Engr Cons Gp	94	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 1177th Engr Cons Gp	94	Luzon
1777th Engr Cons Bn	900	Luzon
1393d Engr Cons Bn	900	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 1409th Engr Base Dep Gp	72	Ie Shima
1541st Engr Base Surv Co (less 1 Plat)	54	Luzon
1564th Engr Dep Co	209	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 1052d Engr PC & R Gp	272	Luzon
841st Engr Avn Bn	777	Luzon
873d Engr Avn Bn (less Co A)	594	Okinawa
1876th Engr Avn Bn	777	Luzon
1902d Engr Avn Bn	777	Ie Shima
1913th Engr Avn Bn	777	Luzon
689th Engr Base Equip Co	173	Luzon
198th Engr Dp Trk Co	110	Luzon
3076th Engr Dp Trk Co	110	Okinawa

<u>Unit</u>		<u>Staging</u>
1485th Engr Maint Co	191	Luzon
1487th Engr Maint Co	191	Luzon
2811th Engr Pet Dist Co	216	Luzon
2812th Engr Pet Dist Co	216	Okinawa
1731st Engr Util Det (EE)	54	Luzon
1050th Engr Gas Gen Det	22	Luzon
3138th Engr Ref Maint Det (DG)	3	Luzon
3228th Engr Tech Int Tm (C)	4	Luzon
1979th Engr Repro Det (Avn)	12	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 135th Med Bn	29	Luzon
Co B, 264th Med Bn (4th ESB)	117	Luzon
Co C, 264th Med Bn (4th ESB)	117	Luzon
692d Med Amb Co	90	Luzon
73d Field Hosp (400)	222	Leyte
92d Field Hosp (400)	222	Luzon
25th Evac Hosp (750)	405	Luzon
62d Med Base Dep Co	44	Luzon
712th Med San Co	112	Luzon
721st Med San Co	112	Luzon
123d Sta Hosp (250)(less Det)	172	Luzon
Det, 123d Sta Hosp (250)	17	Okinawa
118th Sta Hosp (500)	286	Okinawa
122d Sta Hosp (500)	286	Okinawa
13th Gen Hosp (1000)	589	Luzon
47th Gen Hosp (1000)	589	Luzon
309th Gen Hosp (1000)	589	Tinian
5th Army Med Lab	53	Luzon
11th Gen Disp (Type 2)	39	Luzon
98th Vet Food Inspection Tm	5	Luzon
108th Vet Food Inspection Tm	5	Luzon
466th Dent Pros Tm (Mbl)	4	Luzon
556th Optical Rep Det (LG)	2	Luzon
24th Mal Surv Det	13	Luzon
201st Mal Surv Det	13	Luzon
203d Mal Surv Det	13	Luzon
415th Mal Surv Det	13	Luzon
36th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
74th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
75th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
76th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
83d Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
94th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
95th Mal Contl Det	12	Luzon
29th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co	72	Luzon
37th Mil Govt Hq & Hq Co	72	Luzon
92d Hq & Hq Det, Mil Govt Gp	40	Luzon
93d Hq & Hq Det, Mil Govt Gp	40	Luzon
94th Hq & Hq Det, Mil Govt Gp	40	Luzon
95th Hq & Hq Det, Mil Govt Gp	40	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 209th Ord Bn	33	Okinawa

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
3007th Ord Base Dep Co	117	Luzon
3475th Ord MAM Co	116	Luzon
3540th Ord MAM Co	116	Luzon
323d Ord Am Co	179	Luzon
284th Hv Maint Co (Tk)	210	Okinawa
Hq & Hq Det, 327th QM Bn	25	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 693d QM Bn	25	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 71st QM Bn (Mbl)	27	Luzon
362d QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
3242d QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
4493d QM Sv Co	212	Luzon
384th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
3656th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
311th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	131	Luzon
3581st QM Trk Co (Hv)(w/Dr Det)	141	Luzon
3873d QM Gas Sup Co	125	Luzon
565th QM Rhd Co	177	Luzon
4th Plat, 369th QM Ldry Co (SM)	62	Luzon
4th Plat, 3069th QM Ldry Co (SM)	62	Luzon
235th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
236th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
238th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
239th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	22	Luzon
1st & 3d Plats, 120th QM Bkry Co	68	Luzon
101st QM GR Plat	24	Luzon
1 Plat, 3073d QM Ref Co (Mbl)	28	Luzon
Co C, 60th Sig Bn	193	Luzon
553d Sig Dep Co	143	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 360th Port Bn	33	Luzon
633d Port Co	219	Luzon
123d Port Co	219	Luzon
153d Port Co	219	Luzon
124th Port Co	219	Luzon
Det, 737th Ry Operating Bn	22	Luzon
71st Amph Trk Co	180	Luzon
173d Fin Disb Sec	34	Luzon
929th APU (Type G)	12	Luzon
1055th APU (Type A)	12	Luzon
22d Sp Sv Co (less 3d & 4th Plats)	64	Luzon
28th Replacement Bn	421	Luzon
Hq, Met CIC Unit No. 93	13	Hawaii
Hq, Met CIC Unit No. 94	13	Hawaii
Hq, Met CIC Unit No. 95	13	Hawaii
Hq 54th CIC Area Det	12	Saipan
403d CIC Det	12	Hawaii
404th CIC Det	12	Hawaii
468th CIC Det	14	Hawaii
496th CIC Det	13	Hawaii
498th CIC Det	14	Saipan
Armed Forces Rad Sta WVTQ	7	Luzon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
Armed Forces Rad Sta WIKA	7	Luzon
Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #1	46	Luzon
Totals, Army Augmentation, Service	17,205	
Grand Totals, Army Augmentation	18,773	
Grand Totals, VAC	89,970	

4. X Corps Troops:

a. Combat Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
Hq & Hq Co, X Corps	580	Mindanao
24th Inf Div	14,035	Mindanao
41st Inf Div	14,035	Zamboanga
104th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	801	Luzon
Hq & Hq Btry, X Corps Arty	116	Mindanao
Hq & Hq Co, 1118th Engr C Gp	81	Okinawa
132d Engr C Bn	637	Okinawa
242d Engr C Bn	637	Ie Shima
233d Engr C Bn	637	Okinawa
Boat Bn, 533d EB & SR (3d ESB)	1,034	Mindanao
1461st Engr Boat Maint Co (3d ESB)	157	Mindanao
66th Engr Topo Co (Corps)	112	Luzon
216th MP Co	163	Mindanao
99th Sig Bn (less Co C)	700	Mindanao
Totals, X Corps, Combat	33,725	

b. Service Units

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
58th Cml Gen Sv Co	130	Leyte
273d Cml Sv Plat	55	Zamboanga
Hq & Hq Co, 1067th Engr Cons Gp (less Det)	74	Luzon
Det, Hq & Hq Co, 1067th Engr Cons Gp	20	Okinawa
477th Engr Maint Co	191	Mindanao
3203d Engr Water Sup Co	136	Luzon
2866th Engr Util Det (EE)	54	Luzon
1872d Engr Avn Bn	777	Luzon
1874th Engr Avn Bn	777	Mindanao
731st Engr Dep Co	209	Luzon
1533d Engr Dp Trk Co	110	Okinawa
3078th Engr Dp Trk Co	110	Okinawa

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
3187th Engr Base Equip Co	173	Okinawa
Hq & Hq Det, 70th Med Bn	29	Luzon
411th Med Coll Co	105	Mindanao
395th Med Coll Co	105	Mindanao
656th Med Clr Co	112	Mindanao
696th Med Amb Co	90	Luzon
8th Port Surg Hosp	37	Zamboanga
12th Port Surg Hosp	37	Zamboanga
38th Port Surg Hosp	37	Luzon
168th Evac Hosp (400)	286	Zamboanga
2d Field Hosp (400)	222	Zamboanga
38th Field Hosp (400)	222	Okinawa
720th Med San Co	112	Luzon
106th Sta Hosp (500)	286	Okinawa
262d Sta Hosp (500)	353	Luzon
361st Sta Hosp (500)	353	Mindanao
308th Gen Hosp (1000)	594	Tinian
97th Vet Food Inspection Tm	5	Leyte
149th Vet Food Inspection Tm	5	Okinawa
29th Mal Surv Det	13	Mindanao
207th Mal Surv Det	13	Luzon
90th Mal Contl Det	12	Zamboanga
91st Mal Contl Det	12	Zamboanga
92d Mal Contl Det	12	Mindanao
21st Med Sup Plat (Avn)	19	Luzon
226th MP Co	156	Luzon
621st MP Co (EG)	135	Luzon
24th MP CI Sec (Type 3)	11	Luzon
43d MP CI Sec (Type 3)	11	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 167th Ord Bn	33	Leyte
59th Ord Am Co	179	Leyte
623d Ord Am Co	179	Zamboanga
642d Ord Am Co	179	Mindanao
22d Ord MM Co	162	Leyte
119th Ord MM Co	162	Zamboanga
5th Ord MM Co	162	Luzon
3538th Ord MAM Co	116	Luzon
540th Ord Hv Maint Co (Tk)	210	Mindanao
AA Maint Tm No. 8, 3073d Ord Maint Co	29	Leyte
818th Ord Dep Co	186	Luzon
2 Sup Tms, 3085th Ord Sup Co	102	Luzon
181st Ord Bomb Disp Squad	7	Zamboanga
177th Ord Bomb Disp Squad	7	Mindanao
178th Ord Bomb Disp Squad	7	Mindanao
Hq & Hq Det, 98th QM Bn	25	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 469th QM Bn (Mbl)	27	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 155th QM Bn (Mbl)	27	Luzon
4171st QM Dep Sup Co	189	Luzon
983d QM Sv Co	212	Zamboanga
4072d QM Sv Co (X)	115	Luzon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
4096th QM Sv Co (M)	212	Luzon
4186th QM Sv Co (M)	212	Luzon
3523d QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	134	Luzon
390th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	134	Zamboanga
3527th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	134	Luzon
4115th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	134	Luzon
4118th QM Trk Co (w/Dr Det)	134	Luzon
3819th QM Gas Sup Co	125	Luzon
302d QM Rhd Co (less 1st Plat)	102	Mindanao
1st Plat, 302d QM Rhd Co	75	Luzon
623d QM Rhd Co (less 2d Plat)	102	Luzon
2d Plat, 570th QM Rhd Co	75	Luzon
4th Plat, 370th QM Bkry Co	40	Mindanao
120th QM Bkry Co (less 2 Plats)	92	Luzon
1st Plat, 3008th QM GR Co	24	Mindanao
3d Plat, 3064th QM GR Co	24	Zamboanga
2d Plat, 21st QM Car Co	38	Luzon
2d & 4th Plats, 580th QM Ldry Co (SM)	130	Leyte
3d Plat, 236th QM Salv Coll Co	60	Luzon
824th QM Fum & Bath Co	86	Okinawa
277th QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Okinawa
346th QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Luzon
360th QM Ldry Det (Hosp)	16	Luzon
174th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	21	Mindanao
176th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	21	Mindanao
177th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	21	Luzon
354th QM Ldry Sec (Hosp)(Mbl)	21	Luzon
394th QM Ref Trk Det	7	Luzon
395th QM Ref Trk Det	7	Luzon
396th QM Ref Trk Det	7	Leyte
954th QM Pet Prod Lab (Mbl)	6	Luzon
62d Sig Bn	793	Luzon
3130th Sig Sv Co (Port)	150	Luzon
274th Sig Hv Cons Co	193	Luzon
Det, 198th Sig Photo Co	15	Luzon
1st Sp Plat, 3119th Sig Sv Bn	91	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 120th Port Bn	33	Luzon
Hq & Hq Det, 491st Port Bn	33	Luzon
154th Port Co	219	Luzon
183d Port Co	219	Luzon
407th Port Co	219	Luzon
408th Port Co	219	Luzon
409th Port Co	219	Luzon
410th Port Co	219	Luzon
549th Port Co	219	Luzon
579th Port Co	219	Luzon
607th Port Co	219	Luzon
608th Port Co	219	Mindanao
609th Port Co	219	Mindanao
75th Amph Trk Co	180	Luzon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
455th Amph Trk Co	180	Luzon
808th Amph Trk Co	180	Zamboanga
369th Har Cft Co	291	Luzon
374th Har Cft Co	291	Leyte
793d Base Dep Co (TC)	121	Luzon
Kure Base Hqs, ASCOMO	301	Luzon
317th AFU (Type H)	16	Luzon
4th Flat, 5th Sp Sv Co	26	Mindanao
4th Flat, 22d Sp Sv Co	26	Luzon
Hq, 60th CIC Area	12	Mindanao
Hq, 61st CIC Area	12	Mindanao
Hq, 52d CIC Area Det	12	Zamboanga
24th CIC Det	14	Mindanao
41st CIC Det	14	Zamboanga
210th CIC Det	14	Mindanao
Field Unit #2 (Type A) 5250th Tech Int Comp Co. (Sep)(Prov)	18	Mindanao
Totals, X Corps, Service	16,066	
Grand Total, X Corps	49,291	


5. ASCOMO Troops:


<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
Hq & Hq Co, ASCOMO	635	Luzon
109th Cml Proc Co	146	Luzon
1094th Engr Util Det	12	Luzon
Hq & Hq Co, 229th Ord Base Dep	132	Luzon
33d Sig L Cons Bn (less Dets)	432	Luzon
Det, 33d Sig L Cons Bn	6	Leyte
Det, 33d Sig L Cons Bn	6	Cebu
291st Sig Ev Cons Co	193	Luzon
3119th Sig Sv Bn (less 2 Special Flats and Cos A and D)	610	Luzon
Co A, 3119th Sig Sv Bn	309	New Caledonia
Co D, 3119th Sig Sv Bn	314	Guadalcanal
588th Sig Dep Co (less Det)	140	Luzon
Det, 588th Sig Dep Co	3	Leyte
67th Sig Rep Co (less Det)	153	Luzon
Det, 67th Sig Rep Co	5	Leyte
3186th Sig Sv Bn (less Dets)	443	Luzon
Det, 3186th Sig Sv Bn	3	Cebu
Det, 3159th Sig Sv Bn	189	Luzon
151st Harbor Craft Plat	35	Activated Japan
186th Fin Disb Sec	20	Luzon
230th AGF Band	29	Luzon


<u>Unit</u>	<u>Approximate Personnel</u>	<u>Staging</u>
315th APU (Type F)	12	Luzon
2d MRU (Type Y)	<u>48</u>	Luzon
Totals, ASCOMO Units	3,868	


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